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                                          Abstract 
 
      This thesis analyzes the dynamics of ethnic conflict evolution, 
mobilization and radicalization with a focus on Nagorno-Karabakh 
(1987–1992) and Northern Ireland (early 1960s–1969). It concentrates 
upon the periods when intersocietal communication was gradually being 
reinterpreted and reshaped on an ethnic basis, which also became 
increasingly crucial to public discourse.  I argue that many of the 
weaknesses of the existing interpretations of these conflicts arise from an 
absolutization of single theoretical and methodological approaches. This 
study utilizes a synthesis of the literatures on ethnic conflict, social 
movements, collective action and nationalism. The perspective offered 
in this research sees nationalist activity as embedded in cultural contexts, 
social networks and intersubjective relations of reciprocity. I stress that 
the understanding of these dimensions is crucial to account for temporal 
evolution within and variation across nationalist movements. Securing 
the success of a specific nationalist agenda requires operating in an 
interdependent field of rival strategies of legitimation. The study also 
highlights unintended consequences in the trajectory of conflict 
development. Many academic accounts approach this subject from the 
point of view of one of the respective communities without recognizing 
the value of alternative conceptualizations. This study systematically 
examines the interactions, perceptions and attitudes of the main parties 
to the conflicts in question avoiding one-sided and often static 
interpretations. 
      The thesis builds on extensive documentary and press material, 
archival research and over 50 semi-structured interviews. New empirical 
evidence presented here casts doubt on strong versions of the ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurship’ literature by emphasizing the fact that the connection 
                                                                                         3
between developments on the ground and elite conduct was not purely 
automatic, and drawing attention to the symbolic repertoires, self-
perceptions, categorizations and ideas that feed into the collective 
representation of the nation. I suggest that the constraints facing elites 
within each ethnic bloc, as well as ‘external’ (state) leaders, are built into 
the process of ethnic contestation. Overall, the thesis makes a strong 
case for greater attention to the limits of elite flexibility in sustaining 
uniform group preferences, freely opting for the path of compromise 
and/or (constitutional) reform. 
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                                            Introduction 
      The broad aim of this thesis is to analyze the causes and dynamics of 
ethnic conflict, mobilization and radicalization in deeply divided 
societies with a particular focus on the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh 
in the South Caucasus (hereafter NK) (1987–1992) and Northern Ireland 
(early 1960s–1969). Integrating some of the key insights from the 
literatures on ethnic conflict, social movements, nationalism and 
collective action into a mixed theoretical approach I attempt: 
• to explore the ways in which nationalist strategies are enabled or 
constrained  by the shared cultural perceptions and collective definitions 
of the groups involved, rather than (as is often assumed in the literature) 
solely by political institutions and/or structures; 
• to look at the issue of agency in nationalist movements – to what 
extent does their activity necessarily imply mass participation and what 
tactics is used by elite networks to secure support from co-nationals? 
• to assess how the interrelated processes of state-activist 
interaction, the shifting dynamics of (real and perceived) opportunities 
and threats and within-movement competition combine to translate into 
radical political action. 
      I attempt to show that elite power and success in neutralizing and 
minimizing challenges to their authority from within the group, as well 
as from outside, and maintaining at least a semblance of community 
cohesion depended largely on their ability to relate the pursuit of 
objective interests, past traumas and sacrifices to contemporary struggles 
and future ventures in an overarching narrative. Building on 
documentary and press material, archival sources and over 50 semi-
structured interviews my perspective acknowledges and privileges the 
standpoints of the activists themselves, both elites and non-elite actors, 
which have generally been underrepresented in academic literature. The 
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thesis also brings into clearer focus the microdynamics of ethnic 
radicalization by considering the (often not automatic) link between 
public expressions of nationalist ideologies as articulated by elites and 
the grassroots reality of (violent) collective action on the ground. Many 
academic accounts approach this subject from the point of view of one 
of the respective (Armenian or Azeri, nationalist or unionist) 
communities without recognizing the value of alternative 
conceptualizations. This research systematically examines the 
interactions, perceptions and attitudes of all the parties to the conflicts in 
NK and Northern Ireland avoiding one-sided and often static 
interpretations. 
                            Case studies and research design 
      In this section I outline my research design and justify case selection. 
I define my study as one based on a most different systems analysis. I 
adopt a comparative strategy and in so doing I hope to partially address 
one of the ‘pathological conditions’ of comparative research, that of too 
many variables, not enough cases (Lijphart, 1971; Ragin, 1987). I also 
examine the advantages and pitfalls of cross-regional comparison and 
explain what a paired comparison can reveal and is therefore preferable 
for my task to a single case or multiple case studies. There has been a 
long dispute about the power and relative merits of the comparative 
method, all the details of which I cannot cover here. This subchapter 
outlines some of the reasons why we learn more about deeply divided 
societies by comparing rather than isolating them. By focusing on the 
mobilization processes in different societies scholars can better 
understand how and why collective action varies/ is similar in its causes, 
forms and outcome.   
      Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970: 32-5) differentiate 
between comparative research designs based on most similar systems 
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analysis and those focusing on most different systems. In the most 
similar systems research design, studies are built on systems that are 
similar in many respects and share, for example, similar cultural, 
economic and political characteristics. When significant differences are 
found, they become the subject of a comparative investigation. 
Alternatively, the most different systems design, advocated by 
Przeworski and Teune, explains variation below the systemic level of 
analysis, and appeals to factors at the level of the individual, subgroup or 
the wider community. This approach, therefore, seeks to eliminate 
irrelevant systemic factors. Thus, a least similar case design is typically 
intended to isolate mechanisms producing similar outcomes among 
otherwise varied cases (e. g. George and Bennett, 2005: 81-2).   Sidney 
Tarrow identifies the main feature of a paired comparison analysis of 
different types of polities or processes as ‘the capacity to point to robust 
causal mechanisms that repeat themselves across broad ranges of 
variation and concatenate differently with different environmental 
conditions and with each other’ (Tarrow, 1999: 10). This perspective is 
likely to produce more convincing arguments when they are shown to be 
associated with similar and/or divergent outcomes emerging under 
diverse conditions across different geographic regions.  
      The uniqueness of each of these conflicts is emphasized (and 
frequently overemphasized) in single case studies or cases in a single 
region (like the South Caucasus). Analysts of the former Soviet block 
have tended to look mainly to each other for comparative referents in 
tracking the dynamics of interethnic relations. For this reason there is 
value in comparing a late/post-Soviet case with a European case. There 
is a similar benefit to understanding the Northern Ireland radicalization 
process in a comparative framework outside of European context. In 
seeking more traction on a range of underexplored but theoretically 
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important questions, a wider array of comparable cases from diverse 
regions, while still analytically bounded can potentially offer better 
analytic leverage precisely because they do not have the combinations of 
features characterizing the historical and institutional framework of the 
South Caucasus in general and NK in particular. Applying the rule of 
inclusion as articulated by (Goertz and Mahoney, 2006: 186) – that is 
‘cases are relevant if their value on at least one independent variable is 
positively related to the outcome of interest’ – there is no 
methodologically compelling reason for ignoring the experiences of any 
polity where the specific process of interest can be adequately studied.  
      As Cheng Chen and Rudra Sil have recently noted, one of the 
distinctive attributes of cross-regional comparison is the self-conscious 
decision of the researcher to choose cases from more than one region to 
engage in multiple strands of historiography and theory that shape 
intellectual debates within two or more area-studies communities (Chen 
and Sil, 2007: 276). The investigation of ethnic conflict and the 
dynamics of interethnic relations is one of the areas where an expanded 
universe of cases has the potential to offer increased analytic leverage 
with some comparative interpretations emphasizing how the relative 
economic and political backwardness of Eastern European countries had 
always created a fertile ground for a type of ressentiment nationalism 
rather than the predominantly ‘civic’ type that had taken root in Western 
Europe (e. g. (Dogan, 1997; Gellner, 1983: 85-105). While being quite 
persuasive this argument reinforces the tendency to treat late Soviet and 
early post-Soviet nationalism as a relatively homogenous phenomenon. 
A cross-regional comparison can draw attention to a more nuanced 
understanding of late Soviet nationalism and of the effects and 
consequences of the ways in which internationalist ideology and 
nationalist sentiments were fused in specific socio-spatial contexts.  
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      This research project follows the approach of comparative-historical 
analysis that has been influential in the repertoire of scholars of 
comparative politics. My investigation shares with this school a 
‘commitment to offering historically grounded explanations of large-
scale and substantively important outcomes’, as well as the contention 
that these ‘fundamental processes could not be analyzed without 
recognizing the importance of temporal sequences and the unfolding of 
events over time’ (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 4).   Mahoney 
and Ruescemeyer further point to three specific advantages of 
comparative-historical analysis in relation to rational choice and 
statistical models. First, in contrast to single case studies aiming to 
develop ‘thick descriptions’ comparative historical analysis is inspired 
by causally centered interpretations designed to account for outcomes of 
interest. Second, in contrast to synchronous comparisons of many cases 
at a particular point in time, it takes seriously the logic of historical 
sequencing and processes as they develop. Third, in contrast to large N 
statistical studies or formal modeling the comparative historical method 
seeks to practice contextualized comparisons of similar and/or 
contrasting cases, therefore moving back and forth between theoretical 
generalizations and the historical features of a given case.  
      As Pierson argues, processes that unfold over time may be ‘slow-
moving’ or even seem invisible but they are frequently decisive in 
generating divergent outcomes for social phenomena (Pierson, 2003: 
177-207). At the same time it is important not to overemphasize 
deterministic conceptions that focus only on antecedent conditions in 
explaining specific outcomes. In such instances the effort to 
simultaneously engage in process-tracing within cases and track 
similarities and differences in these processes across cases makes the 
comparative historical approach particularly well suited for analyzing 
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the operation and consequences of historically embedded processes and 
social relationships that shape forms of collective action and perceptions 
in a given context.   
      Instead of seeking answers to questions, such as ‘How much?’ or 
‘How many?’ the case study design is useful for investigating ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions. Although case studies are frequently criticized for lack 
of rigour and the inability to make generalizations from specific cases, 
proponents maintain that ‘case studies are generalisable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes… in this sense the case 
study does not represent a sample, and the investigator’s goal is to 
expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to 
enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)’ (Yin, 1984: 21). 
Whereas single case studies can richly describe the existence of a 
phenomenon, multiple case studies are thought to provide a stronger 
base for theory building. Multiple cases also contribute to more robust 
theory because the propositions are more deeply grounded in varied 
empirical evidence. While attention must be paid to the issue of context 
sensitivity, as each divided polity will present its own combination of 
conflict-producing factors, certain patterns can still be discerned. More 
specifically, ‘there is no such thing as singularity until one case is 
compared with another. One will not recognize the specificity of an 
individual case unless parallels are drawn with other instances’ 
(Schneckener, 2004: 37). In a recent study Sidney Tarrow highlights 
three main advantages of a focused paired comparison as opposed to a 
single ‘critical’ case or an examination based on multiple cases: 
correcting generalization from single cases, creating an intermediate step 
in theory building and offering ‘a balanced combination of descriptive 
depth and analytical challenge that progressively declines as more cases 
are added’ (Tarrow, 2010: 245-6).   
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      Consequently it is important to find the middle ground between ‘one 
size fits all’ approach and what Andreas Wimmer has called the ‘new 
realism’ in the field of ethnic conflict studies, which assumes that the 
idiosyncrasies of each case preclude meaningful comparisons (Wimmer, 
2004: 340-2).   Richard Kearney notes the weakness of analyses 
stressing the singularity of the Northern Ireland case: ‘A crucial 
weakness of the internal conflict interpretation is that it is vulnerable to 
the superficial reading that the conflict is unique – a hangover of 
seventeenth-century religious quarrels which the rest of Europe has long 
left behind’ (Kearney, 1997: 75). While Kearney is concerned 
specifically with the parallels between Northern Ireland and the rest of 
Europe, I attempt to show the inadequacy of one dimensional 
interpretations that tend to be applied in single case studies. Similarly, in 
a recent study of police behaviour in Northern Ireland during the 1960s 
G. De Fazio focuses on the need to explore the comparability of its 
ethnopolitical dynamics moving beyond the focus on Northern Ireland in 
isolation from other societies (including those in Western Europe) (De 
Fazio, 2007: 83).  
      This argument is not intended to suggest that shared geographic or 
geopolitical factors do not deserve to be taken seriously. Nor does it 
imply that context-specific historical or institutional components cannot 
produce idiosyncratic outcomes that defy analytic framing. However, if 
conducted in response to a theoretically significant problem a more 
diversified cross-regional historically sensitive approach can be 
deployed to identify key processes and mechanisms across varying 
temporal and spatial contexts. Additional reasons for choosing to 
compare two case studies as opposed to a research design based on a 
single or multiple cases relate to scope and depth, as well as pragmatic 
considerations. Similarly, a multi-case study comparative approach 
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allows the researcher to identify shared themes and patterns on a broader 
scale without over-emphasizing the particularities of a single case. 
Small-N comparative studies can incorporate underrepresented cases 
while retaining an awareness of the specificity of each case, permitting a 
‘close analysis of relatively few observations’ (Collier, 1991: 7).  
      Pragmatically the comparative approach limited to two cases allows 
me to engage deep enough with these cases, preserve a relatively high 
degree of contextual specificity and to include richer empirical data 
while maintaining some ability to generalize. It utilizes the richness of 
the single case study approach but also goes beyond a single case to 
make comparative assessments. These two cases should not be mistaken 
as a representative sample of contemporary conflicts. Of course a two-
case study does not have ambitions to generate statistically relevant 
conclusions. King, Keohane and Verba consider the key task of social 
scientists to be ‘explaining as much as possible with as little as possible’ 
(King et al., 1994: 29).  The contentious assumption embedded within 
the comparative approach is that some general patterns can be identified.  
      As mentioned above, the case studies were chosen for their data 
richness and the analytical leverage they provide. In addition, these cases 
allow particularly well for two types of comparative analysis: 
longitudinal, whereby variations and shifts within a case study are 
examined over time, and cross-national whereby similarities and 
differences are investigated across the case studies. The first type of 
analysis permits to control for variables such as rough terrain, rural and 
urban settlement patterns, the presence/absence of natural resources, 
political culture, all of which tend to be static. The second type of 
comparative investigation allows the researcher to contest claims of 
uniqueness or cultural specificity by showing how seemingly unique 
processes can operate under different national and cultural contexts.  A 
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lot of existing empirical research deals with a single case over time, in 
part because it is easier to operationalize key theoretical concepts within 
a single country setting. In a pioneering comparative analysis of conflict 
in Northern Ireland Frank Wright (1987) focuses broadly on the 
interactions between ‘metropolitan’ Britain with the Ulster ‘frontier’. He 
then compares Northern Ireland to other ethnic frontiers in Western and 
Eastern Europe where the intermixing of ethnic communities under 
imperial rule created problems in the modern era. Here the emphasis is 
on cases that, from a politico-institutional perspective, embodied 
political peripheral units vis-à-vis their larger states. In a historical 
comparative study of Britain’s relationship to Ireland, France’s 
relationship to Algeria and Israel’s relationship to the West Bank and 
Gaza, Ian Lustick constructs a common framework concentrating on 
state elites’ justifications for state expansion and contraction (Lustick, 
1993). 
      Despite the saliency of conflict in the late Soviet and early post-
Soviet period NK has remained a relatively marginal case within the 
post-Soviet and comparative conflict research field. Compared to the 
Baltic or Central Asian regions NK and the South Caucasus more 
generally has emerged much less distinctively as a coherent unit of 
analysis. This general pattern reflects the region’s genuinely 
heterogeneous cultural make-up (demanding knowledge of Russian and, 
preferably, of local languages). As a result scholarship has paid much 
less attention to the South Caucasus than to Central Asia. There is a 
consequent lack of detailed studies of interethnic relations in NK (partly 
because this case does not fall within particularly popular schemas of 
late and post-Soviet studies), especially from a comparative perspective, 
and much of the empirical literature is poorly informed by theoretical 
insights from the wider field in terms of seeing how this case confirms 
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and/or moderates such insights. Somewhat similarly, the literature on the 
development of the civil rights movement (CRM) in Northern Ireland 
has, a few notable exceptions aside, been overly concentrated on 
historical-descriptive accounts stressing the distinctiveness of the region 
and therefore lacking a strong potential for a comparative perspective.  
      This thesis asks how contentious activism in deeply divided societies 
is radicalized during periods when intersocietal communication and 
public discourse becomes ‘ethnicized’, and ethnicity is seen as being of 
growing significance to interpersonal relations and self-definition. As 
mentioned above, the thesis focuses on very specific time periods. For 
Northern Ireland I adopt 1969 as the cut off point, because it marked the 
disintegration of the CRM, at least in its original form, and a different 
phase of the conflict. From 1969 onwards radical groups on both sides of 
the communal divide succeeded in legitimizing a new cycle of claims 
and counter-claims, underpinned by a different (even though not a new) 
political discourse. For the NK case I regard the start of a full-fledged 
war in early 1992 as the cut off point. At that stage the complex and 
dynamic fluctuation between non-violent dissent, attempted reforms, 
inconsistent state responses, discursive transformations, resistance and 
violence was replaced by an overwhelming reliance on military force 
which significantly reduces the value of that particular phase for ethnic 
conflict studies. The time periods chosen for an analysis of contentious 
activity in this study are comparable for at least three reasons. First, 
alterations between non-violent and violent forms of contention are 
particularly apparent during the periods under investigation. Such vital 
shifts make these time spans particularly well-suited for applying a more 
fine-grained analysis of the radicalizing trajectories of nationalist 
movements, as well as the complex ‘relationality’ between different 
actors and the dynamic (re)structuring of the linkages and alignments of 
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interethnic interactions. In Northern Ireland the initial effort to challenge 
institutionalized discriminatory practices relied upon mass-based non-
violent tactics while deliberately avoiding the partition issue. Its 
activities prompted changes in the electoral system, housing allocation 
and law enforcement. Yet this amelioration also heightened mobilized 
opposition to reform thus contributing to the adoption of more radical 
repertoires by civil rights activists. Similarly, in NK this conflict phase 
saw the open non-violent pursuit of claims that were not initially 
antisystemic but ended up as such.  
      Second, in both cases the contentious episodes took place amidst 
political, economic and cultural relaxation and liberalization of hitherto 
hegemonic systems1. The link between political and economic reforms 
and mass protest, especially at the beginning of such ‘transitional’ 
periods has long been recognized (e.g. Bunce, 2003, 2000; Leff, 1999; 
Offe, 1991: 866; Lapidus, 1989: 99-102). Liberalization enhances and 
makes more visible the vulnerability of the regime and accelerates extra-
institutional contentious activity. During these time spans the capacities, 
behaviour and manouveur of state elites are particularly strongly 
influenced (and frequently constrained) by the dynamics within the 
wider population. The combined effect of quite radical socio-economic 
changes in Northern Ireland society and the ‘deinsularisation’ (Bosi, 
2007: 248) of Northern Ireland ecomomically, politically and culturally, 
pressures for modernization from Ireland and Britain, and international 
influence on Northern Ireland affairs can be compared to the sweeping 
transformations trigerred by Gorbachev’s perestroika. Third, these 
periods are analytically significant because in both cases they were 
marked by transformations of dominant discourses at the elite and 
                                                 
1 Even though in Northern Ireland the liberalization was arguably more rhetorical than real, the 
openings were still highly significant insofar as they changed the actors’ perceptions of the 
availability of avenues for protest and opportunity to create new, non-nationalist issue space. 
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grassroots levels, and the consequent erosion of any previously available 
shared social space. In Northern Ireland an exclusivist nationalist 
narrative ultimately suceeded over an alternative ‘story’ focused on 
equal rights and social justice. Similarly, in NK a single nationalist 
narrative emphasizing traditional historical themes, conflict over 
cooperation and enmity over brotherhood completely sidelined the 
discourses of democratization and economic renewal within a common 
Soviet institutional framework. Such shifts resulted in the hegemony of a 
particular form of self-representation of the nation as an 
uncompromising community that has to close ranks in a struggle where 
its survival is at stake. They also triggered changes in patterns of 
intercommunal interaction and behaviour across group boundaries.  
 
       Given the fact that there is a particularly vast (predominantly 
historical) literature on this specific period in Northern Ireland, I see my 
contribution here as primarily comparative and theoretical.  While I do 
introduce and utilize different categories of empirical material (see the 
next section) I also draw widely on the available literature for my 
investigation of Northern Ireland. Thus, one might notice that there is 
richer, more detailed and extensive original empirical data on NK than 
on Northern Ireland in this study. However, as discussed above, the 
comparability of the time periods, the need to remedy the scarcity of 
comparative research bridging different geographic regions and the 
insular nature of scholarship on each of these conflicts explain the 
inclusion of Northern Ireland in this project. In addition, the explicit 
theoretical framing of the discussion of Northern Ireland directly 
addresses the difficiencies of many of the purely narrative historical and 
largely static accounts of the CRM. 
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      When looking at the contribution of the comparative study of these 
periods to the broader understanding of ethnic conflict and elite 
behaviour the thesis focuses on the following questions: 
• In what ways did institutional and discursive opportunity 
structures, real and perceived threats and their interpretation by 
various elite actors and ordinary community members enable or 
constrain ‘elite manipulation’ strategies? 
• How did the use or lack/(in) consistency of repression influence 
activist choices to employ violent or non-violent dissent? 
• In what ways did the actions and decisions of the people on the 
streets interact with the actions and (non)-decisions of ‘external’ 
state officials? 
Here I argue that in both cases state elites were increasingly restricted 
in their capacity to implement conflict transformation or to 
‘deactivate’ the ethnic cleavage and in that sense found themselves 
‘locked’ in a specific conflictual dynamics that intensified and took 
on self-reinforcing qualities very rapidly. 
      In path-dependence theories ‘lock-in’ is said to exist where 
relationships between the parties change within definite limits and are 
confined to a particular trajectory (Ruane and Todd, 2004; Pierson, 
2004: 27; Mahoney, 2000: 529-35). Lock-in confines potential action 
alternatives and thus impacts the course of future developments (Beyer, 
2010). This thesis understands the ‘lock-in’ effect in a broader sense. I 
show how in both cases the situation on the ground was becoming 
resistant to ‘external’ intervention and even measures that had the 
intention of addressing constituency concerns were interpreted as parts 
of (non)-persuasive ‘stories’ holding historical and symbolic 
significance for the respective communities. 
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• In what ways was the process of elite legitimation affected by 
within-movement competion? In particular, how are those 
presenting themselves as the most ethnically ‘authentic’ granted 
powers of representation on behalf of a community, while 
different voices and alternative expressions of social change are 
silenced? 
Some of the key elements common to conflict dynamics in the two 
cases discussed in this thesis are represented schematically in Figure 
1.                                                                                                            
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Figure 1 Visualialization of the key elements of the radicalization process in NK 
and Northern Ireland 
 
 
 
                        
                                                     
      It could be argued that ethnopolitical mobilization in NK cannot 
be studied in the same way as activism in Northern Ireland, because 
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NK formed part of an already extremely weak or collapsing polity 
(the Soviet Union) with opening windows of political opportunity, 
whereas Northern Ireland represented a closed political formation 
with an elaborate system of hegemonic control. A comparison of 
these cases therefore exemplifies, one might suggest, the lack of 
appreciation of the differences between open and closed (or semi-
closed) political systems where open claim-making is not possible or 
is severely restricted. This project recognizes the important 
distinction and contends that each individual conflict must be 
examined with reference to its particularities and in its own temporal 
and spatial context to permit a meaningful comparison with other 
cases.  Although there is some danger of not controlling for 
historical, social and economic variation, selecting cases from 
different regions helps challenge the argument that the process of 
conflict escalation in each of them in isolation was entirely the 
function of features unique to the region. 
      It is indeed very difficult to argue that Northern Ireland in the 1960s 
was a weak state, which differentiates it from the Soviet Union during 
the period when the movement for NK fully emerged on the political 
scene. The state in Northern Ireland in the 1960s was economically 
robust, it had control of internal security and was able to govern 
effectively. However, at least three points are worth noting.  Firstly, 
while Northern Ireland was not a weak state it was in an insecure 
position regarding its regime type. Secondly, both cases showed signs of 
incomplete democratization and weakened legitimacy rather than weak 
state structures. Thirdly, as Tarrow (1998: 82) points out, strength and 
weakness are also relational categories that vary for different sectors and 
levels of the state. This is perhaps partly why the Northern Ireland CRM 
initially made claims about local government rather than the devolved 
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administration and why the devolved administration was the general 
target rather than the British state. Many of the CRM grievances 
involved the behaviour and policies of local authorities and many 
sections of the movement initially legitimized their struggle as being on 
a local scale, related to local issues (O’Dochartaigh, 2010: 165). 
      Comparing the NK and Northern Ireland cases means dealing with a 
wide range of variation. There are contrasting patterns of political 
development. There is a colonial dimension to the patterns of 
intercommunal relations in Northern Ireland, which is absent in NK2. 
The common denominator of NK and Northern Irish history is the 
existence of numerically disproportionate and territorially mixed 
ethnocultural communities with competing claims to territory. The 
relative intractability of both conflicts stems from a contestation over 
sovereignty of a particular piece of territory which has been disputed by 
competing ethnonational groups. In both cases one can point to 
historically identifiable antagonisms between two collectivities that are 
rooted in experiences of domination/ subordination and have the 
qualities of a ‘we’ versus ‘the others’ zero-sum game. This basic ‘we’/ 
‘they’ structure conditions the relations of power and interest between 
the parties, and is analytically, if not necessarily historically prior to it 
taking on an ethnic character. Conflicts with an alien religious 
community in the land only reinforced each group’s sense of 
vulnerability. Viewing Northern Irish nationalists and Azeris as 
complete outsiders both unionists and Armenians sought to protect their 
cultural and religious identities from the (perceived as) alien 
environment in which they lived.  Both conflicts are complicated by the 
                                                 
2 I will not engage with the debate over whether the Soviet Union can or should be seen as an empire 
(for an overview of whether aspects of Soviet rule may usefully be viewed as colonial see e. g. 
(Smith, 1998: 8-10; Beissinger, 2002: 5-6, Kuzio, 2002: 241-64).  
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presence of ethnic kin-states advancing irredentist claims to reunite with 
their ‘lost’ co-nationals3. 
      The outbreak and escalation of violence in NK does not present a 
mirror image of events in Northern Ireland. Some of the key similarities 
and differences between the two cases are summarized in the tables 
below. For the purposes of clarity I divide them into structural, socio-
economic components and those related to identity salience4.  
                                         Table 1 
         Structural variables in NK and Northern Ireland 
 
 Weak 
central 
authority 
 Illegitimate 
borders/territorial claims 
Substantial 
minority 
population 
Geographically 
concentrated 
minority 
Northern 
Ireland 
No – part of 
a 
centralized 
state 
  Yes, 
core of 
the 
dispute. 
Yes. 35% 
Catholic 
minority 
population 
Strong 
territorial 
segregation 
NK Mixed –  
strong 
formal 
governance 
structures 
  Yes, 
core of 
the 
dispute. 
Yes, 25% 
Azeri 
minority 
population. 
Most areas are 
mixed 
 
 
                                                 
3 Throughout the active phase of the conflict (1987–94) the NK issue dominated Armenian politics 
and served as a major catalyst for Armenian independence in 1991.  The active participation of the 
Armenian ethnic brethren from the start of the NK conflict contrasts with the much more passive 
stance of southern Irish nationalists in supporting the CRM. Yet within Northern Ireland the 
perception of support by successive Irish governments in a historical context was significant however 
weak it might have been in practice. 
4 Identity salience is taken to reflect  those conceptions of the differences between one’s group and 
outsiders that are prevalent in a given society (the extent to which ‘the other’ is represented as 
threatening to the ‘in-group’);  comparative advantages or disadvantages of one community vis-à-vis 
other communities and the intensity of past conflicts with the state and rival groups. The underlying 
argument here is that identity is constituted rather than essential, processural rather than fixed and is 
intrinsically social – hence, the context in which the process occurs is crucial.   Studies confirm that 
strong identity salience tends to negatively affect attitudes towards members of the ‘out-group’ (e. g. 
Korostelina, 2003). 
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                               Table 2 
               Socio-economic variables in NK and Northern Ireland 
 Relative deprivation  Discriminatory economic system 
Northern 
Ireland 
Yes, strong interethnic inequality  Yes. Large economic disparity, unequal 
allocation of resources, minority 
exclusion 
NK Yes, perception of the Armenian 
(majority) population being at a clear 
disadvantage compared to Azeris 
  Yes, perceived economic discrimination 
and exclusion of the Armenian population 
from state structures.  
 
 
                                       Table 3  
           Identity salience in NK and Northern Ireland 
 
 Shared 
conception 
of in-
group/out-
group 
Shared 
perception of the 
“other” as 
threatening to 
the core group 
Clear 
advantages or 
disadvantages 
shared by the 
group 
Intensity 
of past 
conflict 
with the 
“other” 
Ethno-
cultural 
national 
identity 
builds state 
around a 
core group 
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Northern 
Ireland 
Yes.  Yes. From its 
inception many 
Protestants viewed 
Northern Ireland as 
a state under siege, 
particularly 
demographically 
and culturally. 
Yes. Minority at a 
clear 
disadvantage that 
has been 
institutionalized  
Strong. Yes. The 
(Northern 
Ireland) state 
was built 
upon an 
exclusive 
conception of 
an ethno-
cultural 
national 
identity 
NK Yes.  Yes. Perception of 
insecurity, cultural 
and demographic 
threats intensely 
felt by the 
Armenian majority 
Yes. Policies of 
indigenization 
strengthened and 
promoted the 
titular group 
(Azeris). 
Strong. Past 
intergroup 
conflicts 
include 
massacres, 
civil war 
during the 
early 1900s.  
Yes, the state 
was built 
around the 
ethno-
cultural 
identity of 
the titular 
group.  
                 
Both conflicts revolve around territorial claims about the redrawing of 
borders that are perceived as illegitimate. In contrast to NK where 
settlement patterns were mixed, Northern Ireland had a high degree of 
local level territorial segregation. Unlike Catholics/nationalists in 
Northern Ireland, Armenians were a majority in NK. However, it is 
important to recognize that they constituted a minority in Azerbaijan as a 
whole, somewhat similarly to Northern Ireland Protestants constituting a 
minority on the island as a whole. From its inception many Protestants 
viewed Northern Ireland as a state under siege. Despite the stability of 
the size of the Catholic population during the years of unionist rule, 
Protestants feared that Catholics would ‘outbreed’ them. The sense of 
anxiety Protestants had in relation to the perceived ‘enemy’ meant that 
they could see a time ‘just beyond the horizon, when the majority 
(would) vote non-unionist’ (Akenson, 1992: 290). Somewhat similarly, 
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despite having a numerical advantage the Armenian majority in NK 
perceived an acute threat that the demographic balance would shift 
dramatically in favour of Azeris. 
      The salience of identity in both cases could be seen as increasing the 
likelihood for conflict with both majority and minority groups having a 
strong shared sense of collective identity.  On the one hand, in both 
cases ‘defending’ groups felt threatened by the ‘other’ with Northern 
Irish Protestants and NK Azeris fearing oppression if the challengers 
(NK Armenians and Catholics in Northern Ireland) join forces with their 
neighbouring ethnic kin to overturn the current structure of the state 
within their homeland. On the other hand, NK Armenians and Northern 
Irish nationalists in turn felt threatened by the real or perceived 
discriminatory and exclusionary nature of state policies, since the state 
was built around an ethnocultural identity that was perceived to rule out 
any meaningful role for the aggrieved groups. Past conflicts served to 
affirm the image each group had of the ‘other’.  
 
                          Data-gathering methods 
      Understanding and explaining the connections between different 
actors, levels of analysis and theoretical perspectives invariably involves 
working at the intersection of methodological boundaries in empirical 
investigation. In advocating a more dynamic approach to my case 
studies I also attempt to demonstrate the utility of a mixed method of 
data collection as a means of examining empirical processes and patterns 
that cannot be adequately captured by singular methodological 
frameworks, which focus only on content analysis of selected newspaper 
sources or interviews with key decision-makers. 
      As Margaret Somers (1994) and others have emphasized, the 
(re)creation and maintenance of identity categories and boundaries that 
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are so central to ethnic polarization and violence takes place largely 
through narratives but narratives, which are constrained by a relational 
setting5. Of the four general types of narratives Somers outlines two are 
particularly relevant here – ontological and public (Somers, 1994: 618-
19). Ontological narratives exist interpersonally and in interactions over 
time. They are used by individual social actors to make sense of 
everyday lives and provide a lifeworld aspect to ethnic categories. 
Interviewing is one of the ways to examine these narratives in action. A 
second category – public narratives – concerns ‘those narratives attached 
to cultural formations or institutions larger than the single individual’ 
(Somers, 1994: 619). While interviewing helps the researcher to engage 
with the individual or local level, the analysis of newspaper content, 
unofficial movement documents and, to some extent, archival material 
helps uncover the public realm beyond the local, and often at statewide, 
level. Thus, the triangulation of sources and the use of mixed methods of 
data collection provide a means to incorporate more areas of 
investigation than would have been possible through the application of 
single methods. This broadening of perspective allows to pay greater 
attention to the spatio-temporal contexts and sequencing of actions, 
policies and interactions in conflict situations, as well as the subjectively 
defined content of exchanges within ethnically polarized environments. 
 
      The evidence I use to support my argument draws on five categories 
of sources including secondary sources, official government sources, 
unofficial sources, such as pamphlets, leaflets, unpublished letters and 
petitions by movement participants, interviews and small-scale surveys. 
Between July 2008 and February 2010 I conducted over 50 
                                                 
5 For a study of the social constraints of narratives and of how the accounts given by activists depend 
partly on the specificity of their social ties and environment see (Tilly, 2006).  
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semistructured interviews in Yerevan (Armenia), Baku (Azerbaijan), 
Stepanakert (NK) and Belfast (Northern Ireland), Moscow (Russia) and 
London (UK). For both of my cases checking the information obtained 
in interviews against published, archival and other unpublished material 
allowed to complement the subjective perspectives provided by those 
directly involved in the events under investigation and to minimize the 
problems inherent in interviewing.   
      Any researcher conducting interviews in a deeply divided society in 
the aftermath of a violent conflict faces several methodogical 
difficulties. People often portray events during the conflict in a manner 
that is favourable to themselves and members of their ethnic community. 
One of the most common demands made during my interviews, 
especially for the NK case, was a request by members of each group that 
I write a ‘true’ story of their relationship to the other group, by which 
they meant their version of the conflict and of history rather than the 
other’s version. The representation of history is acutely perceived as a 
terrain of struggle for legitimacy – whether a group is understood to be 
the persecutor or the persecuted, the wronged or the inflictor of wrongs 
strongly affects the probability that future claims on behalf of group 
interests will or will not be seen by the outside world as legitimate. It 
would, however, be too simplistic to label these efforts ‘mere 
manipulation’. Such histories resonate with individuals, since they are 
perceived to coincide to an extent with their own lived experiences. It is 
for this reason that they are not mere inventions of intellectuals and/or 
politicians but become an integral part of each group’s collective 
existence. Written from a perspective outside both NK and Northern 
Irish politics this project aspires to be free from political and ideological 
constraints commonly encountered in much of the literature. In addition, 
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acts of violence or war distort memories and can also modify the ways in 
which informants justify their actions to outsiders.  
      Most historians and social scientists agree that oral sources can be 
problematic  and ‘it is a rule among historians, and a good one, to place 
greater reliance on contemporary sources than on recollections produced 
years later, after memory has been reprocessed and refigured’ (Novick, 
1999: 106). Such distortion is especially problematic given the traumas, 
devastation and suffering invariably involved in conflict situations. Self-
defense, a common justification for violent action, may become the 
default explanation for pre-conflict activity, regardless of the groups’ 
original motivations. Carrying out the research a few years after the 
events in question often means that individuals fully believe their 
version of events and present it as final to outsiders.  Using oral evidence 
from postwar environments therefore inevitably involves the risk of 
mistakenly employing arguments that emerged after the violent phase of 
conflicts as explanations of why and how the conflict evolved. For this 
reason triangulation of sources – obtaining different versions of the same 
events from opposing sides and supplementing such oral narratives with 
accounts based on archival, documentary and press material is 
particularly important. I have also consulted the personal recollections of 
prominent activists that had already been published, including memoirs 
and interviews that appeared in the local press.  
      In both of my case studies interviewees were selected largely on the 
basis of their engagement in the movements during the periods studied 
and /or being affected by the conflicts in one way or another, which 
necessarily entailed the construction of a relatively narrow set of 
selection criteria. Focusing on a singular aspect or a particular period of 
an individual’s life can be problematic as the very process of 
categorization in this way involves drawing boundaries around and 
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‘freezing’ or delimiting the diversity of experiences. However, research 
manageability required such categorization. The interview samples 
included a combination of elites and ordinary participants (see Appendix 
2). In the project I attempt to bring into clearer focus perspectives ‘from 
below’, which are often undervalued in academic literature. In his 
investigation of popular contentious action in Argentina Javier Ayurero 
insists on the need to integrate the ‘lived experience of movement 
participants into the ‘grand, ‘serious’ narratives of protest’ (Ayurero, 
2003: 13, 205). In addition to targeting those whose ideas, opinions and 
experiences can already be found in published memoirs and interviews, I 
made extra efforts to obtain interviews with individuals who had not 
written or spoken publicly about their experiences.    
      On the one hand, I view elites and intellectuals as critical actors 
whose access to intangible (legitimacy, skills) and material resources 
allow them to be prominent in the mobilization process. Understanding 
their behaviour and motives provides an insight into the mechanisms of 
political and social change.  On the other hand, I do not consider the 
masses to be mere ‘passive followers’ who automatically respond to the 
appeals made by elites. Interviews reveal that ordinary members of each 
group tend to see their grievances and demands as entirely just and 
resonant within their own community but frequently maintain that their 
opponents have been manipulated by elites. As a result, increasing 
polarization is often explained by the deliberate efforts of the rival elites. 
The combination of elites and ordinary participants rectifies to some 
extent what Robert Benford (Benford, 1997: 421) calls a pervasive ‘elite 
bias’ in social movement literature, which has partly obscured analytic 
understanding of the degree of consistency between a movement’s 
public statements and its grassroots discourse.  
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      As mentioned above, many scholars have noted the difficulty of 
relying on personal accounts to investigate actual historical events (Tilly, 
2002a: 25-42; Passerini, 1987: 10-16). Given the fact that individuals are 
considered to be ‘the worst narrators of the events in which they have 
been involved, in so far as they have a direct interest in them’ (Della 
Porta, 1992: 181), oral narratives do not contain ‘objective truths’ or 
uncontested ‘facts’ and the historical accuracy of such accounts cannot 
be guaranteed. In addition, informants may purposefully distort their 
accounts to make themselves, or the movement, appear in a favourable 
light (White, 2005: 287). Even proponents of oral methods in research 
concede that they ‘ultimately produce data derived from artificially 
constructed realities’ (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 111). Nevertheless they 
provided additional – more nuanced and dynamic perspectives on the 
events referred to in secondary and archival sources. Interviews helped 
to reveal the ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott, 1990: 2-4) that informed 
participants’ understandings of the conflicts. The distortions, omissions 
and emphases on some issues at the expense of others are all part of the 
story I wanted to tell. In fact, one of the ways to study the 
misrepresentations, mirror images and the us-them dichotomy, all of 
which feed into the macro-level factors, is to consider how collective 
memory seizes upon certain interpretations of events at specific points in 
time.   
      In line with some recent studies of violence in ethnically divided 
societies (e. g. Kalyvas, 2006: 409), I found that informants were 
generally willing to talk about their experiences and perceptions, and 
memories of the events under investigation were quite vivid, since most 
families had been affected in very tangible and often dramatic ways. In 
sum, extensive use of oral sources in my project has at least three 
distinct advantages. First, the inclusion of oral narratives and particularly 
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of the generally neglected in the public domain voices of ordinary 
movement participants gives greater depth and subtlety. It provides a 
more nuanced view of the cultural and emotional contexts of collective 
identities.  Second, adding the individual/ subjective dimension to the 
research helps focus on the dynamic and interactive nature of the 
conflict escalation process by highlighting the meaning events have for 
participants, which emerges and sometimes changes as a result of social 
interaction (Blumer, 1969). Engagement with participants’ perspectives 
rather than the ‘obvious’ meanings of key issues, objects and events is 
especially important given the conflicting interpretations that are so 
central to polarized societies. Third, one should note the limited insights 
that can be drawn from official accounts of events and quantitative 
sources of data, such as surveys and opinion polls, in semi-closed 
societies. The practical difficulties of collecting this type of data should 
also be mentioned. In the late Soviet period the nature and dynamics of 
interethnic relations was not particularly amenable to public discussion. 
For 1960s Northern Ireland such data is also very limited, a few 
exceptions aside (e. g. (Rose, 1971). In this context conducting research 
on ethnic polarization and intrastate violence would require 
supplementing the study of concrete events and claim-making with a 
methodology aimed at understanding group perceptions, choices and 
strategies.  
      I have also undertaken a qualitative examination of the main 
Russian-language Armenian and Azeri newspapers. In divided societies 
the choice of one newspaper over others often influences the nature and 
content of primary material, since their reporting often diverges when it 
comes to contentious political events. This is particularly true, as Soviet 
censorship had an explicit or implicit input into the editorial policy of 
the regional press.     For Northern Ireland I have also used the political 
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leanings of different newspapers in such a way as to reconstruct the 
various perspectives on the CRM’s development.  Archival material was 
gathered during   an admittedly incomplete survey of archives in 
Yerevan, Belfast (Northern Ireland Public Records Office, Linen Hall 
Library) and London (Public Records Office Kew). My usage of 
disparate source materials has been necessarily eclectic, drawing upon 
those sources most relevant to the central themes of the study.   
            
                    Structure of the thesis 
      Chapter 1 locates the thesis within the literatures on nationalism, 
comparative ethnic conflict and contentious politics and summarizes the 
benefits of a process centered approach to conflict evolution. It also 
critically assesses the main explanations of the NK conflict.  Chapter 2 
outlines the historical background to the NK conflict. Drawing upon 
ethnosymbolic interpretations of ethnicity it shows how conflicting 
historical narratives on NK, contrasting perceptions of the past and 
arguments about nationhood provided the ideational sources for the 
unfolding of the conflict. It also sketches the main stages and themes in 
the development of Armenian and Azeri identities, as well as the 
intellectual and the wider public (historical) discourses that continue to 
inform the dynamics of interethnic relations.       
      Chapters 3 to 7 comprise the core of the thesis where the main 
research evidence is presented. Chapter 3 looks at the reasons behind the 
divergent trajectories of mobilization in Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 
late 1980s.   It also introduces the context of Gorbachev’s reforms and 
examines how strategically-oriented activists adapted their tactics to a 
new political and social environment during the ‘constitutional’ phase of 
the movement for NK. Chapter 4 utilizes theories of ethnic riots to 
highlight the limits of elite centered interpretations of the NK conflict. It 
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also emphasizes the limits of agent flexibility and their capacity to shape 
the rapidly changing situation with regard to three interrelated arenas – 
within-movement competition, state-activist interaction and the 
transformation of interethnic relations.  
      Chapter 5 moves on to critique the dominant interpretations of the 
civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, and the social, political and 
ideological milieu in which it developed. Chapter 6 further traces the 
main developments between the peak of civil rights and the virtual 
disintegration of the movement and the (re)launch of an armed 
campaign. In particular, this chapter seeks to address two main 
questions: 
1. What were the sources of the movement’s internal fragmentation and 
what effect did it have on facilitating or inhibiting collective action by 
non- state challengers? 
2. How did the movement interact with other actors in the system and 
what did this interaction mean for the decisions on what strategies – 
violent or otherwise – were appropriate for achieving the desired 
objectives at different points in time and for  the eventual demobilization 
of the civil rights movement as a cross-community alliance? 
Chapter 7 compares and contrasts the two cases with an emphasis on the 
discursive opportunity/threat context, and its utilization, state-activist 
relations and the influence of intra-group dynamics. The conclusion 
reflects upon the arguments of the thesis and considers the implications 
of the findings for ethnic conflict theorizing. 
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                                          Chapter 1 
                                        Literature review 
      Since the collapse of the bipolar international system and the 
breakdown of the Eastern European socialist bloc the renewed salience 
of ethnic conflict has led to an increased interest in ethnically centered 
collective action, as well as the links between identity and action.      
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section analyzes the 
underlying theoretical presuppositions of the different approaches to the 
factors and processes, which foster high levels of antagonistic ethnic 
mobilization examining the characteristic features of each analytical 
position. In this connection, three bodies of literature are explored – 
theories of nationalism, ethnic conflict and social movements. The 
objective is to trace some of the most important strands of theorizing and 
to single out those that will guide my interpretation of the empirical 
material. The second section presents a critical discussion of the main 
approaches to the radicalization of Armenian and Azeri nationalisms in 
the dispute over NK as a case study in violent conflict escalation. To this 
end the literature on the conflict is examined concentrating especially on 
the late Soviet period. 
 
 
             Unpacking mobilization 
      Given that the term mobilization has been used to refer to an 
extremely wide range of activities, including riots, rebellions, electoral 
contests and some other contexts, it is important to define what is meant 
by the term in this study. Karl Deutsch was the first to define it as 
occurring to ‘large numbers of people in areas which undergo 
modernization’. The concept, Deutsch continues, brings together several 
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processes of social transformation, notably the ‘need for new patterns of 
group affiliation and new images of personal identity’ (Deutsch, 1961: 
493). I agree with Birgitta Nedelmann in that mobilization involves 
some attempt ‘to influence the existing distribution of power’ 
(Nedelmann, 1987: 181). What is vital here is the actors’ efforts to 
reshape and legitimize the distribution of power within a society. I refer 
to ethnonational mobilization as a form of mobilization, where (ethnic) 
group identity is used as the basis for collective action, typically for the 
purposes of establishing a separate political formation (Olzak, 1983: 
355; Tilly, 1991: 574). By ethnically divided societies I mean societies 
where regimes lack legitimacy, ethnic and cultural differences are 
persistent markers of identity, and ‘ethnicity is a politically salient 
cleavage’ (Reilly, 2001: 4). Political claims are seen through the lens of 
identity and political conflict becomes synonymous with conflict 
between ethnonational groups.  Within this particular field there has 
been relatively little consideration of how ‘reformist’ messages of non-
violent protest are gradually transformed, how they move from 
moderation to radicalism. The next section discusses various attempts to 
conceptualize these transformations. 
 
       
 
        Theoretical approaches: main strands of research 
      Attempts to theorize ethnonational mobilization have been based on 
three interrelated but nevertheless separate bodies of literature – firstly, 
the rise of nationalism and national identities, secondly, ethnic conflict, 
and finally, social movements and collective action. As key analysts in 
the field of social movement research have noted, scholars of social 
movements, conflict studies and nationalism have generally paid little 
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attention to each other’s findings (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1996: 
19). In particular, relatively few studies have applied the conceptual 
framework of social movement studies to ethnonational mobilization, 
especially in divided societies (notable exceptions include (Bosi, 2006, 
2007; Maney, 2007; Githens-Mazer, 2006, 2008). The vast majority of 
works that employ this framework have analyzed social mobilization in 
industrialized democratic settings. This section attempts to map out the 
main ideas espoused by the proponents of each of these broad research 
paradigms.          
      Most of the literature on nationalism is quite weak in accounting for 
mobilization and especially the transition from non-violent to violent 
conflict since it focuses predominantly on specific causes of national 
identification, such the role of ethnic origins (Smith, 1986, 1991), state 
education (Gellner, 1983), print media (Anderson, 1983) or political 
institutions (mainly federalism (Brubaker, 1996; Roeder, 1991)). 
Primary explanations within this broad tradition emphasize the 
importance of the mobilizational resources afforded to a group as a 
result of ‘social mobilization’ (Deutsch, 1961), cultural markers (Barth, 
1969; Anderson, 1983) and the psychological power of appeals to group 
identity (Connor, 1994). According to primordialists (Geertz, 1963: 107-
113; Shills, 1957), ethnic differences are stable ‘givens’ that make 
societies inherently conflict-prone and automatically lead to hostility 
towards the outgroup. Primordialists hold that people have a natural 
emotional bond with the ethnic and national groups to which they belong 
and the strength of this organic solidarity and self-evident attachment 
accounts for feelings of antagonism towards ethnic others, which 
eventually expresses itself through violence.  The presence of ethnic 
divisions and the sense of ingroup belonging are seen as sufficient to 
explain both the nature of collective solidarity and the occurrence of 
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violence. This line of thought tends to assume that interethnic violence 
flows logically out of the intensity of allegiance to the collectivity and 
this bond constitutes the single coherent motivation for the perpetration 
of violence.  
      This approach has been consistently challenged by scholars who 
argue that the identities of conflicting ethnonational groups are in fact 
recent social constructs, which selectively appropriate traditions to 
justify ethnicity-based claims. Here ethnicity is understood as a means-
end concept, since the articulation and politicization of ethnic identity is 
possible only because of the efforts of political entrepreneurs. What is 
relevant is the capacity of nationalist leaders to manipulate mass 
sentiments.  Constructivists discuss the discursive resources available to 
political leaders, intersubjective understandings of identity and the ways 
in which elites frame their own interests as the interests of the collective 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Anderson, 1983). According to this line 
of thought, the main aim of collective action by groups is material and 
political gains. Political entrepreneurs seek to raise the level of group 
consciousness and cohesion among their target populations, promoting 
ethnic solidarity is a means to achieve pragmatic objectives.   
      Here nationhood is conceived of as ‘a contingent conjuncturally 
fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision and basis for individual and 
collective action, rather than as a relatively stable product of deep 
developmental trends in economy, polity, or culture’ (Brubaker 1996: 
19).  Paul Brass conveys a similar idea when asserting that ‘the study of 
ethnicity is in large part the study of …the process by which elites and 
counterelites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, 
attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to 
mobilize the group’ (Brass, 1991: 75). Intellectuals ‘construct a 
discourse that undermines the legitimacy of the current order of things’ 
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(Guibernau, 2000: 1003). The agency of elites and especially 
intellectuals in moulding political outcomes is, thus, widely recognized 
in the literature. 
      Neither the primordialist nor the social constructivist perspectives 
explicitly address the issue of the translation of ethnic antagonism into 
political mobilization or violence. On the one hand, for primordialists 
interethnic violence flows naturally out of the intensity of cultural 
allegiance to a given community. On the other hand, constructivism with 
its focus on the fluid and fluctuating nature of ethnic and national 
identities would assume that support for violence moves exactly hand in 
hand with elite discourses emphasizing antagonism towards the 
opponent, so that it is difficult to demonstrate a causal link between the 
content of these identities and violence. 
      Since nationalism does not always manifest itself violently it is 
essential to explain variations in support for violence (as well as non-
violence) across time and space and the low frequency of such support 
compared to the vast numbers of potential movements which fail to 
mobilize and take action in support of the nation. It is hardly 
questionable that ethnonational mobilization often results from the 
conscious efforts by political elites to obtain access to specific social, 
political and material resources. At the same time theoretical and 
empirical studies consistently demonstrate that there are vastly more 
ethnic and cultural communities than there are nationalist movements. 
Traditional theories of nationalism fail to establish a causal connection 
between the variables discussed and the sociopolitical outcome they seek 
to explain.  
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      The position taken in this study is broadly consistent with the 
social constructivist6 proporsition that identities are largely malleable 
and constructed, while elites play a role in manipulating and fueling 
ethnic animosities. Substantial sections of the project build upon the 
ethnosymbolic approach7. I use the ethnosymbolic perspective to 
highlight the importance of conflicting narratives of territorial 
belonging and to consider how competing hitoriographies were 
integrated into collective memory, as well as the 'feedback 
mechanisms' through which elements of elite discourses appealing to 
ethnic identity succeed and resonate among the population. 
However, the thesis does not extensively utilize or frame the 
discussion in terms of the traditional primordialism/constructivism 
opposition in nationalism studies for three reasons.  First, the 
analytical distinction itself is no longer clear-cut. Most primordialists 
would now recognize that not everything about ethnicity is stable 
and fixed, while constructivists have begun to find evidence that in 
some cases people are intuitively inclined to think about ethnic 
groups in essentialist terms (Gil-White, 2001: 519).  Second, both of 
those approaches to nationalism studies tend to see nationalist 
outcomes from the perspective of ideas and forms of discourse rather 
than collective action8 and conflict process. Consequently it is 
difficult to explain how identities are related to action and why 
nationalism is often generated through action more than prior to it. 
By bringing in ‘perspectives from below’ and examinaing the 
dynamics of interaction and participation in ethnic violence on the 
ground I show how many ordinary people became nationalist as a 
                                                 
6 The constructivist approach is not a single paradigm and different variations of theories can be found 
under this umbrella. 
7 See chapter 2 for a more detailed consideration of the ethnosymbolic theoretical literature. 
8 On this point see also (Beissinger, 2002: 10-11; King, 2010: 59). 
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result of mobilization.   Third, the thesis considers the wider theme 
of unintended consequences and unforeseen contingencies in conflict 
development which has been overlooked by nationalism theories. 
      In the field of conflict studies an influential branch of research in the 
understanding of mobilization is built around Gurr’s (1970) idea of the 
activation of discontent resulting from relative deprivation. Gurr 
extended the idea of frustration-aggression from individual to societal 
level. His study of political violence refers to ‘all collective attacks 
within a political community against the political regime, its actors – 
including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its 
policies’ (Gurr, 1970: 3).  Relative deprivation is defined by Gurr 
primarily in psychological terms as a group’s ‘perception of the 
discrepancy between…its value expectations and… its value 
capabilities’ (Gurr, 1970: 24).  The key source of relative deprivation 
considered in the literature is the extent of economic inequality in a 
given society. In other words, at the core of this theory lies the idea of a 
perceived gap between what a group believes it should receive and what 
it believes it will receive. This framework, thus, seeks to explain the 
incidence of political contention (rebellion and violence are the most 
frequently analyzed outcomes in this body of literature) with reference to 
individual psychological states aggregated across groups or societies. 
The premise is that if enough people in a given society feel deprived in 
relation to a perceived state of well-being, the probability of violence 
will increase.  
      The rational choice perspective looks at the incentives the individual 
has to mobilize. According to scholars working within this tradition, 
groups are formed by self-interested individuals. It is this emphasis on 
the individual that makes this category analytically distinct from 
structural and social-psychological theories. The choice of political 
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strategies used by nationalist movements results from a rational 
calculation of the perceived costs and benefits of various courses of 
action. Rational choice can thus be seen as an attempt to introduce 
utilitarian considerations to the study of collective mobilization. 
Consequently, violence is a display of collective rationality – ‘…groups 
employ violence strategically as a means to produce their joint goods’ 
(Hechter, 1995: 62).  
      In a similar vein, Olson’s pivotal The Logic of Collective Action 
(1965) stressed the rationality of actors weighing up possible choices as 
the central element of collective dynamics. Olson argues that because 
movement goals provide collective goods individuals would be unlikely 
to endure the risks involved in participating as they would eventually 
benefit from the collective actions of others. This factor renders the use 
of grievance or resentment at the individual level somewhat suspect and 
incomplete. The perspective explained collective action as the sum of 
strategic decisions by individuals who could only be induced to join a 
group through incentives or punishments and sanctions suffered as a 
result of the failure to join. Olson's work led rationalist-oriented political 
scientists to focus on the micro-foundations of collective action, and to 
turn from specific forms of contention to develop a general law intended 
to cover all forms of collective action.  
      For Russell Hardin the central problem in ethnonational mobilization 
is that of coordination (Hardin, 1995). Mobilization is treated as a 
tipping process motivated by peer pressure – the more people join a 
given movement the more pressure they exert on others into joining. 
Group members mobilize for political activity in the expectation that 
selective rewards will drive their fellow members to do the same. 
Proponents of the rational choice perspective are correct to stress the 
importance of incentives to the study of individual activism. Any 
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decision to participate in collective action invariably involves some 
crude calculation of the actual and potential costs involved. Individual 
decisions are indeed, as Hardin suggests, influenced by the actions of 
those around them, both as new actors become engaged and as 
previously engaged actors alter their strategies.          
      One of the factors that is not captured by this framework is that the 
efforts of individuals to contribute to the collective cause also vary 
significantly across participants in terms of the type and intensity of 
involvement, the repertoire of action within a particular movement and 
other parameters. More importantly, the debate over the 
rational/irrational nature of ethnonational radicalization and violence 
does not fully account for the dynamic nature of events that gradually 
build up towards activating ethnic boundaries and setting violence in 
motion. It is arguable that violence is precipitated by a sequence of 
events embedded within a context of symbolic references which render 
these events meaningful for the members of a particular ethnonational 
community (but not necessarily for outsiders). Utilitarian theories are 
particularly weak in accounting for the relationship between identity and 
action, specifically the question of how ethnic identity influences 
behaviour and orientations that lead to conflict. By limiting itself to the 
issue of incentives, punishments and strategic calculations the rationalist 
perspective fails to offer any substantive analysis of the role of ethnicity 
and the mechanisms which activate specific components of ethnic 
identity. Addressing the issue of why and how this activation occurs in 
some cases but not in others requires a detailed historico-cultural 
interpretation. Hechter (e.g. Hechter, 2001) does recognize the 
importance of cultural components but by treating unequal development 
as a key explanatory variable he tends to subordinate the study of 
ethnicity to other structural factors.  
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      At the opposite end of the rationality-structure spectrum are those 
explanations of ethnic conflict and collective mobilization which 
minimize the role of agency and stress the primacy of the broad social, 
political and economic variables. Researchers working in this framework 
focus on the role of state structures in tactical group choices. Drawing on 
the realist tradition in international relations that emphasizes the search 
for security as a primary result of state anarchy Barry Posen, Jack 
Snyder and Robert Jervis have applied the lessons of the ‘security 
dilemma’ to the study of ethnic conflict. Structuralists attribute the 
emergence of ethnic conflict to the consequences of the breakup of the 
central authority in a multiethnic state. According to this line of 
argument, inter-group hostility becomes threatening in a state of anarchy 
and drives opposing groups into defensive solidarity to gain political 
advantage (Jervis, 1978; Posen, 1993; Snyder and Jervis, 1999). One 
community, the argument runs, will take actions to enhance its security, 
which, in the general atmosphere of mutual mistrust, will automatically 
lead to increased insecurity of the other communities creating an 
escalating circle of insecurity.   
       The application of this approach to ethnically-centered struggles has 
a number of weaknesses. Firstly, as Laitin (1993) and others have 
pointed out, ethnic conflict differs markedly from interstate conflict in 
being identity-centered. Secondly, and in close connection to the first 
point, by emphasizing only the physical dimension of security and 
neglecting its cultural side structuralists tend to overlook the ways in 
which real and perceived threats to the identity of an ethnonational 
community affect both the tactics of groups directly involved in conflict 
and some of the actions kin neighbouring states might take in response 
to the ethnic strife. One of the most challenging aspects in dealing with 
the security concerns of an ethnonational group is that it is rarely 
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confined to the boundaries of a single state. Due to the intricate and 
close relationship between the community in the homeland, in 
neighbouring kin states and in the diaspora it is usually the case that 
when one part of the group is in danger it also influences other parts.    
This more inclusive approach helps to acquire a better sense of the 
overall picture of rebellious activity. From this perspective, the security 
dilemma in ethnic conflict is closer to a perceptual than a structural 
security dilemma and is unlikely to arise solely from an anarchical 
situation alone (Kaufman, 1996: 112). The discussion of security in the 
broader context has only recently been developing in the literature (e. g. 
Roe, 2001;  Kaufman, 1996). 
      Efforts by one group to strengthen its cultural security can be 
perceived as offensive and threatening to other groups which respond 
with their own demands for cultural preservation.  Cultural concerns 
often reinforce the structural aspects in the escalation of conflicts, since 
distinct communities fear physical destruction as much as they fear a 
demise from cultural decline and perceived potential extinction. 
Traditional accounts of the security dilemma offer no convincing 
explanation of why individuals often value the cultural and physical 
survival of the group higher than their own physical security, i. e. why 
they choose to fight even in the presence of feasible alternatives, like 
assimilation or subordination to the dominant ethnic group.  
      A partial modification of this lack of cultural considerations inherent 
in structuralist theories is offered by Donald Horowitz (2000: 166-84) in 
his synthesis of rational and socio-psychological elements. His emphasis 
on intergroup competition, contests for relative group worth  as the 
driving forces behind ethnonational mobilization provides an important 
corrective to the non-cultural nature of the perspectives considered 
above, as well as to purely grievance-based explanations. By rooting 
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ethnic contestation in a comparative evaluation process and the quest for 
symbolic recognition of group status he provides a fuller explanation of 
mass behaviour and the psychological ground for ingroup solidarity. 
According to this perspective, cultural differences are important not 
because of their intrinsic value but to the extent that they impact on 
matters of perceived prestige, as well as how, in the perception of the 
respective groups, being different equates to being better or worse. 
When culture becomes the basis for comparison, the cultural mechanism 
for conflict is ignited.  
      In response to the limited predictive and explanatory utility of some 
of the above literature a core group of social movement theorists have 
introduced a more nuanced analysis of political and institutional 
dimensions to the accounts of the roots of mobilization. In parallel and 
somewhat similarly to the key developments and debates between  major 
schools in the fields of nationalism and ethnic conflict, theories of social 
movements have undergone a number of paradigm shifts from mass 
behaviour to resource mobilization, political process and identity-
centered conceptualizations. In the past, social movements tended to be 
seen as relatively marginal and largely irrational forms of political 
expression, while areas of related research tended to follow traditions of 
the prevailing paradigms in social science. Social movements were 
initially analyzed in line with the structural and socio-psychological 
causes of mass mobilization (Parsons, 1951; Smelser, 1962; Davies, 
1962). It was generally thought that structural strains or constraints 
produced enough psychological discomfort (sense of isolation and 
impotence) to induce collective action which provided empowerment, 
belonging, and a sense of control. Major arguments tended to focus on 
socioeconomic deprivation, and the consequences of political or 
psychological distress. Structural functionalism provided some insights 
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fundamental to social movements and collective behaviour. From 
Parsons to Smelser, however, functionalism continuously stressed the 
difference between collective contentious activity occurring outside of 
the system or in exceptional situations of strain, and regular behaviour in 
the social system, with the latter corresponding to standard individual 
behaviour rationally defending his/ her interests according to accepted 
values. Actions not conforming to this regular rational model were thus 
left to be categorized as deviant and often implicitly or explicitly 
irrational. 
      In response to some of the sociopsychological explanatory 
difficulties, resource mobilization theory challenged the earlier 
assumption that irrationality, poor economic and social background, 
anomie or a combination of those traits are the hallmarks of activism. 
Instead, it put forth the idea that movements were rational, logical, 
organized responses of collective action (Zald and McCarthy, 1977, 
1990). Thus, resource mobilization theory concentrates on attributes of 
particular social movement groups, rather than individual psychological 
states or macroeconomic indicators. The crucial insight of this 
perspective is that, if a social movement organization faces a resource 
deficit, deprivation will not be sufficient to translate grievances into 
social mobilization. RMT stated social movement organizations (SMOs) 
were needed to enable strategically directed and sustained activism. 
Charles Tilly’s work (Tilly, 1978) provides some of the earliest ideas on 
resource mobilization theories. Oberschall, who also uses it to examine a 
variety of social movements, describes Tilly’s and his own analytical 
framework: 
  Group conflict in its dynamic aspects can be conceptualized from 
the point of view of resource management. Mobilization refers to the 
processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests 
resources for the pursuit of group goals. Social control refers to the 
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same processes, but from the point of view of the incumbents or the 
group that is being challenged’ (Oberschall, 1973: 28). 
 
      SMOs could evolve into organizational models very similar to other 
bureaucratic entities found in institutionalized politics because of their 
inherent efficiency, infrastructures, formal institutions, resources, 
internal community organizations, and division of labour capabilities.  
 This perspective still had a very strong structural component; and it did 
not take into account the relationship between structural and agency-
oriented components, as well as the role of identity and symbolism in 
enabling mobilization.    
      For the proponents of the political process (or political opportunity) 
framework political context becomes decisive in activating the potential 
for mobilization (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978; Kriesi et al., 1995). The 
term ‘political process’ became especially popular following the 
publication of a study by Doug McAdam on the civil rights protest in the 
United States (McAdam, 1982). The central concept in this perspective 
is the political opportunity structure defined by Tarrow as ‘the 
dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for 
people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for 
success and failure’ (Tarrow, 1998: 76-7).   The political opportunity 
structure is an important analytical tool to understand the success or 
failure of nationalist activity. It represented an advance beyond the 
relative deprivation theories that, as mentioned above, dominated the 
study of ethnic mobilization from the 1970s onwards and such 
transformation is evident in three ways. Firstly, it recognized that 
grievances alone are not a sufficient precondition for political action. In 
other words, although grievances vary across time and space, variation 
in this criterion cannot explain the scope of mobilization. In addition, 
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grievances alone fail to fully explain the timing and dynamics of 
nationalist movements.  
      In contrast to grievance-based theories of conflict eruption, political 
`opportunity theory argued that while grievances can be relatively 
constant, social movements emerge only in particular circumstances. 
Instead, disparate political structures favour distinct forms of political 
behaviour. Secondly, it acknowledged that the origins of mobilization 
cannot be understood without reference to the broader environment, in 
which it is embedded. Thirdly, by uniting subjective and objective 
dimensions of opportunity it can to some extent capture the gradual and 
dynamic broadening of the opportunity spectrum as actors themselves 
contribute to shaping the space around them. Since this confrontation is 
typically vis-à-vis the state, this school has traditionally looked to 
signals emanating from the state in their search for evidence of an 
expansion or contraction of political opportunities. The primary 
hypothesis is that relatively stable features of the political environment 
fundamentally condition political behaviour and thus ‘significantly 
affect any polity’s patterns of contention’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 
1996: 24; Tarrow, 1998: Chapter 5).       
      According to this line of thought, political opportunities act as a filter 
for the transformation of mobilization induced by structural 
preconditions into political action. Contentious politics emerges when 
changing political opportunities -such as decline in state capacity for 
repression, the opening of institutional access, the fragmentation of 
political elites, and the availability of new social networks and external 
actors- create incentives for social actors to mobilize. The tolerance, 
accessibility, and responsiveness of states determine the extent to which 
people can organize and act collectively. This perspective centers not on 
movement internal dynamics but on the goals of those excluded from the 
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polity to gain recognition as legitimate actors and their interactions with 
the dominant political regime. Protest is, thus, directly related to actors’ 
positioning within the system.  
      At the same time while this school acknowledged that political 
opportunities emerge and change partly through the dynamic 
transformation of the historical, political and cultural milieu, they hardly 
provide the analytical tools with which to explore the expansion of 
political opportunity. It remains underspecified or at least insufficiently 
specified on this process. It is undeniable that the trajectory of 
mobilization and whether or not such mobilization leads to violence is 
often contingent upon the channels of participation open to actors, as 
well as on the capacity and willingness of the dominant group to 
embrace and deliver their demands. It should be noted that this school 
seems to say that favourable political opportunities are conducive both to 
movement emergence and the sustainability of its success over time. 
While a great deal has been written about the factors influencing 
movement formation, less consideration has been given to the ways in 
which change and transformation happens once they are on the scene. It 
is arguable that the treatment of movement emergence and success as 
part of the same favourable external environment fostered by a similar 
set of opportunities is not always justified. As some critics have rightly 
pointed out, the literature is often characterized by the additive 
enumeration of political opportunities (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999) 
rather than a consideration of the interaction between these factors which 
may vary in intensity depending on a particular context at different 
points in time.  
      Studies in this area have some commonality with rational choice, 
since the recognition that movements respond to external conditions 
implies, at least to some extent that they are strategically motivated 
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actors.  But by concentrating on the individual pure rationalists tended to 
isolate their object of analysis from the larger political system. Rational 
choice and political process models share a broad focus on the 
rationality of individual and group action within an institutional context. 
Both understand collective action as the sum total of normal rather than 
unusual political acts. Hetcher’s argument comes very close to that 
advanced by political process theorists when he asserts that ‘institutional 
barriers to collective action affect the set of strategies available to 
nationalist groups’ (Hetcher, 2001: 128-9). This is not particularly well-
suited to increasing our understanding of the magnitude of mobilization 
and demobilization mechanisms within a specific ethnonational 
community.  
      A key area of research related to the rise of violent mobilization 
focuses on the so called repression-mobilization nexus, that is state 
dealings with violent protest. There has been a vast range of theoretical 
and empirical explorations of the interaction between challengers and 
the state. What emerges from these studies is that challenger 
mobilization generally induces some form of repressive response (e. g. 
Lichbach, 1987). Although there is a consensus within the literature that 
the level of repression the state brings to bear on movements is 
influential in determining the nature, scope and outcomes of contention, 
the findings with regard to the precise relationship have not been entirely 
clear. The main hypothesis advanced by scholars who focus on the 
dynamics of ethnic relations is that indiscriminate repression against an 
ethnic/national group generates more antagonism and violence among 
the members of the groups that are subjected to this violence than does a 
judicious and targeted used of public-order measures.  
      Tilly (1978: 39) was one of the first scholars to identify a curvilinear 
relationship between repression and protest. While low levels of 
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repression can make protest obsolete by allowing challengers to use 
institutionalized routes in voicing their demands, extremely high 
repression can hinder the development of social networks among 
potential challengers.  It is in the middle range of cases where 
mobilization is most likely (Gupta, and Sprague, 1993: 301-39; Dudley 
and Miller, 1998: 77-96; Muller and Opp, 1986: 471-87).  In such 
contexts challengers have the opportunity to organize, the cost of 
collective action is not prohibitive, but there are still considerable 
constraints to participation in nonviolent avenues of action.  At the same 
time the analysis of nationalist contention shows that the effects of 
repression can be quite diverse. Repression is sometimes effective, 
sometimes counterproductive, and sometimes makes little identifiable 
difference. Whereas earlier work treated dissent and repression as 
uniform phenomena, Lichbach (1987) argued that the state’s actions 
should be assessed in terms of both repression and accommodation; 
likewise dissident behaviour should be analyzed in terms of the cost-
benefit calculations made by ‘dissident entrepreneurs’ (Lichbach, 1987: 
266) (protest leaders) according to a rational actor model.  
      Several studies have cast doubt on the reliability of the U–curve 
thesis. The opposite argument relates to the backlash hypothesis which 
argues that ‘harsh coercion accelerates protest’ (Francisco, 1996: 1182). 
In particular, repressive events that are perceived as unjust have the 
potential to generate backlash against those seen as responsible and, 
thus, lead to greater movement mobilization.  The backlash approach is 
based on a more dynamic framework distinguishing between long-term 
and short-term effects of repression on protest.   It predicts that 
extremely severe coercion decreases protest temporarily but increases it 
in the long-run. The reasoning behind this relationship is that intensive 
and indiscriminately applied state repression diminishes the additional 
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costs of protest and leaves challengers no other choice but to respond 
with severe resistance. Repression stimulates the switch from 
nonviolence to violence particularly when the net opportunity cost of 
violence is small. There are at least two steps in the switching process. 
First, there is an emotional reaction to repression by classifying it as 
unjust causing outrage and heightening an individual’s desire for 
security. Second, there is a decision on how to deal with this emotion, 
based on a calculation of the costs and benefits of violence. While 
emotions are micro-level mechanisms motivating the recourse to 
violence, they are moderated by the opportunity costs of rebellion, which 
in turn, are weighed against the intangible rewards from a violent 
response to repression.  
      What emerges from these somewhat contradictory conceptions is 
that repression alone will not produce a predictable response – context 
and conditions matter.  For example, in his study of contentious activity 
in the post-Soviet space during the late 1980s–early 1990s Mark 
Beissinger (2002: 333-5) shows that repression did not have any 
systematic influence on the occurrence of backlash protests. In particular 
while the power of a sense of unjust repression was one of the most 
robust mobilizers throughout this period, groups differed significantly in 
their structural capacity to mobilize in the face of repression. When 
considering the patterns of state-challenger relationships it is important 
to recognize that the scope of feasible state responses is bounded 
critically by both the nature of its abstract preferences and its existing 
capacities. Whether or not nationalist demands are accommodated 
depends largely on the resilience of political structures and the political 
choices made by ruling elites.   
      State capacity could be seen as a function of two dimensions: the 
level of institutionalization of central authority as expressed by the 
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specificity of the regime and the degree to which leaders are prepared to 
accommodate the demands of an oppositional movement (Kohli, 1997: 
329-30). In this reading, given scarce political power and economic 
resources, it is inevitable that ethnically based movements will emerge, 
but they will just as inevitably decline if they obtain substantial 
concessions from the state. The nature of the established political 
structures combines with the prevailing norms of governance and the 
cohesion of the ruling elites to determine the accommodative capacity of 
a given state. Unaccommodating leaders in the context of both weakly 
and well institutionalized states are most likely to provoke militant 
struggles for recognition and self-determination. Jack Snyder (2000: 74-
9) also emphasizes the mutually reinforcing influence of the adaptability 
of elite interests and the strength of political institutions. Inadaptable 
elites together with weak institutions are hypothesized to trigger the 
emergence of exclusive forms of nationalism. Somewhat similarly, in 
their study of four Western European societies Kriesi and his coauthors 
(Kriesi et al., 1995) concluded that the degree of inclusion/exclusion is 
one of the main parameters determining the propensity of specific actors 
and groups to employ violent strategies. In particular, movements are 
more likely to opt for violence in states based upon exclusion than in 
those relying upon inclusion. Sustained avoidance or suppression of 
nationalist demands by the central authority will over time only 
exacerbate the explosive potential of the underlying problems. 
      The interaction between state capacity and collective claim-making 
is also a key theme in C. Tilly’s work The Politics of Collective Violence 
(2003). By collective violence Tilly means ‘social interactions that 
directly inflict physical damage result in part from the coordination of 
among the persons who perform the damaging acts’ (Tilly, 2003: 15). 
High-capacity regimes exert extensive control over available means of 
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coercion, which places significant constraints upon the opportunities for 
militant rebellion and means that the agents of the regime are more 
likely to intervene in majority-minority relationships, if violence breaks 
out.   By contrast, in low-capacity regimes rival coercive centers are 
regularly formed and the lack of the means to suppress them creates an 
extremely favourable environment for the formation of oppositional 
movements (Tilly, 2003: 41-52). The dynamic unfolding of responses to 
actions taken by the authorities, challengers and their opponents 
highlights how the creation of new political conditions brought about by 
such responses in turn triggers shifts in the goals and forms of 
contention. Political context partly reflects conscious decisions of 
particular actors but at the same time these decisions cannot be fully 
evaluated without regard to their anticipated consequences within a 
given context.  
      From the late 1980s social movement literature has started to take 
into consideration ideology, identity and framing whereby grievances 
and identity boundaries were conceptualized as socially constructed 
within a collective interpretative context (Snow and Benford, 1988; 
Snow et al., 1986, Melucci, 1989). Social movements were seen as the 
centers of the negotiation and formation of collective identities. With the 
‘cultural turn’ motivated at least in part by the recognition of the need to 
rethink and complement grievance-based explanations  a new wave of 
analysts has become interested in the role of ideology and identity in the 
mobilization and legitimation strategies of social movements. This trend 
of research attempts to account for how participants are provided with 
specific schemes of interpretation that contribute to constructing the 
legitimacy and goals of a particular movement.  The work of David 
Snow and Robert Benford provides much of the theoretical background 
to this approach.  
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      More recent analysis in this domain has thus moved towards 
explanations of the construction of meaning and the formation of 
political identities. This perspective describes how the cognitive 
orientations of individuals and the ideological frames of a movement are 
fused together. Successful framing depends on frames bearing an 
internal logical consistency and congruence with audiences’ everyday 
lived experiences, perceptions and beliefs. Movements interpret relevant 
events by highlighting certain objectives and values while blurring or 
discounting others with the intention to mobilize potential adherents and 
win popular support. The model incorporates through a constructivist 
perspective an explanation of cultural and identity sources of movement 
rationale.  The frames approach provides a useful tool for the analysis of 
schematic stereotypes and collective beliefs that give meaning to 
participation in nationalist collective action, particularly in terms of how 
specific ideas resonate at the popular level. In `contrast to pure 
constructivists who interpret framing as implying that elites are free to 
push their followers to support almost any claims they make in order to 
further their own material self-interest (e. g. (Ballentine and Snyder, 
1996: 5-40) social movement scholars argue that frames must relate to 
the shared experiences and self-understandings of the populations which 
the appeals address. Frames achieve greater success if there is a 
‘connection between the discourse on a particular issue and the broader 
political culture of which it is a part’ (Gamson, 1992: 135). This line of 
thought points to one set of mechanisms crucial for radicalization 
processes but leads to questions of why and when they become effective.  
Zald crucially suggests that the relationship between framing and 
political behaviour should not be seen as unidimensional but as working 
in both directions with frames structuring social action and being 
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structured by it (Zald, 1996: 269). This perspective, thus, serves as a 
certain interface between structure and agency. 
      In sum, it appears that the explanatory power of each of the 
frameworks discussed above is weak when taken in isolation. Theories 
of nationalism are too general to explain variations in specific outcomes, 
the static measure of individual rationality, as well as structural anarchy 
is insufficient to analyze participation in nationalist activity as an 
affective, emotionally charged and dynamic process, as well to do full 
justice to the plurality of mobilizational mechanisms, while the political 
opportunity school does not differentiate clearly between factors 
contributing to movement emergence and endurance and does not 
always allow for specificity in the manifestation of opportunities in 
particular contexts.  A theoretically multifaceted explanation can 
facilitate a fuller appreciation of ethnonational mobilization in general 
and the trajectory of the conflicts in question in particular.  
      In the 1990s a number of authors attempted to build a consolidated 
approach to ethnonational mobilization. Works by Gurr (1993), 
McAdam and his coauthors (McAdam et al., 2001) and Lichbach (1998) 
provided important theoretical insights – the first via a synthesis of 
relative deprivation and resource mobilization approaches, the second 
via an expanded political opportunity framework and the third via a 
combination of political opportunity and rational choice approaches. 
What these studies suggest is that the grievances of the deprivation 
school (Gurr, 1970), the relative group status of socio-psychological 
approaches, the community-level organizational capacity central to the 
resource mobilization perspective, the identity construction of the 
nationalism literature all contribute to the generation of radical political 
action. There is a growing consensus that these approaches are not 
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mutually exclusive but should complement each other, as they address 
different issues and scales of analysis.   
 
            
      The approach adopted here recognizes a certain degree of fluidity 
and ‘constructedness’ of the main categories discussed above while 
maintaining a focus on the factors and processes that affect their 
resilience and persistence. The structural and historical context(s) create 
the initial parameters within which collective action takes place but they 
are not entirely predetermined.  Instead the immediate environment and 
strategic considerations indicate the extent to and the direction in which 
these underlying parameters will be realized and/or will shift during the 
mobilization process. Actors continually adjust their strategies in 
response to emerging opportunities and/or constraints presented by the 
specific situation(s) they face.  
      The theoretical challenge posed by the fact that salient political 
cleavages are often ethnic ones is to explain why and how violent 
outcomes relate to this particular category. Some authors suggest that the 
violent politicization of ethnicity and the intentional construction of 
antagonistic collective identities presents a form of legitimation for 
ethnic entrepreneurs who use ethnonational radicalization against a rival 
group to build a constituency by way of identity-based mobilization (e.g. 
Gagnon, 2004). Undoubtedly, certain powerful and charismatic political 
leaders may incite others to act violently and significantly contribute to 
increasing the salience of antagonistic identity constructions, which 
promote conflict between groups over cooperation. Without disregarding 
or denying the insights of the ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ literature this study 
attempts to argue that to identify a social construction is not necessarily 
to point to a conspiracy by intellectuals, populist elites or states. The 
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power of construction is extremely rarely, if ever, concentrated in the 
hands of one actor. Nationalist boundaries are continually 
(re)constructed through complex decisions, decisions which are in turn 
fundamentally influenced by situations and opportunities, cultural and 
political élites and rewarded or punished by controllers of resources 
(primarily states but also organized identity groups). 
      Nationalist claims are made in a tensely interdependent field of 
competing actors and strategies of legitimation. First, identities 
themselves develop and transform through interaction with others. The 
awareness of being different from any entity, whether it be a state, or a 
group comes from a recognition of that entity and its attributes. The 
formation of identities, thus, relies primarily on comparing one’s 
attributes with those of another. Second, contentious political activity 
consists of patterns of relational interaction. Interethnic relations are 
inherently dynamic and it is precisely this dynamism that should be 
recognized as one of the key contributory factors to defining their 
specificity in each particular socio-spatial context. While historical 
accounts sometimes describe events in terms of interactions, social 
science has been relatively slow in moving away from rationalist and 
structuralist paradigms. Yet those perspectives that lack an interactionist 
component have great difficulty explaining divergent (violent/non-
violent) behaviour of different nationalist groups within the same 
territory or the choices and transitions between non-violent and violent 
strategies at specific points in time (see Chenoweth and Lawrence, 2010 
for a recent comparative discussion of how and why violence erupts).  
      This study suggests that many of the weaknesses of the existing 
interpretations of the conflicts under investigation arise from the 
absolutization of single theoretical perspectives and methodological 
approaches. For example those interpretations that read ethnic 
                                                                                         65
preferences from identity categories and take for granted the link 
between the ‘intrinsically’ ethnic nature of the respective nationalisms 
and conflict tend to recognize the importance of ethnicity in particular 
socio-spatial environments but largely disregard that it is contingent and 
constantly in a process of contestation and / or (re)construction.  
Likewise, those, predominantly constructivist, approaches that deny the 
historical authenticity and/ or contexualised efficacy of ethnic categories 
and suggest that nationalist outcomes flow logically from the ideas, 
identities and/or (as in rationalist approaches) interests of political actors 
tend to be poor at addressing how and why appeals to ethnic identity 
become intelligible and resonant to wide social constituencies. 
      This study shares with some recent sociological research the 
emphasis on the primacy of process and contexuality in analysis and an 
attention to explanation that seeks to avoid both structural determinism 
and pure voluntarism. As Mustafa Emirbayer notes, the choice between 
substantianalism and relationalism constitutes a ‘fundamental dilemma’. 
The question is whether ‘to conceive of the social world as consisting 
primarily in substances or in processes, in static ‘things’ or in dynamic, 
unfolding relations’ (Emirbayer, 1997: 281). Thus, in ontological terms 
the literature could be divided into substantionalist approaches, which 
break the social world down into entities, and relational approaches, 
which regard social interaction as the starting point for critical 
examination. Largely substantialist conceptions of nationalism, ethnicity 
and identity tend to conceive of these phenomena as entities or 
properties of entities (groups or states), which attributes more uniformity 
to them than is found to be true under empirical scrutiny.  While 
relational understandings of ethnic conflict and nationalism are not 
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entirely new9, many theoretical perspectives have tended to rely on a 
rather deterministic view of causation, thus overemphasizing a structural 
logic and missing the role of contingency in political life, as well as the 
interdependency of human actions within and across spatial contexts.  
      Nationalist movements are always shaped by the actions of 
opponents, and other participants in the system. Actors not only interact, 
often strategically, at each point in time, they learn over time from past 
interactions and from information communicated to them by others.   
The perspective offered in this study stresses that nationalist activity is 
embedded in cultural contexts, social networks and intersubjective 
relations of reciprocity and that the understanding of these dimensions is 
crucial to account for temporal variation and shifts within and across 
nationalist movements. By conceptualizing conflict and violence as 
processes rather than unique events I also attempt to relax the unitary 
actor assumption, which is quite common in the literature. When actors 
are assumed to make the collective decision to radicalize and take up 
arms at one specific point in time with no alternatives available, scholars 
generally tend to downplay the differences between the initiation and 
escalation/ expansion of conflict. This analysis is grounded in historical 
context attempting to combine an evaluation of the importance of 
process with an appreciation of the enabling and constraining impact of 
social settings, that is the wider environment in which nationalist activity 
is situated on the level, form and direction of collective action. 
Nationalist movements vary significantly in terms of their 
microstructures, and one of the key dimensions to assess in this regard is 
how collective needs, demands and perspectives of the movement 
constituency relate to the structural environment to influence the 
                                                 
9 See e. g. (Brubaker, 1996). For one of the earliest understandings of ethnicity as defined not by inner 
substances but by changeable outer boundaries see (Barth, 1969). 
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expressions of dissent, resistance and claim-making. This study does not 
share the analytical position that ethnic conflict is a ‘myth’ (Crawford 
and Lipschutz, 1998)10. Similar explanations commonly ignore the 
extent to which ethnicity and ethnic frames of interpretation have been 
and continue to be compelling for large sections of the populations. In 
this sense I agree with Pal Kolsto that the key point should be not be the 
inherent quality of events but how actors perceive them, and the 
historical, cultural and institutional contexts through which such events 
are viewed and interpreted (Kolsto, 2002: 7).  
      As has been mentioned above, a strong polarization of perspectives 
has impeded the development of richer understandings of ethnicity and 
nationalism, as well as the unfolding dynamics of the political behaviour 
of ethnonational groups in the two cases under consideration. Most 
studies concentrate either on how the state reacts to the activities of its 
people or on how the people make sense of the state.  Whilst the former 
tend to be weaker at assessing the resonance and effectiveness of elite 
discourse with the general population, the latter generally lose sight of 
the significance of the state, as well as cultural and political elites in the 
(re)production of these discourses.  On a more general level, failing to 
recognize the multiple complexities that result in conflicts taking the 
form they do, might lead to the institutionalization of policies which in 
turn have an adverse effect on the populations concerned. This study 
attempts to bridge the divides mentioned above and recapture a more 
complete and nuanced understanding of conflict evolution mediated 
through specific historico-cultural and temporal contexts. In so doing it 
                                                 
10 While the simplistic view that  ethnic conflict is a ‘myth’ is based on a purely instrumental 
conceptualization of ethnicity and reduces conflict to socio-economic forces, I do recognize the 
significance of prior cultural materials and processes. In particular, national myths can be utilized for 
two main purposes: 1) mass mobilization through references to common symbols, shared historical 
heritages and common future aspirations; 2) legitimation of political elites’ status and political 
authority (see e. g. (Kaufman, 2001; Hutchinson, 2005, Githens-Mazer, 2006, 2008).  See chapters 2 
and 5 for a more detailed analysis  of the symbolic dimension of the conflicts in question. 
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highlights the utility of process-centered analysis in addition to variable 
based approaches to explaining nationalist movement activity. The next 
section discusses the main analytical perspectives on the development of 
the NK conflict and outlines how the interpretation taken in this study 
will build on some of those approaches.  
 
 
 
      Key issues in research on NK: an evaluation of competing      
       explanations 
      Each of the three approaches discussed in the theoretical section of 
this chapter finds some echoes in the literature on the conflict in 
question. The convergence of the Soviet Union's collapse, Armenian and 
Azeri independence, and the rise of the NK movement gave many 
historians, political scientists, and sociologists fertile ground to study the 
roots of the hostilities. There is a widespread agreement in the literature 
that it has a clearly visible nationalist and ethnoterritorial component – 
the dispute is over who has the legitimate right to the territory and this 
right is seen as the crucial attribute of fully fledged nationhood.  Within 
this general consensus, however, interpretations differ when identifying 
the key triggering factors that were responsible for its escalation into a 
militant struggle in the late Soviet period.   In the 1990s there was an 
upsurge in the number of academic works looking at the NK conflict 
from a historical perspective. The majority of these publications, 
especially those by Western journalists and scholars was largely factual 
in nature and dealt with the historical roots of the conflict (Suny, 1993; 
Dudwick, 1993; Chorbajian, 1994; Dragadze, 1989). This is 
understandable given the enormous role played by history in 
legitimizing the demands of both sides. A number of studies explored 
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the possibilities of peacemaking from the perspective of international 
law (Cornell, 1997) and conflict regulation (Fraser et al., 1990, Rutland, 
1991).  At the same time this emphasis on the factual side has led to a 
noticeable lack of complex theoretical conceptualizations.  It should be 
noted that although some scholars do tend to look to multiple factors in 
the discussion of the escalation of the conflict in the late Soviet period, 
which might make it hard to divide the literature on the subject into neat 
subfields, prioritization of a particular set of factors over others is often 
seen in scholarly debates.  
      The first category of explanations used to account for the nature and 
course of contention in NK while acknowledging that ‘ethnic pride and 
territorial sovereignty are the two themes that dominate all others in the 
conflict’ (Dragadze, 1989: 69) commonly offer a grievance-based 
interpretation and tend to put economic grievances at the heart of the 
analysis (Dragadze, 1989; Goldenberg, 1994). It is argued that objective 
reasons – the economically underdeveloped status of NK within the 
Azeri SSR, the reluctance of the center to allocate the funds and 
resources necessary for economic well-being during the Soviet era, 
discriminatory language policies (the imposition of Azeri as the 
language of education), political and economic discrimination of the 
Armenian population in both Azerbaijan and NK were largely 
responsible for the escalation of the conflict.    These scholars capture 
some of the key underlying conditions and triggering factors for 
collective mobilization but do not specify the mechanisms that translate 
these grievances into action. Perhaps, more importantly there could be a 
very large number of grievances that have the potential to be used as 
mobilizing instruments (Zald and McCarthy, 1987: 347-92). The long 
list of grievances to choose from makes it hard to identify the causal 
primacy of individual factors and weakens the power of using grievance 
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as the basis of explanation. I argue that as far as NK is concerned, 
grievances rooted in historical antagonisms, as well as real and 
perceived interethnic inequalities clearly directly influenced the 
trajectory of the movement’s development and the continuous support 
for collective action once it was underway but these factors do not 
account for the timing and internal dynamics of the movement.  
      The second line of argument commonly discussed in relation to the 
conflict in NK and in the former Soviet Union more generally deals with 
the determining influence of the ethno-federal structure of the Soviet 
state in which administrative division was based on ethnic criteria and, 
thus, failed to provide outlets for free participation in political life. 
According to this perspective, the politicization of ethnicity triggered by 
Soviet institutional legacy together with the launching of substantial 
reforms during the Gorbachev era allowed local elites to evoke and 
skillfully manipulate historical memories and intercommunal grievances 
during the political struggle that followed the Soviet collapse. Following 
the lead of constructivist theorists a number of scholars – including 
Rogers Brubaker, Yuri Slezkine and Ronald Suny emphasized the ways 
in which the process of nation-building was decisively shaped by Soviet 
nationality policies (Roeder, 1991; Bunce, 1999: Brubaker, 1994; 1996; 
Slezkine, 1994; Suny, 1993).  
      Instead of diffusing ethnic identity the institutions created in an 
attempt to forge a new civic political identity, homo soveticus, helped to 
strengthen and perpetuate ethnic territorial identification among non-
Russians. Institutionalists hold that the creation of stable territorial units 
defined in terms of nationality prevented the formation of horizontal 
civic bonds across society and gave political entrepreneurs the territorial, 
material and symbolic resources to organize violence.   Several authors 
have applied this line of explanation to NK (Zurcher, 2007; Koehler and 
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Zurcher, 2003). Swante Cornell also points to the significance of the 
autonomous status of NK: ‘…the autonomous status of the province… 
carried with it the political institutions to channel secessionist 
sentiments’ (Cornell, 2000: 41).   The institutional explanation goes 
some way towards exploring the ways in which institutions contribute to 
structuring political behaviour but can hardly account for the underlying 
causes of conflict escalation. When trying to predict the occurrence of 
nationalist protest based solely on the existence of institutional pre-
determinants one is frequently at a loss. First, it fails to consider why 
ethnonational mobilization can be latent or blocked despite the presence 
of favourable institutional preconditions. Second, it underestimates 
competing claims and emotional attachments to a single territory that are 
seen as mutually exclusive and remain a key source of the hostilities.  
      The third – structuralist line of thought predictably puts the conflict 
in the context of a broader process of state disintegration and prioritizes 
the collapse of the state which led to a crisis of legitimacy and 
eliminated the restraining effect of Soviet power: ‘Defense and internal 
security were the prerogative of the federal center and its collapse left 
the successor states without any meaningful institutions that could have 
claimed the monopoly of violence… The weakness of the old, dying 
Soviet state was paralleled by the weakness of the new, emerging 
independent states’ (Zurcher, 2007: 213). By showing how nationalism 
arose in the period when the political space expanded this account offers 
a means of explaining the timing of radicalization.  The nationalist 
movement(s) crystallized against the background of a deepening 
awareness of the crisis of Soviet power. The weakening of the center 
was one of the key favourable factors which allowed the communities to 
struggle for national recognition. However, as with institutionalist 
analysis, state weakness only establishes a broad frame of reference for 
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analyzing some of the conditions conducive to radicalization but does 
not provide a sufficiently specific understanding of the variation 
between violent and non-violent outcomes. In addition, for this case a 
purely structuralist analysis does not stand up to scrutiny, as the tensions 
within the region predated the period of state weakness.  If one accepts 
that the dispute over NK would not have happened without the anarchy 
emerging out of Soviet collapse it is hard to explain the fact that the first 
indications of instability and hostility were visible long before the iron 
grip of the Soviet state started to loosen. 
      It should be noted that in the context of studies dealing with the 
former Soviet Union, structuralist arguments, i. e. those emphasizing 
weakening state capacity overlap significantly with institutionalist 
interpretations. Both address the background factors that enhance the 
likelihood and incentives for mobilization. While institutionalists stress 
that the nature of institutions promoted separatism, pure structuralists 
tend to discuss how actors respond to real and perceived state 
weaknesses in the struggles for national recognition, as well as the 
diminished capacity and willingness of the state to assert control over its 
territory. In what follows I use the term ‘structural’ in a broad sense, that 
is to describe and analyze the conditions that favoured the radicalization 
of the conflict in question in the late Soviet era – what is commonly 
referred to as the ‘Soviet legacy’.  
      It can be argued that in general theoretical approaches to the study of 
ethnonational mobilization in the post-Soviet space and Armenia-
Azerbaijan in particular have tended to rely on the traditional structure-
agency dualism.  On the one hand, the emphasis on the historical legacy 
of the Soviet era mentioned above (Roeder, 1991, 2007; Cornell, 2002; 
Hale, 2000) means that the causal status of the mechanisms employed by 
elites remains relatively low compared to the structural legacies that 
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distinguished the wide universe of late and post-communist societies. 
Undoubtedly structural and institutional factors, most notably, the 
salience of the Soviet experience especially its political, economic, 
cultural dimensions and institutional structures in particular the 
dominance of the Communist Party and the highly centralized nature of 
decision-making and policy implementation play an important role in 
Armenian and Azeri mobilizations. However, a purely structural-
institutional analysis commonly ascribes this mobilization to factors 
external to the group, thus devaluing the community as a source of 
autonomous power and agency.  On the other hand, some of the recent 
literature on the conflict treats it as an elite-led phenomenon. The 
choices of elites have been investigated most closely by those (e. g. 
(Gorenburg, 2003) stressing divergent (violent/ non-violent) outcomes in 
similar starting conditions in the post-Soviet environment. 
      With regard to to ethnonational mobilization in Armenia, NK and to 
a lesser extent, Azerbaijan the role of elites as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ – 
elite actors who are able to frame a grievance in ethnic terms and unite 
the community around it – has received particular attention by 
(Melander, 2001) and (Caspersen, 2008, 2008a) amongst others. These 
accounts take issue with unitary, homogenous actor treatments and 
suggest that fixed conceptions of the ethnic identities of the parties to the 
conflict obscure the driving force of radicalization as the product of 
power struggles between opposing elites and competing visions about 
how a political community should be developing. According to this 
view, intra-community conflict correlated strongly with inter-community 
radicalization, and ethnic tension helped advance the socio-political 
projects of some groups over others. The emphasis on elites represents 
an important alternative to the structural determinism and allows to 
consider how rival leaders within the same group compete to articulate 
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their strategies to protect collective interests, as well as to define 
‘similar’ situations in subtly different ways.  It is certainly necessary to 
recognize that by early 1990s the conflict transformed from a pure 
national liberation struggle to a movement of liberal urban elites whose 
primary agenda became the achievement of independence seizing of 
state power. At the same time these perspectives tend to ignore the group 
itself as an agent of mobilization. In addition, such analyses concentrate 
on how within community divisions affect tactical choices and decisions, 
and generally fail to explore why audiences are receptive to particular 
types of messages over others or the conditions under which political 
elites’ appeals to ethnonational rhetoric are reflective of widely held 
communal beliefs.  
      Another approach to explaining the course of ethnonational 
mobilization puts broadly cultural, behavioural and socio-psychological 
variables at the heart of the analysis. In this vein, Abrahamian (1990, 
1995, 1997) stresses the discursive, symbolic and ritualistic aspects of 
radicalization. While recognizing that Armenian and Azeri mobilization 
emerged in a particular social, political and economic context in the late 
Soviet period, this approach tends to see collective mobilization as part 
of certain patterns of practices and meanings which belong to and are 
produced by a specific cultural logic.  Taking culture as the central 
component of movements it analyzes mobilization as largely a cultural 
struggle between different traditions and outlines how national models 
of aggressive behaviour were shaped by myths and images of heroes of 
the traditional Caucasian epic. This perspective can useful in analyzing 
how pre-existing cultural patterns are instrumental in the formation and 
transformation of ethnic boundaries. At the same time it tends to assume 
the direct translation of culture into political action.  
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      Laitin and Suny (1999) and Laitin (2001) use demographic and 
linguistic data to demonstrate that the major urban centers in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and NK were culturally vibrant and heterogeneous, with a 
high degree of cultural and linguistic penetration and assimilation 
between the two communities. From such accounts the authors derive 
their conceptualizations of the escalation of the conflict based on 
rationalist assumptions. It is suggested that the start and continuation of 
military struggle could be attributed to the fact that elites in the  national 
homeland were prepared to make  credible commitments to the 
Armenian population that they will pay extraordinary costs to support 
their compatriots (Laitin, 2001: 853). The relative power of an outside 
protector state, thus, becomes decisive in lowering the potential risks of 
involvement in collective action, as well as creating incentives to initiate 
and continue fighting.  The rise of Armenian and Azeri nationalisms 
stemmed from strategic considerations. Both Armenian and Azeri 
communities were confident that overwhelming support would be 
provided by the respective kin states even if this forces them to accept 
associated costs and risks. 
       This approach has the benefit of stressing that ethnic kin states and 
diasporas which crosscut national boundaries play an important role in 
the production of violence. With few exceptions (e. g. Saideman and 
Ayres, 2008; Panossian, 1998; 2001; Koinova, 2011) transnational 
connections is an aspect that is often overlooked by other models. The 
emphasis on domestic structures tends to overlook the extent to which 
cross-border networks can contribute to the emergence and success of 
collective action. In addition, the rational choice model, as applied to 
NK seems to leave some space for ethnic solidarity.   However, if a 
rational cost/benefit calculation even underpinned by support from 
powerful external patrons is the only driving force behind violent 
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mobilization at least two questions remain unanswered. Firstly, the 
mechanisms and sentiments fostering collective solidarity that motivate 
the communities in the external homelands to support their co-nationals 
remain underspecified. The only factor that is mentioned in this context 
is that ‘the expected payoffs for war are less than the homeland’s costs’ 
(Laitin, 2001: 856).  The impact of shared cultural backgrounds and 
meanings (memories of victimization, historical experiences) is not 
considered. The role of the external homeland(s) is too narrowly 
conceptualized in terms of their instrumentalism. Secondly, by focusing 
on the external dimension this perspective disregards the ways in which 
mobilization can be triggered by a combination of changes in internal 
and external environments. 
      Another subfield for examining the conflict has been a comparative 
approach looking at the issue within the framework of other conflicts in 
the region, such as the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South 
Ossetian (Tchilingirian, 1999; 2003). This perspective pushed forward 
the idea that ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union have a number 
of common aspects – all are byproducts of Soviet nationality policies 
and use grievances to perpetuate the hostilities.  In the context of 
unfulfilled aspirations for political transformation and in the absence of 
effective new institutions to replace the old ones the dissatisfied 
minorities had to search for alternative ways to bring about social 
transformation and pressed for autonomy. The examination of the 
sources of conflict between the titular nationality and other, non-titular 
groups, of how minorities became minorities not in terms of absolute 
numbers but because they were no longer identified with the dominant 
nationality provides an interesting vantage point on the initial 
polarization between the parties. At the same time the insights of the 
approach focusing on majority-minority relations alone are limited 
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because it is very difficult to show that the development of Armenian 
nationalism was a specific reaction to Azeri maltreatment during Soviet 
rule, although it was clearly crucial in influencing Armenian collective 
memory. A direct correlation between the level of oppression and the 
intensity of political and cultural claims can hardly be demonstrated. The 
national liberation project developed not just because Armenians thought 
the titular group (Azeris) was treating them unfairly. In reality, both 
sides had a certain understanding of fairness and rooted the legitimacy of 
their claims in historical arguments.  
      One of the strands in the literature emphasizes the perceptions of 
insecurity developed in the context of mutually exclusive territorial 
claims: ‘In a sense the sole determinant of the conflict is a security 
dilemma based on fear, or one could say, on the development of 
nationalisms mirroring each other, fuelling and directed against each 
other and scarcely able to develop without each other’ (Cornell,1999: 
55-6; Dudwick, 1996).  The strength of this approach is in its recognition 
of the impossibility to treat nationalist mobilization in fixed insular 
terms. Rather than seeing nationalism as the quest for the adequate 
expression of a single cultural identity its relational character is 
acknowledged. However, the interactional nature of movement 
formation is not limited to the ethnic other the nationalist community is 
in contrast with. The process of radicalization ties together disparate 
actors in different locations, including but not restricted to state agents, 
society-level actors sharing the ideas, values and goals of those involved 
in armed struggle, regional powers. It is, thus, too simplistic to state that 
the development of the conflict can be explained in a deterministic 
manner, that is only as a reaction against the tactics of the ethnic 
opponent. In addition, in 1987 when the movements in Armenia and NK 
started the anticipated scale of reform in the Soviet Union was not so 
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great that the Azeris could easily flaunt Soviet security guarantees. At 
the time the power of the Soviet government was still present, though 
weakening. Thus, the notion of the region as one of ‘emerging anarchy’ 
is not entirely accurate. 
      A final category for assessing the NK conflict includes research 
putting greed rather than grievance at the heart of the analysis and 
incorporates publications dealing with the correlation between the 
development of the conflict and the transfer of oil from the Caspian 
region (through Azerbaijan) to international markets. Within this 
analytical perspective are Mary Kaldor’s paper ‘Oil and Conflict’ 
(Kaldor, 2007) and Charles Blandy’s The Impact of Baku Oil on 
Nagorny Karabakh (1997). While it is for the most part agreed on in the 
literature that the economic aspect seems to have accentuated the 
conflict rather than initiated it, both Kaldor and Blandy emphasize the 
impact of economic factors and the ways in which oil revenues might 
encourage renewed fighting, the economic windfall causing an arms 
buildup that enhances the possibility of a military solution. Explicit in 
such arguments is the idea of postnationalist politics, where elites are 
preoccupied with issues of power and economic gains rather than 
nationalist considerations and ideology. 
      Representatives of Armenian and Azeri scholarship commonly 
center on the question of territory and approach the issue  from the point 
of view of their respective communities – that is only one of the parties 
without showing the capacity or willingness to recognize the legitimacy, 
let alone value of alternative conceptualizations. In other words, if the 
author is ethnically Armenian (s) he usually tries to prove that NK has 
historically been the autonomous space for Armenians, the conflict is the 
continuation of organized Turkish-Azeri attempts to dilute NK of 
Armenians and the end of NK subordination to Azerbaijan is a matter of 
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the restoration of historical justice (Donabedian and Mutafian, 1989;  
Manasyan, 2005).  In this reading the contestation is closely linked to 
broader Armenian traditional themes, such as suffering, injustice, the 
chains of all foreign (and particularly Azeri) hegemony, the forced 
migrations of Armenians and the eternal Armenian statehood question11. 
If the author is Azeri the reverse is generally true and the radicalization 
is attributed to unjustified territorial pretensions of both NK and 
Armenia in respect of Azerbaijan (Kocharli, 2004; Sultanov, 2001; 
2004; 2004b). While in recent years some studies have attempted to 
present a balanced picture of the roots of the hostilities (Yamskov, 1991; 
De Waal, 2003; Geukjian, 2005; Tchilingirian, 1999), there is still a 
clearly observable trend to concentrate on historical research with the 
aspiration to ‘prove’ opposing historical and/or territorial claims. Local 
researchers tend to use the past as a pulpit from which to establish the 
legitimacy of one political and constitutional programme over another. 
As a result of this almost unavoidable bias very few publications have 
systematically examined from a neutral perspective the totality of 
structural, political, economic, cultural, historical, territorial and ethnic 
dimensions, as well as the complex interactions between them at each 
specific point in time. It is increasingly difficult to find any common 
ground in history or culture or to concede to the ‘other’ any positive role. 
Historians and experts from both sides give opposing versions of the 
conflict.  Koehler and Zurcher rightly point out that ‘the object, the 
parties and the timing of the conflict themselves are strongly disputed’ 
(Koehler and Zurcher, 2003: 145). As mentioned above, some of the 
more recent studies in this area can be classified as multidimensional as 
they modify some of the assumptions of the earlier works.  
                                                 
11 See chapter 2 for an elaboration of these points in the Armenian context. 
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      For example the ‘rationality of fear’ framework incorporating 
rational and emotion-based aspects and developed initially by de 
Fegueiredo and Weingast (1999) was recently applied to the NK conflict 
by J. Fearon and D. Laitin (Fearon and Laitin, 2006). They suggested 
that the perception of fundamental threats made it rational for the 
opposing groups to fight to cleanse the republic of the ethnic other. 
Cornell (2000) and Kaufman (1998; 2001: 49-84) attribute the escalation 
of the conflict to the combined presence of factors related to willingness 
and opportunity to mobilize, thus attempting to address the weaknesses 
in structuralist and rationalist conceptions.  
      Thomas De Waal (2003) discusses a combination of rationalist, 
grievance-based and emotional elements.  He further points that the 
conflict cannot be considered only in the framework of political or 
socioeconomic problems. History and identity - or, rather misguided and 
dangerous ideas of history and identity - played a more important role. 
He writes: ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict makes sense only if we 
acknowledge that hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis 
were driven to act by passionately held ideas about history, identity, and 
rights.’(De Waal, 2003: 272). De Waal is certainly right to stress the 
crucial role of the past in understanding the perceptions and motivations 
of all the parties. Like Ronald Suny (1993) and Laitin and Suny (1999), 
Waal emphasizes that Armenians and Azeris had amicably coexisted in 
NK under Soviet rule. When stressing the peaceful nature of interethnic 
relations in the Soviet era these authors seem to be somewhat dismissive 
of the fact that even then Armenians continuously expressed discontent, 
although in non-violent forms and never accepted the subordinate status 
of the NK territory. From a theoretical perspective, Waal’s approach 
appears to be closest to a constructivist one in that he does not attribute 
the escalation of the conflict to ‘ancient hatreds’. In line with 
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constructivism he sees the power of ideas, myths and prejudices about 
identity and nationalism as the key to understanding the nature of 
Armenian-Azeri relationships. At the same time his conceptualization 
differs from a purely constructivist position in one crucial respect. 
Unlike pure constructivists, Waal does not maintain that the conflict can 
be fully and adequately explained solely with reference to power 
struggles between competing groupings and clans, who used the 
ideology of extreme nationalism to strengthen their economic and 
political positions within patronage-based networks: ‘Another wrong 
assumption is that the conflict was basically triggered by top-down 
politics… That the vast mass of these ideas were dangerous and delusory 
does not make them any less sincerely felt’ (De Waal, 2003: 272-3). 
Thus, while acknowledging the role of political actors and especially 
intellectuals in forging a common identity centered on the exclusion of 
the ethnic other he does not dismiss the fact that the roots of the 
hostilities lie at least partly in genuinely held and contradictory 
conceptions of territorial and national belonging.  
      Stuart Kaufman (1998, 2001: 49-84) makes a somewhat similar 
conclusion. Neither economic problems (Armenians rejected a package 
of economic benefits offered by the Soviet authorities in the beginning 
of the conflict) nor insecurity (the Soviet Union was relatively stable) 
caused violence and subsequent war. Instead Kaufman views ethnic 
conflict as a continuous process of escalatory behaviour. While 
grievances, ethnic symbols, a history of past domination and military 
capacity increase the willingness of ethnonational communities to 
engage in violent rebellion, they are not sufficient to trigger a full-scale 
war. Crucially, however, when both groups perceive an ethnic threat 
based on the actions of the opponent violence breaks out, which 
eventually justifies the perceptions. Blending together key elements 
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from rationalist, structuralist and culturalist approaches the symbolic 
politics theory holds that if three preconditions - hostile myths, ethnic 
fears, and political opportunity – are present, ethnic war results when 
they lead to rising mass hostility, chauvinist mobilization by leaders 
making extreme symbolic appeals, and a security dilemma between 
groups. While his account is a moderately constructivist one Kaufman 
also refers back to some essential human characteristics and patterns of 
interaction: ‘Cultural tendencies toward collective group self-defense, 
while not in the genes, are evolutionarily favoured’ (Kaufman, 2001: 
25). His theory, thus, occupies a middle position between purely 
constructivist and primordialist accounts.    Crucially for an integrated 
model of ethnic rebellion ‘if any of the three processes are missing… 
war can be avoided’ (Kaufman, 2001: 25). 
      With regard to NK, Kaufman denounces the idea that the real cause 
of the conflict lies in historical grievances: ‘Prejudice, fear, and a hostile 
myth-symbol complex can create a contest for dominance and 
interethnic security dilemma’ (Kaufman, 2001: 82-3).  Armenian ethnic 
identity with the highlight of its ancient history and memories of 
genocide collided with the Azeri one focused on its territory and 
statehood: ‘What made the situation so fiendishly hard to manage was 
not existence of ethnic minorities, or even the tragic history of the two 
groups, but the way of historical myths and hostile attitudes led them to 
insist on mutually exclusive political goals’ (Kaufman,2001:206). In this 
sense the modern construction of Armenian and Azeri identities based 
on selective interpretations of past experiences and a history of 
oppression was primarily an intellectual project for political 
entrepreneurs and does not in and of itself provide a fulfilling 
explanation for the making and radicalization of ethnonational politics. 
This construction did, however render a repository of myths and 
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symbols that could be mobilized and refined for political purposes. Thus, 
on the one hand, Kaufman does not accept the notion of the search for 
the supposed true, objective origin of ethnic identities on either side. On 
the contrary, he is concerned with the way in which political claims are 
grounded in and articulated through specific narratives of oppression, 
history and identity. On the other hand, he does not maintain that 
histories of wrongs suffered were merely a discursive construction 
created by ethnic entrepreneurs. The mobilizational potential of the 
symbolic elements stemmed at least in part from their rootedness in the 
collective memories of the communities concerned.  
      Rauf Garagozov (2006) also stresses the destructive role of specific 
‘schematic narrative templates’ about past atrocities rooted in collective 
memories in shaping Armenian and Azeri perceptions of their histories 
and of each other. However, he tends to overemphasize the role of elites 
by suggesting that ethnic entrepreneurs only need to revive the templates 
of ‘memory politics’ at any point to start a conflict.  Saideman and Ayres 
(2008) concentrate on the international isolation, as well as material and 
emotional costs incurred by Armenia as a result of its unconditional 
commitment to supporting  its co-ethnics in NK. At the core of their 
paper is the question why despite high losses and negative economic 
repercussions ‘Armenia represents the most successful…and intractable 
case of postcommunist irredentism’ (Saideman and Ayres, 2008: 99). 
They are interested in explaining the reasons behind Armenia’s choice to 
violently reclaim the territory of NK inhabited by its ethnic kin, while 
many other Eastern European regions with internal boundary problems 
remained at the margins of the waves of mobilization. The authors 
attribute the willingness of Armenia to reunite with NK to a whole host 
of factors rooted in domestic politics, most notably the power of mass 
nationalist sentiments, the image of a ‘martyr’ nation, the belief in 
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antiquity and the close relationship between the territory and national 
identity (Saideman and Ayres, 2008: 94-5). By taking into consideration 
the role of historical discourses, territory and mass nationalism based on 
exclusivist assumptions this account improves realist assessments of 
territorial conflict and expansion, which tend to explain irredentism 
primarily as the result of security dilemmas and power politics (e.g., 
(Liberman, 1993; Posen, 1993). It also provides a more comprehensive 
basis from which to understand the motivations of actors resistant to 
territorial losses regardless of the associated costs. 
      A more dynamic account of conflict development has been recently 
provided by (O’Lear and Whiting, 2008). Although not directly 
concerned with the course of the radicalization process the authors 
correctly point out the need to compare the content of Armenian and 
Azeri identities, as well as to study the differences in the respective 
nation and state-building processes in specific territorial contexts. The 
aim here is to identify how ‘nations and states utilize, operate within… 
or aim to control physical space’ (O’Lear and Whiting, 2008: 189). In 
this model the fundamental variations between a strong state, weak but 
cohesive national identity in the case of Azerbaijan vs. a weak state and 
strong but diffused national identity in Armenia account for the actors’ 
unwillingness to be flexible in the negotiation of institutional solutions. 
              
      This study builds upon the more complex interpretations by 
comparing and contrasting in a more systematic manner Armenian and 
Azeri courses of action (as influenced by memories, the degree of 
development of social networks, the presence/availability of mobilizing 
ideas, the degree of cohesion/rivalry among elites), which can help to 
avoid one-sided interpretations evident in much of the literature on the 
subject. Particular attention is paid to how the reactualization of 
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competing understandings of ethnogenesis combined with the structural 
impact of Soviet nationalities policies to generate ethnic tension and 
translate into political mobilization. My perspective also acknowledges 
and privileges the standpoints of the activists themselves, which have 
generally been underrepresented in academic literature. Analyzing the 
dynamics of state- activist communication as part of a feedback driven 
process, within-movement competition and the shifting balance of 
opportunities and threats, particularly in the late Soviet context, allows 
for a more nuanced examination of how gradualist platforms of action 
are replaced with radical repertoires in specific spatio-temporal 
environments.  
      One dimension that will not be considered in this study is the role of 
diaspora actors and transnational linkages. While I recognize that 
diasporas can have a significant influence on the course of nationalist 
agitation, I have chosen not to focus on diasporas in this research, 
primarily because for most of the time periods under investigation 
interaction between diaspora organizations and domestic protagonists 
remained rather limited. In particular, in the case of NK, ‘the diaspora 
did not understand the scope and direction of the nationalist movement 
in 1988’ (Koinova, 2011: 349). Thus, my lack of attention to diaspora 
involvement should not be taken as a general statement on its impact on 
local politics overall, but as a reflection of the fact this category of actors 
was not of central importance during specific time spans12. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 For an analysis of how the Armenian diaspora became more actively engaged in the NK conflict in 
the post-independence period and started to exert a radicalizing influence on domestic developments, 
especially after the war, see (Koinova, 2011). For a consideration of the transnational dimension in 
the Northern Ireland case see e. g. (Maney, 2000). 
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                                                    Chapter 2  
                                       NK in a historical context 
 
                               Introduction 
      The first aim of this chapter is to explore the selective use of history 
in political action. By examining what each side includes in its history it 
is possible to also look at how each account implies certain forgettings.  
The ways that are used to structure different historical narratives become 
clearer once we compare the two sides’ (Armenian and Azeri) views.  
The (re)appropriation of the past for the purposes of the present, the 
quest to rediscover, reclaim, reinterpret and defend historical and 
cultural traditions in the broadest sense has been a common phenomenon 
in nationalist struggles: ‘In order to create a convincing representation of 
the ‘nation’, a worthy and distinctive past must be rediscovered and 
appropriated’ (Smith, 1997: 36). This process is closely intertwined with 
the political sphere and can be used for political purposes, including 
mass mobilization and the legitimation of elites’ status and authority 
(Kaufman, 2001). Drawing primarily on ethnosymbolic interpretations 
of ethnicity (Armstrong, 1982; Smith, 1986, 1999; Hutchinson, 1987, 
2005; Kaufman, 2001; Ross, 2007, Coakley, 2004) that stress the 
importance of historical continuity this chapter aims to show how 
conflicting historical narratives on NK, contrasting perceptions of the 
past and arguments about nationhood translate into the reality of political 
mobilization.  The role of intellectuals in shaping and supporting the 
national project partly by utilizing and integrating an array of historical 
and social ‘facts’ into an authoritative discourse will be emphasized.   
Long before the active phase of the movement for reunification and the 
resulting conflict, scholars (primarily, historians, archeologists and 
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political scientists) on both sides have engaged in an intense competition 
over the ‘indigenization’ of history as a way of encoding national 
identities and authenticating the desired changes in the region’s 
boundaries.  Through a particular interpretation of historic, archeological 
and cultural material intellectuals supported and legitimized mass 
political mobilization, which eventually integrated this historiography 
into collective memory. A debate over the past became an important 
cultural resource when the conflict escalated.  
      Over the years leaders extensively drew upon the historic themes to 
lay the foundation for the creation of a nationalist movement, harness a 
powerful identity narrative and (re)activate ethnic discourse. 
Intellectuals on both sides were directly engaged in the production of 
scholarly works with predominantly cultural motifs, documenting 
cultural and political claims to the territory. Both sides have used history 
to: 
• legitimize their grievances; 
• find ‘uncontestatable’ evidence to demonstrate that their ideas and 
arguments are founded on what they see as ‘objective historical facts’; 
• justify their struggle on behalf of pre-existing nations, referring to 
the (pre-Soviet) era of cultural and political flourishing. 
 
      The second aim of this chapter is to discuss the background factors 
that favoured the radicalization of the conflict in the late Soviet era 
comprising what is commonly referred to as the ‘Soviet legacy’. 
Political and cultural aspects will be addressed. Introducing the Soviet 
legacy helps to explain that the nationalist movements in Armenia, NK, 
and, to a lesser extent Azerbaijan, did not emerge entirely spontaneously 
in the 1980s. Rather, they were part of an ongoing cycle.  
                                                                                         88
      Given the mismatch in the arguments and rhetoric of both sides to 
the conflict, which will be discussed below my purpose is not to provide 
a definitive and exhaustive account of the historical background to the 
conflict. Instead I focus on some of the key themes that have historically 
been influential in the formation of the respective identities to be able to 
show how these themes evolved to be used as legitimation strategies 
during the active phase of the struggle. Political claims became 
grounded in, and articulated through, specific narratives of history, 
territory and identity, which taken together worked to provide answers to 
the two critical questions in the case at hand – the question of ethnic 
borders and ethnic membership. Partly because the authoritarian nature 
of the Soviet system did not allow for an open discussion of grievances 
or open competition for status, prestige and power, such battles were 
concealed in the form of academic debates over history and ethnography 
(Shnirelman, 1996; Cheterian, 2008: 38). Equally limited were the 
opportunities to engage in public debate over modern history. As a 
result, debates on medieval and ancient history intensified. Studies 
produced in the ‘host republics’ were designed to undermine the 
opponent’s claim to legitimate nationhood. Meanwhile the opposite side 
came up with completely different conclusions and implications.  
      Popular interpretations attest to the internalization of historical 
‘facts’, which do not necessarily fully reflect an empirical historic and/or 
geographic reality. Before the conflict took to the streets it was fought in 
the minds of the ‘chosen few’. As an ethnographer puts it: ‘Everything 
started with ‘kitchentalk’. Armenians and Azeris went to libraries, read 
about NK and then tried to convince the other of their view. It was like 
an intellectual mind game’ (author interview with Lev Perepelkin, 8 July 
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2008, Moscow)13.   This level of ideas is therefore particularly 
significant for understanding the late and post-Soviet political contest, as 
well as how the conflict came to be defined in ethnic terms. This 
chapter, thus, outlines the origins of Armenian and Azeri national 
identities, as well as the discourses, which continue to inform the 
dynamics of ethnic relations. The examination of these themes is 
presented here not as an original contribution to the region’s history but 
as a necessary, and inevitably brief, introduction to the complex 
developments that shaped the self-perceptions of the respective groups. 
      A lot of existing publications dealing with historical themes 
concentrate on one of two dimensions. On the one hand, as mentioned 
above, the essentialization of history on both sides has meant that 
historical retrospect remains the most salient research interest for local 
authors. On the other hand, many works by Western scholars tend to put 
overwhelming emphasis on the enabling or constraining role of Soviet 
institutional structures. There is a consequent need to compare and 
contrast, from a more balanced perspective, the key cultural-symbolic 
and historical motifs to understand the resilience of ethnic and cultural 
affinities of both elites and masses. On the whole, the argument in this 
chapter builds upon and supports the general theoretical (ethnosymbolic 
and ethnic conflict) literature, and some literature on NK (e.g. 
Shnirelman, 1996; Cheterian, 2008) about the crucial role of nationalist 
intellectuals in the selective reappropriation and reinterpretation of the 
past within the political sphere. However, by paying particular attention 
to competing perceptions and self-positionings at the non-elite level and 
applying D. Horowitz’s (2000) analytical focus on the psychological 
                                                 
13 All the interviews in Armenia, Azerbaijan, NK and Russia were conducted in Russian. All 
translations from Russian, including those of quotations from interviews and other sources, are my 
own. 
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significance of interpretations of relative group status I attempt to move 
away from the concentration on powerful social actors alone. The 
(comparative) analysis of such intergroup fluctuation, especially its 
operation below the elite, helps highlight how subjective evaluations of 
socio-economic placement, homeland status, shared sentiments of mass 
traumas and culturally embedded narratives can take on a dynamics that 
sometimes corresponds to but is also separate from elite intentions. 
 
      The boundaries of the region known today as Nagorno-Karabakh 
(the toponym Nagorno-Karabakh, ‘black garden’, has been in use since 
the 13th century) have repeatedly shifted depending on conquests, 
territorial and administrative divisions and the relationship between the 
major powers dominating the territory. Between the 11th and the 19th 
centuries the list of foreign dominations has included the Arabs, Seljuk 
Turks, Ottoman Turks and Persians. The history of the Transcaucasus is 
one of overlapping expansion and power competition mainly between 
Turkish, Persian and later Russian empires, as well as the efforts of 
small units within the territory to resist political domination. The peoples 
living in the region found themselves repeatedly taken under the control 
of one or the other of the major powers. This turbulent history of border 
shifts inevitably has had an impact on the experiences and identity 
formation of the respective populations. Being subjected to centuries of 
foreign domination meant remaining virtual hostages to their larger and 
more powerful neighbours.  
      Since the early 1920s this mountainous, predominantly Armenian-
populated enclave has been contested between Armenians who sought 
the territory’s reunification with neighbouring Armenia and Azeris, who 
strove to maintain its status as part of Azerbaijan. The roots of the 
conflict date back to the dissolution of the Russian empire and the 
                                                                                         91
formation (for a very brief period) of independent Transcaucasian states 
in 1918. Both peoples view the region as their historic homeland. Both 
have simultaneously argued for their right to control the territory and 
point to the long-lasting presence of their ancestors within the territory 
to justify their claims.  Both sides have also defended the need to protect 
themselves from their opponent by employing the homeland as a shield 
against the ‘aggressive other’. At the same time the struggle has been not 
simply over territory and self-determination but also over the exercise 
and interpretation of national identity as the area holds a special 
significance for Armenian and Azeri national consciousness. Material 
and cultural grievances have been developing against the background of 
a central issue to the conflict – the constant sense of historic injustice 
that the NK Armenians as well as the Armenians in Armenia proper 
harbour about Azeri rule over this territory. The recurring Armenian 
agenda to redeem and integrate NK was an important source of tensions 
and antagonism between the two Soviet republics and radicalized 
policies of repression and discrimination against Armenians inside 
Azerbaijan, as well as against Azeris inside Armenia14. 
      The NK dispute, like most conflicts, is multidimensional but one of 
the key issues is that the parties have divergent viewpoints on this piece 
of land and each attempts to construct and communicate a public 
narrative of the conflict based on vastly different elements. In this sense 
                                                 
14 The 1979 census is generally considered the most reliable of the available (Soviet era) sources with 
regard to the size of the minority in each state, as it was conducted before substantial population flows 
triggered by the conflict began (e.g. Unusov, 2000). According to the 1979 data, there were 475.000 
Armenians in Azerbaijan (around 8% of the total population) and 161.000 Azeris in Armenia (around 
5% of the total population) (cited in Unusov, 1998:2). However, even these figures probably 
underestimate the real numbers. According to one of my interviewees, who had done some research 
on the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan, by 1988 450.000 Armenians lived in Baku alone, while 
mixed marriages totaled 80.000 (author interview with Julieta Verdyan, retired schoolteacher from 
Kirovabad (Azerbaijan), now living in Yerevan, 17 July 2008, Yerevan). Some respondents cited a 
figure of 250.000 Azeris living in Armenia in the mid-1980s (e.g. author interview with Mahammad 
Maharramov, Deputy head of the Department for Problems of Refugees, IDPs, migration and work 
with international organizations, 16 January 2009, Baku). 
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the conflict is not only a struggle for physical control over territory but 
also a moral battle for ‘ownership’ of that territory.   The only idea that 
unites the two positions is that the history of NK dates back to ancient 
times and that it represents the birthplace of modern civilization. As a 
former senior official in the Armenian political establishment and 
activist of the NK movement attests: ‘… there are two truths in this 
conflict – the Armenian and the Azeri one.  The reality, however, is 
totally different. It is somewhere in between’ (author interview with 
David Shakhnazaryan, 30 July 2008, Yerevan). The predominant 
Armenian view portrays the conflict as a struggle for national survival 
justified by a shared history of oppression and genocide. The main Azeri 
interpretation stresses the importance of abiding by international 
standards and preserving its territorial integrity.   My intention in the 
next sections is not to give an assessment about which narrative is 
historically more accurate. Rather I aim to compare and contrast the 
main components of Armenian and Azeri identities. This comparison 
helps consider, from an outsider’s perspective, the debates over NK’s 
ethnogenesis and the competing claims to indigenous habitation. 
 
         
                 Armenian identity15 
   The collective identity of Armenian nationalists has its roots in the 
historical legacy of resistance to all foreign, and especially Turkish, 
domination that had been the prevailing theme of collective existence in 
the 19th and early 20th century. In the modern era, the Ottomans and the 
Russians/Soviets were the most significant foreign powers that helped 
shape Armenia’s national character. This identity was a complex 
                                                 
15 For general overviews of Armenian history and/or its relationship to NK see e. g. (Balayan, 2005; 
Babayan, 2007; Seyranyan, 1997). For overviews written by Western scholars see Suny, 1993; 
Libaridian, 2004). 
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combination of religion, ethnicity, collective historical memory, deeply 
felt grievances and the perceptions of threats from ethnic others, which, 
arguably, can partly explain the dynamics of the resulting ethnic strife.  
The perception of threat is a function of the perceived capabilities and 
aggressive intentions of the ethnic other(s) and is composed of threats 
not only to the physical security of the group, but also to its identity (e.g. 
Kaufman, 1998, 2001). 
      Armenian historians generally trace the origins of the Armenian 
nation to the ancient Uratians. In 330AD Armenia adopted Christianity 
and claims to be the oldest Christian nation in the world. Throughout 
much of its history Armenia has rarely been united as a single political 
entity. For a long period (16th – 18th centuries) its territory had been 
divided between the Turkish and the Persian Empires.  This dependence 
instilled a sense of vulnerability which the passage of time has hardly 
diminished. At least five elements should be mentioned as having a 
significant impact on Armenian self-perceptions and self-representation: 
1. Mythologies of religion contributed to the formation of a national 
culture and became indispensable components of Armenian national 
identity. Being surrounded by mainly hostile Muslim countries and 
living under the yoke of foreigners, Armenians have always fought to 
preserve their religion and culture and have always felt threatened by 
any designs to eradicate their national identity. Looking to the West for 
help proved to be frustrating. This fact distanced the Armenians to some 
extent from the West, as well as providing them with a feeling of being 
distinctive and having a unique mission of guarding the gates of the 
Christian world. In addition, the Armenian Church, although 
administratively divided over the centuries served as the basis for uniting 
Armenians.  
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2. Linguistic distinctiveness. The Armenian language, which constitutes 
a separate branch of the Indo-European branch also contributes to the 
perception of uniqueness.  
3. The Genocide of the Armenian population that occurred between 
1895 and 1920, and the loss of its historical lands (Western Armenia – 
modern day Turkey) resulted in a victimization of the nation and the 
emergence of a diaspora spread around the world. The recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide over the years has become the indivisible part of the 
Armenian Cause (Hay Dat) where the achievement of historical justice 
and the restoration of historical territories of Armenia are central. The 
NK issue gradually became a component of this broader struggle for 
historical justice.  
4. A lack of an indigenous institutional history of statehood and state 
building. As a consequence, ‘statehood’ and ‘statelessness’ function as 
important explanatory categories to understand Armenian identity. 
Armenians often use their long history of statelessness to account for 
their fears, insecurity and sometimes passivity. This component could 
also be described as a fear of independence given Armenia’s 
geostrategic location between competing powers (Libaridian, 1991: 4).  
The special place of NK in Armenian national consciousness is at least 
partly due to the fact that (according to Armenian historiography), 
despite being caught between more powerful external political forces 
NK, unlike Armenia, has always managed to maintain a certain degree 
of independence and to preserve its statehood. 
5. Another key historical event that has left a strong impact on the 
formation of Armenian self-representation was the emergence and rapid 
fall of the First Independent Republic of Armenia (1918–1920). This 
historical fact is important not only because that was a unique period of 
independent statehood, but it was also the first democratic experience of 
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Armenia at the beginning of the 20th century. First as a part of the anti-
Bolshevik Transcaucasian Federation, Eastern Armenia declared its 
independence in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1918. The 
government of Eastern Armenia was dominated by the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation. Within two years the country's leadership had 
tried to build a democratically governed republic by establishing basic 
state institutions and holding parliamentary elections. After two years of 
independence, however, the Russian Red Army occupied the country 
turning Armenia into a Soviet Republic in November 1920.  
      The issue of NK represented a synthesis of all aspects of Armenian 
national problems –firstly, it was a legacy of Soviet nationality policies 
and in accordance with the spirit of perestroika initiated in April 1985, it 
was seen by participants as one of the strongest challenges to those 
policies – a ‘test-case for perestroika’. Secondly, NK was attached to 
Azerbaijan which represented the traditional enemy – Turkey given the 
lingering effect of the 1915 Genocide in the Ottoman Empire on 
Armenian national consciousness; the population was forced to migrate 
and exposed to various cultural pressures that led to an existential crisis, 
therefore the problem of cultural survival was acute. Finally there were 
some (real or perceived) interethnic inequalities and allegations of 
discrimination against the Armenian population are common (see 
below).  
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                      Azeri identity16 
      While the Armenians have a long-standing and strong sense of 
identity based primarily on shared linguistic and religious elements, the 
Azeri perceptions of self-identity and self-representation are more 
difficult to pinpoint than that of the Armenians. The Azeris did not have 
a common language or religion until the early 20th century (Aukh, 2001; 
Swietochowski, 2001), and their sense of identification developed in 
accordance with the powers that had ruled them: Turkey and Iran. A 
shared Azeri identity gained momentum in the early 1900s resulting 
from economic cohesion and the rise of an intelligentsia brought about 
by Russian influence, and, simultaneously, Islamic, Persian and Turkic 
aspects of the collective identity reinforced a desire for political 
autonomy (Swietochowski, 1985). Unlike Armenians with their 
heightened sense of vulnerability, uniqueness and isolation from the 
outside world, Azeris have always had the perception of belonging to 
larger entities and larger communities – Muslim and Turkic17: ‘Azeris 
saw themselves as an integral part of a common Caucasian cultural 
space, and could easily live in NK, Armenia or Azerbaijan. They did not 
feel enclave existence in NK’ (author interview with Jivanshir 
Akhundov, 7 January 2009, Baku). 
      The history of NK played an important role in helping Azerbaijan to 
solidify a national identity against Armenia’s attempts to reincorporate 
territories which it considers to have been artificially separated by Stalin. 
Like the Armenians, the Azeris have tried to prove that the region is a 
cradle of their national culture. Azeris themselves have origins in Turkic 
communities moving to the area, and Mongol and Indo-European 
                                                 
16 For general overviews of Azeri history written from more impartial perspectives see (Hunter, 1994, 
1997: 437-40; Swietochowski, 1985; Altstadt, 1992). For overviews having a strong anti-Armenian 
component see (Sevdimaliev, 2004; Mustafaev, 2008; Nagdaliyev, 2006; Mardzhanly, 2010; 
Mamedly, 2010). 
17 See (Furman, 1998: 122-3) for observations along similar lines. 
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influences shaped Azeri language and culture (Leeuw van der, 2000: 19-
20). 
      Like Armenians and Georgians, Azeris also enjoyed a brief period of 
independence between 1918 and 1920. From the first days of its 
existence, the Azerbaijan Republic claimed certain disputed territories, 
including NK and stated that Zangezur, NK and the Lake Sevan basin as 
being, historic regions of Azerbaijan. The Azeris argue that the rivalry 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan started in the early 19th century when 
Russian conquerors deported the Azeri population of the region and 
settled in Armenian migrants, mainly from the Ottoman Empire and 
Iran. According to the Azeri interpretation, Tsarist administration used 
forced Armenian migration to the region as a means to impose Russian 
control over Azerbaijan (Kazymbeyli, 2009: 166-8). Citing Tsarist 
population records, Azeris maintain that the population of NK had been 
overwhelmingly Muslim prior to the forced mass migration of 
Armenians from around the world.  Azeri sources state (citing Russian 
records) that the total population in Transcaucasia kept increasing 
throughout the 19th century and reached one million 300 thousand in 
1918 of which one million migrated to the region in mid to late 19th 
century (Shavrov, 1911: 60, cited in Khalilov, 2000: 3). Thus, 
Armenians were not a majority in NK until mid 19th century. 
 
 
      For both peoples the main task in making their claim is to locate the 
first stages of their ethnogenesis as far back in history as possible Both 
are appealing to different periods in their pasts, and disregard everything 
that does not fit into their system of arguments. In this sense the 
narrative put forward by each group presents a ‘universal history, the 
only one with a real claim…’ (Keating, 2001: 31, emphasis added). 
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From the perspective of Armenians residing in Armenia proper, there is 
a deep tie to the territory based on both the historical assertion of it 
rightfully belonging to Armenia and on the dynamics of the conflict 
being framed in terms of defending the rights of Armenian co-ethnics 
wrongfully subsumed within the Azeri state. The critical uninterrupted 
link between the Armenian nation and NK transcends any Azeri 
assertions to the contrary. From the very beginning of the struggle for 
NK and the emergence of a nationalist movement, perceptions of current 
events were coloured by an understanding of the past and, conversely, a 
particular reading of the past greatly influenced the ways in which the 
present was seen and understood.  
      The core of the historical dimension of the dispute concerns the 
identity of the ancient inhabitants of NK and whether Armenians or 
Azeris are the ethnic descendants of Caucasian Albanians, who had 
inhabited the Transcaucasus in ancient times, and therefore can 
legitimately claim the right to the territory based on that long-lasting 
presence in the land. The dispute began with the publication of 
Azerbaijan in the Seventh to Ninth Centuries (1965) where an Azeri 
historian, Ziya Buniyatov, questioned not only the legitimacy of 
Armenian territorial and cultural claims but also the identity of NK 
Armenians. The contestation centers on the ethnic composition of the 
Albanian Kingdom.  
Since the Albanian Kingdom occupied most of the territory now covered 
by the Azeri Republic, Azeris have represented it as the precursor of the 
contemporary Azeri state and the Azeri people as the direct descendents 
of Albanians. In later writings Buniyatov claimed that NK Armenians 
were not true Armenians but ‘Armenized Albanians’ (Buniyatov, 1987). 
A proportion of Albanians had gradually been ‘Armenized’. 
Consequently, for Buniyatov and his students Azerbaijan can claim to be 
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the legitimate heir to the land and culture of NK, as its present occupants 
are in fact the descendants of ethnic Albanians.  In other words, in Azeri 
historiography NK is an ancient land of the Caucasian Albanian 
civilization (Akademiya Nauk Azerbaijanskoy SSR, 1962; Mamedova, 
1986; Aliyev, 1989). Even the Armenian churches and monasteries, 
tomb stones on the territory of NK are in reality the creations of 
Caucasian Albanians and should therefore belong to Azerbaijan.   
      For Armenians the point of Azeri assertions is clear – to minimize 
Armenian rights to NK and undermine the sense of kinship between NK 
Armenians and their kin state. Armenians, tend to label such works 
‘falsification’ and consider them to be part of an aggressive deliberate 
campaign to appropriate their history and culture. A recent conference in 
Yerevan on Caucasian Albania and its legacy summarizes this line 
argument well when stating that ‘the monopolization of the ethnocultural 
heritage of Caucasian Albania is an integral part of the Azeri state’s 
falsification of Transcaucasian history’ (Golos Armenii, 11.09. 2007). 
For Armenians Azeris were introduced to the Caucasus with the 
invasions of the 11th century and are therefore ‘newcomers’ to the region 
(e. g.Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the NK 
Republic, section on NK history). 
      Armenian historiographic interpretations focus on those periods in 
NK history when it was under Persian or Russian vassalage as a separate 
principality. Semi-independent Armenian princes governed most of NK, 
mainly in feudal, patriarchal arrangements, until the early nineteenth 
century when imperial Russia annexed the region from Persia. Until that 
time, ethno-territorial boundaries had remained relatively fluid, 
accommodating seasonal land use patterns of Muslim pastoralists 
migrating between mountains and plains. Through the century of tsarist 
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rule, however, NK became linked administratively with richer areas to 
the east – the agricultural plains of Ganja and the oil fields of Baku.  
      With growing integration came the crystallization of national 
identities: territorial boundaries became increasingly fixed and policed; 
tsarist administration exercised its presence through taxation, education, 
and land reform.   Armenians tend to represent the governors (meliks) of 
NK Armenians as the key actors in the liberation struggle and resistance 
to Turkish and Persian yoke. The earliest heroes of the liberation 
struggle, it is argued, turned NK into the center of Armenia’s Russian 
orientation and a symbol of Armenian proximity to Russia based on a 
sense of Christian fellowship (Academiya Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 
1988: 12-13; Javanshir, 1959: 118-19; Babayan, 2007: 6).  Armenian 
historians have generally downplayed the significance of the presence of 
alien powers in the territory and stressed the continuity and autonomy of 
Armenian princes. The inclusion of eastern Armenia within the frontiers 
of the Russian Empire is seen in Armenian historiography as a pivotal 
point, since at that stage ‘Karabakh became even more the political, 
cultural and, subsequently, the revolutionary center of Armenia’ 
(Armenian Document Sent to Kremlin, cited in Devlin, 1988: 2).  Even 
under Russian rule in the 19th century NK Armenians were particularly 
close to the Tsar and had considerable privileges when applying for state 
positions and military service. In Armenian collective memory NK 
epitomized Armenian desire for independence and loyalty to Russia. 
While other parts of Armenia were conquered and disputed by alien 
invaders the relative autonomy of NK served as a reminder of Armenian 
former power and glory. Resisting a chain of foreign invaders ensured a 
continuous Armenian presence in NK. It is very difficult to establish the 
‘true’ historical record, which has become virtually inseparable from the 
nationalist narratives.  
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      These claims are significant because they provide the symbolic and 
political discourse through which the conflict is portrayed. Their wide 
acceptance in the respective societies together with their (re)enforcement 
in academic circles in the mid and late Soviet period also make them 
powerfully resonant – a feature upon which the leaders consistently 
draw. It should be remembered that while purporting to describe the 
origins of the conflict with regard to objective historical ‘facts’, these 
narratives also serve to construct it as a dyadic opposition between 
groups defined in absolute terms. Indeed these historically centered 
debates have provided a rhetorical space for the (re)construction of 
ethnic identities, as nationalist scholarship has re-examined distant 
historical periods to justify contemporary claims, (re) presented the 
region’s past through an ethnic lens. 
      At least two points are worth noting. First, certain elements, for 
example, the once prosperous and substantial Armenian community in 
Baku and other Azeri cities tend to be excluded from the history of 
Azerbaijan. Similarly, the history of Armenia downplays or ‘forgets’ to 
mention the presence of Muslim population, in the territory of 
contemporary Armenia before the 19th century. In this sense, the case 
provides another example of a more widely recognized nationalist 
strategy centered on (re)focusing national identity on a specific bounded 
subset of a nation’s cultural and historical experiences (Kaufmann, 2008: 
451). Second, demographic change was undoubtedly an important 
consequence of the Russian conquest of the Transcaucasus in 1828. In 
the first few years after the beginning of Russian domination the 
proportion of Muslim population declined by a third (Bournotyan, 1996: 
72). At the same time for strategic and economic reasons the Russian 
authorities encouraged the resettlement in Eastern Armenia of Christian 
Armenians from Persia. Some authors suggest that the goal was to create 
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a buffer zone between the Russian territory and the Muslim states of 
Persia and Turkey (e.g. Mamedova, 2003: 57-8). Whatever the 
underlying motives, an Armyanskaya Oblast’ (Armenian Province) was 
created by special decree to accommodate the Armenian population. The 
result of such policies was a rapid increase of the Armenian population 
from around 20% before the conquest to nearly 50% by 1832 (Velichko, 
2007 [1904]: 146). 
      Thus, there was an obvious (constructed) clash between Armenian 
and Azeri versions, and little possibility of dialogue, at least under the 
conditions of competition for power, as well as the privileges associated 
with indigenous status, created by the Soviet regime.  As two of the 
leading Azeri historians recently argued: 
  If three generations had been living on this territory, then this can 
already be considered indigenous population… Even taking into 
account that Armenians were relocated there at the beginning of the 
19th century, they can be acknowledged to be an indigenous population. 
They have the same rights to that land as anyone else. Someone would 
make a historical journey backwards as far as one thousand years, 
others – two thousand years… From the viewpoint of ethnopolitics, 
this is totally irrelevant. All anthropological studies have revealed that 
Armenians and Azeris, who had lived on that territory, had developed a 
close anthropological affinity. In ancient times, the migration of the 
population had not followed a pattern, a new ruler came to power, and 
exercised his dominance both economically and ideologically (author 
interview with Rasim Musabaev, 10 January 2009, Baku). 
 
  The category of ‘indigenous people’ is a relative notion. Strictly 
speaking, neither Armenians, nor Azeris are an indigenous population 
in Transcaucasia. Both of them had come from somewhere some time 
ago, it is just a question of establishing that time. We have our own 
myths about it, just like Armenians have theirs. Our myth reveals that 
Armenians are aliens who came to Transcaucasia from other parts.  
Very many Armenians migrated to Transcaucasia in the 19th century, 
but it would be wrong to assert that all of them are migrants. So I 
always try to persuade our political scientists and politicians not to 
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treat history too frivolously (author interview with Arif Unusov, 12 
January 2009, Baku).  
 
Another commentator writes of the period immediately preceding the 
establishment of Soviet rule that ‘…nowhere is population more mixed 
than in the Caucasus…Of the nine administrative regions [in the 
Transcaucasus] only one is ethnically homogenous (98% Georgian)… 
All the others are home to various nationalities, including Russians’ 
(Nemanov, 1921: 273). 
      The unstable environment caused by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution 
created an opportunity for the Transcaucasian states to gain 
independence, although it was short-lived and lasted for only two years. 
At this juncture, the status of NK being unclear, its Armenian majority 
voiced a desire to join Armenia which along with Georgia and 
Azerbaijan had newly declared their status as independent republics. 
When the Soviets subsumed both entities in the 1920s the borders of 
each were redrawn. It is the Soviet-era borders that have persisted and 
were disputed later. At the time the delineation of territoriality was 
imposed by external agents and events with republics’ borders being 
arbitrarily redrawn as a result of administrative decisions made by the 
Soviet regime. Borders and associated political and administrative 
boundaries were established in a very haphazard manner, which not only 
ignored existing ethnographic realities but also contradicted religious, 
linguistic and cultural affinities.                                   
      In July 1923 the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party 
(Kavburo) issued a decree assigning NK the status of an Autonomous 
Oblast’ (Region) within the Sovietized Republic of Azerbaijan. At the 
time of annexation Armenians constituted 94,8% of 158,000 inhabitants 
(Department of Statistics of the NK Republic, cited in Barsegov, 2008: 
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659). For the next 70 years NK remained an enclave within Azerbaijani 
jurisdiction. Even by Soviet standards the situation in NK was an 
anomaly as it was the only separate administrative unit hosting a 
minority living on the borders of its ethnic kin’s Republic.  
    Although 1988 is usually cited as the starting point of the nationalist 
movement both in NK itself and in Armenia it is at least arguable that 
prior processes substantially influenced the content and form of later 
upheavals. In other words, the historical roots of what is commonly 
called the NK problem do not coincide with the year 1988 when the first 
mass demonstrations in support of reunification with Armenia began.  
For Armenians the question of NK has always had both proactive and 
reactive aspects to it. Proactively Armenians saw its reunification with 
the Armenian Republic as an essential step towards rebuilding a 
dispersed nation. Reactively Armenians sought to remedy what they 
perceived as a persistent pattern of political and cultural discrimination 
that had emerged during Soviet domination.  In a small scale random 
sample survey (N=120) conducted by the author in Armenia in July 
2008 60% of respondents identified rectifying a historic injustice as the 
most important component of the NK cause18. In this connection, it can 
be suggested that NK’s experience in the Soviet era contributed to the 
escalation of ethnic tensions, as (perceived) economic 
underdevelopment, cultural discrimination and oppression significantly 
contributed to the desire of Armenians to liberate themselves from the 
rule of Baku.  
 
         
 
                                                 
18 Given the small sample size I aimed to explore in some more detail the responses of people whose 
experiences could allow to complement in-depth interviews.  
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        NK during the Soviet era: a polarized socio-political context? 
      Most academic accounts of NK during the Soviet rule, especially 
those written by Western scholars stress the latency of nationalist 
aspirations in that period. These conceptualizations generally emphasize 
either  
1) the rapidity, explosiveness and unexpectedness with which NK 
became a hot spot in the late 1980s (together with the unexpected and 
unpredictable nature of events in the Soviet Union more generally) (e. g. 
Beissinger, 1996: 105-6) or; 
2) the durability of nationalist sentiments which would inevitably 
reawaken sooner or later (e. g. Markhedonov, 2008: 2). 
      The Soviet period provided the institutional and ideological context 
that facilitated the preservation, development and (re)enforcement of 
territorial identities.      Soviet nation-building strategies attempted to 
ensure peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnic groups, resolving the 
problems associated with nationalism.  Soviet policy on nationality 
promoted the development of what it saw as ‘backward’ nations and 
implemented korenizatsiya (indigenization, nativization) which was seen 
as an antidote to Russian political hegemony under Tsarist rule. Lenin 
saw the essence of the national problem in the ‘development of a core-
periphery colonial relationship between the Russians on the one hand, 
and the non-Russians and their homelands on the other’ (cited in Chinn 
and Kaiser, 1996: 25).   In an attempt to reverse this relationship the 
central government took measured and deliberate steps to enhance the 
identities of titular and other non-Russian nationalities. This policy 
involved the sponsorship and encouragement of the institutionalization 
and codification of nationhood at the sub-state rather than at state-wide 
level by implementing affirmative action to foster local intellectual 
elites. It is now widely accepted that Soviet policy paradoxically 
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combined two trends. On the one hand, national cultural production and 
representation was promoted within the limits of Soviet power, on the 
other hand, the merging of Soviet nations and the shaping of a 
community free from ethnic/national attributes was attempted (Saroyan, 
1997; Suny, 1993; Altstadt, 1992).   
      Thus, the federal structure of the Soviet Union made it necessary to 
adapt the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism to local conditions. The 
promotion of local cultures followed the famous Soviet slogan ‘national 
in form, socialist in content’. The division between the formal 
institutional structure and the real mechanisms of power constituted an 
important part of the Soviet political system (Brubaker, 1996; 1994: 17-
48; Martin, 2001; Slezkine, 1994). The façade was represented by a 
quasi-federal, quasi-democratic constitution that put power in elected 
parliaments and even formally allowed Soviet republics to secede. The 
real mechanisms of power were in fact strictly centralized and not based 
on democratic practice. Territory was increasingly identified with a 
singular, titular nationality. The history of the place became identified 
with the titular nationality that lived there, not the history of all the 
peoples who lived in the territory. Its status as an ‘indigenous’ 
community was recognized by it being the only legitimate holder of state 
level authority within a defined territory. Territory was thus nationalized 
and nationality territorialized, which of course created the problem of 
dissatisfied minorities. In practice this meant that those members of a 
titular nationality who happened to reside within the territory to which 
the nationality was tied enjoyed a system of benefits including, for 
example, quotas in higher education.  Azeri (perceived) inability to 
accommodate the needs of the other ‘non-titular’ groups residing within 
their borders served to confirm and reinforce Armenian fears and 
vulnerability based in part on the idea that Baku was unfit to govern the 
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territory and a poor guarantor – indeed a threat – to its security and 
prosperity.  
      It is difficult to argue that NK Armenians were structurally 
disadvantaged under the Soviet system in a part of the USSR, which was 
not particularly resource rich. Although NK Armenians lagged behind 
Armenia in terms of some indicators of economic and social 
development, it consistently remained above Azerbaijan and some other 
poorer regions, as well as above average for the Soviet Union as a 
whole. The table below summarizes some indicators.    
 
                            Table 4 
        Comparative indicators of social development 
 
 
Indicators Azeri SSR NK USSR Armenian 
SSR 
Availability of 
hospital beds 
(per 10000 
persons) 
97.7 101.7 130.1 86.2 
Availability of 
public libraries 
(per 
10000persons) 
6 13 4.8 4.1 
Percentage of 
children covered 
by nurseries (%) 
20 35 57 39 
Percentage of 
children 
attending 
74.3 92.5 78.2 87.8 
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primary school 
(%) 
Availability of 
housing per 
person (square 
meters) 
10.9 14.6 14.9 13.7 
- in cities 12.2 14.6 14.3 13.1 
-in countryside 9.2 14.6 16.1 15.0 
 
Source: Bakhinskiy Rabochiy, 17. 03. 1988 (cited in Shukurov, 1990: 
87)19. 
Even if some economic indicators were behind Armenia and/or other 
republics it is very difficult to ascertain whether the (very limited) 
economic underdevelopment of the region was the result of a conscious 
decision of Baku or general incompetence of the ruling elites and 
inflexibility of existing economic structures. The extent to which 
Azerbaijan had the administrative and ideological resources to pursue 
proactive strategies in the region could be questioned.   
      It appears that the dynamics of NK’s development should not be 
assessed solely in the framework of republican processes.  It depended 
crucially on the interplay between regional, republican and union-level 
scales of power with the latter ultimately proving decisive: ‘Our 
demands grew, while opportunities within the Soviet system remained 
                                                 
19 My aim in citing these indicators is not to give a definitive assessment of their accuracy but to 
consider how they impacted upon psychological perceptions of relative group status among NK 
Armenians, and how this data relates to/ has been woven into an overarching Armenian (historical) 
narrative. Most Armenian publications accentuate the disadvantages and injustices committed by 
Azeris during the Soviet era. Balancing Armenian claims about deliberate and widespread 
discrimination is particularly difficult, since the figures can themselves be contradictory. Armenian 
sources tend to concentrate only on those areas where NK did lag behind Armenian and (only 
marginally) Azeri SSRs. See e.g. (Academiya Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1988: 45-55). By contrast, 
Azeris tend to stress how very little variation existed in a cultural or political sense, between NK and 
Armenia: ‘We used to be cosmopolitan back then [in the Soviet period]… I did not feel any difference 
between Armenia and NK….When I came to Stepanakert it felt like I found myself in Armenia’ 
(author interview with Rizvan Bayramov, 13 January 2009, Baku).  
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limited’ (author interview with Karen Oganjanyan, 21 July 2008, 
Stepanakert, former secretary of the NK branch of the Committee for 
reunification (Krunk).   From this perspective, it could be argued that 
republican policies only kept in line with the political climate of the time 
and came to reflect Soviet federalism’s contradictory tendencies, which 
gave very limited space for national expression.   In any case the specific 
status of NK – an Autonomous Oblast’, which was nonetheless fully 
accountable to the Azeri-dominated republican government in Baku and 
could not act autonomously simultaneously enhanced the availability of 
organizational resources, and increased the sense that mobilization is 
fully legitimate. The hierarchical structure also created (perceived or 
real) inequalities around which to mobilize (Hechter and Levi, 1979).  
      Available general economic development indicators for NK also 
show a steady growth. For example between 1973 and 1988 the overall 
volume of industrial production increased 3 times, while production in 
agriculture increased 1.5 times (Izvestiya, 25.03.1988).  On the whole, 
the data provides very limited evidence for (real) socio-economic 
grievances as a source of confrontational strategies. The next section 
will examine the politics of oppression (perceived or real) by the host 
republic as a key ingredient generating ethnic tension. The demographic 
‘engineering’ carried out by the republican authorities from the 1970s 
onwards will be considered as one of the major manifestations of the 
various (real and perceived) restrictions that had dominated NK society 
during the Soviet era.  
 
            Demographic trends 
      Armenians from Azerbaijan (mainly Baku) and NK often speak of 
the 1970s as the time when the crystallization of the image of the Azeri 
as the alien other started. Heidar Aliev’s rise to power in Azerbaijan is 
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widely recognized to have had a strong impact both on NK and on the 
entire Azeri Republic, as his policies translated into tighter and more 
systematic forms of control. His rule witnessed an emergence of new 
processes and an intensification of existing ones. Chief among the new 
processes was the influx of Azeri settlers, which altered not only the 
demographic situation in the region but also the very social and cultural 
fabric of NK society. The following table illustrates the main 
demographic trends over the Soviet period, as well as natural population 
growth: 
 
 
Table 5 The population of the NK Autonomous Oblast’ (according 
to the 1989 census) and population growth  
 Armenians  Azeris  
Years Actual 
number 
Population 
growth 
compared 
to the 
period 
before (%) 
Actual 
number 
Population 
growth 
compared 
to the 
period 
before (%) 
1921 128060  7594  
1939 132800 3.7 14100 77.2 
1959 110100 - 17.1 18100 27.6 
1970 121100 10 27200 51.1 
1979 123100 1.6 37200 36.7 
Source: (Barsegov, 1989: 101, cited in Mahmudov and Shukurov, 2005: 
71; growth calculations compared to the period before done by 
Mahmudov and Shukurov). 
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      We can see that the absolute number of Azeris grew steadily 
increasing from 7594 in 1921 to 37200 in 1979. This was the prevailing 
dynamics both in NK itself and in traditionally Armenian populated 
cities of Azerbaijan, like Baku, Kirovabad and some others, which 
Armenians always considered to be their homeland. Population figures 
show only a slight decrease in absolute numbers of Armenians (from 
128.060 in 1921 to 123.100 in 1979). These changes could be attributed 
to fluctuations in out-migration and slow natural growth.  The idea of a 
sharp decline in the absolute size of the Armenian population is, thus, 
not supported by census figures.  Two more significant and persuasive 
factors appear to have led Armenians to believe that their physical and 
cultural survival was under threat – a decrease in the relative size of the 
group compared to ethnic ‘others’ and very rapid population growth of 
the Azeris. While Armenians have suffered a small decrease in absolute 
numbers over the entire Soviet era, the percentage of the population as a 
whole and relative to Azeris fell from 89.1% to 75.9% between 1926 and 
1979 (Moutafian, 1994: 142).    
      Locally initiated affirmative action policies propelled members of 
the titular nationality into high-status positions and encouraged them to 
entrench politically and culturally. These policies involved the 
indigenization of university student bodies as well as of key political and 
economic positions, as Azerbaijan tried to bolster its own nation-
building project. According to my Armenian respondents, very few 
Azeri families had permanently resided in the Azeri capital prior to the 
1970s when there was an influx of Azeris from rural areas and 
educational institutions began catering for Azeri population. 
Eyewitnesses emphasize their perception that this was not a natural 
process, rather it was government-initiated and sponsored, which 
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magnified the (subjectively felt) threat. As one of my interviewees from 
Baku recalls: 
  I never saw a single Azeri in our city prior the 1970s. When Aliev 
came to power he started issuing decrees to the effect that only rural 
population was to be accepted to universities… Before Aliev there 
were many Armenians, Russians, Jews and only 2-3% Azeris in 
university departments and then everything turned upside down (author 
interview with Aida Asbekian, 15 July 2008, Yerevan).  
 
      The ethnodemographic shift was increasingly apparent in the 1970s 
such that by the late 1980s it became conceivable, from an Armenian 
perspective, that the once overwhelming Armenian predominance in NK 
would disappear in the foreseeable future. Armenians claimed that the 
demographic change occurred due to deliberate efforts of Azerbaijan to 
relocate Azeris to NK and ‘bloodlessly de-Armenize’ NK by forcing 
Armenians out. According to Armenian intellectuals, republican 
authorities in Azerbaijan devised and directed two methods of the 
deportation of Armenians. The first covert strategy consisted of 
changing the demographic balance in the region and was carried out 
gradually by creating conditions that force NK Armenians to out-
migrate. The second one had at its core the repression of any nationalist 
movements in the territory, should they arise (e. g. Movanisyan, Golos 
Armenii, 04.03. 2008; Manasyan, 2005: 73-4). The demographic shift 
represented a direct threat to the physical survival of the Armenian 
nation in a vital region of its historical homeland. As the former 
President of the contemporary NK Republic asserts: ‘The inclusion of 
NK within the borders of the Azeri SSR put the Armenian people on the 
verge of extinction’ (Goukasyan, Karabakhskiy Kourier, 2006: 17). 
      From an Armenian perspective, active Azeri discrimination against 
the Armenian population of NK would have eventually driven them out 
of the region altogether and Armenians would have lost the territory 
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forever. Geographically the smallest Soviet Republic Armenia lost land 
and population to many of its neighbours throughout its history. The 
predominantly Armenian populated southern regions of Soviet Georgia 
were handed over to Georgian administration. The overwhelmingly 
Armenian populated Nakhichevan received the status of a protectorate 
within the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan back in 1918, while NK 
with its Armenian majority was turned into an autonomous region under 
the jurisdiction of Baku. These territorial adjustments were hardly 
comparable to the devastating loss of the whole of Western Armenia and 
parts of Eastern Armenia to present day Turkey.  
      From this perspective, it is understandable that any demographic 
changes in favour of the titular nationality brought to the surface the fate 
of Nakhichevan, where Armenians had constituted the majority in the 
1920s but only a minority of 5.8 thousand people remaned by 1970 and 
this number was declining progressively (All Union Census, 1970, cited 
in Barsegov, 2008: 660). The link between the current situation in NK 
and past events in Nakhichevan was frequently made by Armenian 
intellectuals. The connection in the minds of many Armenians between 
NK and Nakhichevan as part of a single historical process of 
depopulation is also apparent in numerous petitions sent to Moscow 
during the Gorbachev era. For example Suren Avazyan notes in his 
petition to Gorbachev in March 1988 that ‘if 80% of Nakhichevan’s 
population was Armenian in 1913, today Armenians constitute only 
1.5% (of the population). In NK the Armenian population has been 
reduced from 95 to 80%’ (Avazyan, 1988: 3). 
      The underlying insecurity of NK Armenians was based on the idea 
that if the population growth continues, NK runs a very real and serious 
risk of ‘Nakhichevisation’ (e. g. Melik-Shaknazarov, 2009: 49-53). The 
long-term political objective of the Azeri authorities was to solve the NK 
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issue by applying a very simple formula – ‘No people – no problem’ 
(author interview with Aram Sarkisyan, 14 July 2008, Yerevan).  That 
plan would—if successful—end up with the annihilation of Armenians 
in their historical homeland. The persistent policy of what they saw as 
deliberate depopulation and neglect would eventually force Armenians 
out of their homeland creating the opportunity for Azerbaijan to preserve 
the region for itself.  
      On the one hand, it is undeniable that elites in Azerbaijan embraced 
the nationalization project which promoted through formal policies and 
informal practice ‘the language, culture, demographic preponderance, 
economic flourishing or political hegemony of the core ethnocultural 
nation’ (Brubaker, 1996: 9). Former President Heidar Aliev admits: ‘I 
tried to increase the number of Azeris in NK… I agreed to open a 
university there but only on the condition that there should be three 
sectors in it – Armenian, Russian and Azeri’ (Aliev, in Bakhinskiy 
Rabochiy, 22. 07. 2002, emphasis added). On the other hand, although 
members of the republican elite strove to use indigenization as a means 
to gain a competitive advantage over outsiders this strategy did not 
necessarily restrict Armenian upward mobility. All Party officials in NK 
except for the Party chairman were Armenians. Armenians also 
continued to occupy key positions in educational and cultural 
institutions.  
      It should be noted that when Baku assumed authority over NK it saw 
an already well-developed Armenian nationalism, at least among the 
intelligentsia. By contrast, for Azerbaijan the state largely preceded the 
nation and was the source of legitimacy (Dudwick, 1996: 433-9). A 
distinctive Azeri identity developed only with the onset of the Soviet 
period.  Preserving territorial integrity became the focus of the creation 
of solidarity and social cohesion.  The desire to homogenize political 
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space could, thus, be seen as an attempt to overcome and compensate for 
a still underdeveloped sense of nationhood.  At the same time there is no 
evidence to suggest that the policies of the Azeri authorities were 
directed specifically and deliberately against Armenians. Rather it was 
aimed at enhancing the presence of the titular nationality, and could 
equally have been somewhat hostile, for example, to Russians or any 
other ‘outsiders’. 
      In addition, the official population figures are not very reliable, as 
those Armenians who (temporarily) left Karbakh and went to work or 
study in Baku or Yerevan) did not always cancel their house registration 
(propiska) (author interviews with Ali Abbasov, 7 January 2009, Baku, 
Kerim Kerimly, 6 January 2009, Baku, Jivanshir Akhundov, 7 January 
2009, Baku). Thus, the data is likely to reflect some Armenians who 
remained formally registered but did not actually live in NK, which 
means that the absolute number of Armenians was (probably) lower 
even during the Soviet era, and the demographic decline was not as 
sharp as Armenians themselves like to portray. 
      The present context lived as a result of the past does not exist based 
solely on the historical reference but also through the act of continuously 
reliving and remembering the past as a dynamic progression into the 
future. In a population with the historical experience and collective 
memory of the Armenians the people’s priority became not only to 
preserve the identity they have struggled to hold on to but to constantly 
reassert its dominance within a particular politico-cultural space. In 
addition, the fears of annihilation to a certain extent expressed Armenian 
anxiety about their own cultural survival. A crucial factor that led NK 
Armenians to conclude that their national survival was threatened was 
the lack of cultural autonomy.  
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      On the one hand, the special status of NK within Azeri SSR meant 
that its people were legally guaranteed the right to develop their own 
language and culture, as well as to be educated in their native language 
in the framework of the regional curriculum. The Azeris appealed to a 
similar conception of rights to argue for greater economic and political 
autonomy within the all Union context. On the other hand, autonomy 
bred a sense of being underprivileged when compared to groups who 
were represented by union republics.  Political and cultural autonomy 
meant that local elites enjoyed a limited degree of freedom in 
formulating policies and were ultimately dependant on Azerbaijan (and 
the Soviet state) for major decisions in political and cultural life. A key 
element affecting the dynamics of the conflict, especially in the context 
of Soviet nationality policies is the fluctuation in intergroup perceptions 
relative to each other. It is revealing that, as mentioned above, when 
affirming NK’s status as a ‘forgotten land’ both economically and 
culturally Armenians constantly compare its development to Armenia 
and the Baltic states. At the same time they forget to mention the fact 
that NK’s development was actually better than some regions of 
Azerbaijan. 
      Even though the economic and social conditions in NK were not 
particularly prosperous, it should be noted that this situation was hardly 
unique to NK – many other Soviet regions were in a similar (or much 
worse) position during that period. However, the policies of the host 
republic were seen as a manifestation of a deliberate policy of 
discrimination. As Horowitz (2000 [1985]) has emphasized, it is not 
actual disparities among groups along socio-economic lines that matter 
in the polarization of ethnicity but a comparative evaluation of group 
worth approached on the basis of a ‘positional group psychology’. This 
perceptual differential between Armenian and Azeri communities both 
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in NK and in Azerbaijan while not in itself sufficient to explain the 
evolution of collective action in the respective societies can nonetheless 
help to account for how changing attitudes and dispositions breed 
feelings of resentment and hostility leading to increased politicization 
and radicalization. Subjective comparisons of intergroup esteem are 
particularly strong in cultural and identity politics due to the vital 
importance of these areas in psychological aspirations to public 
validation (Horowitz, 2000: 218).  Intercommunal politics depends 
heavily on the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, securing privileges 
that accompany inclusion and overcoming or mitigating the penalties 
that accompany exclusion. The provision of material and symbolic 
goods, like admission to educational institutions, access to employment 
opportunities, the prestige of the ethnic group, its relative power and 
autonomy within the polity are all indicators of the benefits of inclusion 
groups seek to protect or secure.  Inclusion in turn confers an important 
symbol of group worth – ‘identification with the polity’ (Horowitz, 
2000: 185). 
      The policies of Azerbaijan that were perceived to undermine 
Armenian cultural presence in NK included the following:  
1) the construction of a distinctly Azeri cultural space through the 
destruction of Armenian historic monuments: ‘Some Azeri leaders could 
give an order to shoot at Armenian cultural monuments. There were 
instances when Azeris shot at the monuments of the 4th century in 
Gandzasar’ (Author interview with Stepan Grigoryan, 28 July 2008, 
Yerevan); 
2) a progressive isolation of NK from Armenia proper primarily 
through the blockage of cultural communication. These policies had the 
cumulative effect of enforcing a muted quiescence among the majority 
of the population while forcing others to leave the region altogether. 
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Resistance became largely defensive, cultural ‘victories’ were often 
sought in seemingly small but symbolically significant matters, e. g. the 
right to name places was contested. Far from being simply national in 
form these developments served to focus the discontent of Armenians 
(both in NK and in Armenia) all the more sharply and resulted in 
instilling a heightened territorial consciousness that had a very tangible 
goal – reattaching a separated part of the homeland.   It should be 
remembered that NK Armenians did enjoy the right to primary and 
secondary education in Armenian, and educational and cultural 
institutions were allowed to function fully. 
      Thus, it is arguable that the core of the matter was not a struggle over 
material resources and not so much a fight for the recognition of 
Armenian culture, although the perceived lack of means to cultural self-
expression remained a key grievance. Most importantly, after nearly 
seven decades of Soviet rule Armenians did not accept Azeri rule as 
legitimate and feared its long-term consequences, which they imagined 
would be the loss of their identity.  
      Based on Armenian accounts alone it is too easy to envision NK 
Armenians as an unwanted ‘element’ whose very presence hindered the 
construction of Azeri nationhood. According to this interpretation, NK 
Armenians had no other choice but to seek separation from Azerbaijan 
to avoid ‘oppression’ and eventual cultural obliteration. The empirical 
evidence, however, is rather mixed. Even though the rights of the 
autonomous region were limited, the institutional and cultural 
framework for the (re)enforcement of specific territorial identities 
remained in place. The Armenian public perceived NK dependence on 
Azerbaijan as entirely illegitimate, and all Azeri policies, regardless of 
their actual intention were seen through that lens. 
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            Conclusion 
       This chapter has considered how ethnocentric historiography 
legitimized the claims of both majority and minority in the conflict (e. g. 
Tishkov, 1997: 1-12). In fact at the initial stages of the movement for 
NK not only reunification with Armenia but also social and cultural 
concerns, like environmental protection and an increased volume of 
publications on Armenian history became the foci of intellectual 
attention and the main themes through which the wider population was 
mobilized. At the same time the existence of grievances alone is clearly 
insufficient to account for the nature and timing of collective action in 
NK, as well as the dynamism and vigorous social activism that 
distinguished the national movement, at least during its early phase. I 
question the sufficiency of those accounts that are detached from the 
territorial context (e.g. Kaldor, 2007). I emphasized those aspects of 
Soviet nationality policies that were of significance for the formation, 
maintenance and /or weakening of Armenian and Azeri identities. I 
attempted to show that the structural environment mattered in so far as it 
defined the parameters of what was (not) allowed in internal politics. 
One of the most important elements of this environment was the 
competition for status and prestige, whereby to have a higher status in 
the hierarchy of Soviet nationalities required ‘proving’ a long historic 
presence, developing and distributing their versions of history and 
culture. 
      On the whole, the examination of the Soviet era alone confirms the 
findings of elite-centered research on collective action about the decisive 
role of strategies pursued by elites, primarily intellectuals, even when 
deep ethnic grievances are at stake. Although the Soviet Union had 
firmly institutionalized ethnonational identities the politicization of 
boundaries between groups, the categorization and redefinition of 
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relationships in that period (e. g. indigenous vs. newcomer) was not self-
evident.  But without ‘people’s perception of an existence-threatening 
force…people are unlikely to respond to the national agendas… of 
intellectuals’ (Bowman, 2003: 320). The need for physical and 
psychological security in that period was one of the key elements 
directing the attention of the nation’s intellectuals towards the past out of 
which out they tried to construct ‘uncontestable’ evidence against future 
threats to their collective existence.  
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                                      Chapter 3 
        The dynamics of politicization in NK: towards mass movement 
mobilization 
 
        Introduction 
      The previous chapter explored how Armenians and Azeris have used 
history to legitimize their grievances through particular interpretations of 
historical, archeological and cultural materials. I showed that the 
assertion of the ‘righteousness’ of the positions of both parties had taken 
place largely as a competition between ethnohistories, which affirmed 
‘natural’ ties of the respective ethnonational groups to the contested 
territory through specific accounts of ethnogenesis and historical 
continuity. I also dealt with Soviet nationality policies in the pre-
Gorbachev period.  
      This chapter aims to consider the ‘constitutional’ phase of the 
development of the Armenian national movement.  The first section 
builds upon the discussion in chapter 2 to explore some of the reasons 
behind the divergent trajectories of mobilization in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in the late 1980s.   While the unfolding of Armenian 
nationalism in NK and Armenia has been subject to different and 
competing interpretations, the emergence of the Azeri counter-
movement has been frequently presented as overwhelmingly reactionary 
and seen as inevitable. The virtual absence of contentious activity 
outside institutional channels in Azerbaijan in the mid to late 1980s has 
been rather poorly theorized. Even those works by Western scholars that 
touch on this aspect tend to proceed on the assumption that the muted 
and weak patterns of Azeri collective action constitute yet another 
example of defensive mobilization which explains the different 
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dynamics. This general path is quite widely recognized and detailed in 
the literature on ethnic conflict20. While I do not deny that Azerbaijan’s 
political revitalization took place partly in response to the resurfacing of 
Armenian demands, I suggest that it is too simplistic to see Azeri 
nationalism as entirely reactionary and defensive. The divergent socio-
psychological profiles of the parties and the related deeply embedded 
patterns of domination, subordination and resistance are particularly 
crucial for understanding the variations in degrees of ‘emotional 
investment’ (Melucci, 1996: 98) in the conflict in the late 1980s.   I 
argue that higher levels of political activity in Armenia and NK were due 
at least in part to the presence and availability of three key dimensions: 
1) (relatively) extensive social networks dating back to the Soviet 
period; 2) symbolic resources (and political opportunities to develop 
them); 3) ideas about the Armenian national project that resonated more 
widely among the population.   By contrast, in Azerbaijan these factors 
were not entirely absent but much less pronounced which undermined 
the ability of the Azeris to take full advantage of the political 
opportunities, leading to initial passivity and lower levels of 
mobilization. Each of these factors in isolation has been discussed with 
various degrees of precision and detail in the literature on ethnic conflict 
but their combined effect in specific spatio-temporal contexts has been 
overlooked and has not been analyzed for this particular case.  
      The second section introduces the ‘permissive’ context of 
Gorbachev’s reforms, as they relate to the present discussion and 
attempts to show that context does not predetermine political activity but 
defines the range of strategies available to agents. They adapt their 
behaviour on the basis of both the outcome of previous action and 
perceptions, awareness of context in terms of the constraints and 
                                                 
20 See e.g. (Gelvin, 2005: 93-100; Crighton and Iver, 1991) for comparative evidence. 
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opportunities this imposes. Strategically-oriented activists modify their 
tactics to maximize their mobilization potential in a given political and 
social environment. When asking the Soviet regime for reunification, as 
well as cultural reforms, leaders chose to adopt a language grounded in 
the Soviet experience (socialist internationalism, inter-ethnic friendship, 
cooperation with and loyalty to the central state). Similarly, the ideas 
used to mobilize the Armenian population or to prevent Azeri counter-
mobilization in the 1980s can only be understood against the background 
of Soviet nationality policies (e.g. the implications of being considered 
indigenous in terms of status, prestige and resources in the Soviet 
hierarchy). In particular, the Armenian movement developed largely in 
response to changes in political context and within an environment that 
was the least unfavourable to challenger groups. It also depended partly 
on its temporal location in a broader wave of protest activity. Armenians 
in both Armenia itself and NK emphasized attachments to their ethnic 
identity and determined their actions in accordance with the new 
circumstances.     
      I also explain how group perceptions about the possibility of 
institutional change were grounded not only in the call for 
democratization, greater participation and openness but on the 
correlation between their claims and the (largely rhetorical) commitment 
of the authorities to rectify the mistakes of the past. The reforms and 
more importantly the ideology and discourse which accompanied them 
offered a unique opportunity to attempt to eliminate the existing state-
regional hierarchy. In this connection, the issue of the ‘legal file’, which 
was and continues to be used as a justification for nationalist demands, 
will be discussed. The consideration of this factor in addition to the 
broad spirit of democratization provides a more nuanced understanding 
of opportunity (which can potentially account for variations in the levels 
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of mobilization in other Soviet contexts) and of how actions and 
discourses were structured in response to the openings that specific acts 
and pronouncements of government provided. The emphasis on changes 
in the discursive environment that were associated with perestroika and 
how they impacted upon specific instances of ethnonational activism 
modifies the exclusive focus on reforms as structural openings for 
contestation evident in much of the literature on post-Soviet 
ethnonational resurgence (e.g. Zurcher, 2007: 211-5; Suny, 1998: 460-
3).  The next section looks at structural and institutional 
facilitating/constraining factors. Their significance, especially in the 
overall Soviet context, has been discussed (e. g. Beissinger, 2002) but 
the dual role of cultural institutions as both bases and catalysts for 
mobilization has been downplayed. In general, I argue that although 
structural, institutional and cultural contexts may explain Armenian and 
Azeri vulnerability to conflict, there is a causal disjunction between 
conflict and violence. Violence should be seen as an outcome emergent 
from developments within the process of mobilization, therefore 
academic treatments of the conflict should pay greater attention to the 
timebound nature of particular expressions of nationalism in a shifting 
political environment. 
      On the whole, the evidence supports top-down theories of conflict 
radicalization which see it as the result of intentional elite behaviour but 
this does not entail a purely voluntaristic approach (e.g. Snyder and 
Ballentine, 1996; Snyder, 2000; Gagnon, 2004). Elite interests are 
affected by a system of constraints and opportunities, and the process 
also acquires its own momentum which restricts the elites. As I will 
attempt to show in the next two chapters, elite power and their success in 
neutralizing challenges to their authority from within the group and 
maintaining at least a semblance of community cohesion depended 
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partly on their ability to link the pursuit of objective interests (such as, 
for example, the improvement of the socio-economic situation), past 
traumas and sacrifices with contemporary struggles and future ventures 
in an overaching narrative. Tirza Hechter rightly notes that ‘perceived 
and traumatic shared experiences under certain conditions might lend 
themselves to divergent interpretations and conceptualizations. In such 
situations it is possible that major ideologies…dormant in the specific 
society would be rediscovered and even born anew’ (Hechter, 2003: 
455). 
       
  The differences in Armenian and Azeri contentious activity: The 
legacy of the Armenian Genocide, social networks and resonant 
ideas 
      As discussed in the previous chapter, Soviet nation-building 
strategies attempted to ensure peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnic 
groups, ‘resolving’ the problems associated with nationalism.  One of 
the most important facets of this policy, which is particularly relevant to 
the present discussion, was the creation of national historiographies and, 
in some cases, allowing public commemorations of past events which 
gradually revitalized a vocabulary of protest and a set of symbolic 
resources that could later be drawn upon by people involved in 
contentious collective action, especially in the absence of alternative 
effective communication channels. In this connection, one key point that 
affected Armenian readiness for mobilization and to a certain extent 
gave them an advantage over Azerbaijan in terms of mobilizational 
resources was that in 1965 the Soviet authorities permitted the official 
commemoration of the Armenian Genocide of 1915. A monument was 
also erected in memory of the Genocide. Official commemorations 
constitute both culturally-provided opportunities and symbolic resources 
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for collective action (Peaff and Yang, 2001: 552). They contribute to 
shaping public opinion and focus discontent among the citizens. 
      Many people, especially intellectuals in Armenia retained a strong 
sense of identity that predated Soviet rule, and the memory of the 
Genocide formed an integral part of that identification. The trauma was 
transmitted from the survivor generation to their descendants. However, 
prior to the 1960s mention of this tragic page in Armenian history and 
the lost lands of Western Armenia (modern Turkey) was largely 
confined to a very narrow domain of selected intellectuals, as well as the 
relatives of Genocide survivors and excluded from the wider public 
discourse. Earlier with the Stalinist prohibition of unsanctioned public 
expressions and spontaneous forms of mass participation, Armenians 
had turned their memories of the national tragedy inward with 
commemoration and remembrance taking place in the home, among 
small circles of trusted friends and family. As a result, only those 
families whose members had lived through the Genocide and were 
directly affected by it had heard and internalized stories of the survivors. 
The director of a local NGO in Yerevan recalls: ‘My family had not 
suffered in the Genocide, so we never spoke about it at home or 
commemorated the 24th of April [anniversary]… I first learnt about the 
Genocide in 1965 when I was at university’ (author interview with 
Jasmin Telyan, 31 July 2008, Yerevan). 
‘The main source of knowledge about the Genocide were relatives’ 
(author interview with Larissa Alaverdyan, 18 July 2008, Yerevan). 
      In the context of Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ and the relative political 
relaxation there was at least one factor which mitigated the traditional 
Soviet reluctance towards open Armenian displays of remembrance. The 
Genocide was perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks and subsequently 
denied by the Republic of Turkey. Any treatment of the Genocide inside 
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Armenia was constrained by the trajectory of the development of Soviet-
Turkish relations, with domestic politics being subordinated to both the 
ideological climate of the time and foreign policy priorities. It was 
constantly stressed in official Soviet rhetoric that the modern Republic 
of Turkey was distinct from the Ottoman Empire, it was a completely 
different country and that its relationships with the Soviet Union as a 
whole should be built within the ‘Marxist-Leninist ideological 
framework of internationalism’ (Pravda, 1961: 3).  For example, shortly 
before the official commemoration of the Genocide was allowed 
Khrushchev called the Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk a companion of 
Lenin in an interview (cited in Dolbakyan, 2005: 3).  On the one hand, 
the Soviets strove to ‘redirect Armenian nationalist feeling towards 
Communist goals’ (Kilboyrne-Matossyan, 1962: 36). In general, the 
Soviet Union was a society, where large-scale remembarance 
ceremonies and public rituals were not allowed.  On the other hand, the 
Soviet authorities permitted and even encouraged the limited use of local 
nationalism if it did not contradict their political agenda. If local 
nationalism could easily be directed at foreign adversaries, then one 
could expect to see quite a wide range of concessions. The Armenian 
case is a good illustration – Armenian nationalism could easily be 
directed at the Soviet foreign adversary at that time – Turkey.  In cases 
where the (potential) local nationalism did not conveniently coincide 
with the Soviet goals, the concessions granted to local nationalism were 
very selective.  
      The fiftieth anniversary of the events (24th April 1965) when at least 
30,000–40,000 mostly young people marched through the streets of 
Yerevan calling on everyone to join them is widely recognized as the 
first instance of spontaneous mass politics in the country (e.g. Suny, 
1993: 186, 228; Terjanian, 13.09.2009). Shortly after commemorations 
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were officially sanctioned (partly under pressure from some Armenian 
Communist party officials) and started to take place annually. The 
‘opportunity structure’ arising from Soviet tolerance of carefully 
channeled expressions of Armenian nationalism played an important role 
in the revitalization of the memory of loss and had several distinct 
consequences (see also Panossian, 2006: 320-2).  
      Firstly, it meant that after 1965 nationalistic forces—mostly 
mediated through culture and history— were resurrected and became 
more visible in the public space in Soviet Armenia. While there was still 
no green light for independent social activity, the very possibility of 
holding demonstrations and commemorative ceremonies on the 
anniversary of a key event in Armenian history, was an important source 
of political and cultural regeneration. Secondly, the annual 
commemorations were largely responsible for the fact that Armenian 
nationalism did not take on anti-Soviet tones until much later (from mid 
1988). Only the Ottoman Turks were the object of hostility at this stage. 
Although there is a lack of direct data available to assess Armenian 
attitudes towards Soviet rule during the period, the absence of an all 
encompassing and well-organized dissident movement, in contrast to 
other union republics (for example, the Baltics), seems to support this 
conclusion. Thirdly, public awareness of the Genocide as a key cultural 
marker of identity increased (author interview with Jasmin Gevondyan 
14 July 2008, Yerevan; Balayan, 1999: 131).  For the first time in 
addition to the traditional stories told among those families that lived 
through the Genocide, the personal experiences of survivors started to be 
passed on to the younger generation in a systematic manner – primarily 
through literature, but also through memoirs, annual commemorations. 
Literary and scholarly work on the Genocide became more common.  
This theme was reflected in the literary works of P. Sevak, O. Shiraz, S. 
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Kaputikyan and R. Kochar amongst others. Discussion of the Genocide 
was no longer confined to the private sphere but became an integral part 
of public discourse interweaving the public with the private realm and 
incorporating personal histories into the national narrative. Given the 
traditional affinity between Turks and Azeris in Armenian national 
consciousness, the opportunity to discuss matters related to the 
Genocide, its recognition, as well as the return of lost lands publicly and 
without any fear of retaliation at least partially provided cultural and 
ideational preparation for subsequent anti-Azeri mobilization, although 
in an unintended fashion. Many activists of the movement of the late 
1980s have linked their own political awakening to the surge of national 
feeling associated with 1965 (Dolbakyan, 2005; Khechoyan, 2005). In 
this sense, the commemorations transcended the specific temporal 
contours of the 1960-s Soviet Armenia and became a key part of the 
Armenian ‘cultural grammar’ during the active phase of the NK conflict. 
      By emphasizing the role of the commemorations I am not insisting 
on the purely constructed nature of the categories and events involved in 
the process of identity formation (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).   The 
heightened sense of vulnerability found among Armenians and an 
awareness of their tragic history is due at least in part to the small size of 
the republic and its geographical position at the crossroads of 
intersecting and often competing outside interests.   However, a degree 
of institutionalization of memory during the Soviet era contributed both 
to shaping short-term reactions to subsequent events and influencing 
their outcomes. The commemorations made a much wider range of 
social actors fully aware of the details of these events and reinforced the 
latent memories, which were now ready to come to the surface under 
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when triggered by contingent events.21 This was reflected fully during 
the anti-Armenian pogroms in the town of Sumgait. Although such 
public occasions were short-lived and tightly controlled they provided 
the setting for spontaneous celebrations of identity and belonging.   
      It could be argued that the absence of this degree of awareness of 
past events in Azerbaijan (although they also experienced what they now 
consider to be Genocide in 1918) and the absence of any propaganda 
partly accounts for why ordinary Azeris were unprepared for the 
campaigns of Armenians, as well as for anti-Azeri riots in 1987 and 
1988. The Azeri sense of identification developed in accordance with the 
powers that had ruled them: Turkey and Iran. A shared Azeri identity 
gained momentum in the early 1900s resulting from economic cohesion 
and the rise of a very narrow circle of intelligentsia brought about by 
Russian influence, and, simultaneously, Islamic, Persian and Turkic 
aspects of the collective identity reinforced a desire for political 
autonomy (Swietochowski, 1985). This specificity affected Azeri 
perceptions of interethnic relations. While there were major interethnic 
clashes between Armenians and Azeris prior to the establishment of 
Soviet rule in the region, the traumas of the Azeris as a result of these 
experiences did not become part of the Azeri national narrative, as the 
Genocide did in Armenia.  
      The contending elements of an unconsolidated national identity 
made it difficult to evoke, particularly among a mass public that was 
unaccustomed to thinking about itself in terms of ethnicity. Nationalist 
ideas found among a very narrow circle of cultural elites were very slow 
                                                 
21 Interviewees who mentioned the importance of the April 1965 events and/ or stressed how these 
served as an impulse towards increased awareness by placing the issue of the Genocide at the 
forefront of their individual and national consciousness include Aram Sarkisyan, Larissa Alaverdyan,  
Jasmin Gevondyan, Ghegam Baghdasaryan amongst others. Many also recognized its contribution to 
individual decisions to engage in sustained collective action in support of nationalist goals. 
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to spread to the public. Those of my interviewees whose relatives had 
suffered and who were directly exposed to the autobiographical 
memories vividly recalled their grandparents’ stories.  Oral histories of 
the atrocities committed by Armenians were transmitted in the families 
affected but did not enter the wider public discourse. As one interviewee 
attests: ‘The Azeri people are distinguished by a short historical 
memory. No one even remembers that Northern and Southern 
Azerbaijan, which was a part of our territory had been separated’ (author 
interview with Ramiz Sevdimaliev, 5 January 2009, Baku; also Kerim 
Kerimly, 6 January 2009).  
      At the same time under Soviet rule ‘the Azeris were not allowed to 
mourn the victims and even to remember why they should be mourned’ 
(Smith, 2001: 53). Given the spirit of internationalism and brotherhood 
with the Armenian people during the Soviet era any official recognition 
of remembrance was actively discouraged. In contrast to Armenia, Azeri 
nationalism would have been directed against Armenians and Russians, 
not the Turks due to the close identity ties Azeris (were perceived to) 
have with the Turks. This factor left a very small margin for expressing 
Azeri nationalism within the official Soviet framework. As a result, 
nationalism remained largely a taboo in Azerbaijan.    
      This specificity and the lack of spontaneous mass activity associated 
with such occasions could be seen as partly accountable for the passivity 
of the Azeri population at the initial stages of the Armenian movement 
and its slow response to Armenian contentious action. Both in Armenia/ 
NK and Azerbaijan the history of the late 19th century national 
awakenings and the brief periods of the existence of independent 
republics (1918–1920) along with the repressions of the early Soviet era 
provided the broad common contours that shaped the collective 
memories of the respective national communities. Both Armenians and 
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Azeris had ethnocultural histories from which to draw their identities but 
the extent of the resonance of these memories and their images differed 
between the two groups. The resulting divergent patterns of contentious 
politics need to be accounted for.  
      In Armenia reunification with NK had always been the key identity 
reference and the dominant source of elite legitimacy that, when 
invoked, resonated widely among the population. For the Armenian 
population both in NK and in Armenia proper the source of agitation 
came from inside the polity and was an integral part of the national 
project. Some authors have pointed out that the internal cohesion and 
unity of NK Armenians, while not complete, seemed to have been 
strengthened by their shared experience of enclave existence (Caspersen, 
2008a: 364). By contrast, the NK conflict served as a catalyst for the 
process of Azeri self-identification which had been latent during the 
Soviet period. In Azerbaijan the resonance of the idea of NK as a 
‘national’ territory remained conspicuously weak and failed to produce 
an effect equivelant to that in Armenia. Its transformation into an issue 
that commanded public attention and (relatively) widespread support 
came primarily as a consequence of a reaction against a perceived 
external threat.  
      Another factor that appears to have influenced the differences in 
Armenian and Azeri potentials is the availability/ strength of preexisting 
social networks, that is ties between individuals that are united by the 
same ideas and interests. Sayers and Meyer (1999) have emphasized that 
a hostile environment forces movements to turn from tackling external 
challenges to activities inside specific groups to maintain micro-level 
solidarity that can, when the conditions are right be transformed into a 
macro-level nationalist narrative (see also Malesevic, 2011: 143). This 
within group work becomes important for the continuity of the pursuit of 
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collective action and the battle to survive ideologically during the 
periods when political structure remains closed.  
      As mentioned in the previous chapter, throughout the period of 
Soviet domination NK Armenians struggled for their rights in different 
ways depending on the political constellation of any given period and 
the opportunities that were available to them. NK Armenians continued  
to call for change in the region's political status, be it through clandestine 
agitation, acts of civil disobedience, or periodic appeals to Moscow by 
prominent intellectuals. Although the 1988 movement was the first 
sustained case of mobilization in Armenia and NK, it was hardly the first 
attempt at collective contentious action. Major attempts at mobilization 
of challenger groups had occurred in the 1920s, 1940s and 1960s but 
were swiftly suppressed by authorities. The reassertion of Armenian 
national aspirations and their crystallization around NK occurred each 
time there was a change of leadership at the center.   
      Authorities at all levels prevented attempts to raise the issue of 
interethnic relations. Those groups of intellectuals who appealed to 
local, republican and most importantly central authorities were 
persecuted and eventually had to leave NK.  Nevertheless even these 
failed attempts show that a culture of resistance was taking shape before 
the 1980s and organizational networks were being developed within the 
NK region. These networks directed by several intellectuals from NK 
were instrumental in arranging petitions to Soviet authorities and 
securing support among prominent Armenians in an attempt to generate 
a favourable climate for putting pressure on the authorities to take their 
problems seriously. In 1974 the National Unity Party, an underground 
Armenian nationalist organization that demanded the return of 
Nakhichevan, NK and Western Armenia and the formation of a united 
independent state, was uncovered and its members were tried and 
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imprisoned (Suny, 1993: 187; Panossyan, 2006: 323-4, Libaridian, 2004: 
29). The active repression of dissident nationalism by the Soviet 
authorities meant that Armenian nationalists were unable to pursue their 
demands beyond occasional petitions and letters of protest. Public 
discussion during most of the Soviet era was limited and restricted to a 
narrow academic audience. Academic institutions and research centers 
were also circles where intellectuals gathered and privately discussed 
national issues. The outside world and even Armenians in the diaspora 
hardly knew where NK was on the map. Although the region was small 
and relatively resource poor, it was endowed with human resources, 
which would prove crucial in providing the organizational basis of the 
movement. NK intellectuals also reportedly coordinated through 
underground cells the shipment of Czech weapons (De Waal, 2003: 16-
8).  
      Thus, in Armenia and NK the networks of the perestroika period 
were mostly constituted by political and social actors who had remained 
committed to the pursuance of collective interests over the years and had 
accumulated valuable acquaintances at various levels of authority: ‘We 
had always had a naïve idea that a man close to the ‘tsar’ would help 
solve any problem….We fought to enlist on our side the opinion of any 
well-known Soviet person’ (author interview with Stepan Grigoryan, 28 
July 2008, Yerevan). A certain personalization was partly due to the fact 
that civil society and independent institutions outside the control of the 
state were not allowed in the Soviet system. In this context on the one 
hand, activism was confined to the initiatives of small groups of 
individuals. On the other hand, such early clandestine initiatives 
gradually grew into group involvement on a larger scale and created the 
ground for the emergence of a broader nationalist movement. 
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      By contrast, in Azerbaijan the presence of informal social networks 
that would give currency to national ideology was much more limited. 
Although the Azeri elite came to political maturity in the early 20th 
century and did some intellectual groundwork among the lower strata of 
society (peasants and workers) it did not manage to create an equally 
well developed network of informal radical groups that could later form 
the core of a single movement. As one of the participants attested, ‘there 
was absolutely no ground upon which to forge a national democratic 
movement apart from one or two informal organizations, which were 
controlled by the Communist Party’ (Agaev and Alizadeh, 2006: 57; 
author interview with Zardusht Alizadeh, 5 January 2009, Baku). While 
in Armenia there was continuously one or another underground 
organization functioning, very few such organizations existed in 
Azerbaijan. This made it harder to take advantage of the opening 
political context when it came about.  The co-founders of the Popular 
Front of Azerbaijan established towards the end of 1988 listed a lack of 
professionalism and a weak sense of national identification as the main 
reasons for the movement’s late development (author interview with 
Arzu Abdulaeva, 7 January 2009, Baku). While the movements in 
Armenia and NK were formed out of a number of highly committed 
individuals united by the NK issue, the Popular Front in Azerbaijan was 
an organization comprised of activists with divergent interests and goals. 
Brought together largely by opposition to republican communist mode 
of rule, the Front found itself increasingly divided internally by 
competing interests, which resulted in its gradual splintering into a 
number of factions. Glasnost’ and perestroika did not mobilize the 
Azeris, at least not to the same extent as it did the Armenians.  
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       Emerging opportunities in a restructured Union 
      There is a broad consensus in the literature that reforms introduced 
by a previously inflexible regime propelled opposition to the weakening 
Soviet hegemonic control system and galvanized the idea of national 
self-determination (e. g. Furman, 1998: 123; Zurcher, 2007: 211-5; 
Tchilingirian, 1999; Suny, 1998: 460-3). When Gorbachev came to 
power in 1985 he called on Soviet citizens to play a more active role in 
the life of the country. Striving to animate a stagnating economy and 
unresponsive political institutions he unexpectedly unleashed waves of 
ethnic activism in various parts of the USSR, and this cascade of mass 
mobilization was particularly prominent in the South Caucasus. The 
reformists were unable to foresee the full impact of the political 
transformation on ethnic assertion and how this reform ultimately 
encouraged various ethnic groups to promote their agendas, as well as to 
question the hitherto dominant, single and unified Soviet historical, 
thereby undermining the basic legitimacy of the system. Such 
transformations went far beyond what Gorbachev had envisaged when 
he initiated the reforms, and soon it proved increasingly hard for 
Moscow to control the course of events22. The reforms initiated by 
Gorbachev and aimed at democratizing the state had created strong 
contradictions. As the shock-waves of democratization initiated from the 
top of the Soviet state reached the bottom of society the legitimacy of 
the system as a whole was increasingly questioned.  
      With the onset of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) 
the activists renewed their efforts towards establishing a network that 
linked local concerns with official structures of Soviet power by sending 
letters to Moscow and Gorbachev specifically, by compiling lists of 
                                                 
22 On the ‘spillover’ effects of the events in Eastern Europe and repercussions for the (weakening) 
Soviet ideology see e.g. (Kramer, 2004). 
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petitions and door–to-door campaigning. The Armenian national 
movement began with requests to the Soviet Union for membership in a 
manner by which they would no longer be subordinate to Azerbaijan.  
The meetings and mass demonstrations of what came to be known as the 
NK movement emerged from an Armenian ecology campaign 
(Geukjian, 2007; Dudwick, 1993). An early public demonstration 
occurred in Yerevan in October 1987, when two to four thousand people 
gathered in Yerevan’s central square demanding the shutdown of the 
Nairit synthetic rubber plant. Environmental dangers of annihilation 
came to be strongly associated with previous threats through the 
rhetorical metaphor of genocide.23 
      The first phase of the contemporary conflict started in the autumn 
and early winter of 1987 when a petition with some 75,000 signatures 
requesting the transfer of the region to the Armenian SSR was sent to the 
Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party (CPSU). The activity 
arose in a coordinated but decentralized fashion with a representative in 
each of NK’s regions operating separately and establishing links with 
Yerevan under the orchestration of some key participants. Activists 
circulated from village to village obtaining signatures and identifying 
cultural and economic issues that gave voice to popular grievances.24 In 
Yerevan an informal group of eleven intellectuals united in a NK 
Committee that led mass demonstrations and strikes taking place on a 
quasi-daily basis throughout 1988.  
      Although Moscow failed to respond to the request immediately 
Armenians had reason to hope that their demands for justice would be 
received favourably. From November 1987 to February 1988 three 
                                                 
23 This rhetoric prefigured the subsequent demonstrations in response to the massacres in Sumgait by 
treating threats to the well-being of the Armenian nation as an instance of potential genocide. See 
chapter 4 for a more detailed analysis of this topic. 
24 See chapter 2 for an elaboration of popular grievances against Azeri rule. 
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separate Armenian delegations from NK visited Moscow lobbying for 
the transfer of the region. They were carefully listened to by the Soviet 
authorities and reportedly given assurances that a settlement was under 
active consideration (Rost, 1990: 135; author interview with Zori 
Balayan, 28 July 2008, Yerevan). These groups held meetings with 
senior Party leadership in Moscow, including the Nationalities Issues 
Department, the vice-president of the Supreme Council, Pyotr 
Demichev, who was also a member of the Politburo. For the first time a 
Politburo member was meeting directly – without intermediaries from 
Baku – with NK delegations.  At this stage of the evolution of the 
conflict, the gradual ethnic mobilization of Armenians should be 
perceived in the context of the reformist policies of Gorbachev and the 
political rehabilitation of previous Armenian ethnocultural demands. 
These hints of progress created a widespread impression that the center 
was sympathetic to Armenian demands and that only ensuring mass 
support was required to fully resolve the problem. According to a Soviet 
news report, during the February 1988 protests in Stepanakert ‘rumours 
were being circulated that Moscow was nearly in favour of it, all that 
was necessary was to voice the demand more resolutely’ (Izvestiya, 
1988: 3).               
      Challengers interpreted the (relatively) positive cues from the 
liberalizing political environment and used their newly formed 
organizational networks to launch protest campaigns. As one of the 
participants in Armenia recently recalled: 
  As everything was in the hands of the Kremlin, the consent (to 
reunite NK with Armenia) looked a mere formality… We were sure 
that the movement was being encouraged, that it was part of the 
designs of the party and government…For me Moscow was the head. 
And we were not going to jump over the head (author interview with 
Larissa Alaverdyan, 18 July 2008, Yerevan).   
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The reforms introduced by the central regime provided an opportunity to 
redress the historical injustice committed by Stalin when he handed NK 
over to Azerbaijan in 1921: 
  The fresh wind of perestroika has opened the way to freedom for 
NK Armenians… Using the Leninist principle of the self-determination 
of nations, which is the key principle of the Soviet Constitution, we ask 
to transfer the NK Autonomous Oblast’ (NKAO) (Pis’mo Nagorno-
Karabakhskikh armyan delegatam XIX Partkonferentsii, 1988: 4). 
 
      For movement participants their call for self-determination did not 
necessarily entail the dissolution of Soviet authority nor was it 
specifically directed against the center, at least at the initial stages. The 
first wave of nationalist agitation did not advocate independence but 
simply requested a reconsideration of existing borders within the 
boundaries of the USSR.   Unlike most nationality struggles in the 
Soviet Union, which were directed towards secession from the outset, 
the Armenian movement both in NK and in Armenia was strongly 
supportive of the preservation of the Union and of Gorbachev’s 
leadership in the early phase. The majority of those involved in the 
movement saw their activities as a ‘test case’ operating within the 
revised parameters of power set by glasnost’ and perestroika. The 
adversary against which the Armenian activists organized was 
Azerbaijan with its practices, which were seen as discriminatory, not the 
Soviet political system.  
      Andrei Sakharov, one of the key supporters of Armenians among the 
intellectual elite based in Moscow coined a famous phrase, which 
characterized the struggle for NK as ‘the touchstone of perestroika and 
democratization’ (Zolyan,1992 :3). This took hold as the movement’s 
unofficial slogan. The central authorities refrained from any negative 
pronouncements or repression and seemed to be viewing this activity 
within acceptable limits as being in line with the glasnost’ campaign. 
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Gorbachev concluded that ‘existing economic, social, ecological and 
other problems should and will be resolved in the spirit of the politics of 
perestroika and renewal implemented in our country as a whole’ 
(Gorbachev, 1988: 2). In fact, some scholars (for example Shireen 
Hunter) argue that Moscow encouraged the activity of the informal 
networks and circles, since they were not seen as a serious threat to 
authority and as a way to weaken conservative cadres in local 
communist organizations (Hunter, 1994: 34-5).  
      Perestroika raised genuine hopes at the grassroots level that justice 
could be achieved by attracting the attention of the central authorities 
and then backing a given claim with legal arguments and mass support.  
It is in this broader context of new self- liberating ideas that the activists 
saw an opportunity to redress past injustices and to change NK’s status 
rectifying what they saw as Stalin’s arbitrariness. The subjective 
evaluation of risks and benefits associated with protest seemed 
overwhelmingly favourable and the prospects of success very high 
especially after Gorbachev’s speech in April 1985 where he stressed his 
commitment to political and economic renewal (Balayan, 1999: 132; 
Shakhnazaryan, 1988: 1; author interview with Maxim Mirzoyan, 22 
July 2008, Stepanakert). The perception of the righteousness of their 
actions and a belief in an inevitable victory provided the emotional 
background against which collective action unfolded. They believed that 
the prospect of success was better than they had so far seen in their 
lifetimes.  Participants recall feeling a powerful and unprecedented 
unity, which transcended social and interpersonal differences. 
      The relatively relaxed and inclusive context of the mid to late 1980s 
raised expectations. There were several reasons for the absence of anti-
Soviet mood at this stage. These included pro-Russian sentiments related 
to the image of Russia as a saviour from foreign oppression found 
                                                                                         141
among Armenian population and influenced by decades of Soviet rule, a 
somewhat naïve belief in the integrity of Gorbachev’s pronouncements 
and a strong restorationist component – activists did not seek a complete 
transformation of the existing social order as much as its reorientation 
along national lines. Self- perceptions of Armenians should also be 
considered when explaining their support for restructuring within the 
constitutional framework of the Soviet Union. 
      The existential justification of Soviet rule in Armenia remained 
strong and was based on the idea that without the protective umbrella of 
Soviet power the very existence of the Armenian nation would be in 
doubt. It was largely linked to a particular interpretation of history which 
emphasised that the Soviets had saved Armenia from complete 
destruction by Turkish forces and preserved Armenian physical security.  
Most Armenians considered their inclusion in the Soviet Union as a 
relatively strong guarantee against Turkish aggression (Panossian 2001: 
157). The inclusion of Armenia in the Soviet Union permitted at least a 
formal national and cultural self-expression (Dudwick 1997: 76). These 
attitudes were hard to change, especially as they had become deeply 
entrenched over decades of Soviet institutionalisation and propaganda. 
The process of the replacement of this dominant narrative with a 
different one where Armenia could be presented as relying on its own 
forces and independent from outside patrons proved very slow.  At the 
same time the leaders both in NK and in Armenia clearly exploited the 
opportunities presented to them and voiced their demands within the 
official discourse.  
      Not only during the preparatory phase but also during the active 
phase of mass demonstrations which started in February 1988, when 
according to different estimates between half a million and a million 
people out of the three million population participated (e. g. Malkasyan, 
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1996: 5; Kharmandaryan, Golos Armenii, 23. 02. 2008), the 
demonstrators overtly showed their solidarity with and support for the 
center by carrying posters with pro-glasnost’ slogans and portraits of 
Gorbachev. Among the slogans were: ‘Gorbachev, the great people of 
small Armenia have faith in the (Communist) Party… We salute the first 
instance of mass participation of Soviet people in the life (of our 
country) which has become possible thanks to perestroika’ (Ananyan et 
al., 1988: 4). The Armenians framed their demands in the language of 
‘internationalism’ and ‘interethnic friendship’ insisting that far from 
pursuing narrow nationalist goals their efforts to regulate the relationship 
with their neighbours would contribute to the cohesion and solidarity of 
the Soviet state: ‘The solution of the NK problem in the spirit of Leninist 
principles of the self-determination of nations is perestroika. Those 
opposed to that solution are enemies of perestroika, glasnost’ and 
democracy’ (Sarkisyan, 1988: 5). 
      The display of loyalty towards the central authorities had partly a 
strategic nature. For many decades throughout Soviet rule the slogans of 
internationalism functioned in the official propaganda to deny the 
existence of tensions in the multiethnic Soviet state. In this specific 
context leaders used the language of Marxism-Leninism in a calculated 
manner to signal to senior officials that they were not challenging the 
authority of the state but seeking through constitutional means a clearly 
defined border change. The emphasis on transformation within 
constitutional parameters was one the key parts of the (publicly 
declared) principles, which underlay the activities in NK and the 
solidarity movement in Armenia.  A key activist recently recalled: 
 
  One of the most interesting aspects of the movement [in NK] was 
its ideological platform. That was something new… All the leaders had a 
good knowledge of the history of our people, its psychology and they 
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knew that the Armenians were attached to the Soviet system. One had to 
organize the movement…in such a way that people would not be afraid 
of taking part in it…We came to the conclusion it had to be conducted 
under the flag of perestroika. One had to declare that this was not so 
much a national liberation movement but one under the perestroika 
banner… We took the principle – constitutional movement – and life 
itself dictated its forms to us (author interview with Manvel Sarkisyan, 
31 July 2008, Yerevan).  
 
      The elites engaged in articulating a political and legal case for the 
transformation of the existing system of boundaries through official 
channels of authority discussed above (letters, petitions to formal 
structures of authority, appeal to legal arguments and documents). 
Undoubtedly, some activists genuinely believed that a constitutional 
change within the reformist framework was the only conceivable option. 
At the same time it also had a strong strategic component in that it was 
intended to secure a position of legitimate political representation and 
full recognition for the leaders, as well as to achieve the maximum 
resonance with target audiences. 
      For Gorbachev the desire for reform extended to an 
acknowledgement of the mistakes of the past, in particular Stalinism and 
denunciation of ‘ideas… that were deviations from Leninist policy’ 
(cited in Kaiser, 1992: 188).  His call to return to the Soviet foundations 
could support a claim for changing NK Armenians’ subordinate status, 
as initially they had been promised different political arrangements than 
the autonomous institutions they eventually received. In April 1920 
Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin informed Lenin that it 
was necessary to ‘establish peaceful relations with Armenia’ (cited in 
Barsegov, 2008: 463). For the purpose of reaching a compromise, 
disputed territories, including NK should remain under Russian 
provisional authority rather than be handed over to Azerbaijan or 
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Armenia. Shortly after NK was declared a part of Soviet Armenia. 
However, in July 1921 the decision was reversed as a result of what 
Armenians interpreted as a deliberate strategic step by Stalin and a 
‘serious violation of the Leninist principle of self-determination’ 
(Grigoryan, 1989: 2). They tend to disregard the fact that Stalin was 
excluded from voting when that decision was taken. According to 
dominant interpretations, this decision was a major manifestation of 
Moscow’s policy of ‘divide and rule’ (e.g. Nies, 2007). Some 
commentators suggest quite convincingly, based on transcripts of 
conversations between Bolshevik leaders from July 1921 that Georgian 
Bolsheviks opposed the transfer out of fear that it would create a 
dangerous precedent for other groups and encourage ethnic secessions 
across the volatile Caucasian region (cited in Derluguian, 2005: 186)25.  
In addition, locating Karabakh close to one of the key industrial centers 
at the time – Baku might in part be explained by the firm belief that 
enhanced industrial development would solve all problems, although in 
practice Armenia too remained relatively prosperous economically 
throughout the Soviet era.  
      In 1988 Armenians framed their demands as a restoration of the 
same Leninist principles which, they argued, had formed the ideological 
basis of the Soviet state: ‘Leninism is our guiding star’ (Sarkisyan, 1988: 
5).  By referring back to Lenin they attempted to legitimize their claims 
through one of the few Soviet leaders whose moral authority had not 
been challenged and whose precepts were constantly mentioned at the 
official level as models for reform.  By contrast Stalin was an acceptable 
target for criticism because it was he who (allegedly) made the historic 
decision to hand NK over to Azerbaijan and ignored the interests of the 
                                                 
25 This argument is particularly convincing, as the real and perceived threat of the ‘contagion effect’ 
seems to have remained one of the key motivating forces behind central authorities’ behaviour 
throughout the period of Soviet rule. See chapter 4 for some evidence. 
                                                                                         145
Armenian people. In Armenian discourse the contrast between the 
claims of Armenia and Azerbaijan to NK was equally clear-cut – 
constitutionalism vs. oppression, which can be seen in the following 
statement:  
  The violation of the Leninist principle of self-determination is the 
result of the perverted thinking of the enemies of perestroika and 
democracy… Stalin is the agent of counterrevolution…he created 
Azerbaijan and gave the Azeris the freedom to quietly destroy the Union 
and perestroika (Eremyantz, 1988: 3-4).   
 
Presenting the problem in oppositional terms gave an apparent clarity to 
a constitutional issue. If Gorbachev was committed to rectifying 
deviations from Leninist ideals he was bound to approve of their 
campaign, especially after his promise of a ‘new beginning in Karabakh’ 
(cited in Devlin, 1988a: 2). 
      The documents related to the early Soviet policy in the 
Transcaucasus form part of the so called ‘legal file’, which has been 
consistently referred to by Armenians throughout the development of the 
movement. It is arguable that the issue of the legal file has two 
dimensions, which are relevant to the present discussion.   The first one 
is what could be called a realpolitik dimension and refers to the real 
collection of documents (e. g. the letter of Chicherin to Lenin and the 
decisions of the Kavburo). The second aspect includes the construction 
of a legitimizing discourse around it. For example, on the one hand, it is 
true that when Azerbaijan declared independence in 1991 it formally 
refused to be the successor to the Azeri SSR (Manasyan, 2006: 73). On 
the other hand, the way in which this refusal is also (re)interpreted to 
offer a justification for NK’s liberation from Azerbaijan is yet another 
illustration of how legal and rhetorical frameworks can be intertwined to 
contribute to shaping the perspectives of (potential) supporters. 
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      After the perceived go-ahead from Armenian lobbying efforts in 
Moscow the first mass protests took place in the center of Stepanakert in 
mid February 1988 and a week later in Yerevan.  At this particular stage 
it is quite hard to distinguish between the strategies of the movements in 
NK and in Armenia. The emotional ties of solidarity between NK 
Armenians and Soviet Armenia played a decisive role in enhancing the 
mobilization campaign led by the nationalist intelligentsia. For them it 
was the Armenian cultural community that had been threatened by 
separation since the 1920s and what was needed was the protection of 
Armenian identity against incorporation into Azerbaijan and 
assimilation. They worked with a high degree of cooperation sharing a 
common sense of belonging. Baku and local officials were unable to 
disperse the crowds and their loss of control over the situation became 
increasingly apparent. Every day more participants joined, motivated by 
a combination of factors – peer pressure, curiosity, contemporary 
grievances and an acute perception of historical justice. The numbers 
soon became mythologized as people received inflated and second-hand 
estimates of more than one million (Urmala, 21.08. 1988). 
      The very fact that the mass gatherings were allowed and not cracked 
down on was remarkable.  The   right to demonstrate was formally 
guaranteed by the Soviet constitution but it was well-known that such 
mass gatherings were rarely tolerated considering, for example, Soviet 
support for the suppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland and 
demonstrations in Lithuania and elsewhere. Fear of retaliation by the 
authorities gradually diminished as the size of the crowds increased26. 
The passivity of the authorities during the demonstrations thus exposed 
for the first time the vulnerability of the regime being unable to deal 
                                                 
26 Some commentators rightly see this sudden passivity as a sign of a deeper decline in the repressive 
potential of the state, where ‘institutional capacity to repress…invariably exceeded the mobilizational 
challenges which institutions faced’ (Beissinger, 2002: 333). 
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with this particular attempt to stretch the limits of the acceptable and to 
undermine the longstanding myth that the ‘nationalities problem had 
been solved’. The activists recall the sensation of self-liberation they felt 
from the first major demonstrations: 
  Once in 1988, my wife and I were walking along the Opera Square 
and saw that about 100-200 people were standing and talking about NK. 
I was then astonished that they were not being dispersed or killed. I said 
to my wife then: “We are witnessing a historic event. In this country 
where people coming to a mass rally are shot to death right away, these 
people are standing, talking and they are not even dispersed.” This quite 
amazed us (author interview with Stepan Grigoryan, 28 July 2008, 
Yerevan).  
    
In addition to mass gatherings in Yerevan and Stepanakert a network of 
committees was formed, mainly through workplaces. Through locally 
elected representatives these networks exchanged news outside of the 
demonstrations, disseminated information about the situation to the 
wider public and organized the collection of signatures in favour of 
reunification. 
 
            Structural and institutional facilitating factors 
      It has been pointed out in the literature that structural facilitation 
factors such as, demography, size, the possession of national institutions 
affect the ability of elites within the group to take advantage of event-
generated influences (e. g. Beissinger, 2002: 156). In this connection, it 
is worth noting that Armenia was one of the most ethnically 
homogenous republics of the Soviet Union which contributed to a 
significant indigenization of central political structures in the Armenian 
Republic. In NK, despite the presence of some representatives of the 
titular group (Azeris) in positions of power, Armenians still controlled 
many key positions within the region’s institutions and formed 
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majorities in the main urban centers. Thus, Armenian movement(s) did 
not share the structural limitations of weakened urban networks or a 
diminished linguistic base of, for example, the Central Asian context.  
      In addition to possessing institutionalized cultural assets in the form 
of national literature, language, symbols, press, education Armenians 
were aided by the virtual absence of resistance to their activism from the 
local authorities. Armenian Communist authorities occupied a 
structurally ambiguous position. As ethnic Armenians, they strove to 
rhetorically affirm their identities as part of ‘the people’ and therefore 
did not substantially interfere with the movement’s development or 
repress its members. As part of the Soviet state-Party system they also 
had to respect the interests of the center. The movement organisers tried 
to pressure rather than confront the local authorities into speaking out in 
Moscow. Nevertheless their failure to openly show signs of support 
intensified the anti-government stance of the activists. Armenian 
officials did not make the resources of the Party and the state available 
to movement participants, but did not assume a position of 
uncompromising obstructionism either, which was advantageous given 
the lasting psychological legacy of authoritarian rule with its suppression 
of alternative opinions.   
      At the same time, as has been mentioned earlier, institutions played a 
dual role. On the one hand, the possession of institutions permitted the 
Armenians and Azeris to promote their political claims and their vision 
of history. Cultural institutions, such as state university, museums 
provided a forum for the advancement of the ideological justification for 
such claims through their own interpretation of history.  Clearly, without 
an institutional base they would have found it far more difficult to 
articulate their concerns both within and outside of Soviet political 
structures. On the other hand, attempts to limit or remove those 
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institutions were a catalyst for mobilization. For example, the 
publication of historical works challenging Armenian versions of history 
provoked a furious reaction among Armenian intellectuals based in the 
Armenian State Museum. Thus, the formal institutions served as both 
base and catalyst for national activism.   As Jack Snyder puts it in his 
consideration of the causes of war, ‘the effect of each element can be 
understood only in the context of the rest of the system’ (Snyder, 2002: 
34). 
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                               Chapter 4 
                  From ethnic conflict to violence in NK 
        
       Introduction 
      The previous chapter analyzed the differences in Armenian and 
Azeri trajectories of collective action. I showed that in Armenia the 
advance of nationalism served as a basis for (relative) elite consensus 
and prevented the emergence of intense intra-elite struggle at the early 
stage of the movement for NK (1987–mid 1988). The consensus was 
over the ‘mission’ of the postcommunist elite to resolve the NK problem 
– a task which the old communist functionaries were widely perceived 
as unable to accomplish. Since 1988 the internal balance between the 
ruling and emerging counter elite shifted fundamentally in Armenia. The 
mass movement legitimized its leaders in advance and gave them the 
power to negotiate with the then ruling elite. This ‘forward legitimation’ 
significantly reduced the chances of conflict between the old and new 
elites. By contrast, the Azeri political scene was highly fragmented, 
while a certain degree of social cohesion came about because of the 
presence of a clear external enemy. In that context, growing elite 
disunity thwarted attempts to reach a common position on the growing 
Armenian mobilization. Azerbaijan hardly had the social networks and 
independent activism of underground organizations, such as existed in 
NK and Armenia. In addition, unlike Azeris Armenians continually used 
narratives of sacrifice, suffering and martyrdom as paradigms for 
defining identity and politics. As a result, the NK issue and the rich 
repository of symbolic representations associated with it resonated much 
less widely across Azeri society, which partly accounted for lower levels 
of national activism.    
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      The aim of this chapter is to trace further development and 
radicalization of the conflict within a broadly elite-centered model to 
explain the ascendance of a particular strand of radical nationalism over 
its alternatives as a development taking place within a particular political 
and institutional context rather than predetermined. There is little doubt 
that intellectuals and their perceptions played a key role in shaping the 
conflict. The nationalist intellectuals had at least two qualities necessary 
to exercise leadership and to become the definitive political force in a 
short time: first, the rejection of Soviet egalitarian ideology by referring 
to nationalist ideas and second, the capacity to claim leadership over a 
body of thought, past political struggles and an institutional framework. 
One of the key arguments on which the movement’s leadership justified 
its activity and subsequent desire to lead the country to independence 
were the memories of the First Independent Republic (1918–21).  
Referring to the nation in the pre Soviet period as well as to the 
intellectual tradition and cultural institutions that had developed in the 
Soviet era allowed them to act as credible and legitimate leaders in the 
eyes of the masses.  
      Rather than seeing violence as the ‘natural’ progression of ethnic 
conflict within the context of raised expectations (Kaplan, 1993) I argue 
that radicalization should be understood as a contingent outcome of 
developments in the wider cycle of mobilization beginning in the 1980s. 
Ethnic conflict was not contained within institutional channels, taking 
the form of riots, paramilitary activities as well as a discursive 
ethnicization of violence by perpetrators and third parties. Rather than 
any ‘inherent’ radicalism in Armenian and Azeri nationalism(s), the 
(relative) extremity of the nationalism that followed needs to be seen 
against the backdrop of contingent factors, a shifting context of 
incentives, constraints and idioms of nationalist politics.  
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      A central component in the radicalization which has been 
surprisingly underestimated in the literature on NK is the first use of 
force. It is the deportations of the Azeri population from Armenia in 
1987 and subsequent anti-Armenian riots in Azeri populated towns there 
which triggered the initial explosion that caused a series of chain 
reactions and precipitated political confrontation into armed conflict. Yet 
the impact of these deportations on the collective emotional orientation 
of the Azeri population in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and their role in 
visibly violating ‘previously agreed upon tacit agreements between the 
actors’ (Alimi, 2011: 108) has been largely unacknowledged, especially 
in works written by Western scholars. 
 
 
      While recognizing the vital role of intellectuals and political elites in 
shaping the trajectory of radicalization I suggest that presenting elite and 
mass-level interests in entirely dichotomous terms tends to 
underestimate the complexity of the conflict. In addition, conflict 
situations are influenced at various levels spanning agency and structure, 
including but not limited to individual, communal, structural and 
institutional, and patterns need to be examined at all those levels. This 
research does not share the view that portrays individuals as motivated 
solely by self-interest and capable of acting with emotional detachment 
but considers beliefs and perceptions to be of critical importance when it 
comes to making sense of the actors’ behaviour (Ross, 2007; Bar-Tal et 
al., 2007).  
      In addition to focusing on crucial events it is equally necessary to 
study the more routine manifestations and practices of political 
behaviour. Extreme institutional weakness associated with the demise of 
the Soviet system of rule led to the intertwining of ‘national’ struggles 
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for self-determination and ‘personal’ struggles for power.  In stressing 
the mutually constitutive role of elite agency and mass-level influences, 
rational calculation and emotion  I do not seek to dismiss any single 
theory, rather I proceed from the observation that the optimum strategy 
is to draw selectively upon a combination of those theoretical 
approaches that most convincingly address the questions posed by a 
given case, to the extent that the case substantiates or refutes the 
predictions of a given theory it may be seen as having been confirmed or 
disproved. 
      A mixed theoretical approach that recognizes the mutually 
reinforcing role of agency and structure is particularly appropriate, since 
the NK issue itself is representative of the multi-dimensionality of 
Armenian nationalism.   Firstly, it was part of the troubled legacy of the 
Soviet nationality problem; secondly, in accordance with perestroika, it 
was one of the strongest challenges to Soviet nationality policies; 
thirdly, the issue was symptomatic of the still pendant Armenian 
question born in the last quarter of the 19th century and perceived as such 
by Armenians in the republic and in the diaspora, and, lastly, it gradually 
turned into an unprecedented political incentive to win sovereignty and 
independence. 
      As the process of fragmentation and competition between elites 
(within Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Armenia and NK) 
gained pace, the ‘old’ actors, who had managed to take advantage of the 
relaxation of the political environment found themselves increasingly 
unable to shape the changing situation. The pattern of unintended and 
unanticipated consequences is in line with the observations made by 
scholars of historical revolutions (e. g. Sztompka, 1993: 319). In the NK 
case this pattern manifested itself in three main areas considered in this 
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chapter27. First, movement participants were not a united front28, 
although, as discussed above, a rather fragile intra-elite consensus did 
exist in Armenia and NK at the early stage (1987–early 1988). Here, in 
contrast to Azerbaijan, the early demonstrations generated a temporary 
unity. The vision of a unified historical experience popularized during 
this period for a short time brought rival community leaders together in 
support of an overarching cause. In fact, the leaders disagreed among 
themselves and with the public on strategy and the nature of interaction 
with neighbours. As the former head of the Russian mediation mission 
on NK (1994–96) notes, the fact that this conflict involves three different 
main players (Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK) is one of the features that 
sets it apart from some of the other post-Soviet conflicts (for example, in 
Georgia and Tajikistan) where, if we abstract from the wider context, the 
direct confrontation takes place between two sides (Kazimirov, 2009: 
21). With time the older and in some ways less radical elites came to 
have much less of an impact within the nationalist movement(s). The 
second area is the dynamics of the communication of the activists on 
both sides with the central Soviet authorities. Largely through 
inadequate understanding and late reactions, the Soviet state allowed the 
situation to take on self-reinforcing aspects, which in turn made it 
increasingly difficult to control what was happening once collective 
action had progressed to a (violent) escalatory stage. 
      The third dimension concerns interethnic relations. The waves of 
mobilization, of which nationalist agitation is a part, deepen conflicts 
throughout society and political system and trigger changes in power 
relations between various sections of the political elite, as well as 
                                                 
27 See chapter 7 for an elaboration of how unintended effects in these dimensions compare to the 
Northern Ireland case. 
28 For a more detailed analysis of the divisions, especially between elites in NK and Armenia, 
focusing predominantly on the post-independence period see (Caspersen, 2008, 2008a). 
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between elites and challenger groups, as well as the radicalization of 
political actors. In the process, challenges to the dominant order are 
likely to intensify, while ordinary individuals embrace views and goals 
that had previously been considered inconceivable. I attempt to show 
that many members of non-elites turned nationalist only in the course of 
collective action, not before it had been initiated. They, frequently 
unwillingly, became part of the waves of mobilization that challenged 
and often altered the boundaries of the existing national order and were 
drawn into the interaction of various actors, who struggled over 
nationalist issues in institutional arenas and on the streets. 
      By looking at the issue from this perspective I aim to modify some 
of the assumptions of the purposive elite mobilization thesis (e. g. 
Snyder, 2000; Gagnon, 2004) which suggests that nationalist outcomes 
should be seen as the direct consequence of the intentional instigation by 
powerful individuals, namely dissident intellectuals and emerging elites, 
devised long before their action. The impact of deliberate elite 
orchestration – the perception of the NK conflict as triggered ‘from 
above’ by manipulative ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ is explicitly recognized in 
many post-conflict accounts ‘from below’ on both Armenian and Azeri 
side: 
 
We used to have very amicable relations with each other… 
Whenever I am told that the conflict is complex, I always respond that in 
fact everything is quite simple. We did not want any enmity between the 
two peoples… interpersonal communication is very important…  (author 
interview with Zakhid Abbasov, former head of the department of 
Culture and Tourism of the Shushi in the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism of Azerbaijan, refugee from Shushi,15 January 2009, Baku. 
 
We had good relationships with the Azeris… The elites are to blame 
for everything… They initiated all this… Ordinary people have got 
nothing to do with it (author interview with Aida Asbekyan, retired 
engineer, now deputy director of a local NGO, 15 July 2008, Yerevan). 
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Ordinary Armenians were on good terms with Azeris, we lived in 
peace… I had many Azeri friends, we had nothing to argue about…I still 
communicate with Azeris whenever I am in Moscow, and we always 
help each other on the road…The conflict was provoked by the elite 
(author interview with a driver from Yerevan, Yerevan, 13 July 2008). 
 
      I argue that the elite manipulation argument, while, being popular on 
the ground, does not tell the full story. Without denying the importance 
of elite influence, which features so prominently in many academic 
accounts of nationalism and ethnic conflict, I suggest that the 
transformation in the perceptions of ‘the other’ as ‘alien’ and the re-
conceptualization of relationships with ‘the other’ as dangerous and 
untrustworthy at least on a micro-social level depends not just on elite 
manipulation but on the continuous redefinition of past and present 
situations through interaction with other members of the ‘in-group’ and 
partly through the continuous retelling of stories contained in rumours 
and other sources of unverified orally transmitted information, which are 
filtered through collective memories of past events.29 The main 
categories of actors – the central authorities in Moscow, the elites of the 
titular republics (Armenia and Azerbaijan), the leaderships of the 
nationalist movements in Armenia and Azerbaijan and the regional 
activists in NK had not fully anticipated such all-encompassing popular 
participation and polarization of the population (see also Tchilingirian, 
2003: 141). In this sense, the protagonists were ‘themselves transformed 
by the spread of nationalism’ (Vladisavljevic, 2011: 158). The 
increasing prevalence of highly exclusivist nationalist themes was at 
least partly the outcome of the snowballing spread of mobilization 
throughout society. 
                                                 
29 For a recent analysis of ethnic cleavages in the Ottoman Empire emphasizing how ethnic 
differences are politicized, become important and heightened as a result of conflict, rather than prior 
to it see (Bulutgil, 2010). 
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      In addition to ideological proximity, emotional attachment and self-
interest that encourage participation there are also catalystic events, 
which help to set in motion important processes of deep ‘collective 
interpretation, construction and attribution’ (McAdam et al., 2001: 228). 
These events have such a radical impact on the perception of a situation 
that mobilization ‘cascades’ (Beissinger, 2002: 156) may result. Ethnic 
collective action tends to exhibit a ‘wave-like’ quality rising and falling 
in response to specific events (Stroschein, 2011). 
      The first substantive section of the chapter explores the impact of the 
bloody events in Sumgait. Why focus on a single event? I argue that the 
Sumgait episode was a ‘transformative’ event (Sewell, 1990: 548), as it 
affected Armenian collective action in three main ways. First, it 
prompted a rapid and radical shift from within system requests to those 
directly challenging the parameters of the existing regime, as well as an 
attitudinal change from sympathy to mistrust and suspicion.  Second, it 
expanded the symbolic meaning of NK as one of the key carriers of 
Armenian identity. Third, it intensified the process of the ‘cultural 
construction of fear’ (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998: 441) and strengthened 
the ethnic character of the confrontation in the minds of the participants.     
Using Donald Horowitz’s scheme looking at the disposition to secede 
and the likelihood for secession Sumgait could also be seen as the last in 
a series of ‘precipitants’ signaling to Armenians (both in Armenia and 
NK) that ‘the advantages of remaining in a unified state are much 
reduced and the costs of remaining seem periously high’ (Horowitz, 
2000: 244)30.   
                                                 
30 On the whole, given that Armenians (or at least factions within Armenian elites) strove to remain 
part of the Soviet Union until relatively late in the mobilizational cycle Horowitz’s scheme seems to 
correctly predict the dynamics of Armenia’s secessionism but mispredict NK’s secession from 
Azerbaijan.  If we consider NK Armenians to be an advanced group in a backward region secession 
attempts should be late and ‘somewhat frequent’ (Horowitz, 2000: 258), while they occurred early 
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      I start by situating the conceptualization of this event within broader 
theoretical debates in the literature on ethnic riots. I emphasize two main 
divides in this subfield – between the primacy of elite agency vs. mass 
phenomena and organization vs. spontaneity. Within that literature there 
are several key questions relevant to this study: 
1. Are ethnic riots most often spontaneous or coordinated? To what 
extent can Sumgait be seen as an explosion of spontaneous action by 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable masses? 
2.  How important is any provocation and organization that does 
occur before riots? If it was a planned event what political forces had an 
interest in it? 
3. Why do ordinary community members engage in ethnic riots? 
      The insights of the literature on ethnic riots are useful for 
understanding the Sumgait episode, since this literature offers competing 
explanations for the relative weight of different factors (social networks, 
power structures, manipulation efforts by elites) in the dynamic process 
of the production and involvement in such violence. To be precise, 
Sumgait should most likely be classified as a pogrom (because of the 
presence of one targeted ethnic group – Armenians and the destruction 
of property) and not an ethnic riot. Some scholars have recently 
emphasized that the term ‘ethnic riot’ refers only to instances in which 
(two or more) ethnic groups mobilize against each other simultaneously, 
rather than to any intense and ‘sudden’ instances of violence (e. g. 
Stroschein, 2011: 1). 
      I also consider the role of unverified oral stories in episodes of 
violence. In line with some recent sociological studies (e. g. Horowitz, 
2001; Brass, 1996; 2003) I attempt to show that the process of how 
                                                                                                                                          
and were very frequent. See (Laitin, 2001: 845-53) for a broader critique of the application of 
Horowitz’s scheme to the (post)-Soviet context. 
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individuals are mobilized for collective action during an emerging socio-
political crisis is not fully explored solely by identifying a possible 
political instigator. Instead nationalist agitation happens through the 
much less controlled and controllable emotional appeal of particular 
types of narratives, such as rumours. Such appeal also helps, even if for 
a short period, overcome the obstacles associated with class and 
ideological differences.  Drawing on the example of Sumgait I argue that 
it is difficult to distinguish between leadership and mass level influences 
in the actual trajectory of specific violent events. Organized mobilization 
often shifts to a combination of more spontaneous acts, which take place 
largely in the complex and rarely analytically investigated area between 
leadership and impulse, orchestration and chaos. I aim to enhance our 
understanding of this area by considering some answers to the questions 
above. In addition to modifying entirely elite-centered accounts of local-
level participation in ethnic conflict this discussion also expands the 
sociological work on rumour by examining the NK case where this 
particular aspect remains underresearched. The analysis in this chapter 
could also be seen as contributing to the literature on storytelling in 
social movements (Polletta, 1998; Fine, 1995). While social movement 
scholars have extensively investigated framing and rhetoric, not a lot has 
been written about how personalized movement narratives, especially 
those with symbolic connotations, sustain or change activism. 
       
 
       As mentioned previously, Moscow was the traditional target of 
mobilization of the aggrieved population in NK and Armenia in the non-
violent forms of sending letters and petitions, the passing of quasi-legal 
acts and declarations within regional institutions of government, the 
publication of letters and articles in the regional press, meetings, 
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demonstrations and strikes. While these forms of mobilization had not 
been successful in bringing about the fulfillment of the maximum 
demands of the protesting groups – the readjustment of borders –they 
did succeed in laying the groundwork for the national movement(s). 
Gorbachev’s policies in the late 1980s fed national unrest in three 
distinct ways (e g. Lapidus, 1989: 99-102). First, they permitted debate 
about previously censored issues introducing individual opinions into the 
public sphere. Secondly, liberalization encouraged grassroots 
participation in the political process resulting in the formation of a 
number of organizations – nationality and shared historical experiences 
formed a basis upon which to build these organizations. Finally, the 
economic weakness of the Union in the late 1980s compounded 
historical grievances with contemporary concerns, thus, contributing to 
rising discontent within this framework. 
      Initially Armenian activists did not fully take the Azeri political 
factor into account when they raised the territorial issue, since the Azeri 
national movement came into being largely in response to the perceived 
threat arising from Armenian activism and the perception of bias of the 
Soviet authorities towards Armenians: ‘At the early stage we did not 
regard the (NK) problem as an interethnic confrontation’ (author 
interview with Ashot Goulyan, former activist, now Chairman of the NK 
Republic National Assembly, 22 July 2008, Stepanakert).  As discussed 
in chapter 3, Armenians understood their role to be limited to convincing 
Moscow about the justice of their cause and solving the problem in the 
spirit of democratization and perestroika. Later, as their anger turned 
towards the central authorities, the struggle started to be seen in the spirit 
of liberation from the repressive Soviet regime and the Yerevan-
Moscow perceived dialogue turned into a triangular conflict over the 
control of NK. High officials in Azerbaijan were well aware of the 
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campaign of NK Armenians, even in its episodic manifestations during 
the Soviet era. For example, in 1969 H. Aliev noted that ‘activities of a 
nationalist nature are currently taking place in the NK Autonomous 
Oblast’…. Some sections of the younger generation are also under the 
influence of nationalistically minded individuals’ (Aliev, April 1969, 
cited in Voskresenie Journal, October 1991).  Partly because of the 
continuous character of such efforts Azeri authorities got used to the fact 
that with the advance of perestroika Armenians sent to the central 
government in Moscow thousands of letters every day and for the most 
part did not see such campaigns as a serious challenge to their authority 
(author interview with Afrand Dashdamirov, former member of the 
CCCP (Central Committee of the Communist Party) of the Azeri SSR, 
now academic and Deputy Head of the Pan-Azeri Congress, 4 March 
2009, Moscow).  
      On 20th February 1988 the official political organ of NK – the NK 
Soviet – adopted a resolution by the vote of 110 of a total of 140 
deputies demanding to transfer the region to the Armenian SSR. The 
events that followed this decision were to become pivotal to the 
development of violent, organized activism in NK and Armenia and 
were later used by Armenians to exemplify the ‘inherent’ differences 
between the two peoples, as well as the kind of Azeri aggression which 
made Karabakhis determined not to remain under Azeri rule. 
                            
                            The Sumgait pogrom 
      Given the centrality of the Genocide to Armenian historical 
experience, which has been discussed more extensively in chapters 2 and 
3, and for a movement so affected by symbols of loss, suffering and 
isolation it is not surprising that an early episode of violence influenced 
subsequent discourse and shaped attitudes.  Days after the decision of 
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the regional assembly violence in the Azeri town of Sumgait led to the 
death of at least 26 Armenians, according to official reports (e. g. 
Izvestiya, 03. 03.1988). In addition, at least 54 members of the local 
militia were injured (Zasedanie POLITBURO TSK KPSS, 29. 02. 1988). 
Armenians report a much greater number of dead – up to 450-500 
(Urmala, 29. 06. 1989; Tntesanget, 11. 03. 1989) but to the best of my 
knowledge, no formal evidence or confirmation of these greater 
casualties has ever been produced31.  
      Local youth and unemployed people, mainly from other regions of 
Azerbaijan, were brought to the young industrial town (built in 1939 and 
granted city status in 1949), which suffered from extreme poverty and 
severe ecological degradation. By the end of 1980 approximately 20% of 
the industrial potential of Azerbaijan centered in Sumgait, and its 
industrial production was exported to more than 300 towns and cities 
across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Aliev, 2009). It had been 
notorious for being a polluted site of numerous factories producing 
synthetic rubber and chemicals. The population of Sumgait grew steadily 
throughout the Soviet period - from 6400 in 1939 to 17200 in 1949, to 
135100 in 1970. By 1988 the population reached 250,000 including 
18,000 Armenians (Obshaya Informatsiya po gorodu Sumgaitu, 2010;  
Taran, 09. 03. 2010; General’naya Prokuratura Resoublily Armeniya, 
21.06. 2010). The rapid influx of Azeris contributed to the collective 
sentiment of the (minority) Armenian population that the Azeri national 
project to assert their dominance within a particular political and cultural 
space undermined the capacity of Armenians to lead a fulfilling 
existence since the perception of threat became part of everyday life. As 
an Armenian refugee from Sumgait expressed it:  
                                                 
31 Azeri historians also report 32 dead (including 26 Armenians and 6 Azeris) and around 400 
wounded (Unusov, 21. 05. 1991, cited in Unusov, 2005: 69). 
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  By the 1980s we were afraid to let our children go out at night…. 
We had not felt Azeri presence before but then the atmosphere grew 
very tense… They [the Azeris] represented the titular nation, they 
considered themselves the hegemons (author interview with Galina 
Somova, 21 July 2008, Stepanakert)32. 
     
      A single and simple explanation of the violent episode in Sumgait 
(27–29 February 1988) is difficult, if not impossible to provide. Any 
event of this nature is more of each group’s collective emotional 
memory than common factual history. A definitive picture of the episode 
can hardly be reconstructed from incomplete and contradictory press and 
verbal reports. Violence continued for three days unhindered by Azeri 
police or Soviet troops, although Sumgait was located only 30 
kilometers (around 18 miles) away from Baku.  Much of what happened 
over the three days will never be fully known. Both sides offer their own 
interpretations of the facts, so that there are multiple ‘truth versions’ of 
the event. Any interpretation inadvertently follows the position defended 
by one side of the conflict or the other.  Mutually exclusive truths of this 
highly emotionally charged episode have emerged, and its reconstruction 
is signifanctly compounded by the fact that hard documentary evidence 
is extremely scarce.  
      What is certain, however, and what seems to be accepted by both 
sides is that after Sumgait a political confrontation which was just taking 
shape turned into a more radical one. Before Sumgait compromises were 
conceivable, after that such a result became hardly possible: ‘After 
Sumgait dialogue was no longer feasible’ (author interview with Karen 
Oganjanyan, 21 July 2008, Stepanakert). 
                                                 
32 In this sense there is some usefulness to models that link ethnic solidarity, coordination and 
ultimately escalation to the subordination of one area of a country to others for explaining this 
situation (Hechter, 1975).  
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‘After the events the process of alienation between the two peoples was 
irreversible’ (Agaev and Alizadeh, 2006: 83). 
      Large groups of Azeri men reportedly armed with home-made 
weapons (such as sharpened knives) attacked Armenians in their homes 
and on the streets, looted and vandalised apartments, burnt cars and 
destroyed public buildings. Threatening leaflets had been reportedly 
posted on the doors of apartments housing Armenian families, and most 
local telephone service was cut off for several days (e. g. Shakhmuratian, 
1990; De Waal, 2003). At least two competing explanations for these 
events exist. The first is that, through force, Azeris now sought to 
compel Armenians to retract their resolution. The second is that Azeris 
were largely reacting to the belief that Armenians were physically 
harming local Azeris and would commit further acts of aggression if 
they were not stopped. 
    Whatever the exact composition and origins of the individuals who 
committed the atrocities it is doubtful whether the violence was a 
straightforward reaction of local Azeris to the campaign of NK 
Armenians.33 Many reportedly saw the First Secretary of the Sumgait 
City Party Committee carrying an Azeri flag at the head of a mob 
attacking Armenian residences (Shakhmuratian, 1990: 5-6; Kazarian, 
1988: 1).  In what follows I will review and attempt to critically apply to 
this particular case different frameworks for understanding the nature 
and mechanisms of ethnic riots. For the purposes of analysis I divide the 
literature into two broad explanatory strands: macro-level and micro-
level theories. By macro level, I mean theories that analyze structural or 
                                                 
33 Erik Melander (2001: 59) has provided a useful outline of the various suspects – agents of the 
central authorities, the Azeri republican government, an autonomously operating KGB, 
representatives of Azeri organized crime, and –a claim made by some Azeri authors and occasionally 
Russian officials– extremist Armenian nationalists themselves. As a former Russian official recently 
asserted: ‘Certain Armenian entrepreneurs played the ‘Sumgait card’… In essence they used a tragedy 
to put on a show’ (Ilukhin, 09. 09. 2010). To the best of my knowledge, such claims remain purely 
speculative and have never been verified. 
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community environment and conditions and for the most part do not deal 
directly with individual decision-makers. By micro-level I mean those 
frameworks that operate at the individual level and focus on factors that 
influence a particular individual’s decision on whether or not to engage 
in ethnic riot related activities, although naturally, some theories tend to 
posit mechanisms in which macro / structural conditions affect 
individual decision-making. I recognize that the differentiation between 
these two levels, while being useful analytically, is rather artificial. In 
fact, the broader social structures have to be traced within single 
(violent) events, and at the same time such events can be understood as 
embedded in historical and social structures. Although ethnic riots seem 
to evolve rather spontaneously, and are often perceived and referred to 
as ‘sudden outbreaks’ by the actors involved, bystanders and outside 
observers, they nevertheless require preparation and mobilization, and 
are therefore, to a certain extent, socially guided.  
 
                        
        Macro-level theories of ethnic riots 
      From a macro-level perspective, one possible explanation of the 
atrocities is that Sumgait was a ‘riot-prone’ location. It could be argued 
that Azeri refugees from Armenia who lived there having suffered at the 
hands of Armenians in their former homeland tended to be more hostile 
to Armenians than the average Azeri. According to this interpretation, 
conflict is perpetuated largely by the flow of refugees with stories of 
brutality that anger their ethnic kin.  R. Lemarchand (1996: 60-1) 
provides evidence for the hostile refugees hypothesis in his study of 
ethnic violence in Burundi. There is some evidence to support this 
proposition in the case of Sumgait. It is well documented that the town 
was largely populated by migrants from poor rural districts of 
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Azerbaijan (e. g. De Waal, 2003: 20). As mentioned above, it was 
known as the ‘town of chemists’ for its industrial base, for being 
populated by individuals considered to be the lowest ranks of Soviet 
society - large numbers of paroled prisoners and criminals34, chronic 
unemployment and inadequate housing – many workers lived in factory 
residences. In addition, Azeri refugees from Armenia came to the area in 
two waves – in the late 1940s to make way for repatriation of Armenians 
from the diaspora and in 1987 because of a growing sense of insecurity 
for Azeris in Armenia (Unusov, 2005: 56-7).   At the same time the 
presence and influx of refugees and the accompanying increase in 
tension is insufficient to explain the spread of communal rioting. Despite 
the presence of social strata which could be seen to be relatively easily 
instigated to violence, according to numerous testimonies, one can just 
as easily point to an atmosphere of interethnic tolerance and friendly 
relations, at least at the grassroots level.  
      The ‘violence causes violence’ hypothesis suggests that each riot 
strengthens existing fears and hatreds leading to a vicious circle of 
continuous rioting (e.g.Tambiah, 1996). Horowitz and others have 
demonstrated that once rioting has begun, larger numbers of participants 
will join, including a wider section of the community with no direct 
involvement in any preceding incidents. Subsequent riots often flow 
from preceding violence, as rumours and misperceptions abound. As 
Stanley Tambiah puts it, ‘ethnic riots form a series, with antecedent riots 
influencing the unfolding of subsequent ones’ (Tambiah, 1996: 214). 
Although, Sumgait itself did not have a history of violent confrontations, 
the violent episode in February 1988 was followed by similar incidents 
in other Azeri towns throughout 1988. In this sense it can be seen as the 
                                                 
34 According to some sources, around two thousand paroled prisoners came to Sumgait between 1981 
and 1988 (Mamedov, 1994: 31-2, cited in De Waal, 2003: 32; Agaev and Alizadeh, 2006: 77). 
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first in a chain of continuous rioting. In addition, the constitutional 
campaign of Armenians in NK and Armenia proper35, which intensified 
immediately prior to the events in Sumgait undoubtedly raised the level 
of threat among some sections of the Azeri community. The ‘attribution 
of threat’ refers to the ‘collective perception that the fulfillment of 
another actor’s goals will negatively affect its interests or values’ 
(McAdam et al., 2001: 46-7).   From this perspective, the episode could 
be seen as a response from those who saw a change in the status quo that 
would fundamentally undermine their interests and traditional cultural 
patterns as imminent. 
      The civic engagement hypothesis focuses on the broader social 
environment that allows riots to take place or prevents them from 
happening. A.  Varshney suggests that routine interactions – either 
organized through associations that span the ethnic divide or 
unorganized through everyday contact – have a direct effect on diffusing 
tensions between the communities and reducing the likelihood of riots at 
the local level (Varshney, 2001, 2002).  No tradition of such networks 
existed in this case. In a similar vein, an Azeri historian has recently 
argued:  
  Why did it not occur in some other city? Let’s say, in Baku? In 
cities with tradition there would always be a person held in high esteem 
who might come out and say: “Stop” and the mob would stop (author 
interview with Eldar Namazov, 10 January 2009, Baku).  
 
Overall, macro-level theories provide some interesting insights on the 
environment that may avert or be conducive to ethnic riots. Arguments 
about the availability/ absence of civic associations and ‘riot-prone’ 
locations are relatively easy to test compared to those explanations that 
focus more on the individual level and should involve a ‘deconstruction’ 
                                                 
35 See chapter 3. 
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to understand the meanings that individual actors attribute to their 
interactions with others. Yet it is the micro-level that helps understand 
what drives specific decisions on participation. 
 
                      Micro-level theories 
      In contrast to the frameworks considered above, which tend focus on 
the general structural conditions, either favourable or unfavourable to the 
outbreak of a riot, and show how riots are always dependant upon and 
entrenched in specific structural contexts, Paul Brass in his influential 
studies of communal violence in India models the actions of individual 
participants (Brass, 1996, 1997, 2003). He suggests that in some cases 
an institutionalised riot system involving a range of actors from 
politicians to criminals emerges (Brass, 1997: 208). Crucial to those 
networks are certain individuals who ‘take as one of their purposes the 
protection of the status, pride and interests of one community against 
presumed threats to them from another’ (Brass, 1996: 13). Brass 
concludes that communal riots in India were made possible by a 
prevailing discourse of Hindu-Muslim confrontation built up over two 
centuries and maintained by interested parties. Similarly, W. 
Berenschoft (2009) concentrates on how relations between various 
actors enhance ‘incentives and perceptions that motivate them to 
contribute to the rioting’ (Berenschoft, 2009: 421). From the 
‘institutionalized riot system’ perspective, it is important to consider that 
one or two individual instigators have been mentioned in all accounts of 
the events in Sumgait even if their precise role is ambiguous. Although 
not ‘riot specialists’ in Brass’s sense of term, they contributed to 
attracting larger numbers to the confrontation by making direct appeals 
to violence.  
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      In Benjamin Valentino’s thesis small numbers carry out the violence 
and little societal support is necessary – all that is required is for the 
wider population not to physically oppose the killings. For Valentino, 
the search for the causes of killing should begin with ‘the capabilities, 
interests, ideas and strategies of groups and individuals in positions of 
political and military power’ (Valentino, 2004: 64).  Horowitz writes 
that riots can be located anywhere along a spectrum of organization from 
highly coordinated to spontaneous (Horowitz, 2001: 225-6). 
      Many studies of communal violence tend to see particular cases of 
ethnic rioting as spontaneous eruptions of outrage at the barbaric stories 
found in rumours unsubstantiated unverified information. The 
increasingly accepted idea of the ‘productive’ aspects of rumour has 
made it a focus of attention in conflict studies in recent years 
(Appadurai, 1998; Brass, 1997; Das, 1990, 2007; Horowitz, 2001; 
Pandey, 2002). Anonymous rumours often exaggerate the significance of 
(relatively) minor incidents, bring about feelings of insecurity, reduce 
the perceived feasibility of peaceful solutions and increase radical 
attitudes within society. Rumours often play a central role during periods 
of acute insecurity. The horrifying content of some rumours stimulates a 
sense of urgency and makes non-violent alternatives seem hardly 
conceivable. In such situations groups may decide that their options lie 
not between cooperation and aggression but between aggression and 
victimhood (Weingast, 1998: 165). When escalation is viewed in this 
way, an initial violent incident ignites long-standing tensions between 
the communal groups. References to past and present intercommunal 
clashes and murders form a common feature of speeches for popular 
mobilization, which clearly reinforced popular Armenian anger towards 
Azeris, and vice versa. To the best of my knowledge, none of these 
stories had ever been documented or verified. For example, in the 
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sample of my interviews in NK and Armenia twenty five out of twenty 
seven mentioned the retelling of the story of the murder of an Armenian 
boy by an Azeri school principle in the 1960s as fundamental to their 
perception of insecurity. The boy’s body was allegedly later deformed 
by the principle. The story also features in the memoirs of Armenian 
activists (e. g. Balayan, 1999: 135-7; Guruntz, 2002: 53-5). The story of 
this terrible cruelty was retold in Armenian families and passed though 
generations as an example of a killing motivated entirely by the ‘ethnic 
otherness’ of the victim. 
      There are multiple undocumented cases of Azeri tutors regularly 
abusing Armenian schoolchildren (e. g. Gevondyan, no date: 1), author 
interview with Jasmin Gevondyan, 14 July 2008, Yerevan). Even if 
subsequent analysis ever establishes those narratives to be fabrications – 
and Armenian and Azeri historiographies tend to have a poor track 
record when it comes to agreeing upon unilaterally accepted accounts of 
historical violence - it is necessary to view them as believable accounts 
for the victims, as well as for those members of the community who 
heard the testimonies being retold. Whether they are historically true or 
false the impact of similar narratives has to do with their capacity to be 
perceived as real by those who feel affected by them. An Azeri activist 
has recognized the centrality of such unverified stories to individual 
participation in communal riots and the ways in which they were taken 
to reveal or confirm very different ‘truths’ that make engagement in 
violent riots seem desirable, even necessary: 
  …In one accident four corpses of Azeris were found but where is 
the proof that they were killed by Armenians? Russians or Azeris 
themselves could have done it as well. However, everyone was already 
speculating about taking revenge on the Armenians… Another example, 
an Armenian man took the floor at a rally and said that in Nakhichevan 
his grandfather’s tomb had been defiled and an Armenian had been 
beheaded. But no one had ever gone there to verify…whether such a 
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thing had really occurred. Or vice versa, an Azeri man in his speech 
asserted that in one region three Armenians had killed an Azeri national. 
But no one knew whether it was true or not. That’s how it all began, and 
then it grew bigger like a snowball (author interview with Kerim 
Kerimly, 6 January 2009, Baku). 
 
Similarly an Armenian activist recalls in relation to the events in 
Sumgait: 
 
  Rumours were growing like a snowball- someone was killed here, 
someone arrested there, and something else done in some other 
place…Rumours (about Sumgait) spread very fast…What people were 
telling was horrible… Often in reality violence is less than its 
perception… A thousand people retell one and the same story (author 
interview with Stepan Grigoryan, 28 July 2008, Yerevan).  
 
      Any community will contain different subgroups with varying 
identities and motives.   As Horowitz notes, an ‘amalgam of apparently 
rational-purposive behaviour and irrational-brutal behaviour forms the 
leitmotiv of the ethnic riot’ (Horowitz, 2001: 13; Brass, 2003: 32). It is 
reasonable to suggest that many of the people became involved for a 
range of reasons, including the opportunity to loot and occupy victims’ 
houses, a perception that the violence confirms the content of recent 
stories and the fact that no punishment was incurred by participants. 
      Ethnographers have noted that in situations of social disorder or 
crisis people are more likely to accept rumour as ‘impoverished news’ 
(Shibutani, 1966: 17) – information that in less uncertain and threatening 
circumstances they might be willing to reject as hardly credible 
(Pendelton, 1998: 69). The fact that rumour is distinguished by a lack of 
verified and verifiable information tends to strengthen the perceptions of 
instability and insecurity.  This environment provides openings for 
rumour to emerge. Similarly, G. Elwert (1991) has emphasized that in 
                                                                                         172
times of political turmoil rumor has the potential to contribute to the 
construction of mythology central to the widespread mobilization of 
nationalist movements.  
      The role of rumour should be considered in Armenian and Azeri 
contexts for at least two reasons. Firstly, it shows that radicalism is not 
just a matter of rational planning, careful organization and relative 
deprivation as dominant theories of conflict tend to assert. By its very 
nature the dynamics of ethnic collective action does not follow pre-
determined trajectories, and emotionally centered interactions may 
significantly shape its course. Secondly, contrary to some elite-centered 
theories, (e. g. Snyder, 2000: 216-8) the Soviet media can hardly be 
accused of directly stimulating the conflict because when the agitation 
started the Soviet local and central press – which retained a total 
monopoly of information – attacked relentlessly any manifestation of 
nationalism insisting on the friendship of peoples. Even at later stages 
when local media started to strengthen, it was the lack of information 
rather than the dissemination of nationalist ideas that indirectly 
contributed to exacerbating ethnic tension.   Rumours occupied a 
particularly significant niche in closed regimes where they combined 
‘news’ with expressions of social anxiety. Rumours were also the means 
by which people shared, compared and transmitted information in 
response to ambiguously defined situations (Shibutani, 1966: 22-4).   
      In Armenia and Azerbaijan rumours played a dual role. On the one 
hand, they appear to have filled a genuine information gap where people 
knew that important events (such as Sumgait) were occurring but lacked 
reliable sources of information given the lack of data in official Soviet 
media. In this context individuals tended to speculate about issues that 
worried them, repeat and share with each other the stories that confirmed 
their fears.  It should be noted that the lack of attention to oral narratives 
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in academic literature on the conflict could be explained by the fact that 
they remained at the intra-communal level and were largely excluded 
from the formal discourse through which both sides represented events 
to outside observers. On the other hand, a degree of selectivity 
demonstrated by nationalist elites in sanctioning and privileging one 
interpretation of interethnic relations over others needs to be recognized.  
Clearly, certain individuals significantly contributed to presenting some 
(relatively) isolated and insignificant disputes of the past as ethnic in 
nature. However, treating the emotional appeal of oral narratives as a 
simple instrument deployed by an unaffected political elite tends to set 
up a rather dubious opposition between the rational calculations of the 
political provocateur and the ‘hot’ emotions of the masses. Introducing 
clear intentions, rational motives and plans into discussions of specific 
episodes of violence underestimates the fact that obscurity is not only 
cultivated but also takes on a momentum of its own that ends up 
enveloping most actors. The tight control of all official sources of  
information by the Soviet regime combined with the relative weakness 
of local media at the time were primarily responsible for the distinctely 
powerful radicalizing impact of oral narratives in NK36. In addition, as 
traditional lines of everyday communication between the communities 
started to break down, rumours became the key method of disseminating 
scarce information. 
   In an attempt to understand the atrocities in Sumgait Armenians turned 
to history for explanation. The Genocide provided the most obvious 
framework within which these developments could be analyzed. The 
pogrom was made more comprehensible when viewed as part of the 
historical continuum of persecution by Turks. The implication was clear: 
                                                 
36 By contrast, the information milieu in Northern Ireland did not generate the same social 
uncertainty, while the gap between the official constructions of reality and activist understandings of 
it was narrower. See chapter chapter 7 for a more detailed comparative analysis. 
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for Armenians what had happened in Sumgait could be nothing less than 
a contemporary manifestation of a policy begun at the end of the 19th 
century by Turks. The idea of a historical pattern was reinforced by the 
placards displayed at mass demonstrations after the events in Sumgait. 
The widespread perception was that ethnic cleansing, which had been 
carried out with such marked efficiency in Western Armenia almost 
seventy five years was now being repeated in the East: 
 
What took place in Sumgait was genocide especially since the 
pogroms were perpetrated by the representatives of one nation towards 
another… That genocide had deep roots (Sarkisyan, 1988: 2).   
 
… I completely identify Azeris with the Turks: In 1915 Turks 
committed the same acts as the Azeris later… Even the forms of 
violence were similar… I think it is part of their genetic memory (author 
interview with an Armenian activist, 17 July 2008, Yerevan). 
 
      These narratives provided an ethnic frame for the codification of acts 
of violence as ethnically targeted, ethnic in their causal structure and 
motivation37.  
                                                 
37 It should be noted that Azeris also increasingly speak of acts of Genocide 
committed by Armenians in relation to the outbreaks of anti-Azeri violence in 1918, 
and more recently in the town of Khojaly (around 6 miles north of Stepanakert) in 
1992. Like the violent episodes in Sumgait and Baku (January 1990) for Armenians, 
Khojaly for Azeris has become detached from time and space, and corresponds to 
the generalized notions of resistance and suffering. Khojaly has become an integral 
part of the contemporary Azeri narrative tradition. According to recent estimates in 
Azeri historiography, in Khojaly 613 were dead, 150 went missing and 1275 were 
held captive (Suleymanov et al., 2006: 205; see also Garibov, 1992 for testimonies 
of survivors).  Some sources report up to 1.000 dead (cited in Lieven, The Times, 
02. 03. 1992). This figure is quite possibly higher than the number of real victims 
and might have been deliberately elevated to reinforce the perception of Azerbaijan 
as a martyr nation. While the Khojaly incident remains one of the key 
transformative moments in Azeri national consciousness, the visibly reciprocal 
nature of the Khojaly vs. Sumgait accusations also shows that identity and its 
construction or transformation can hardly be separated from the process of social 
and political interaction, particularly from the strategies of the ‘other’ the ‘self’ is in 
contact (and contrast) with.  The constant competition between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that 
has converged in the self-representation of the two nations as martyr peoples is 
especially apparent at this stage given the (relative) similarity of the (pre-conflict) 
cultural and social fabric in Armenia and Azerbaijan. As one of my respondents 
expressed it, ‘…they [Armenia and Azerbaijan] are like twins changing roles’ 
(author interview with Ali Abasov, 7 January 2009, Baku). 
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Sumgait transformed a past trauma into a (perceived) immediate threat. 
A particularly significant point is how it came to decisively shape 
Armenian discourse symbolizing all the injustices that Armenians had 
ever suffered in the hands of Azeris. Documenting the gruesome details 
became a means of summarizing this history and was a means of 
demonstrating how the events were the logical outcome of injustice in 
NK. What Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 441) call the ‘cultural 
construction of fear’ needs to be considered here. Narratives of outsider 
violence framed in cultural or historic terms offer political entrepreneurs 
opportunities to construct current struggles as ethnic and reap the 
rewards of sharper boundary delineation, greater group cohesion and 
raised levels of mobilization. The success of such framing strategies 
depends on their resonance with established narratives and beliefs 
among their target constituencies.38  
      Entrepreneurs seeking to ethnicize political discourse in the post-
Soviet context were aided by the ubiquity of ethnic categorisations in 
Soviet society and the unquestionable legitimacy of ethnicity as an 
ascriptive identity. The Soviet system made ethnic politics a factor of 
growing importance in the internal institutional life, division of territory 
and resources. The hierarchy of ethnic groups was best expressed in 
political structures, such as positions distributed within the Communist 
Party leadership, the central state bureaucracy and the military 
establishment, where ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups tended to have more 
prestige, respect and power than ‘newcomers’ (Schnilerman,  2001: 4).  
In ways characteristic of ethno-nationalism discourse of the post-
Sumgait period was constructed around a number of core dichotomies.  
At the heart of its representation of interethnic relations was the sharp 
                                                                                                                                          
 
38 See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of the framing concept. 
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distinction between the ‘inherently’ irrational and violent national 
character of Azeris and Armenians as civilised people who would never 
harm others: ‘Azeris are the barbarians of the XXth century’ (Armenian 
population of Kirovabad, 1988: 2). ‘…the Armenian people never 
destroyed anything, they have always engaged in constructive and 
creative activities’ (Sarkisyan, 1988: 4). 
       In this context, the word ‘Sumgait’ signified the event itself (the 
brutal murder of Armenians), the context (Armenian victimisation, Azeri 
aggression and Soviet complacency), as well as the underlying paradigm 
of Genocide. Some slogans implied that Sumgait was part of a broadly 
coordinated strategy which they linked to Turkish expansionism: ‘The 
Sumgait Genocide – the test of pan-Turkic tactics’. Armenian elites used 
this event to argue that, aside from political or constitutional reasons, 
NK had no alternative but to withdraw from Azerbaijan to protect its 
Armenian population: ‘…the defense of NK’s 150,000 Armenians 
against a ‘second Sumgait’ became a supreme national priority, to the 
detriment of almost everything else’ (Zolyan, 1988, cited in Astourian, 
2000: 23). Sumgait also sparked a massive flow of refugees. Within a 
month of the riots most of the Azeri population of Armenia (around 
160.000) fled to Azerbaijan and the first Armenian refugees from 
Azerbaijan came to Armenia (Unusov, 2005: 48).  
      Because the violence in Sumgait happened straight after the 
beginning of an open campaign for ending Azeri rule over the territory it 
quickly became an icon of ethnic and religious difference.  The 
deployment of narratives focusing ethnic fear is not to suggest 
unequivocally that the radicalization and violence that followed can be 
fully explained by such cultural constructions. We have no way of 
testing whether all individuals en masse believed that a ‘pan-Turkic 
threat’ against them was imminent.  In addition, not all Armenians 
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subscribed to holding Azeris as a people responsible for the acts of 
isolated perpetrators. Nevertheless, fears and prejudices dominated 
public discourse and generated frightening rumours which in turn 
seemed to affect even the most self-critical and detached individuals. 
The perceived existential threat faced by both communities made some 
individuals emphasize the ethnic character of the conflict in 
confrontational incidents exacerbating the environment of tension. The 
response of the Soviet authorities was fuelling Armenian suspicions 
about the organized nature of the pogroms. Two battalions arrived in 
Sumgait only two days after the pogroms had begun.  
      On the one hand, many Armenians believed that the authorities in 
Moscow either instigated the episode or allowed it to continue to 
demonstrate to the people their vulnerability and to warn them against 
further reunification claims (Nolyan, 2001; author interviews, July 2008, 
Yerevan). On the other hand, for some Azeris the events in Sumgait 
represented an integral part of a conspiracy between the central 
government and Western agencies most notably, the CIA aimed at 
destabilising and ultimately dismantling the Soviet system of rule (Agiev 
and Alizadeh, 2006: 72-86; author interviews with Arzu Abdulaeva, 7 
January 2009, Baku, Ramiz Sevdimaliev, Kerim Kerimly). Both 
Armenians and Azeris have hypothesised that the central authorities or 
anti-perestroika forces have engineered the riots to deflect the discourse 
from one of democracy to one of violence: ‘The goal (of Sumgait) was 
to strip Gorbachev of his power… ‘He is credited with having launched 
perestroika but look at what it has led to – a bloodshed and killings’ 
(author interview with Eldar Namazov, 10 January 2009, Baku). But it 
seems hardly plausible that they could have directly orchestrated specific 
episodes of violence. 
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                The role of the media 
      The perceptions of both sides were inflamed by the stance taken by 
official Soviet media. Brief articles covering Sumgait regularly equated 
perpetrator and victim without pronouncing in favour of one or the other 
while substituting real issues with formalistic phrases about enduring 
friendship between the two peoples in the spirit of internationalism. For 
the political elite the internationalist language offered imagery of 
interethnic relations that resonated with three key audiences. Firstly, it 
accorded with Azeri titulars’ desire for stability and absence of serious 
unrest. Secondly, it resonated with non-titulars’ struggle for non-
discrimination. Finally, it projected a favourable image of interethnic 
harmony to the outside world. In the case of Sumgait the lack of 
openness and the concealment of casualties served only to bolster the 
problem’s framing as an interethnic conflict in the minds of the 
participants. In navigating between the parties in this way Moscow was 
acting as if expecting and waiting for the situation to deteriorate. The 
day before Sumgait the Deputy General Procurator of the USSR 
appeared on Central television to report on an earlier incident indicating 
that ‘as a consequence of …riots two inhabitants of the Aghdam region 
fell victim to murder’ and stating the names and ages of the two Azeri 
youths who had died. Without specifying who was to blame he vaguely 
attributed the deaths to the actions of ‘isolated hooligan elements who 
resorted, obviously for the purpose of provocations to violations of 
public order’ (Grafova, Golos Armenii, 13.04.1991; Katusev, Izvestiya, 
20.08. 1988). 
      On the 1st of March 1988 the official Soviet communist newspaper 
Pravda reported that ‘…a group of hooligan elements provoked 
disturbances in Sumgait… There were instances of outrages and 
violence. Measures have been taken to normalize life in the city’ 
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(Pravda, 01.03.1988). No details were given about who were the 
‘hooligans’ nor about the identity or the number of the victims. On 3rd 
March more information was provided: ‘Unstable and immature people 
who fell under the influence of provocative rumours and inflammatory 
talk about the events in NK and Armenia were drawn into illegal 
actions… Tragic events occurred and there were fatalities’ (Bakinskiy 
Rabochiy, 03.03.1988). These pronouncements were accompanied by 
occasional references to hot-blooded Caucasian passions in which all 
acts were somehow attributed to the same uncontrolled emotions.  In a 
strong state, outbreaks of violence usually attract the overwhelming 
presence of security forces dedicated to the restoration of social order. 
The fact that the Sumgait perpetrators faced no censure from security 
agencies and were not punished severely contributed to delegitimizing  
the regime: 
  The only weapon against Sumgait is openness, complete and 
unconditional… Truth and justice even if they seem harsh… But the first 
newspaper articles, the first verdict show the expectations of the public 
are not being met. We are being fed with half-truth, half-openness and 
half-justice (Zolyan and Balayan, 1988:1; see also Grafova, 13. 04. 1991 
for similar observations). 
 
      Armenian confidence in the ability of the center to act as an honest 
broker in the dispute was shaken.  Within a very short period of time the 
pro-Soviet sentiments of the Armenian population were largely eroded 
and replaced by a sense of disbelief and shock. Many asked how their 
‘own’ Soviet government could have allowed such a thing to happen.  
Thus, one key outcome of the Sumgait events was the near universal 
reversal of Armenian perceptions of the Union, which contributed to 
lending an enormous symbolic legitimacy to the national movement(s) 
both in NK and in Armenia: 
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  …After Sumgait even the last careerist scoundrel stood side by side 
with us... all hopes pinned on perestroika started to wane…Sumgait is 
one of those turning points from which the unraveling of the USSR 
began (author interview with Stepan Grigoryan, 28 July 2008, Yerevan). 
 
In the eyes of the protesters Sumgait signified the redundancy of prior 
patterns of non-violent Moscow-oriented protest. Vazgen Manukyan, a 
respected scientist and one of the organizers of the national movement 
suggested that the central authorities in Moscow had orchestrated the 
massacre out of fear of popular democracy:  
  The government is genuinely scared of our unity… They just 
wanted to intimidate us to stop the demonstrations from happening. 
They thought it was all being directed from  somewhere… they just 
could not imagine that half a million people would interrupt the day-to-
day business of their lives to express their bitterness at how  they had 
been treated (cited in Malkasyan, 1996: 54).  
 
      Quite apart from the highly questionable image of Sumgait created 
by the central Soviet media, their overall misrepresentation and 
concealment of information proved to be a catalyst for the 
transformation of the movement over time – what began as a (non-
violent) protest for (perceived) constitutional rights in the name of 
glasnost’ and perestroika became a forum for the exchange of 
suppressed information, then a rally for pan-Armenian solidarity against 
Soviet policies and Azeri responses, and finally, a platform for the 
growing pro-independence democratic forces. The spirit of the 
demonstrations changed from voicing support for the Armenians of NK 
to a struggle for the rights and survival of the Armenian nation as a 
whole. Early optimism gave way to anger in response to the 
objectionable characterization of the activists in the official press as 
‘groups of nationalist extremists’ (Pravda, 21.02.1988). Demands for 
recognition intensified together with Armenian claims that their protests 
were misrepresented by the Soviet press. As with other aspects of the 
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movement, the construction of alternative sources of information began 
reactively as Armenians attempted to refute accusations about their 
actions and to compensate for the lack of correct information available 
to citizens. In this connection it is important to examine their response to 
official press publications in the context of the broader struggle to 
provide the ‘definitive’ legitimation of their grievances and activities. 
The distortion of information about the movement in the press acted as a 
facilitating factor for mass mobilization by shifting individual reasoning 
and making the protesters more perceptive of the demands advanced on 
behalf of the group.  
      One of the most telling examples of conflict with the press was in 
response to an article entitled ‘Emotions and reason: events in and 
around Nagorno-Karabakh’, which appeared in the official newspaper of 
the Communist Party, Pravda. The article attributed Armenian activism 
to the influence of ‘Western radio voices’, such as Radio Liberty, which 
had a stake in ‘inflaming passions’. ‘Anti-socialist elements’ in Armenia 
were also accused of attempts to hinder democratization and perestroika, 
‘national egoism’ and pursuing ‘selfish interests’. The authors concluded 
by stating that the ‘noble idea of reunification had a noticeable anti-
socialist flavour’ (Pravda, 21.03.1988).  
      Armenian resentment at ‘half-truths and distortions’ (Sarkisyan, 
1988: 1) contained in such publications was particularly significant in 
the context of the transformation of popular attitudes, since Armenians 
felt they were confronting Soviet power because of the perceived power 
behind Pravda as the official organ of the Communist Party. Posters that 
appeared after the publication commented ironically on the Soviet 
manipulation of the truth and the consequent worthlessness of official 
information through ironic wordplays. Words were subtly altered so that 
Izvestiya (knowledge) became bezvestiya (lack of knowledge), Pravda 
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(truth) became nepravda (lack of truth). Thus, the creation of a particular 
media image of the movement distant from its ‘true’ politico-legal basis 
and authentic desire for historical justice had the effect of gradually 
eroding popular faith in the system and broadening opposition to the 
regime. Those attitudes which came about largely as a result of a moral 
shock at the reaction of the government to protest form as much a part of 
the movement’s identity construction and development as its initial 
lobbying efforts at the highest levels of authority.39 
      It should be reiterated that the issue of security, which the episode in 
Sumgait brought to the fore has a broader significance, at least in the 
Armenian context: ‘One group need not believe that the other really is 
aggressive, only fear that it might be’ (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 51). It 
is possible to suggest that for some sections of the community the 
transformations initiated by Gorbachev triggered both hope and 
opportunity and a relative uncertainty at the pace, if not content, of 
reforms. In a period of change these sections chose to employ violence 
when peaceful resistance to the various substantial threats to their 
collective existence was perceived as no longer feasible. Similarly, it 
could be argued that the sometimes violent (re)actions of Azeris partly 
responded to the (perceived) gains of Armenians (like, for example, 
signs of support for Armenian delegations in Moscow, the passing of 
resolutions on NK in the local Soviet) and the long-lasting implications 
such gains could have for Azeri collective life patterns.40  
 
       
 
                                                 
39 See chapter 3 on this period. 
40 For a similar line of argument in relation to Northern Ireland focusing on violence as a resistance 
strategy to key changes in the level of intensity of direct and relative threats, as well as to reform, see 
(Mitchell, 2011). 
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     Central state-activist relations 
      As discussed previously, independence did not become part of the 
agenda until after the Soviet state had persistently failed to play its role 
as the ‘benign ruler’. Armenian resistance to independence was 
generally voiced more in terms of fears about the future rather than 
satisfaction with the present – Armenians expressed fear that if they left 
the Soviet Union they would lose protection and suffer in the hands of 
more powerful and hostile neighbours. A crucial factor in this 
transformation was the perception of government partiality. From the 
beginning Moscow’s political moves and lack of clear tactics 
emphasized equal distance between the two (Armenian and Azeri) sides 
and led each side to believe at different times that its efforts would 
ultimately prove successful. As a result, both sides later accused the 
Union authorities of favouring one side over the other and of 
deliberately sustaining and encouraging conflict as a means of retaining 
control over the region. At different times each of the parties felt 
aggrieved at the perceived bias of the authorities or got a sense of 
empowerment from the apparently secured government support for 
itself.  For example, given the authoritarian nature of the state, the 
absence of repressions during the first public demonstrations and the 
very fact that these activities were not banned gave Armenians the 
impression that they enjoyed unconditional approval from the center. 
The behaviour of the police also contributed to the perception of official 
tolerance of the demonstrations. At the same time the Azeri population 
became convinced that the Soviets were unduly favouring the 
Armenians.  
      Paradoxically, the idea of the NK campaign having been strongly 
supported and encouraged by external actors (whether they be the Union 
authorities or other ‘interested’ powers) is one of the few conceptions 
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that is shared by many Armenian and Azeri activists and analysts, 
despite their deep divergence on other fundamental issues. The search 
for the ‘true’ causes of the Center’s behaviour, the quest to uncover 
some deeper, hidden motives behind the authorities’ actions became a 
common feature. Such interpretations entail more than simply 
questioning the reasons for specific decisions but seeking to interrogate 
who is ‘really’ behind the actions, as powerful forces are deemed to be 
controlling events. The idea of outside orchestration is dominant in 
Armenian sources, as exemplified by the following quote: 
  The real impetus for the NK movement was not Gorbachev’s 
perestroika but an external force. For example the CIA had firmly 
decided to put everything at stake to destroy the Soviet Union, thus 
saving the planet from the communist plague once and for all. Several 
attempts had been made staring with the Uzbek SSR… They strove to 
find weak spots… The Tashkent scenario did not work and they 
remembered about NK…The NK issue was constantly on the Armenian 
agenda…It was the weak thread that was designed to lead to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (Gazaryan, 13.02. 2011). 
 
An Azeri political scientist has recently expressed a similar 
preoccupation with the premeditated nature of the actions of the 
(external) ruling elites: 
  The process of the initiation of the Armenian movement was 
directed from outside… The promotion of the idea of ‘reunification’ 
could not have taken place without an explicit permission from the 
Union authorities (Ataev, 2009: no pagination).   
  
      Attempting to balance between contradictory obligations of 
redressing collective grievances and guaranteeing political stability and 
security in the context of weakening legitimacy meant that the only 
consistent element in the reactions of the central state was inconsistency. 
Moscow was faced with a serious puzzle. To accede to Armenian 
demands for reunification would have opened a Pandora’s box of other 
                                                                                         185
long-standing grievances throughout the Soviet Union and could have 
been used by different groups to push their (similar) claims. One of 
Gorbachev’s advisor’s recalls: 
  …NK was the first sign of the explosive and destructive power of 
nationalism, if its spread is not stopped… We discussed the situation on 
numerous occasions and came to the only feasible conclusion that at 
present the readjustment of borders was not possible. This is a principle. 
If it is violated once, the door will be opened for multiple armed 
conflicts (Ligachev, 1999: 153).    
      
      The authorities tried to appease the parties and ended up alienating 
both. Whatever steps the Kremlin took, they backfired and progressively 
weakened its hold over the region. One of the options persistently put 
forward by some Azeri activists was the use of repression to avoid 
violent escalation. Until the end of 1988, perhaps, the central authorities 
would still have been able to resort to brute force on a large scale. 
However, on the one hand, given the high levels of mass participation in 
Armenia high-level repression could have transformed the military 
intervention into an unimaginable bloodbath. On the other hand, the 
failure to use force in a state which was still perceived to be highly 
centralized and authoritarian was taken by Azeris as a sign of 
unconditional Soviet support for Armenian national goals. Some 
intermediary options were being discussed within the walls of the 
Kremlin. It was reported that Politburo members were considering 
granting a higher degree of political authority to NK Armenians by 
making the region an autonomous republic with its own constitution and 
with Armenian as the official language, thus granting more symbolic and 
substantive attributes of stateness (Hovhanissyan, 1998: 41). Some 
dissident intellectuals in Moscow favoured a solution involving a 
referendum on a swap of territories which would see some Azeri 
populated territories of southern Armenia becoming part of Azerbaijan 
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in exchange for NK being reunited with Armenia (Sakharov, 1996: 
Chapter 5). However, the lack of understanding about the depth of ethnic 
problems combined with divisions within the party elite undermined the 
possibility of reaching a consensual approach: ‘The Soviet leaders did 
not devise any plan to resolve the NK issue… What was needed was a 
quick and adequate reaction… If they had introduced direct rule in early 
1988, the conflict would not escalated to such an extent’ (author 
interview with David Petrosyan, political observer, 28 July 2008, 
Yerevan). The former Armenian Defense Minister comes to similar 
conclusions: 
  A widespread view is that Gorbachev had a specific scheme, 
because Armenians cannot comprehend how and why he could have 
acted in such a way as to trip himself up… When starting perestroika he 
ruined the old system but nothing was available to replace it… The 
situation was changing every day and he could not keep pace with it…. 
The authorities underestimated the depth of the crisis [in NK] and did 
not fully foresee what it would lead to (author interview with Vagarshak 
Arutunyan, 31 July 2008, Yerevan). 
        
      In the case of NK, rather than taking decisive measures, Moscow 
first offered a 500 million rouble (approximately $ 83.3 mln.) 
development package. This sum was intended to be used to improve 
housing, enhance school construction, Armenian language education and 
build a network of roads between Yerevan and Stepanakert. Armenians 
heavily criticized the decision, primarily since the funding had to pass 
through the hesitant Baku authorities. When these measures failed to 
remedy the grievances of the local population, NK was put under 
Moscow’s direct administrative control in January 1989. In the already 
extremely tense environment this move had the effect of deepening 
Armenian and Azeri suspicions towards Moscow and towards each 
other. The measure had the objective of putting an end to the impasse 
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between Armenians and Azeris over NK. Ten months later control was 
ceded back to Azerbaijan, which made the situation even more 
intolerable from the Armenian point of view. In reality there is no hard 
evidence to suggest that in the period from 1987 until the final collapse 
of the Union in 1991 the Soviet state or the military high command as 
institutions fully supported one of the contending sides.  
      The idea that the government had a direct interest in fuelling the 
conflict seems hardly credible in the absence of any documentary 
evidence and given that it would seriously undermine the goals of the 
reform process, and inevitably damage international reputation. 
However, in the end, the center’s involvement amounted to partial 
satisfaction of both sides. Moscow’s ‘arbitration’ indirectly encouraged 
both majority and minority activism, since it did not suggest that either 
was decisively wrong. This externally articulated ‘mechanism’ for 
resolving conflict could not therefore act as a basis for consensual and 
self-contained relations between majority and minority. The inadequacy 
of the arbitration efforts of the central government partly accounts for 
(and is simultaneously explained by) the fact that popular identification 
with ethnic nationality and the strengthening of the legitimacy of 
nationalism as a form of political authority outstripped identification 
with the Soviet state as an integrating vehicle or the capacity of state 
institutions to fulfill such a role. While the Soviet authorities were quite 
successful in incubating the discourse of nationhood, conflict regulation 
relied on external intervention and was dependant upon adjudication by 
the center. In effect this external reliance shielded minority and majority 
from direct negotiations with each other. The lack of lateral relations 
between the communities at grassroot and elite level was seen by some 
activists as a major obstacle to avoiding violent escalation (author 
                                                                                         188
interviews, July 2008, Yerevan, Zakhid Abbasov, 15 January 2009, 
Baku). 
      One particularly revealing example of the shift in the attitude 
towards the regime from sympathy to mistrust and rejection relates to 
the December 1988 earthquake in the Armenian city of Spitak,41 which 
many Armenians believe, resulted from deliberate policies of the central 
authorities in Moscow designed to harm the Armenian nation. Even 
knowing that they live in a seismic zone many people did not accept the 
explanation of a tragic coincidence and started to speculate that Moscow 
had detonated subterranean explosives, which stimulated the earthquake 
as a punishment for the demonstrations (Rost, 1990: 126; Titizian, The 
Armenian Reporter, 06.12. 2008; Gregoryan, The Armenian Reporter, 
06.12. 2008; author interviews, July 2008, Yerevan). To some this 
theory seemed to be confirmed by the government’s slow reaction to the 
emergency. Gorbachev’s visit to the United States the day the disaster 
struck fed suspicions about its artificial origins. To outsiders suggestions 
that the earthquake was part of the authorities’ anti-Armenian campaign 
and the central government had deliberately planned and organized such 
a catastrophe are hardly credible.  Yet the readiness to accuse the 
government reveals the deep sensitivity and suspicions many Armenians 
harboured that they constitute a special target for the authorities. The 
story about the earthquake fit and reinforced existing paradigms of 
victimization as in their collective memory Armenians have lived with 
constant and continuous threats to their existence, both as individuals 
and as a society.  At the same time the aftermath and internalization of 
this event also evidenced the effectiveness of elite ideological discourse 
in contributing to shaping the ways in which Armenians perceived 
                                                 
41 The earthquake killed at least 25.000 people and left many more wounded or homeless (e. g. 
Ramirez and Peek-Asa, 2005: 48). 
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themselves. The earthquake was absorbed into a single historical 
narrative, which comprised massacres, genocide, environmental 
pollution, state discrimination and domination. In this context, the 
meaning of NK as one of the key carriers of Armenian identity also 
expanded to include the central state’s complacency and (perceived) 
indifference: ‘The issue is not just NK but the future of all our people’ 
(Arutunyan, 1988: 3). 
 
      Thus, with time the situation in NK became highly resistant to 
change, and external elites were faced with the increasingly complex 
task of trying to address and minimize rather than negate the growing 
salience of the ethnonational cleavage. In this context it is difficult to 
retrospectively evaluate whether a particular set of actors (primarily, the 
Soviet authorities) could have effectively helped to avoid a conflictual 
path and prevented a strong ‘ethnicisation’ of the perceptions and 
thinking of local protagonists. On the one hand, state elites became 
progressively restricted in their capacity to decisively shape and 
reconstitute the forms and structures of participation and interaction on 
the ground in a way that would be more geared towards the moderate 
end of the conflict spectrum.  On the other hand, I argue that Soviet 
policy (or, rather, lack thereof) resulted in a missed opportunity in terms 
of facilitating a less extreme and exclusive form of nationalism.  Below I 
briefly consider the dynamics of intergroup communication and the 
extent of integration during the Soviet period. This dimension is 
particularly useful in exploring the potential for political moderation and 
conflict diffusion, yet has not been given adequate attention in the 
literature. In this section I use extensive quotations from interviews to 
gain an understanding of the different perceptions of daily interethnic 
interactions before the active phase of the conflict.  
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      The link between spatial proximity and close social contact has been 
well documented in survey data from different national contexts (e.g. 
Johnston, 1974; Bakke et al., 2009). With the exception of three or four 
towns and cities (and even those had some integrated schools), 
settlement patterns in Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK were mixed which 
resulted in a relatively high degree of interethnic interaction. On the 
whole, evidence on the ‘true’ nature of Armenian-Azeri ties at the 
everyday level is rather mixed. On the one hand, there are testimonies of 
genuinely friendly relations on both sides. An Azeri student from 
Agdam (a small town around 16 miles away from Stepanakert) whose 
family had been internally displaced as a result of the conflict recalls: ‘I 
do not remember my parents saying anything against 
Armenians…People from our village would often go to Armenian 
villages to work because they got paid more [there]…We had friendly 
relations’ (author interview with Zulfugar Agaev, 9 January 2009, 
Baku). 
An Armenian who grew up in Baku has a similar reminiscence of 
everyday life in the Soviet era: ‘Relations between Armenians and 
Azeris were friendly…there were Azeri neighbours who helped 
Armenians’ (author interview with Sarasar Saryan, 23 July 2008, 
Stepanakert). 
      Such affirmations of harmonious coexistence are common42 and are 
frequently contrasted, especially by ordinary citizens with the 
unexpected and brutal nature of hostilities and violence at the later 
stages of the conflict.    On the other hand, these stories do not alter the 
fact that most people appeared to know perfectly well which nationality 
their neighbours had and that it could become crucial any time. In 
particular, some accounts point to a (latent) awareness and fear of the 
                                                 
42 See also (Grant, 2010; Krebs, 2011). 
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possibility of what Frank Wright has termed ‘representative violence’, 
where potential victims are chosen on the basis of belonging to a 
particular community (Wright, 1987: 11). One of my respondent’s 
recollection of her childhood in NK illustrates this perception: 
  My farther had a very good Azeri friend who lived in 
Azerbaijan…They interacted regularly through work. He used to come 
and visit us with his family. We stayed with them frequently too but my 
farther never allowed us to stay at his friend’s house overnight, as there 
had been cases of Armenians being murdered in sleep after a friendly 
meal with their Azeri friends (author interview with Rita Karapetyan, 25 
July 2008, Stepanakert). 
  
According to the vast majority of my interviewees, especially in NK and 
Armenia members of mixed marriages, which remained frequent 
throughout the Soviet period, were nonetheless regarded as outcasts by 
their own community, partly due to religious differences, and the fear of 
the erosion of religious identity. 
      NK’s geographical position also had an impact on the nature of 
interethnic attitudes when, compared to large cosmopolitan cities that 
were more spatially removed from (real and perceived) sources of 
tension. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the NK Republic and 
Advisor to the President on foreign policy issues recently summed up 
this distinction: 
  Relations [between Armenians and Azeris] have always been (and 
remain) very good outside the region… For example, in Russia they 
cooperate, make friends and help each other. Here [in NK] in a frontier 
region the tension has been quite strong but it is largely 
implanted…There is no inherent hostility, it is simply that certain 
conditions have contributed to forming particular behaviour patterns 
(author interview with Arman Melikyan, 18 July 2008, Yerevan). 
 
Another activist makes a similar point: ‘In Baku we were on very good 
terms with Azeris… In Krabakh the situation was different…friendly 
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relations resembled a fine lace’ (author interview with Larissa 
Alaverdyan, 18 July 2008, Yerevan). 
      In a small scale random sample survey I conducted in Yerevan and 
some neigbouring towns (N= 120) and Stepanakert (N= 61) in July 
200843 the majority of respondents stated that Armenian- Azeri 
communication was frequent and friendly but responses varied widely 
when it came to explaining the nature of this friendliness, as can be seen  
below: 
 
 
                         Armenia 
Q. Did you know any Azeris with whom you had regular formal or 
informal contact (neighbour, friend, work colleague, family 
member)? 
Yes 55.5% 
No    44.5% 
In your opinion, were Armenian-Azeri relations during the Soviet 
era friendly? 
Yes   82.4% 
No       17.6% 
    If yes, what, in your opinion, was the key to this friendliness? 
– constant (state) cultivation of a Soviet identity and the diffusion of the ideas of  
brotherhood and internationalism 68% 
     – authoritarian nature of the Soviet regime and fear to express true feelings 28% 
     –   other  4% 
  
                                                 
43 As mentioned in chapter 2, given the small sample size the goal is not to be able to claim having a 
statistical sample of individuals who accurately represent ‘their community’. Rather I aimed to 
explore in some more detail the responses of people whose experiences could allow to complement 
in-depth interviews. For logistical reasons it was not possible to conduct the same survey in 
Azerbaijan. 
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                                    NK  
Q. Did you know any Azeris with whom you had regular formal or 
informal contact (neighbour, friend, work colleague, family 
member)? 
Yes 69% 
No    31% 
In your opinion, were Armenian-Azeri relations during the Soviet 
era friendly? 
Yes   33% 
No       46% 
 Don’t know 21% 
    If yes, what, in your opinion, was the key to this friendliness? 
    – constant (state) cultivation of a Soviet identity and the diffusion of the ideas of  
brotherhood and internationalism 50% 
–  authoritarian nature of the Soviet regime and fear to express true feelings 50% 
       While I do not wish to suggest that this data is in any way 
representative of the general public opinion in Armenia or NK it does 
seem to support at least two observations. Firstly, it is difficult to 
separate the effect of Soviet ideological construction, which aimed to 
generate a new internationalist consciousness, maintain a spirit of unity 
and cohesion from those cases of genuinely friendly interaction that 
were not the result of a deliberate state policy. In this sense, the 
protagonists appear to have absorbed facets of state identity discourse, 
while their attitudes and understandings of micro-level communication 
partly mirrored the prescriptions of the state. Secondly, the often not 
fully rationalized interpretation of confirmed and unconfirmed episodes 
of past victimization (which were a living memory in the minds of some 
people) constrained those members of Armenian and Azeri communities 
who strove to resist radical outcomes in an increasingly rigid and 
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ethnicized polity in the late 1980s. In this context any attempt to 
successfully manage (emerging) conflict and prevent it from taking on a 
self-reinforcing quality would have required politically astute and rapid 
decision-making which was not forthcoming from the Soviet ruling 
elites. The next section will consider how intra-movement change and 
competition affected the transformation of Armenian goals. 
 
 
          Intra-elite competition 
      Very soon after Sumgait and the decision of the central authorities to 
allocate the development package to NK facilitating socio-economic 
improvement and strengthening cultural links with Armenia the public 
leaders of the NK movement began to change. The old strongly pro-
Soviet intellegensia – writers, poets, scientists (e. g. Kaputikyan, 
Balayan) retreated and new intellectuals came to the fore, more 
uncompromising with Moscow authorities. This younger generation was 
more vocal towards the center and raised the problem up to a political 
issue between Moscow and the Armenian people. With time the activism 
transformed into a larger democratic movement advocating the country’s 
independence. The NK Committee – the official organization created to 
give voice to Armenian grievances and eventually to create a vehicle for 
the democratization of the political system – cautioned the Armenian 
public against falling prey to a fear of a rebirth of Pan-Turkism.  
      Thus, despite the solidarity experienced by participants in the first 
demonstrations for NK, the platform of the younger sections of 
Armenian elites diverged quite significantly from popular ideas 
commonly expressed in public discourse. Another area of difference was 
the attitude towards Russia. The new elite emphasized its suspicions of 
Russians and argued strongly against traditional Soviet Armenian 
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thought, which glorified Russia and the Soviet Union as the key 
protector (s) against Pan-Turkism. One of the main representatives of 
this rather radical strand, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who became the first 
president of independent Armenia, wrote: 
   
This mindset [the idea of Armenia being able to realize its full 
potential only under the shelter and protection of a strong state, like 
Russia] takes our nation toward moral slavery, and deprives it of the 
opportunity to become a political ally, which is the guarantor of success 
in politics. The concept of Armenia…as a factor in Russia’s interests…is 
full of danger for the destiny of our nation’ (cited in Hakobyan, 20.09. 
2008).  
 
At the same time some members of the elite continued to support the 
preservation of the USSR in whatever form, seeing Moscow as the main 
guarantor of Armenian interests, even if this role had been shaken by 
Moscow’s (nationality) policy failures. 
                
 
                The politicization of the population 
      One of the least researched and frequently overlooked, yet dramatic, 
far-reaching and lasting aspects of the NK and other conflicts is the 
gradual politicization of the population (see Tchilingirian, 2003: 143 for 
one notable exception).  I suggest that the breakdown of everyday 
relations at the micro-social level and the transformation of previously 
accepted norms of coexistence, whereby people on both sides come to 
exclude each other from social interactions cannot be explained solely 
by considering the role of external and internal elites as instigators of 
ethnic rivalry. Major attitudinal shifts can hardly be accounted without 
reference to the (not fully controllable) waves of nationalist agitation.  
Mobilization also led to the radicalization of most political actors by 
                                                                                         196
bringing contestation over historical, cultural and border issues onto the 
public stage whereas earlier such conflicts had been apparent only to a 
narrow circle of intellectuals.44 Mobilization and counter-mobilization 
can polarize two communities by severing pre-existing ties between 
them. The emerging social crisis – the breaking up of old friendships and 
neighbourly relations – results in the politicization of the population: 
  With the outbreak of the conflict it began to be clearly felt that 
something was slipping away from the Azeri population. First, the 
former sincerity in interaction (between the two communities) started to 
evaporate. Second, a sense of fear and caution on both sides appeared. 
Third, came the incomprehension of events – who is orchestrating all 
that? (author interview with Ali Abasov, 7 January 2009, Baku).   
 
This breakdown was largely an unintended consequence of high levels 
of mobilization and the spiraling of old and new conflicts across all 
sectors of society and the political system:  
  On the 1st of September 1988 when we came back to the Institute 
after summer holidays we were told that the classes were cancelled for at 
least a month and that the Principal would have to make a decision 
[about our future], as studying in mixed (Armenian-Azeri) groups was 
no longer possible and was becoming dangerous (author interview with 
Ashot Gulyan, 22 July 2008, Stepanakert).  
 
      While limited communal collaboration and a degree of moderation 
persisted among some ordinary people, the transformation of actual 
behaviour taking place was not self-explanatory. Murat Somer writing 
on the case of Yugoslavia describes this social distancing as a cascading 
process that changes behaviour and attitudes and, once begun, is very 
difficult to stop. ‘Cascades’ are: 
  . . . self-reinforcing processes that change the behaviour of a group 
of people through interpersonal dependencies . . .Cascade models 
explain situations in which the individual’s incentives for taking an 
                                                 
44 See chapter 3 on this period. 
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action, holding a belief, or conforming to a norm depend significantly on 
the behaviour of others (Somer, 2001: 129).   
 
Thus, the hardening of boundaries between the communities is best 
explained as a collective interaction process where the framing attempts 
of political enterpreneurs coalesce with incidents of conflict spreading 
across the population in a cascading fashion.  As the Armenian and 
Azeri parties began to polarize there was a steady evaporation of the 
‘third space’ which had existed in the form of limited dialogue between 
small initiative groups on both sides and constitutional means of 
addressing the problem. 
      In the second half of 1988 tens of thousands of Azeris left Armenia 
for Azerbaijan, there was also a flow of Armenian population from 
Azerbaijan.    Adopting Mario Diani's terminology we can say that from 
then on each community’s ‘action was largely embedded within 
the…ethno-national cleavage of the region’ (Diani, 2000: 398) and 
participants tended ‘to draw their acquaintances from milieus directly 
connected to the core group they belong to’ (2000: 394).  Azeri and 
Armenian refugees partly provided volunteers for the local defense 
groups that started to be organized by both communities. The formation 
of these local defense groups laid the groundwork for the later 
development of Armenian and Azeri armed organizations.  
      The devolution of political authority to new republican political 
institutions that accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union was combined 
with a complete closure of institutional avenues of conflict regulation.  
The pursuit of such institutional avenues remained a possibility, even if 
very remote, as long as the weak and imperfect adjudication by the state 
was in place. Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the fall of 
Soviet power was its loss of control over Soviet troops stationed in 
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Azerbaijan and Armenia. Some units of the army in Armenia reportedly 
participated, together with Armenian self-defense units, in the expulsion 
of Azeris from the republic. In Azerbaijan the 104th division of the 
Soviet army sold weapons and military equipment to Azeri militias. 
Armenia received arms delivered by Russian high military officers in 
1991-1992. Azeri warlords also had arms trade contacts with Russian 
military. Both sides accused the former Soviet army of helping their 
opponents.  Isolated clashes between NK Armenians and Azeris turned 
into a full scale war by early 1992, shortly after Soviet collapse. 
        
                   Conclusion      
      For elites engaged in struggles over national self-determination the 
earlier entrenchment of narratives of massacres and ethnic extinction 
which resonated with the intellectual construction of (perceived) 
historical precedents and ethnic injustices allowed to represent reality in 
terms of familiar preexisting models.  Yet the strength of Armenian 
national identity and the receptiveness of the social terrain does not fully 
account for the success of mobilization or the rapidity with which a 
pattern of cultural, linguistic and relatively moderate reunification 
demands changed to more openly secessionist demands. The 
identification of ‘objective factors’ frequently associated with conflict 
situations also tells us little if we do not uncover the meaning of those 
objects to relevant actors. Rather it is the collective perceptions of failed 
state policies and the wider context of systemic crisis that, in conjunction 
with less contingent factors helps explain this transformation.  
      The weakening of the authorities in Moscow and its incapacity to 
play a decisive role in making political decisions led to a power vacuum 
within which anti-Soviet and pro-independence elites could come to the 
fore. Most of the sources of friction were there well before Gorbachev’s 
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rise to power and the launch of his reform project. It was largely the 
attempt at reform that destabilised the existing political arrangements, 
raised expectations among ‘peripheral’ groups and opened up space for 
new political forces to emerge and clash with Moscow and with each 
other. Yet at each stage violent confrontation may not have occurred or 
at least may not have been as intense had certain issues and actions not 
caused emotional responses in large sections of each community.  
      Emotional attachments to territory, frustration at (perceived) 
economic and political inequalities, fear of demographic domination, 
anger at previous violence and perceived injustices all appear to be 
driving mobilization and participation in the violence. Once the 
movement for NK became fully visible in the political architecture of the 
region, its repertoire of action and ideology progressively transformed as 
a new revitalised sense of ‘we’ was created and largely imposed from 
outside the movement, from the process of its interaction with the 
environment in which protest took place. 
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                                  Chapter 5 
The dialectics of ethnic relations in Northern Ireland in the early 
1960s 
 
           Introduction 
      The civil rights movement (hereafter CRM) and the subsequent 
violent escalation in Northern Ireland has had a major impact on the 
political, institutional and ideological configuration of the region. For 
this reason it has continued to be the subject of different and sometimes 
conflicting historical and analytical narratives. This chapter aims to 
introduce the main interpretations of the CRM mobilization, while 
highlighting the need to move beyond narrative historical interpretations 
of events that fail to specify how transformations within a movement 
happen, as well as what brings about the success or failure of a specific 
nationalist agenda. A few exceptions aside (e.g. Bosi, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2011; Smyth, 2006; De Fazio, 2009) the government-challenger 
interaction tends to be described rather than analyzed or explained. I 
analyze the transformation of extremely obvious and material concerns 
(discrimination in electoral practices, employment, housing, security 
laws and justice system) into collective action in the mid 1960s.  
      This examination also aims to critique some of the traditional 
interpretations of  ethnonational activism in Northern Ireland that see it 
as rooted in changes in the socioeconomic environment and a natural 
reaction to real and perceived failures of Stormont and Westminster to 
adequately respond to and placate nationalist demands. Traditional 
models are largely based on the collective behavioural approach. The ad 
hoc explanation usually stresses a minority population’s grievances 
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whose political expression has been oppressed in a state dominated by 
the ethnic ‘other’.  
      I argue that the nationalism that eventually emerged proceeded from 
a rational desire to take advantage of what the activists perceived to be 
an opening of opportunities, partly in the form of the fracturing of 
unionism and resulting uncertainty. Elites played a crucial role 
particularly in framing and promoting ‘the attribution of threat’ (De 
Fazio, 2009: 165)45. With time radical elements from both communities 
in Northern Ireland highlighted boundaries and made them more salient 
by differentiating social relations on either side more sharply from each 
other and increasing the extensiveness of shared representations of a 
group. The collective representation of events and actors is based not 
upon hard facts and uncontestable evidence but upon continuous 
interpretative disputes between rival political entrepreneurs. In 
particular, leaders influence the way in which risk is factored into mass 
perceptions about collective future (Hale, 2008: 77).  Building on these 
premises the chapter aims to consider the interactions and 
disconnections between elite strategies and opportunities presented by 
the shifting social, political and cultural environment. In so doing it 
critiques approaches that see radicalization as an unproblematic 
extension or evident aftermath of political mobilization. I advocate a 
perspective focusing more on the reciprocal influences between real and 
symbolic context transformations and redefinition on the one hand, and 
(changing) elite capacity to initiate, implement or resist intercommunal 
boundary shifts on the other. 
 
          
 
                                                 
45 See the explanation of this term in chapter 4. 
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               Socio-historical background 
      The partition of Ireland with the British royal ascent of the 
Government of Ireland Act in December 1920 ensured a division of the 
population of Northern Ireland between a minority – approximately one 
third of the population Catholic (predominantly nationalist) and majority 
(two thirds) Protestant (predominantly unionist) community46. The 
weakness of the Northern Ireland institutional system and its incapacity 
to channel demands and contentious issues directly depended on the 
nature of the regional ethno-political cleavage.  
      Politics in Northern Ireland historically had been marked by unionist 
control of the state apparatus.  Coupled with the disadvantages tied to 
being an electoral minority, Catholics experienced economic disparities 
that ensured unionist governmental domination. The combination of 
fears of Irish irredentism, an unreliable British government and 
nationalist disloyalty sufficed to justify socio-political domination in the 
region through a strategy of what has been described as hegemonic 
control (McGarry and O’Leary, 1996; Smooha, 2001, 2005). Most of the 
region’s political parties reinforced sociopolitical segregation by 
constructing exclusive identities, facilitating and consolidating the 
ethnonational cleavage, as well as its crystallization in the political 
system. Initially proportional representation was introduced as a means 
of safeguarding minority rights for local and parliamentary elections (in 
the Local Government Acts of 1919 and the Government of Ireland Act 
of 1920 respectively). Only one set of local elections in 1920 and two 
general contests in 1921 and 1925 were held under the single 
transferable voting system. The Stormont regime abolished PR for local 
elections in the 1922 Local Government Act and for parliamentary 
                                                 
46 Because of the tight relationship that exists in Northern Ireland between religious identities and 
constitutional positions the labels ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ often imply a political ideology 
(‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ respectively). 
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elections in the 1929 House of Commons Act. The effect of this move 
was that Northern Ireland reverted to the plurality voting method with 
newly created single member electoral districts. The measure might not 
have targeted nationalists as such but aimed at the consolidation of 
unionist vote (Hadfield, 1989: 52).  Unionists interpreted their loss of 
seats in the 1925 general election ‘if not as a defeat, at least a dangerous 
trend’ (Osborne, 1982: 140, cited in Coakley, 2009: 257). 
      Regardless of the underlying motivations behind the changes, the 
arrangement of the majoritarian electoral system seems to have 
sharpened and even institutionalized the systematic exclusion of the 
minority from the exercise of power at the national level. Most of 
concrete political decision-making operated quite autonomously at the 
local level, especially in areas of housing, economic planning and 
education. This was achieved mainly through the ‘endemic’ 
gerrymandering practice of redrawing the electoral boundaries and 
maintaining political control of housing allocation procedures. After 
1945 the franchise remained restricted to ratepayers and multiple votes 
in local government elections were granted to business owners who were 
predominantly unionists (Whyte, 1983).  This arrangement 
disenfranchised a large number of people (overwhelmingly Catholics), 
who would have been eligible to vote at the local level.   
      Discrimination against the Catholic population led to the emergence 
of a radically segmented society in which the two communities lived 
‘parallel lives in a patchwork of small segregated areas’ (Bloomfield, 
1998: 125): ‘What we were going towards at the time was the creation of 
an apartheid society. Separate schools, separate churches, separate 
workplaces, separate housing sites. That was not the way to go’ (author 
interview with Patrick McClean, 4 January 2010, Beragh). Marc 
Mulholland (2000a: 141) describes unionist attitudes towards nationalist 
                                                                                         204
mobilization as ‘defensive rather than aggressive’. While 
gerrymandering and the general ‘defensive posture of cultural and 
political segregationism’ (Mulholland, 2000: 307) was publicly denied, 
some unionists privately recognized its existence. A former Minister of 
Home Affairs Edmond Warnock wrote: 
  If ever a community had a right to demonstrate against a denial of 
civil rights, Derry is the finest example. A Roman Catholic and 
nationalist city has for three or four decades been administered (and 
none too fairly administered) by a Protestant and unionist majority 
secured by a manipulation of the ward boundaries for the sole purpose of 
maintaining unionist control… It was defensible on the basis that the 
safety of the State is the supreme law (Letter to the Prime Minister from 
Edmond Warnock, CAB/9B/205/7, 13.11.1968, PRONI).  
   
Proposals were introduced for ensuring fair housing allocation to 
‘prevent the wholly indefensible approach of certain authorities’ ( 
Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, CAB/4/1414:2, 14. 11.1968, 
PRONI)47. The issue to consider in this context is not so much the extent 
of actual discrimination but the changing in the 1960s perceptions of 
those who came to believe that discrimination had exceeded its tolerable 
limits. 
      Scholars have analyzed the multiple mechanisms by which the 
hegemony has developed and unionist loyalty and unity were 
maintained. They included the restriction of the franchise; 
gerrymandering of electoral boundaries, preferential treatment of 
Protestants in employment and the allocation of housing; derogation of 
                                                 
47 The reality of discrimination within Northern Ireland was also recognized in Britain, especially by 
pressure groups that were highly supportive of the effective representation of the nationalist minority. 
The Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties upon which the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association (NICRA) was later modeled acknowledged that ‘discrimination did exist, 
especially in employment’, and that ‘there was room for some reexamination of the electoral 
procedures’ (The Irish Independent, 15.03.1965). A report on Northern Ireland later concluded that 
‘…the housing situation is very bad…in Derry housing is still where it was twenty years ago, people 
obviously live in as bad conditions now…’ (Report on civil and social rights in Northern Ireland – an 
investigation by the Belgian League  for the defense of human rights,  CAB/9B/ 205/8, February 
1969, no specific date, PRONI). 
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civil rights, blocked upward mobility, unbalanced educational 
opportunities and the formation of a uniformed unionist police apparatus 
(Bew et. al., 2002; McGarry and O’Leary, 1996). One key area of the 
criminal justice and security system which was widely perceived by the 
nationalist community to constitute a major infringement on civil 
liberties was the Special Powers (Civil Authorities) Act of 1922. The 
Act elevated police powers to an almost emergency level situation. It 
gave the police and the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs 
virtually unlimited authority to outlaw political organizations, ban public 
processions and assemblies, censor publications, search premises 
without warrants, detain and intern suspects indefinitely without 
charge48. 
      A second area of the legal system where nationalists had grievances 
was the absence of an independent judiciary. Judges at all levels were 
associated with the Unionist party and since qualifications for jury 
service were based on property, Catholics/nationalists remained 
generally excluded and Protestants/unionists formed the overwhelming 
majority on jury lists. Minority confidence in the judiciary as the 
independent vehicle for securing justice was lacking (Boyle et al., 1975: 
11). It is not surprising therefore that one of NICRA’s legal experts 
argued in 1969: ‘Our people are afraid of the Courts: they believe the 
judicial system as it operates in the blatantly sectarian conditions of life 
here is loaded against them’ (The Irish Times, 02.12.1969, cited in 
Carlton, 1981: 228). Similarly, one of the activists has recently recalled: 
‘It was difficult for Catholics to have access to the Courts… Many 
people did not recognize the Courts… We saw the Courts as a tool of 
                                                 
48 For a detailed examination of the provisions of the Act see (Campbell, 1994).  For a discussion of 
the numerous instances of the invocation of the legislation to suppress the activity of Republican 
organizations see (Donohue, 1998: 1091-1102; Boyle et al., 1975: 14-15, 38-39). 
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unionism’ (author interview with Eddie Toman, 25 February 2010, 
London)49. 
      As is well documented little attempt was made to generate the 
loyalty and consent of the nationalist minority. The unionist government 
systematically excluded the nationalist community from participation in 
key political, social and economic arenas.  Unionists tended to 
rationalize their hegemony by pointing to nationalists’ refusal to 
recognize and accept the foundational legitimacy of the post-partition 
northern state. Very little space existed for groups that did not align 
according to region’s ethnonational cleavage.  As a consequence, 
observers labeled Northern Irish elections as ‘sectarian head-counts,’ 
and the political system as highly ‘parochial’ (Rose 1971: 65). The 
Nationalist Party was weak, fragmented and partly disadvantaged by the 
system reinforced by minority apathy. The political power of the party 
was also weakened by their frequent policy of abstentionism, even when 
they were elected to Parliament. This strategy remained ineffective and 
served only to bolster unionist mistrust.  In the face of perceived external 
threats and internal disloyalty to the regime the Ulster Unionist party 
fostered solidarity across class lines.  
       
      At least four main issues of controversy can be identified in the 
literature on this period: 1) the extent of institutionalised sectarian 
practices in the 1960s; 2) the role of constitutional aims in the 
emergence of the CRM – that is the relative importance of internal 
                                                 
49 Some commentators (e.g. Prince, 2007: 73) have suggested that the nationalist minority refused to 
have recourse to law, as they wanted to provoke a confrontation with the Stormont regime. While this 
was true for some sections, the material and organizational resources required for lengthy litigation 
should also be taken into account, when evaluating the potential to redress grievances by legal means: 
 
  The nationalist community was not organized in such a way as to raise the kind of money that 
would have been necessary…We had no patience for the notion that we had to start about raising 
money and engaging teams of lawyers. We thought these matters were too urgent to be left to years 
and years and years of law cases (author interview with Denis Haughey, 7 January 2010, Belfast). 
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reforms versus broader ‘pan-national’ objectives and the extent to which 
those reforms were regarded by the nationalist community as a necessary 
first step towards constitutional change. Specific questions concern the 
scope of involvement of the IRA in shaping the strategies of the 
movement and the degree to which the activism can be described as ‘old 
nationalism’ in a new guise; 3) the extent and relevance of British 
government intervention for Stormont reforms; 4) the impact of 
international events and the mechanisms for transmitting this influence, 
as well as the importance of specific opportunity-level factors.  
      Disagreements over the above points reflect a broader divide 
between internal and externally-oriented analytical approaches to the 
conflict. For proponents of externally oriented explanations the key 
cleavage centers on competing conceptions of national belonging and 
political power. The two conceptions revolve around the aspiration to a 
united Ireland held by nationalists and republicans, and the goal of 
maintaining strong constitutional links with the United Kingdom 
advocated by unionists. This deep division pulls most members of 
society towards opposing poles of political reference and allegiance – 
Dublin or London.  Internal accounts, by contrast, see the roots of the 
conflict in the variety of economic, political, cultural and institutional 
conditions within the province50. In line with such ‘inward-looking’ 
literature, the traditional explanation of the radicalization of the CRM in 
the late 1960s accords primacy to fundamental changes in the 
socioeconomic and political structure of Northern Ireland that led 
members of the nationalist community to challenge the state in order to 
achieve equal political and social rights (e. g. (Purdie, 1990).   By this 
analysis, the nationalist community mobilized when the Northern Ireland 
                                                 
50 A detailed overview of the distinctions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ explanations can be found 
in (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995). 
                                                                                         208
state raised their expectations of change but failed to deliver on its initial 
promise. 
              
       The contradictions of O’Neill’s ‘bridge-building’ policies 
      The appointment of Terrence O’Neill who succeeded Lord 
Brookeborough as Prime Minister in 1963 marked a new era in Northern 
Ireland community relations policy, as he was the first Unionist leader 
who aspired to secure nationalist backing for the regime and adopted 
less overt forms of control compared to his predecessors. O’Neill 
represented the most liberal and reformist group of the unionist elite, 
which was interested primarily in the economic development of 
Northern Ireland rather than in the mere conservation of political 
privileges for unionists. ‘O’Neillism’, as it came to be known, 
represented an ideological stance that attempted to bring ‘reform, 
reconciliation, economic and social equality’ to Northern Ireland 
(Wichert, 1991: 87). For the first time in Northern Ireland’s history 
reconciliation and an improved social and economic position for all 
citizens became the official policy. 
       Struggling to keep in check the growing popularity of the Northern 
Ireland Labour Party (NILP) – the party with the potential to undermine 
the unionists with support across the ethnonational divide -   O’Neill 
emphasized the relevance of economic well-being to face the downturn 
that followed the post-war economic boom. Being a proponent of 
industrial progress and enhanced collective wealth, he believed that 
rapid industrialization and job creation could solve most of Northern 
Ireland’s problems by alleviating poverty. State and international 
investment in industrial infrastructure and the rationalization of 
administrative structures and planning provisions were also implemented 
through the establishment of a new Ministry for Development and a 
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Ministry for Health and Social Services in 196451.  The idea that 
Catholics would naturally seek greater integration within Northern 
Ireland and support the Unionist Party if given a chance to ‘live like 
Protestants’ by obtaining jobs and residing in better neighbourhoods 
resulted in a very superficial approach, which was hardly followed up by 
tangible reform. During O’Neill’s period in office claims of 
discrimination were generally contrasted, at least in the official 
discourse, with the need to improve community relations: 
  It seems… that a great deal of the trouble we have experienced has 
been due to a lack of communication between the governing and the 
governed… Let us not be so preoccupied with our remaining difficulties 
and bend our very best efforts to removing the remaining differences, 
which cause friction in the community’ (Stormont Papers, 17.12.1968: 
28-30).  
 
      The basic tenets of O’Neil’s position included a commitment to self-
help, vigorous promotion of trade and investment and the revitalization 
of a ‘physical and social environment, which was not good enough for 
this day and age’ (O’Neill, 1969: 42)52. O’Neill’s premiership, thus, 
revolved around two intertwined themes – increased majority-minority 
interaction and the creation of a broad industrial base. His inclusive 
economic doctrine of unionism grounded almost entirely in industrial 
modernization and social investment identified improvements in 
community relations as crucial to the success of the new economic 
                                                 
51 The newly formed Ministry of Development was allowed to implement planning projects broadly 
‘in the interests of Northern Ireland as a whole’ (Planning Circular, 1965: 3). The move towards 
centralization of power through conferring many of the planning and administrative powers on the 
centralized authorities reinforced unionist perceptions that the functions of local government bodies as 
repositories of political patronage and pillars of unionist control would diminish. In this context local 
authorities argued that ‘local government should govern and should not be a rubber stamp for the 
central government’ (Belfast Telegraph, 28.10.1965). 
 
52 As mentioned above, physical segregation at the immediate neighbourhood and city/town level, as 
well as a separation of civic, religious and educational facilities had been a remarkable feature of 
communal coexistence throughout the Province. Thus, O’Neill’s long-tem reform plans included 
housing and social integration to remedy what he called a ‘segregation of spirit which occurred as a 
direct result of separate education and separate lives’ (O’Neill, 1969: 14-15). See chapter 6 on the 
CRM’s tactical challenging of traditional spatial divisions. 
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strategy53. Unlike his predecessors, O’Neill freely expounded the 
rhetoric of liberal democracy, even if he sounded more like a reformer 
than he actually was. In his first five years in office O’Neill spoke 
openly of ‘building bridges’ and sought to gain support from the 
Catholic/nationalist community by engaging in a wide range of symbolic 
gestures and sporadic acts of goodwill. He visited Catholic schools and 
hospitals, recognized the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions54 (Mulholland, 2000a: 34-7). 
      The effect of state intervention into planning and industrial 
development was to reinforce existing divisions. Most of the new 
industrial projects went to predominantly unionist populated areas of the 
region, while nationalist areas continued to suffer from severe economic 
degradation. The state might have had little control over the seemingly 
technical decisions of location which might explain its lack of practical 
action to reverse the trend. It was believed that such planning and 
development initiatives could still be effective in serving the long-term 
goal of bringing about dramatic improvements in intergroup relations. 
As the then Minister of Commerce remarked: 
  The aim of industrial development in Ulster was not only to create 
new jobs. We believed that by raising the general level of prosperity for 
everyone, by making it possible for all our citizens to have a secure job 
and thus a good house and a decent standard of living, the traditional 
                                                 
53 It should be noted that although the economic situation in Northern Ireland started to improve 
gradually with O’Neill’s modernization policies, its economic performance was very weak and in 
decline during the period immediately prior to the accession of O’Neill. By 1961 unemployment was 
five times higher than in the rest of Britain. (Wilson, 1965: 21). It reached 7.9% in 1963 (Bew et al., 
2002: 134) which was above the UK average ratio. In terms of the GDP per capita relative to the UK 
average Northern Ireland consistently remained the poorest region. Between 1951 and 1958 Northern 
Ireland’s relative income per capita slipped from 65 to 61% of the national average and only between 
1966 and 1973 did it converge from 63 to 71.1% of the national average (Brownlow, 2007: 71-2). 
Northern Ireland’s growth was about 1% below par relative to a typical European region (Brownlow, 
2007: 72). 
 
54 The decision was significant because it diverged from previous patterns and reversed 
Brookeborough’s policy. The Committee was previously denounced by Lord Brookeborough as ‘pro-
republican’ (Eamonn Phoenix, The Irish Times, 03. 01. 1995). By contrast, O’Neill strove to 
encourage participation of trade unions in the economic activity of the government by enabling them 
to engage in the new Advisory Economic Council and labour training programs (O’Neill, 1969: 63). 
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divisions in our community would soften and become blurred (Faulkner, 
1978: 41). 
 
 But the nationalist community interpreted the inadequate industrial 
modernization of nationalist areas as yet another proof of the unequal 
and sectarian nature of the state. The insuffiency and (perceived as) 
contradictory nature of such industrial development and other planning 
initiatives which appeared to have the genuine intention of promoting 
economic flourishing and interethnic interaction are especially 
analytically interesting in a divided environment, like Northern Ireland.  
They also raise the broader issue of the constraints facing community 
leaders attempting to pursue the path of reform, economic development, 
political accommodation and/ or compromise. For example, the 
implementation of regional planning in the mid 1960s (the Wilson plan) 
seemed to have the effect of destabilizing intergroup relations, because it 
was seen by members of both communities as a hindarance and even a 
threat to securing economic opportunities, and, more importantly, 
maintaining communal identities. In this context the plan became not 
just a technical document but a (non-) persuasive story which those 
affected by it interpreted in quite vastly divergent and often conflicting 
ways. On the one hand, Catholic/nationalists viewed the regional 
planning as a new step in a series of attempts to degrade the region. On 
the other hand, many of the collective fears of Protestant/unionists were 
(re)ignited, in particular the loss of political economic, institutional and 
territorial control and perceived as increasingly real nationalist inclusion 
into the polity. 
       
      In 1965 O’Neill took his most courageous initiative by meeting Sean 
Lemass, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, at Stormont – the 
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first meeting of this kind to occur since partition and by visiting Dublin 
shortly afterwards. Such moves undoubtedly had the dual effect of 
raising nationalist expectations and disorientating the unionist 
community, which considered his actions as disloyal to the United 
Kingdom, as well as stimulating controversy within the ranks of the 
Unionist Party. Some members feared the effect this decision would 
have on the rank and file perceptions and image of the ruling elite and 
started to demand assuarances that the constitutional position of 
Northern Ireland would remain unchanged (Kaufmann, 2007: 26). 
      It is important to consider here internal unionist forces that opposed 
O’Neill’s ‘bridge-building’ policies and some of the reasons behind 
uncertainty and disunity among unionist elites. Unionists constituted the 
majority of the population in the North and Catholic/nationalists were 
regarded by many as disloyal citizens who aspired to destroy the link to 
Britain and establish a united Ireland. A certain sense of superiority 
towards nationalists came from unionist privileged socioeconomic 
positions within Northern Ireland. This attitude had been reinforced by a 
variety of structural and historical circumstances. As a minority on the 
island as a whole, however, the unionist community had several sources 
of fear that contributed to a confrontational and frequently hostile 
attitude to nationalist political participation. The culturally mixed 
context of pessimism and defensiveness has been often noted in relation 
to Northern Ireland (e. g. Finlay, 2001: 3-20). Within Northern Ireland 
politics in general, and the unionist community in particular, invocations 
of ‘loyalty’, ‘trust’ and more often their opposites, ‘disloyalty’ 
‘betrayal’, ‘mistrust’, ‘untrustworthiness’ and ‘treason’, have been 
central themes of its political and cultural life.  Unionists’ political 
mythology replete with images of siege and betrayal finds its roots not 
only in the presence of a sizeable nationalist minority in the North but 
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also in the demographic position of Protestant/unionists.  Individuals 
have the opportunity to perceive their ingroup either as a majority or an 
outnumbered minority depending on the geographical frame of reference 
(Stevenson et al., 2007: 107; Crighton and Iver, 1991; Schaller and 
Abeysinghe, 2006: 617).  The political geography of Northern Ireland in 
the wider context of North–South and British–Irish interaction were 
largely responsible for the fact that traditionally unionism has assumed a 
defensive position with an emphasis on maintaining Protestant unity 
against perceived external threats.  
      The British parliamentary system where the British Parliament 
retained ultimate sovereignty over Northern Ireland and had the power to 
abolish the government strengthened the sense of insecurity based on the 
perception that the British could pull out of the North leaving the 
unionist community at the mercy of a larger neighbour and threatening 
the existence of the Northern Ireland state (Cassidy, 2008). In a similar 
vein, M. Mulholland (Mulholland, 2004: 187-206) and G. Walker 
(Walker, 2004) have recently argued that the prevailing strategies 
(including discrimination) introduced and accepted by unionists to 
control the Northern Ireland minority denote the pragmatism and 
pessimism of unionism, stranded between perceived British indifference 
and  the fear of loss of control to (Catholic) southern irredentism, not its 
supremacy. J. Todd (1987) has identified two main strands in shaping 
unionist identities and aspirations. The first entails a conditional 
obligation to ‘Greater’ British sovereign power.  The second (loyalist) 
involves an obligation to the Ulster unionist community that perceives 
itself as a besieged group ultimately dependant on its own resources for 
its security. The challenge to the CRM emerged largely from the second 
mode.  
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      In addition, the Protestant/unionist community seemed to have 
significant material and symbolic rewards in maintaining the status-quo. 
On the one hand, the structural-institutional configuration of the 
Northern Ireland polity was designed in such a way as to minimize 
perceived external threats. On the other hand, political structures 
provided a favourable opportunity to dominate and majority rule was 
seen as a natural and legitimate feature of democracy. Such structures 
allowed unionists to see the government as the legitimate representative 
of their interests and the defense of the government as fundamental to 
their identity and material well-being. The situation started to change in 
the period after the Second World War when the unionist government 
was forced largely by the defection of working class Protestants to the 
Northern Ireland Labour Party to accept the welfare state. The 
authorities also became increasingly aware of the shifting international 
environment where the creation of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights left the regime extremely vulnerable to 
new forms of criticism from its nationalist and labour opponents 
(Patterson, 1999: 113-4). This consideration encouraged officials to try 
and ensure that the government did not do anything which would allow 
it to be presented as ‘sectarian’ and discriminatory.  
      Such developments made many grassroots unionists deeply 
concerned that the welfare state and industrialization in areas like 
(London)Derry would upset the fragile demographic balance and 
undermine unionist control of border counties where nationalists 
constituted the majority of the population. Thus, even before the 
challenges of the CRM in the 1960s governing unionist elites found 
themselves under pressure from the grassroots for prioritizing material 
interests over ethnonational loyalties. The Unionist Party’s alliance with 
the Conservatives at Westminster also undermined intra-unionist 
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consensus. The reforms of the 1960s further alienated many unionists 
from their political class and opened the space for an ultra-Protestant 
loyalist political agenda directed by Paisley. The timing of O’Neill’s 
meeting with Lemass also appears to have heightened unionist fears of 
impending constitutional change (O’Callaghan and O’Donnell, 2006), 
which reveals the close relationship between political accommodation 
and constitutional transformation in the minds of many loyalists.   
      1966 marked the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising against British 
rule in Ireland. The anniversary sparked widespread rumours of a 
republican invasion from the South compelling Stormont to seal off the 
border during commemoration events. Thus, O’Neill’s reformist 
gestures and the (real or perceived) appeasement of the nationalist 
minority, the improved environment of North-South relations 
symbolized by the O’Neill-Lemass ‘watershed’ and lack of unity of 
unionist elites were among the constituent elements of the 
threat/opportunity balance that favoured the activation of the loyalist 
countermovement.  
      In addition to the tangible and deliberate socio-economic reforms, a 
number of unplanned changes were occurring, which caused growing 
concern among sections of the unionist community. An international 
ecumenical movement, which promoted a gradual integration of 
Christian religions was taking root (Nelson, 1984). For example a 
conference on the theme in 1961 concluded that ‘denominations of 
Protestantism appeared to be much more conscious of the universalism 
that should characterize the Church than they were a generation ago’ 
(Irish Independent, 27.06. 1961). In this context some Protestants feared 
being subsumed within the Catholic Church (Bruce, 2007). Another 
threat lay in the trend towards secularization, which could potentially 
change Northern Ireland from a Protestant society to a ‘secular modern 
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society in which religious affiliation would be of little consequence’ 
(Bruce, 2007: 92). 
      As with most divided societies, Northern Ireland’s political history is 
to a certain extent a battleground where observers tend to legitimize/ 
deny the aspirations and grievances of one group to the benefit/ expense 
of the other. In a lively and extended debate Christopher Hewitt and 
Denis O’Hearn offered contrasting perspectives on the origins of the 
civil rights movement in the 1960s.  Hewitt (1981, 1983, 1985) put 
forward the idea that Irish nationalism among Catholics in Northern 
Ireland played a greater role in the emergence of civil rights rebellion 
than did systematic discrimination by Unionists.  Challenging Hewitt’s 
statistical analysis, O’Hearn (1983, 1985) concluded that Catholic 
grievances were real and served as the main source of mobilization.  It 
appears that when proving their respective positions the subtle shades of 
a rather complex social process became sometimes reduced to black and 
white dichotomies. Discrimination did take place but what mattered 
equally was the subjective perception which was fed by the history of 
communal conflict, as well by the objective conditions experienced by 
Catholics after 1921.  
      A number of historical accounts, biographies and memoirs provide 
valuable sources of relevant information for the understanding of 
collective mobilization from the late 1960s to the early 1970s (Devlin, 
1969; Arthur, 1974; Purdie, 1990; McCluskey, 1989; O’Dochartaigh, 
1994). Much attention has been afforded to the genesis and development 
of the CRM and the repertoire of violent/ non-violent action it utilized in 
the late 1960s and afterwards. The CRM has been identified as crucial 
for developing an agenda charged with the objective of achieving 
internal reform and the democratization of the state, its transformation 
from within (Purdie, 1990: 2; Smyth, 2006: 106) or at a later stage its 
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complete overthrow (Prince, 2006: 856).  This is why the emergence of 
the CRM whose mobilizing ideology embraced reformism and attempts 
to build bridges between sectarian differences was perceived as so 
threatening to the unionist majority. In the early 1960s highly 
heterogeneous networks of activists started to challenge the sectarian 
and discriminatory aspects of the state, in particular the hegemonic 
structure of the unionist establishment. Two main approaches have 
traditionally dominated the study of collective mobilization in the 
Northern Ireland context. 
      The conspiracy interpretation was especially dominant within the 
unionist establishment. According to this conception, by pursuing civil 
rights campaigns the IRA was seeking new means to reach the old 
nationalist objectives. The failure of civil rights leaders to endorse the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland was taken as proof of the 
nationalist intentions of the CRM. It is true that some more radicalized 
actors in the CRM viewed a campaign of civil disobedience as the means 
to initiate an escalating cycle of state provocation and repression which 
would result in the unionist government’s ‘dictatorial face being 
unmasked’ (Prince, 2006: 875; Prince, 2007: 8, 73). The assumption of 
these radicals was that street politics, by illuminating the injustices and 
brutality perceived as inherent to the state, would facilitate the alliance 
of the Protestant and Catholic working class conjoining to ensure that 
their interests would be best served in a new democratic Ireland 
(English, 2003: 89). Protest action could, thus, be seen as a way of 
creating space outside institutional structures of state via challenging the 
legitimacy of Stormont to exist in the first place.    
      At the same time it is now accepted that the view of the movement as 
a republican/ communist conspiracy was oversimplified (Purdie, 1988: 
33-41) and it is not entirely accurate to portray the CRM as simply old 
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Irish nationalism in a new guise.  Firstly, the challengers initially saw 
their primary goal as the reform of the state, not its abolition.  What 
started to matter most for the nationalist community during that period 
was the improvement of their own economic, social and political 
standing in Northern Ireland. Secondly, evidence suggests that 
republicans and communists were by far not the only actors in key civil 
rights organizations (Purdie, 1988: 33). The thinking behind republican 
involvement in the CRM did not fully anticipate the resurgence of 
communal conflict and the opportunities which developed from that.  
      An armed ‘border campaign’ initiated by the IRA and lasting from 
1956 to 1962 raised unionist fears. This failed attempt at ‘driving out the 
British’ showed the Dublin-based IRA’s incomprehension of Northern 
Ireland society and its inability to rally mass support. The border 
campaign was for the most part counterproductive, it reinforced unionist 
fears and did not increase the enthusiasm of the minority in the North.  
Traditionally resistance to the Northern Irish state had resided in 
republicanism, which denied the fundamental legitimacy of the state 
itself counterposing a united Ireland as its only goal. While there is little 
doubt that such an aspiration did exist within the CRM, it was not the 
organizing principle. The Wolfe Tone Societies established in 1963 to 
commemorate the bicentenary of Wolfe Tone’s birth provided important 
organizational and ideational resources for civil rights activism by 
persuading ‘hardline’ sections of republicanism to abandon the tradition 
of violence: 
  We had little support from the republican movement as such… 
Hardline republicans refused to attend our meetings… Some of us were 
saying: ‘Get them away from the guns’ and we were trying to show them 
a different way forward (author interview with Fred Heatley, 6 January 
2010, Belfast). 
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      Political openings in the aftermath of defeat encourage strategically 
oriented activists to test the limits of inclusion through policy-oriented 
protest. To a certain extent, the members of an ethnonational community 
face an advantageous situation in that both inclusive and exclusive 
responses to protest could be seen as advancing their aims (Maney, 
2007). On the one hand, protest may prove successful in pressuring the 
state to increase institutional and economic opportunities, as well as 
cultural recognition. On the other hand, the negative repeccurssions of 
such potential power shifts often lead to states refusing to substantially 
and fully concede political, economic and cultural rights. These refusals, 
in turn, publicly expose the highly exclusive nature of the divided polity 
generating domestic and international support for ethnonationalist 
activists.  
      After the collapse of the (border) campaign (1956–62) 
constitutionally minded nationalists had realized the need to rethink their 
strategy, which would embrace social and economic issues. Instead of a 
socialist revolution the republican movement opted in the short term for 
immediate reforms and the gradual erosion of sectarianism, the reduction 
of communal polarization through a civil rights campaign. Whether 
seeking to advance social justice as an end in itself or as a means to 
constitutional change, proponents of a civil rights campaign agreed that 
any discussion of partition should be avoided. By non-violently pursuing 
demands for equal citizenship, republicans would deny Unionists the 
‘Orange card’ (defense of Northern Ireland constitution against a violent 
challenge) that they had traditionally played to justify repression: 
  The leadership of the republican movement from the mid 1960s had 
given up completely on the whole armed struggle/ violence side of 
things. They were moving to a position where they wanted to mobilize 
people in a political way…There was an element of spontaneity but 
those who started to organize knew what they were doing. They had a 
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plan and they had already been involved in radical activities, like 
housing and fishing protests (author interview with Brian Feeney, 5 
January 2010, Belfast). 
 
The ineffectiveness of traditional nationalist forms of contention, 
perceived strategic advantages and identification with activists outside of 
Northern Ireland all contributed to the adoption of new forms of 
framing.  
      According to this new, strategically oriented perspective, a civil 
rights campaign could ultimately contribute to ending partition by either: 
1) democratising the Northern Ireland state, uniting the working class, 
weakening the influence of unionist ideology upon the working class 
and/or presenting opportunities for building alliances with moderate 
Unionists,  thus leading to the gradual legitimation of nationalist 
activities or; 
2) exposing the inability of a sectarian state to reform itself, 
demonstrating its inherently irreformable nature and forcing the British 
government to reexamine its constitutional relationship with Northern 
Ireland, which would be a stepping stone towards Irish unity. 
At the time most activists had settled into the realization that the long-
term aspiration to a united Ireland needed to be at least temporarily 
sacrificed for the more immediate short-term pragmatic solutions to the 
minority’s grievances and deliberately tried to downplay nationalist 
imagery and rhetoric:  
  The CRM was very careful to limit its objectives to civil rights and 
social justice and to put aside any talk of constitutional issues, the 
reunification of Ireland, any of that, because once those issues came up, 
the Irish national community and indeed the wider community was 
deeply divided about these issues (author interview with Denis Haughey, 
7 January 2010, Belfast). 
  
                                                                                         221
As Richard English rightly notes, ‘strong personal and ideological 
connections linking the 1960s IRA to earlier republican socialist 
thinking… provided a line of descent running through the alternative 
philosophy offered by the twenty-century Irish republican left’ (English, 
2003: 87). The aim of this ideological section was to achieve working 
class agitation through a more gradual reformist grassroots strategy 
focused on civil liberties rather than armed insurrection. That tactics 
would, they believed, itself fundamentally challenge the sectarian 
framework which had kept Ireland’s two states divided55. 
      In addition, the (perceived) inadequacy of the Nationalist Party (the 
traditional representative of the Catholic/nationalist community) in 
assessing the constantly shifting social and ideological needs of the 
population led to its decline as a representative of minority interests. A 
range of newly emerging civil rights organizations started addressing 
issues that traditional political parties had failed to undertake: ‘This (the 
impotence of traditional nationalist leadership) – more than ancient 
hostility – seems to have produced the extra constitutional actions of 
1968–9’ (Budge and O’Leary, 1973: 226). In the new context of the 
1960s the party with its patronizing conservatism was widely seen as 
having failed  to protect the nationalist community as a political force, 
since it did not manage to go ‘beyond the border’ of the constitutional 
issue, refusing to take part in unionist politics. Thus, pre-existing 
networks started to criticize both hard-line nationalist tactics and 
physical force republicanism. 
      Few rules regulated the grassroots membership of the movement 
with no special restraints or conditions to control the involvement of 
new members. Anyone was entitled to take part in meetings, debates and 
                                                 
55 The shift in republicanism was heavily influenced by Marxist economic principles, which affected 
their desire to rebuild the structure of Northern Ireland politics along an economic and class (left-
right) rather than (perceived as) sectarian (Catholic-Protestant) axis (e. g. Johnston, 1967: 1). 
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final decisions. This inclusivity through informal cooperative ties, which 
made it difficult to distinguish clearly between various groups stemmed 
largely from the recognition of the political need to differentiate itself 
visibly from the dominant ethnic identity that was seen as homogenizing 
the region: ‘It was a real mixture of people and political opinions… We 
thought what we should do is try and make allies among broader 
sections of the community…. We sought to keep everybody together 
with common objectives’ (author interview with Edwina Stewart, 5 
January 2010, Belfast). 
‘People’s Democracy was an entirely open organization… If you were 
present at a meeting you were a member… Unionists came along as did 
many others’ (Vincent McCormack, e-mail correspondence with author, 
November 2009). 
Thus, the CRM was not a centralized body but a loose affiliation of 
disparate campaigns with flexible boundaries: ‘It was very important for 
us that Protestants were represented, and they were in great numbers…It 
was a real melting pot of ideas, not a coherent organization’ (Kevin 
Boyle, e-mail correspondence with author, August 2009). 
The key aspect of the campaign at this stage was the strategy of fluidity 
and constant ‘movement’ rather than any rigid and formal organization 
(Lynch, 2006: 278).  
      When the CRM appeared on the political scene in its ‘latent’ form 
the main actors in the political system had come to identify their 
interests largely in the continued exercise of their own roles perceived as 
a consolidation of their position. The CRM tried to go beyond the logic 
of politics being the mere preservation of the status quo and attempted to 
introduce a different type of grassroots activism which would have 
destabilised the relations between state and society by introducing a new 
way of achieving consensus. These forms of activity were aimed not so 
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much at producing disruption but at building fresh patterns of 
relationships that could not be contained within the existing social and 
political organization of Northern Ireland. The result was an innovative 
strategy of contention which combined non-violence with symbolic 
provocations, such as marching through traditionally unionist areas. 
      In addition, the issue of civil rights and equality between 
Catholic/nationalists and Protestant/unionists was emphasized by other 
political parties and organizations and debated across traditional 
distinctions, despite the fact that the Northern Irish political system had 
always been characterised by scarce interaction and rigid divisions with 
the social fabric of Northern Ireland hardly providing any ‘natural’ 
sources for dialogue. For example, the (NILP) channeled emerging 
claims and was quite influential in the support of local protest. Aaron 
Edwards (Edwards, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) has discussed  modest but real 
success the NILP achieved in demonstrating the potential power for 
cross-community politics  and ‘building up a non-sectarian labour 
culture during the 1950s and 1960s’ (Edwards, 2007a: 26). In January 
1967 a broad range of organizations formally came together to launch 
the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). Its five point 
plan included the following aims (McClean, n.d.: 4; NICRA, 1978: 20): 
1. To defend the basic rights of all citizens. 
2. To protect the rights of the individual. 
3. To highlight all abuses of power. 
4. To demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and 
association. 
5. To inform the public of their lawful rights. 
These demands were not based on a single, coherent and elaborate 
ideological outlook. NICRA refused to be affiliated with any political 
party and attempted to function as an inclusive umbrella organization 
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bringing together all groups interested in civil rights and strengthening 
inter-organizational contacts.56 
      The ‘new Catholic middle class thesis’ has been the traditional 
explanation for the upsurge of collective action in the mid 1960s. This 
approach centers on fundamental changes in the socioeconomic structure 
of Northern Irish society and on the idea that the CRM was founded and 
led by a new Catholic middle class which emerged in the 1960s.   The 
stratum was created by the extension of secondary and higher education 
to working class Catholics in the post World War II era (Rose, 1971: 98-
100; Hirsch, 1988: 43-55; Arthur, 1974: 23; Cameron, 1969; Buckland, 
1981). This transformation signified a generational change fuelled by the 
frustrations of a young elite with the inability and refusal of an inflexible 
regime to create sufficient political space that would placate minority 
demands.  The 1950s proved to be a period of economic modernization 
and change.  
       Given the expansion of the British welfare state, nationalists were 
initially less concerned with the national question than with the fact that 
the new economic opportunities disproportionately benefited unionists. 
The introduction of the welfare state in Western European societies 
made the role of the state in directing economic and social life more 
transparent. The strengthening of relations with Westminster, also 
related to the welfare legislation, signified that Britain was to become 
the framework of comparison for the Northern Ireland political system. 
                                                 
56 The non-sectarian inclusive message of NICRA is evidenced by the wide- ranging nature of the 
affiliations of its executive committee members. The committee elected on the 20th January 1967 
consisted of (McClean, n.d.: 4; Irish Democrat, 01. 11. 2008): Chairman: Noel Harris (Trade Unions 
representative); vice-chairman: Dr. Conn McCluskey (Campaign for Social Justice); secretary: Derek 
O'Brien Peters (Communist Party); treasurer: Fred Heatley (Belfast Wolfe Tone Society); public 
relations: Jack Bennett (Belfast Wolfe Tone Society); other members are Betty Sinclair (Belfast 
Trades Council); Billy McMillen (Republican Clubs), John Quinn (Liberal Party), Michael Dolley 
(National Democratic Party), Joe Sherry (Republican Labour Party), Jim Andrews (Ardoyne Tenants' 
Association), Paddy Devlin (Northern Ireland Labour Party), Tony McGettigan (no affiliation). Robin 
Cole (Unionist) was co-opted later. 
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In particular, British policies regarding the economy and social reforms 
in areas of health service, public housing, education, and employment 
affected all citizens: ‘If people had rights in London, in Birmingham and 
Manchester we were entitled to the same rights here. We were entitled to 
the same franchise opportunities, to the same voting rights’ (author 
interview with Ivan Cooper, 8 January 2010, London(Derry).   
      This position had the effect of enhancing expectations for 
nationalists without creating any real institutional avenues for 
channeling minority demands and produced a cycle of frustration-
aggression against the state establishment.   The local government 
network was the agency through which welfare legislation was 
implemented in Northern Ireland. For this reason in the early 1960s it 
became the cornerstone of the CRM’s activity. As Michael Farrell has 
noted: 
  …the post-war free education system and the increase in university 
scholarships produced a much larger, better educated Catholic middle 
class ambitious, anxious to participate in politics and to end their 
second-class status. Free education and the welfare state also made them 
less anxious for immediate unity with the South with its inadequate 
social services, and more willing to work within the Northern system 
(Farrell, 1976: 238). 
       
 The above perspective, thus, sees the CRM as an integral part of a 
process of politico-economic settlement following the Second World 
War when the socio-political status-quo of the region started to come 
under threat. It is particularly useful in showing how individual 
incentives for mobilization interact with broader political and 
organizational processes. It could be argued that the nationalist 
community was opting out of irredentist politics and that many, 
especially in the lower middle class, had been moving towards an 
acceptance of British liberal democratic values since the late 1950s. For 
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some this change signaled the beginning of gradual Catholic assimilation 
into Northern Ireland. For example, Paddy Devlin remarked that ‘for the 
first time in forty years there was a spirit of compromise in the air. 
People from the two communities were more prepared than ever to live 
together in harmony’ (Devlin, 1993: 80). 
      Accounts focusing on socio-structural change consider the historical 
context of the region and its transformative potential for socio-political 
relations, but do not explain everything. As Tarrow  states, ‘on its own 
structural change only creates the objective potential for movements and 
cannot overcome the personal inertia nor develop the networks and 
solidarities necessary to mount group action’ (Tarrow, 1989: 21). For 
this reason it is important to introduce other factors, including regime 
responses, external support, the actions of other states, the agents of 
social control.  
      The ‘growth of the state’ perspective has opposed the middle class 
hypothesis and argued the link between post Second World War socio-
economic transformations and the emergence of a Catholic middle class 
cannot be easily established since: ‘firstly, expansion at the top end of 
the Catholic social scale has been balanced by an equally important 
growth at the other end. Secondly, most of the changes seem to have 
taken place before 1961 and not to have been directly related to 
improved educational provision after 1944’ (Bew et al. 2002: 142-3; 
Morgan, 1987: 108). This strand in the literature has stressed that even 
though the expansion of the Catholic middle class was one feature of the 
minority’s experience under Stormont, the other was a substantial rise in 
the proportion of unskilled manual workers (Bew, et al., 2002: 150-1). 
The available data on the class structure of both communities supports 
this thesis to a certain extent. The 1968 Rose survey found that 31 per 
cent of Catholic respondents identified themselves as working class 
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compared to 47 per cent as middle class. Among Protestants 29 per cent 
considered themselves to be working class and 52 per cent middle class 
(Rose, 1971, cited in Mulholland, 2010: 69). In 1961 22.1 per cent of 
Catholic males and 43.8 of females in work identified themselves as 
upper or lower middle class versus 32.8 per cent of males and 37.9 per 
cent of females identifying themselves as working class (Breen and 
Whelan, 1999: 321). The focus in this moderately Marxist perspective is 
on the impoverishment of the nationalist working class and a conflict 
over state resources as the key element of changes in the structural 
environment, collective action derives largely from the conflict over the 
control of economic resources, and is being shaped and principally 
determined by social structure. 
      Focusing on the link between the local and the global several 
‘external’ studies have discussed how exogenous shocks, the knowledge 
of similar mobilizational waves in different locations (like the initially 
similar campaigns in the United States, as well as of actions outside of 
the immediate communities concerned) influenced their tactics (Prince, 
2006, 2007; Maney, 2000). Some authors have pointed to the 
connections of the CRM with the wider global movement of the1960s: 
the Black civil rights campaign in the USA, the anti-Vietnam war 
campaign and the students’ movements around the world. It was in this 
relatively ‘relaxed’ and inclusive context of the 1960s, which 
internationally opened new spaces for collective action mobilization, 
also changed because of the Cold War ‘thaw’ process of international 
and internal “depolarization”, that the emerging CRM network saw the 
opportunity to adjust the Northern Ireland political system. Somewhat 
similarly, Purdie suggests that the construction of the movement 
‘reflected a fundamental concern with civil-libertarian issues which said 
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little about concrete grievances over discrimination in housing, 
employment and electoral franchise’ (Purdie, 1990: 75).  
      This perspective stresses the fact that what provoked mass support 
for the CRM was a unique and very temporary fusion of 1960s ultra-
leftism common in the international arena during that historical period 
with a much more rooted sense of ethnic exclusion and oppression, 
which saw the civil rights movement, however inchoately, as an 
opportunity for striking a blow at structures of discrimination but also 
potentially the northern state itself. These works see the struggle in 
Northern Ireland as a part of the wider international environment of the 
1960s and stress the numerous international forces that shaped and 
affected the movement. It is emphasised that the events in Northern 
Ireland were influenced far more broadly and profoundly by the non-
Irish world than had previously been suggested (Prince, 2006, 2007, 
Bosi and Prince, 2009). G. De Fazio in his focused comparison between 
Northern Ireland and the African-American struggle shows the 
similarities between the two movements in terms of exclusionary 
politico-institutional structures, initial mechanisms of mobilization (via 
legal avenues) and the perception of a fundamental threat by the 
majority population. He argues that in contrast to the American CRM, 
the (initial) commitment of Northern Irish activists to the principle of 
non-violence was rhetorical rather than substantive and this difference 
was largely responsible for differential outcomes (De Fazio, 2009: 163-
85).  For De Fazio the purely strategic use of non-violence and the 
failure of the Northern Ireland CRM to fully incorporate non-violence 
into its moral and political philosophy in the early 1960s represented the 
decisive factor in setting off the spiral of violence and repression that 
followed.  
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      Recent studies in this area have also stressed the political claim-
making as a culturally embedded process. It has been argued that rather 
than situated within a utilitarian framework where protest tactics are 
devised purely in order to achieve external political aims, the CRM and 
collective action associated with it represented internal meaning and 
symbolic value to facilitate a sense of group identity and solidarity 
(Smyth, 2006; Bosi, 2007: 41-3). For J. Smyth (2006: 106-23) the CRM 
pursued the double aims of agitating for political reform and mobilizing 
against the perceived cultural injustice, the non-recognition and 
exclusion of nationalist identity. He suggests that cultural injustice was 
more significant as a mobilizing factor than economic exploitation 
(Smyth, 2006: 106).  Cultural injustice is understood here as going 
beyond the denial of legal and formal rights, and involving the non-
recognition of difference and group identity. According to Smyth, the 
struggle for formal rights, such as ‘one man – one vote’ is insufficient to 
explain the willingness of nationalists to redress existing grievances at 
that point in time (Smyth, 2006: 109). The gradual expansion of a 
general culture of social democratic ideals, which contradicted unionist 
practices on the ground led to CRM activists engaging in a moral battle 
over the acceptance of the minority as equal citizens of a fully 
participatory democratic society rather than simply striving to improve 
economic conditions.  This approach while stressing the centrality of 
(non)-recognition focuses on the inherent contradiction and conflict 
between the universalist principles of the Keynesian welfare state and 
social democracy vs. the particularist nature of state power in Northern 
Ireland. Universalist reforms were introduced into a particularist setting.  
      This perspective is useful for acknowledging that opposing 
nationalist traditions and claims to self-determination continued to shape 
mobilization even when they were not highly visible. It is generally 
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accepted that the CRM reflected the expression of a fluid collective 
identity centered on a common sense of commitment to the cause of 
social justice through a non-sectarian and non-violent message. In spite 
of the differences in the CRM networks its groups shared a particular 
conception of civil rights based on a different approach to the 
discrimination issues which was ‘liberal rather than nationalist in form’ 
(Ruane and Todd, 1996: 127). The failure of the unionist government’s 
plans for inclusive economic and social modernization was a primary 
catalyst for more direct contentious activity. An era of tolerance towards 
the nationalist community was designed to produce a more flexible and 
responsive leadership that would not jeopardize the state of the Union 
(Arthur, 1987: 90-1). By promising an opening of the political system 
the announcement of reforms created incentives for nationalist dissent. 
As O’ Dochartaigh notes, the concessions introduced by the unionist 
government were always granted ‘just too late to really make a 
difference’ (O Dochartaigh, 1997: 310). The response of the state, 
especially the police with its extensive security apparatus, forced an 
escalation of the protestors’ actions. In this view mobilization can be 
seen as a ‘logical consequence of the closure of every other channel to 
bring about reform’ (Purdie, 1990: 78; Bosi, 2006). 
      Thus, the most commonly cited factors explaining the transformation 
of the CRM’s message from a latent to a more radical one are the sense 
of grievance arising out of persistent discrimination, the introduction of 
reforms by a previously closed and inflexible regime, the rising 
expectations associated with these measures and the impact of state 
repression on the reformation of communal identities. The emphasis on 
the ‘repression-mobilization nexus’ means that combined analytical 
approaches are rarely pursued simultaneously in relation to the conflict. 
Most of the authors concerned with Northern Ireland nationalist 
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mobilization agree on the thesis that the failure of the government to 
respond adequately to the initial protests aimed at combating political 
and economic discrimination and bringing about social justice which 
were met with repression opened the door for the radicalization of 
mobilization and ethnoterritorial demands both in terms of reinforcing 
the motivation for individual participation (White, 1989) and setting off 
the cycles of violence.   The closure of institutional avenues to redress 
grievances provided a major impetus for radicalization. State responses 
to minority activism that galvanized collective identities, a defensive 
reaction against a repressive state is a key theme running through many 
academic and individual accounts of the events.  
The apathy and inadequate responses to peaceful demands on electoral, 
policing and housing reforms together with confused 
(concession/repression) signals from the British state and a violent 
reaction of the loyalist community pushed the CRM into a radical 
change of tactics by late 1968-9 (McGarry and O’Leary, 1996: Chapter 
4;  Smith, 2006: 110-11). In sum, and at the risk of some reductionism, 
the following opportunity-related factors have been most frequently 
identified in the literature as fundamental to the emergence and 
development of the CRM: 
• The changing nature of British–Irish relations. During the 
1960s there was a political and economic improvement of relations 
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Several authors see this 
factor as important for the emergence of the CRM and argue that the 
beginning of a friendship between the Republic of Ireland and the UK 
enhanced the perception of a threat among sections of the Unionist 
community and raised expectations in Northern Ireland society. In 1962 
both countries had applied to become members of the EEC. It has been 
suggested that these new forms of international relations have opened up 
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a communal friendship between the Republic of Ireland and the UK (e. 
g. Bosi, 2007: 45; McGarry and O’Leary, 1996: 155-6).  
      In addition, as mentioned above, the thawing of the relationships 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which began with 
the O’Neill-Lemass meeting of 1965 needs to be considered as a key 
transformation in the political environment of the region. Like the 
British government, the Irish government under Lemass sought to 
promote economic growth through increasing exports. A link was being 
made between the changing economic conditions, the growing pressures 
for economic modernization and the shift in attitudes towards the 
‘border’ question:  
  When the Common Market becomes operative the border will have 
little significance…there will be free movement of men and materials 
north and south and in the whole Common Market area. One feels that 
the men who have been directing the border campaign have come to see 
this very clearly and that they have decided to leave the border to the 
fate of free trade… (Connacht Tribune, 17. 03. 1962). 
 
Détente with the British government also became a priority during that 
period. A key participant has recently recognized the significance of 
economic considerations in bringing about a different ideological 
environment: 
  …when I look back on it now I think more important than anything 
we were doing were the economic changes that were happening. 
Southern Ireland had begun to open up to the wider world under the 
government at the time, to modernize the state, to attract foreign 
investment… There was a coming together of economic interests 
between Southern Ireland and Britain, and this made Ireland closer to 
Britain… Even the Conservative Party which had always been 
prounionist started to see that Ireland was becoming a partner of Britain 
in the new Europe. So the British government whether Labour or 
Conservative had to balance between the North and the South in Ireland 
and not simply take the unionist side (author interview with Eamonn 
McCann, 8 January 2010, (London)Derry). 
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      In a slightly different vein, C. Reeves (2004: 613-38) discusses the 
efforts of the Labour administration to create a favourable climate in the 
interaction between the British and Irish governments. His focus is on 
the ways in which symbolic gestures of the British government (the 
exhumation of the republican martyr Roger Casement and the return of 
the 1916 flag) contributed to improving Anglo-Irish relations while at 
the same time unintentionally stimulating republican sentiments in 
Ireland and, in the longer term, exacerbating conflictual tendencies in 
Northern Ireland in the 1960s. The focus on these aspects that have a 
substantive underpinning yet hold a high symbolic significance helps 
appreciate the constraining effects of symbolic acts and historical 
revivals on those who tried to reformulate ideas and practices, and 
overcome the rigidity of traditional ideological positions at the time.  
•  The election of Labour government in 1964 (Feeney, 1976: 
8; Farrell, 1976: 243; Hennessey, 1997: 134; Bew et al., 2002: 144). 
Labour victory contributed to the perception of increased protest among 
CRM members and raised expectations, although the prospect of 
influential allies did not fully materialize, as Labour proved hesitant to 
involve itself in Northern Ireland. 
•  O’Neill’s largely ‘symbolic’ and ‘rhetorical’ social reforms 
(Cameron, 1969; Purdie, 1990: 9-37; Farrell, 1976: 239-43): ‘The 
accession of O'Neill in 1963 generated hope of change and, along with 
the Maghery Conference and the O'Neill-Lemass meetings, helped to 
create a climate among nationalists for greater cooperation and 
involvement with the Stormont system’. (Currie 2004: 68) 
   The lack of evidence of ‘real’ reforms from O’Neil’s government is 
mainly emphasized by those who link collective action to a process of 
modernization and expansion of education (the ‘Catholic middle class’ 
thesis). The gradual revision in ideology and strategies did not lead to 
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effective governmental reforms, which might have produced support for  
O’Neill within the nationalist community:  
  The advance of O’Neill was an indication that people within 
unionism realized there was something unjust happening and they 
needed to address it. They were wise enough to know that  if they did 
not address it there would be an outburst (author interview with  Patrick 
McClean, 4 January 2010, Beragh).  
 
At the same time nationalist claims were sharpened by the 
discriminatory practices of unionist local governments which considered 
these practices to be necessary to protect their vulnerable (often small) 
majorities and to strengthen their control over wide (and therefore 
perceived as threatening) nationalist minorities57. 
 
• Unionist divisions (Coughlan, 1966; Ellison and Martin, 2000: 688; 
Mullholland, 2000; Greer, 2009a: 196-8). Several authors emphasize 
that O’Neill’s ‘building bridges’ policy revealed clear evidence of 
conflict within the Unionist ruling elites. As mentioned above, unionism 
as a whole was undergoing fundamental changes designed to produce a 
leadership, which could guarantee the continuity of their rule. This lack 
of unity also contributed to the perception of a favourable environment 
for new forms of minority activism.  
      The numerous changes that occurred at the socio-economic and 
political level in the Northern Irish polity mirrored the fact that the 
                                                 
57 Three specific decisions aroused strong emotional responses among large sections of the nationalist 
community and were perceived as an impetus to direct action. The first was the announcement of the 
intention to build a new city in the predominantly Protestant/unionist area rather than in the 
predominantly Catholic/ nationalist deprived west. The second was the project to open a second 
university in the predominantly Protestant/unionist region of Coleraine with no consideration given to 
the expansion of the Magee College in (London)Derry: ‘…it was the last of a series of acts which 
finally convinced the citizens of Derry and the west of “Ulster” that it was the Government’s intention 
to stifle the development of Derry in particular and west “Ulster” in general and to promote instead 
growth in the comparatively prosperous and unionist dominated Belfast- Coleraine-Portadown 
triangle in the hope of creating a redistribution of population in order to consolidate the Unionist 
position in “Northern” Ireland’ (John Hume,  Derry Journal, 08. 08. 1965). The third was the 
abandonment of plans to extend the M1 motorway linking Belfast to the west of the province. 
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environment outside Northern Ireland was transforming too. The 
Northern Ireland CRM – largely by virtue of it being a loose and 
heterogeneous confederation of constitutional nationalists, moderate 
Marxist republicans and leftist radicals – found much of its inspiration in 
the world beyond Northern Ireland, albeit from different and often 
contradictory sources. The 1960s saw many nationalists shift their 
allegiance away from the conservative and traditional nationalism of the 
previous generations to favour a more secular, inclusive and proactive 
form of nationalism that was compatible with social-democratic values.   
      For a number of members of the CRM leadership transnational 
events channeled and changed their understanding of the nature of 
sectarianism and of discrimination in the province. By joining in what 
seemed to some activists a worldwide movement they believed that 
social justice was achievable through a democratic transformation of the 
state from a largely reactionary unionist regime to a more pluralist 
system:  
  People genuinely did see the CRM back then as part of a global 
phenomenon…What was going on in Northern Ireland, in my mind, was 
not part of Irish history, it was part of something contemporary 
happening in the world… Putting all those things in a nationalist 
perspective would only diminish them… That was one of the reasons 
why I would have been against nationalism (author interview with 
Eamonn McCann, 8 January 2010, (London)Derry). 
 
The ‘secondary’ issue of the border would be resolved peacefully and 
naturally, many hoped, if the unionist elite could be compelled to 
renounce the unfair practices that perpetuated its stronghold on local and 
provincial institutions.  In the highly heterogeneous milieu of the CRM 
not everyone was attracted to the cross-societal diffusion of protest in 
the same way and by the same political actors:  
  In the 1960s we had still a very conservative society…Those of us 
who were radicalized by the 60s would have been a small number of 
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people. The vast majority of people who came out to support NICRA 
would not have been radicalized by student protests or the Vietnam war, 
but it had an influence on those of us who were developing strategy and 
leading the movement. So you had the mass movement which was in the 
main Catholic looking for equal rights and you had a lot of us who had 
started the struggle being influenced by the broader political context 
(author interview with Ann Hope, 12 January 2010, Belfast). 
 
• The impact of the US civil rights movement in the 1960s 
(De Fazio, 2009: 163-4; Maney, 2000; Dooley, 1998; O’Dochartaigh, 
1997: 23-5). The global interest in the issue of civil rights was perceived 
by some as a key factor for the growth of a ‘new’ movement in Northern 
Ireland and had a high symbolic significance. 
• The student political mobilizations of the 1960s (Prince, 
2006, 2007; Prince and Bosi, 2009: 149). During the second half of the 
1960s, and especially after the riots of May 1968 in France, there was 
mass mobilization of students in universities throughout the world, 
particularly in France, Italy, Germany, Britain, and the USA. They were 
clearly attuned to and influenced by one another, resulting in the 
development and diffusion of antagonism against every kind of 
authority. 
• The internationalization of political protest through an 
increasing role for mass media. The mass media could effectively 
contribute to attracting popular participation by gaining worldwide 
attention and reducing the time-space constraint. International publicity 
surrounding civil rights events also placed significant pressure upon the 
regime to enact reforms. Later as the demonstrations turned increasingly 
violent media coverage tended to focus more on the actions of protesters 
rather than their messages (Purdie, 1990, 1988: 140; Ruane and Todd, 
1996: 126; Patterson, 2002: 202-5). Media coverage of political 
developments in Northern Ireland interacted with the goals and forms of 
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contention in ways that further accentuated the reform-conflict cycle. 
The legitimacy accorded to non-violent civil rights protest initially 
resulted in international publicity that jeopardised Stormont policy 
priorities. At a later stage negative publicity arising from repression of 
protest marches threatened to undermine the government’s legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public both at home and abroad. Consequently, media 
coverage played a role in setting in motion a series of events leading to 
the escalation of violence. 
      One of the interpretations looks at the issues involved as the starting 
point for analysis. Thomas Hennessey (Hennessey, 2005) argues that the 
issues at stake started to change after 1968 when most of the initial 
grievance-based demands had been conceded – civil rights demands 
began to transform into national demands. Overall, the issue-driven 
explanation tends to assume that if specific issues (inside Northern 
Ireland) had been fully resolved the mobilization would not have 
escalated. This interpretation is not entirely convincing, as it fails to 
recognize the extent to which reforms failed to satisfy the CRM.  In most 
accounts the inability and refusal of the Northern Ireland government to 
reform itself and to address existing complaints led to increasing 
frustration among Northern Irish nationalists, which spilled into 
violence. Some of the literature suggests that an underlying ethnic 
polarization had existed and was ultimately responsible for the 
escalation: ‘With the benefit of hindsight, the surge of antagonism… 
might suggest that an optimistic view of community relations in the 
1960s was rather superficial’ (Dixon, 2001: 71).  N. O’Dochartaigh 
argues that the ‘civil rights campaign destabililised Northern Ireland by 
the simple fact of politically mobilizing the state Catholic minority, 
which had previously been quiescent’(O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 70). This 
approach would seem to suggest that the emergent escalation and crisis 
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was inexorably linked to the nature of the state itself. The Northern 
Ireland experience shows that models, which tend to implicitly or 
explicitly rely upon relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) and other socio-
economic models of protest (e. g. Davies, 1962) are quite simplistic and 
the actual process is much more complex.  
      As soon as political opportunities emerge and protests break the 
ground, the impact of popular protest on the political process is likely to 
be quite substantial. Due to the absence of regular channels of 
expression of discontent the dissatisfaction of the population 
accumulates to high levels over time. Once initial protests demonstrate 
the vulnerability of authorities or divisions in the leadership signaling 
that the risks associated with collective action have been reduced, 
discontent from various sources erupts in the form of non-institutional 
pressure on the leadership. By using civil rights ideas and non-violent 
civil disobedience the CRM enhanced its mobilizational resources and 
organizational capacities while heightening the vulnerability and 
receptivity of the unionist regime to its demands. Relatively high levels 
of intercommunal cooperation and the fluidity of interorganizational 
boundaries helped to take advantage of the emerging political 
opportunities. Loyalist use of constitutional and conspirational ideas as 
the basis for mobilization served mostly to increase support for its rival. 
 
                      Conclusion 
      This chapter has examined how a growing number of protagonists in 
Northern Ireland started in the early 1960s to reconsider traditional 
nationalist values and attitudes searching for a new, more inclusive and 
pluralist definition of Irishness. One of the key avenues to achieving this 
aim was the conscious adoption and promotion by a section of civil 
rights leaders of previously ‘foreign’ concepts, such as decolonization, 
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radical democratic socialism and human rights. The identification of 
favourable opportunities for protest, while being useful for examining 
the emergence of dissent, tends to view the CRM largely as a 
homogenous, strategically oriented actor disregarding the plurality of 
approaches within it. In addition, the enumeration of opportunities does 
not fully consider the role of unionist counter-mobilization to turn the 
CRM challenge into a continuous cycle of violence-counter violence. 
This approach also underestimates the extent to which the policies of 
various state-level actors were affected by their understandings of the 
unfolding situation. In this context it is important to explain not just how 
Northern Ireland’s communities became mobilized on an ethnic basis 
but also the politicization and shifts in the intergroup boundary58. This 
process was not self-evident and those who were politically active in the 
1960s had not been directly socialized into a violently antagonistic 
environment. On the one hand, we need to know what sustained CRM 
mobilization throughout the decade. On the other hand, any credible 
interpretation of the movement’s short life span, limited success and the 
(relatively) rapid erosion of any common ground that had existed should 
take into account how changes, divisions and lack of ideological unity 
within the movement itself led to its gradual radicalization and eventual 
disintegration. These issues will be the subject of the next chapter. 
 
                                 
                               
 
 
 
                                                 
58 For analyses of the dynamics of ethnic relations as boundary generation and (re)making see e.g. 
(Conversi, 1999; Tilly, 2004; Wimmer, 2008). 
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                                Chapter 6 
Protest politics in Northern Ireland: between the peak of 
mobilization and the disintegration of the ‘activist web’ 
           
            Introduction 
      The previous chapter examined the transformation of civil rights 
concerns (political, economic, legal) in Northern Ireland into activism 
from the early 1960s in the broad and loose coalition of the CRM which 
for a very limited time tried to bridge the opposite poles of the dominant 
ethnonational cleavage. I attempted to challenge those accounts of the 
period that stress an inevitable slide into violence from the start of the 
civil rights campaign. I argued that while the civil rights agitation 
ultimately heightened ethnic divisions, this intensification did not 
exhaust the range of opportunities and plausible political alternatives 
which would render it the juncture from which subsequent events 
developed. Being the product of a specific fusion of ‘transnational’ and 
domestic level opportunities the CRM represented at its early stages a 
genuine attempt to differentiate itself visibly from the traditional 
divisions of the Northern Ireland system. In this context protest became 
the primary extra-institutional means of generating leverage on behalf of 
deeply valued yet unfulfilled objectives.  
      This chapter aims to further trace the sequencing of processes 
between 1968 (the peak of CRM mobilization) and 1969 which marks 
the disintegration of the movement and the launch of an armed 
campaign. Protest activism previously restricted largely to struggles over 
relatively limited legislative, political and institutional reform, turned 
increasingly radical, involving maximalist demands for national self-
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determination. In evaluating the trajectory of the CRM during this period 
this chapter seeks to address the following questions: 
1. What were the sources of the movement’s internal fragmentation and 
what effect did it have on facilitating or inhibiting collective action by 
non- state challengers? 
2. How did the movement interact with other actors in the system and 
what did this interaction mean for the decisions on what strategies – 
violent or otherwise – were appropriate for achieving the desired 
objectives at different points in time and for  the eventual demobilization 
of the CRM as a cross-community alliance? 
 While there is some recognition in the recent literature on the CRM that 
‘making direct causal links between ethnicity and conflict is more 
problematic than it first appears’ (Prince and Warner, 2012: 5) the 
majority of the literature presents either narrative historical accounts of 
events or accounts positing a self-evident connection between the 
‘ethnicization’ of identities and armed struggle. Based on the example of 
the CRM I attempt to show that explanations of collective action which 
argue that political processes result from general propensities of entities 
(such as institutions) or individuals are limited primarily because they do 
not take into account the (inter)-relational dynamics affecting how the 
aims and consequences of certain actions are  perceived and / or 
misperceived by contenders at specific points in time.  
          
          Polarization as boundary (re)constitution 
      A process of polarization followed the 5th of October march, when 
CRM activists seized the moment to advocate further political reforms. 
But this protest had a price for the movement as the event fundamentally 
contributed to creating a competitive situation in which its major groups 
started fighting for the same support base whose interests they wished to 
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represent. The latent ideological contradictions within the CRM became 
apparent changing the course of the movement. Protest politics also 
highlighted some of the pre-existing conflicts within the political class 
and initiated changes in power relations among the regional elites, 
thereby altering their strategic choices. Without subscribing to a purely 
structural deterministic line of argument, it is also worth noting that the 
complexity of the situation meant that political power was diluted and 
consequences beyond the (initial) intentions of those involved had a 
greater effect on political outcomes than a straightforward 
instrumentalist perspective would suggest. 
       As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the ways to evaluate 
the dynamics of the emerging polarization is by seeing it as a process of 
social boundary changes. Charles Tilly suggests that a social boundary is 
characterized by three elements: a degree of solidarity within groups on 
either side of the boundary, a form of interaction across the boundary, 
and a legitimizing discourse that makes maintenance of the boundary 
seem vital to those involved (Tilly, 2004: 214). Where polarization 
occurs we generally observe boosts to internal solidarity, regulation of 
interaction across the boundary and (re)createation of the discourses of 
group difference. Intercommunity boundary shifts can also translate into 
individual action insofar as they change how the perception of how a 
‘good’ member of ‘X’ ought to behave. 
      The analysis emphasizes the shifting drivers of the agitation and the 
lack of intragroup homogeneity substantiating the proposition that the 
character of conflict is likely to change over time. The forces and ideas 
that are initially effective in securing widespread support of a particular 
constituency might not be identical to factors influencing further 
development of protest, while a movement’s profile becomes 
increasingly centered around ethnicity. With the ascendance of more 
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radical factions divisions were mainly rooted in divergent views of the 
goals and strategies, although ideological differences also played a role. 
In addition, the groups did not simply become radical once a particular 
participation or anger threshold or ‘temperature’ was reached59, rather 
the turn to violence was the result of a particular confluence of specific 
interactive patterns among those protesting on the streets. At the same 
time the process produced alterations in both the goals and forms of 
contention. With fewer resources and organizational capacities at its 
disposal civil rights activism operating within the context of open anti-
regime rebellion was less effective in generating pressure to advance its 
demands. I also look at the leadership component in an attempt to 
explain how the lack of long-term strategic decision-making led to 
radical ethnonationalism dominating the broader political environment.  
      Dominant explanations of the crisis typically tend to underestimate 
the role of contingencies, which might have changed the course of 
events. This chapter aims to consider how structural factors, 
transformative events, leaders and ideas interacted to produce the 
emerging polarization. Before analyzing the impact of these components 
on the evolution of the CRM it is necessary to reconsider briefly the 
ideational and identity-related backdrop to the Northern Ireland conflict. 
Understanding the ‘meta-conflict’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995: 1) over 
what this contest is fundamentally about has important implications for 
critically evaluating the extent to which the CRM should be seen as a 
missed opportunity and its potential to create a cross-ethnic alliance that 
could have provided (and for a short period did provide) a basis for an 
alternative politics of solidarity beyond the ethnonational cleavage. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, for proponents of externally oriented 
explanations the key cleavage centers on competing conceptions of 
                                                 
59 On this point see also (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998: 426). 
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national belonging and political power. Internal accounts, by contrast, 
see the roots of the conflict in the variety of economic, political, cultural 
and institutional conditions within the province (McGarry and O’Leary, 
1995; Whyte, 1990).  The centrality of self-determination is not meant to 
completely disregard the significance of religious, cultural, socio-
economic and other issues. Neither are these components entirely 
subjugated within an analysis of the contestation over partition and 
national self-determination. Defining Northern Ireland as a site of 
sovereignty and self-determination conflict conceives the Irish border 
the embodiment of historical differences between British and Irish 
nationalisms. Within Northern Ireland the ideational contradictions 
between unionism and nationalism are founded on contrasting 
conceptions of national identity and interpretations of the legitimacy of 
the border. 
      Throughout the 1960s membership of the main national based 
organizations grew steadily, the number of spontaneous groups formally 
independent from the national organizations and active locally increased; 
the CRM gained leverage against the political and social system which 
had been unchanged and virtually unchallenged since the formation of 
Northern Ireland in 1921.  This dynamic activity was the product of 
communication, cooperation and contention amongst the various 
individuals, groups and organizations operating within the highly 
heterogeneous CRM. It is difficult to find a precise starting point, since a 
mixture of social and identity related processes defined its fluid and 
flexible organizational structure, ideology and repertoire of action.  
 
      In the first few years of its existence the movement appears to have 
managed to reduce the gulf between institutional politics and grassroots 
activism and, to a certain extent, the distance between nationalist and 
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unionist communities, as members of the newly emerging middle class 
came together with representatives of grassroots groups.  Thus, on the 
one hand, at the early stages the CRM was capable of bringing together 
previously non-communicating clusters of actors characterised by 
divergent national-religious identities and social milieu. On the other 
hand, it failed to generate new forms of social relationships which could 
weaken the organizational and ideational bases of the dominant 
cleavages in Northern Ireland in the long term.  
      The internal membership of the CRM shows that in the beginning 
some members of the Protestant/unionist community cooperated within 
the movement and in the streets with Catholic/nationalists, which in a 
partial and incomplete way started to bridge the opposite poles of the 
ethnonational cleavage. At the same time since they remained poorly 
integrated within the CRM structure, Protestant/unionists were the first 
to demobilize once different organizations entered in competition for the 
recruitment of supporters and split along the boundary between 
moderates and radicals. The movement managed to hold together 
Catholic/nationalists and Protestant/unionists, as well as moderates and 
radicals only temporarily with visible splits along those ethnonational 
and sociopolitical lines. The network therefore soon disintegrated 
leaving its main participants split along the ethnonational and religious 
cleavage, and between radicals who converged under People Democracy 
(PD) leadership and moderates who were predominant in NICRA.  
      While PD strove to transform the fight for civil rights and reform 
into a wider struggle to destroy Stormont institutions, NICRA 
considered those institutions as the major channel for democratic 
change. In the early to late 1960s the main organizations comprising the 
CRM stood out for their inclusivity and largely shared common 
resources for the attainment of common objectives. They formed ties 
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and made the central committee of NICRA a (relatively) effective 
vehicle for constant coordination. In the late 1960s to early 1970s 
cooperation and mutual exchanges decreased, interorganizational 
differences strengthened gradually turning into open conflict. It was 
during this period that the (few) Protestant/unionists completely 
withdrew their support to the CRM and the web of protesters split. 
      If we accept that issues of national belonging remained crucial to the 
dynamics of interethnic relations, at least part of the failure of the CRM 
to sustain a long-tem broad based coalition that did not regard 
ethnonational identity as the key facet of interpersonal relations and self-
definition should be explained with reference to the zero-sum 
assumptions held by (some) members of the two communities. Key 
activists recently reflected on the difficulties of starting to organize the 
campaign for civil rights in the absence of unconditional support of all 
segments of the nationalist community and in the face of resistance of 
those who continued to  adhere to a traditional interpretation of 
republicanism:   ‘We did not get any help from outside… Hardline 
republicans refused to attend our meetings… They were fighting for a 
Catholic united Ireland… (author interview with Fred Heatley, 6 January 
2010, Belfast). ‘To a certain extent anger among old Republicans who 
were wanting to go back to the old methods also played a role’ (author 
interview with Edwina Stewart, 5 January 2010, Belfast). Similarly, it is 
certainly true that hardline attitudes within the unionist block and 
unionist resistance played a role in blocking the advance of non-radical 
alternatives.  
      From this perspective, the prioritization by unionists of physical and 
constitutional security (pre)determined CRM’s radicalizing trajectory by 
militating against intercommunal cooperation, limiting and curtailing 
options. Unionist alienation was instrumental, acting as a catalyst for 
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delaying change, reversing policy implementation and transforming the 
context within which collective action took place. When taken to its 
extreme, however, this interpretation can through stressing the causal 
primacy of ethnonationalism underestimate the role of the movement 
itself in generating change as well as the reality of strategic choices 
influenced by contingent factors. As mentioned above, the CRM reached 
the peak of its mobilization in 1968 due to the (relative) success of its 
organizational structures and framing strategies. NICRA, DCAC and to 
a certain extent PD were the product of extensive and overlapping 
networks which merged the direct and largely informal activism of 
grassroots participants with the resources made available by a wide 
range of political parties and organizations.  
      By early 1968 the overwhelming perception within the CRM seemed 
to be that conventional channels of political participation were closed 
and an unconventional repertoire of direct action should be used to 
influence policy outcomes through the pressure of public opinion locally 
and internationally:  
  By early 1968 the frustration of those working for greater minority 
rights was rapidly growing. The uselessness of arguing, petitioning and 
otherwise attempting to reach unresponsive governments – both 
Westminster and Stormont – was all too clear. Needed were bolder 
strategies drawing attention to civil rights issues (Scott, 1972: 3). 
  
        The spatial dimension and the peak of mobilization     
      As mentioned above, the CRM was dominated by competition in 
which some of its groups were fighting for the same support base. At the 
same time new waves of participants entered the movement exacerbating 
ideological differences and reformulating its tactics. CRM activists 
affected largely by police repression and countermovement violence 
chose to adapt their protest in terms of organizational structure and 
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repertoire of action to changes in the identity and ideology of the 
movement. The heterogeneity of views amongst civil rights 
organizations operating during this period needs to be emphasized. 
      In 1968 mass protest very rapidly became part of the Northern Irish 
political landscape. Yet there was no uniform or even majority view on 
the desirability of (disruptive and confrontational) forms of street 
agitation. The CRM leadership was driven by internal divisions between 
at least two major factions – those who strove to work within the 
Northern Ireland system with the intention of achieving socio-political 
and socio-economic inclusion and those who saw the campaign for civil 
rights as the key way to undermine the Stormont regime. Among this 
latter group there was a common perception that the dismantling of the 
Northern Ireland state would bring about the ultimate goal of 
(re)unification much more quickly, while others welcomed the 
(imagined) possibility of building a socialist republic capable of 
breaking down traditional divisions and overcoming both nationalism 
and unionism. 
      By 1968 the (perceived) apathy and incapacity of the establishment 
to address CRM’s demands together with a favourable international 
framework of contention in the late 1960s brought the movement onto 
the streets and led to a change in its tactics, although substantial sections 
of the movement remained fully committed to the principle of non-
violence. John Hume expressed the opinion of some key components of 
the CRM when he stated: 
  I would hope… that all people in the city ((London) Derry) will 
follow the instructions of the (Derry) Citizen Action Committee, which 
is clearly not to allow themselves to be provoked, nor not to give 
provocation to anyone… I would condemn any sectarian attitude or act 
by anyone in the city, and anyone who would do this, I would not regard 
them as a real supporter of the CRM…. I think the sectarian element is 
small on each side (RTE News, 20.11. 1968). 
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      The moderate mobilizing message of the CRM was at the time 
consciously and strategically replaced by a more radical one, as a section 
of the movement intended to disorient the (opposing) elites and attract 
media attention. There was a realization among that section that waiting 
for the state to fully implement reform was politically naïve. Instead 
what was needed for change to occur was a new structure of resistance 
aimed at engaging and challenging the state in the same way as the state 
challenged the activists (MacStiofain, 1975: 14360). As Paul Arthur 
remembers in his analysis of the political environment in Northern 
Ireland, ‘press coverage increased 500 per cent between the first and 
second civil rights marches in late 1968’ (Arthur, 1987: 204). In this 
context, street rallies and (illegal) marching became a means to self-
assertion that would provide space within the traditional cleavage 
structures. Individuals, groups and organizations joined together in sit-
ins, pickets and especially protest marches and parades. While these are 
considered to be conventional forms of action and expression in the 
political protest literature, they are highly disruptive and have a 
particularly strong symbolic significance in Northern Ireland largely 
because of the segmentation of much of the territory into 
Catholic/nationalist and Protestant/unionist areas.  
      Social life is ‘organized in spatial routines’ (Sewell, 2001: 62) and 
the movement challenged traditional forms of the organization in a 
symbolic way by marching through both unionist and nationalist places.  
Some commentators (e. g. (Prince, 2007: 7) see this strategy as a way to 
intentionally provoke the authorities to get involved in defending the 
                                                 
60 Sean MacStiofain was one of the key figures in the Provisional IRA. Although he was opposed to 
the ‘new departure’ and the direction the leaders were taking the IRA in the early to mid 1960s, he 
went on to become intelligence officer under Cathal Goulding and later the first Chief of Staff of the 
Provisional Army Council. 
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marches, or to support sectarianism openly in front of the mass media, 
thus, undermining unionist hegemonic control at the local and 
international level. One of NICRA’s key members later recalled: 
  In the spring of 1968 there was much rethinking within the 
NICRA’s leadership; the tactics of Martin Luther King in America had 
been absorbed inasmuch that it was felt by some that only by public 
marches could we really draw world attention to what we were trying to 
achieve by normal democratic means (Heatley, 1974: 9).  
 
Austin Currie, the then Nationalist Party MP for East Tyrone has 
recently outlined the two main reasons behind the decision to escalate 
the campaign to include forms of mass protest in 1968. First he had been 
told by the Labour Party MP Paul Rose that ‘no British government will 
intervene to remedy injustice in Northern Ireland unless you people there 
force it to do so. Second, the demand for ‘British rights’ undercut 
unionist resistance to granting rights available to the rest of the United 
Kingdom (The Irish News, 21.06. 2008). 
      The CRM took to the streets and employed direct confrontational 
action during the summer of 1968. It was the first time that the 
heterogeneous web of activists visibly materialized on the streets in an 
organized manner. Austin Currie suggested the idea of marching after 
his participation in the ‘Caledon Affair’61. At the Nationalist Party 
conference of 1968 he proposed that ‘if justice was not forthcoming 
through normal channels, then it might be time to resort to other means – 
to civil disobedience’ (cited in Eye Witness Caledon, 16. 05. 1979).  At 
                                                 
61 In June 1968 a nationalist family composed of five members was evicted from a public-owned 
house in the town of Caledon, outside Dungannon, and a nineteen-year-old unionist 
woman was allocated a house in the same estate  (Currie 2004: 89-98). Austin Currie 
then occupied the house of the nationalist family. His action received mass-media attention and vast 
publicity (Cameron 1969: 21-3). Later Currie commented on his perception of the far-reaching 
consequences and potentially destructive outcome of those events: ‘I knew that an impact had been 
made because it was the first time when the so called national news from London reported 
discrimination in housing in Northern Ireland’ (Eye Witness Caledon, 16. 05. 1979). ‘At the time we 
did not realise what it would lead to but we had a pretty good idea. If you look over some of my 
speeches in the year before (1967) I …suggested that we would have a more militant outlook in the 
future’ (World This Week, 02. 02. 1972). 
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this stage the CRM was making a successful transition from a very loose 
association of groups created to publicize grievances to a movement able 
to attract a significant number of people throughout the region. As the 
movement took to the streets, the trend of demonstrations followed by 
(loyalist) counterdemonstrations was quickly formed. The counter-
demonstrations established the template of loyalist dissent placing the 
police force between the two groups of protesters and reflected the 
undoubted dominance of Paisley as well as the lack of organizational 
capacity within the unionist right. 
      The events of 5th October when a mass march in (London)Derry was 
brutally attacked by police forces producing widespread feelings of 
indignation and moral shock galvanized the movement and made it more 
visible worldwide by attracting international support and transmitting 
civil rights issues in influential ways. The event itself triggered 
successive waves of mass agitation in the region and is widely 
recognized as a turning point in that it ‘marked the end of a period, when 
people would no longer be intimidated…’ (PRONI, D/3297/4: 3). A 
process of polarization and further radicalization followed 5th October 
providing a catalyst for public action. One of the participants 
characterised this particular event as ‘a baptism we did not try to avoid’ 
(John Burton interview, The Day The Troubles Began, BBC Northern 
Ireland documentary, 6 October 2008). One of the key aspects of the 
tactical nature of their course of action during this period was the careful 
evaluation of the spatial dimension of protest, in particular the 
continuous link between the location (s) of the marches and the political 
and socio-economic claims that accompanied them: ‘The marches just 
did not take place by accident in parts of Northern Ireland, the CRM 
targeted the location of the marches…they were carefully chosen 
places… so as to demonstrate vividly the extent of the injustices in 
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places with unionist city councils but nationalist majority’ (author 
interview with Brian Feeney, 5 January 2010, Belfast). 
      It is however simplistic to assign a purely instrumental value to the 
decision to take to the streets when conventional channels of 
participation were perceived to be closing after multiple attempts at 
moderate pressure. Since space constituted the key domain of 
ethnonational separation in Northern Ireland the challenge facing the 
CRM with its cross-community aspirations was to ‘encourage alternative 
readings of politics within which separation and an ethnosectarian logic 
are viewed as repressive and retrograde relationships’ (Shirlow and 
Murtagh, 2006: 6, cited in Nagle, 2009: 327).   Marching for civil rights 
represented a strong connection with the international environment of 
social protest but it also related to the internal Northern Irish tradition of 
parading. Movement across territory was vigorously policed by the state 
and involved many different aspects of cultural and symbolic power.  As 
Joseph Lee argues, public marches in Northern Ireland differ from 
‘parades in more normal societies. They were not…simple symbols of 
protest, bearing silent or even raucous witness to some grievance, real or 
imagined. They were directed against the self-respect of the other tribe’ 
(Lee, 1989: 420). In marching through both nationalist and unionist 
areas the protesters attempted to appropriate as their own public spaces 
in the region, which had traditionally been viewed as particular kinds of 
places.  
      Neil Jarman comments on the way in which the strategy of marching 
for civil rights had a strong impact on the cultural environment in 
Northern Ireland by confronting ‘head-on the loyalist belief that 
parading was largely the prerogative of unionists’ (Jarman, 1997: 76). 
From this perspective, the civil rights marches were as contentious as 
any other explicitly political demand. They attempted to redefine in very 
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visible terms the power lines of the state and the social order it had 
maintained: 
  For while the loyalists insisted on their inalienable right to parade 
wherever and whenever they wished, this right was not extended to 
Catholics. Civil rights parades did not fit into the traditional polarities; 
but by challenging the authority of the Protestant state… they became 
immediately liable to be categorized as Catholic and nationalist (Jarman, 
1997: 78).  
 
Physical space historically reproduced ethnonational boundaries between 
nationalists and unionists. As mentioned above, marching was a central 
element of the identity of the unionist state. Given the importance of 
space to unionist and nationalist meta-narratives transgressing the 
boundary (between unionist and nationalist areas) became the primary 
means of (re)claiming dominance over territory and at the same time 
demonstrating the feasibility of a more pluralistic polity inclusive of 
unionists and nationalists.  
      After the march the then Minister for Home Affairs William Craig 
used quite extremist language to describe the protesters. Fearing a 
reemergence of republicanism he described the CRM as ‘bogus…made 
up of ill-informed radicals and people who see in unrest a chance to 
renew the campaign of violence’ (cited in Feeney, 1974: 30). The 
behaviour of the police fully delegitimized the political institutions of 
the region as nondemocratic and inspired the growth of organizations 
and groups around the world supportive of civil rights demands in 
Northern Ireland (Maney, 2000). Students idealising emotional and 
ideological bonds with the student movement around the world became 
more active. At the same time the images of violence alienated those 
unionists who had initially been sympathetic to the cause of civil rights.  
      Thus, from late 1968 the nationalist community started to reaffirm its 
(exclusive) identity. After the 5th of October march significant sections 
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of the nationalist community began to (re)draw exclusivist boundaries 
differentiating themselves clearly from the regime which was 
increasingly perceived to be oppressive: ‘The whole mood of the 
community now is for disobedience, and there is almost a total 
disrespect for law and order here’ (Eddie McAteer, (RTE News, 18.11. 
1968).  Only ‘at crucial moments the normally latent 
emotional/ideological contradictions inherent in these trajectories may 
become manifest, altering the course of the movement in the process’ 
(Aminzade and McAdam, 2001: 28). This shift does not mean that 
moderate activists had completely ended their involvement in the 
movement (although some did) but they were progressively losing the 
ability to exercise leadership effectively. The more moderate component 
represented by for example the CSJ and many members of NICRA was 
very cautious to use direct action tactics which in their view could lead 
to widespread communal conflict (as happened later). Radicals instead 
strove by raising a confrontational civil rights struggle to appeal to 
sections of the unionist working class in the name of abstract solidarity. 
Eamonn McCann recalls: 
  We knew that none of our Protestant contacts was going to march 
on 5 October – that would have been too much to expect – but we had 
real hope that the Socialist movement we were going to build after, and 
partly as a result of the march would engage Protestant support (McCann 
1993: 39). 
 
      Soon after the 5th of October protest the People’s Democracy was 
formed. This was a student-led group, which tried to develop, even if 
naively, a student-proletariat alliance from below to initiate a bottom-up 
class struggle in the region. One of PD’s most influential leaders, 
Michael Farrell, described it as ‘not just a part of the Civil Rights 
Movement but a revolutionary association’ (New Left Review, 1969: 31).  
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In many ways PD represented the optimism of the younger generation, 
which perceived itself to be an integral part of the international wave of 
revolt and a transnational network fighting against oppression. One of 
the activists recently emphasised the significance of generational 
changes in the collective aspiration to disrupt the institutional 
equilibrium of the Northern Ireland system: ‘My generation was not 
going to take what they (the older generation) had to take’ (Paul Arthur 
interview, cited in Reynolds, 2008: 8). The emergence of PD was also in 
part a response to the brutal police reaction to the events of 5th October, 
which allowed a broad body of students to identify emotionally and 
ideationally with those repressed during the march: ‘In the wake of the 
(march in) Duke Street they (students) began to organise their opposition 
to the police tactics and their support for the CRM was rapidly gathering 
pace’ (McAliskey, 2009: 73-4).  
      It is important to note that the radical mobilising message, which 
started gaining momentum among segments of PD was at this stage 
quite clearly more resonant among certain groups and associations and 
sections of the community than others and the use of civil disobedience 
did not automatically entail an insistence on violence as part of their 
tactical repertoire. After an early PD march one of the demonstrators 
Ciaran McKeown stated: 
  There is only about fifteen per cent who are looking now to cause 
an instant reverse in public by means of rushing the barricades. The 
majority of students came out on the basis that it was a non-violent 
protest march, a demonstration in favour of civil rights. The majority of 
students in this university, I am quite convinced, are non-violent students 
(RTE News, 10.10. 1968).  
  
To understand the way in which resonance shifts occur and the dominant 
frame for a group changes, it should first be noted that the resonance of 
frames can be broken into two main spheres – its breadth or the degree 
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of its acceptance among members of a group and depth, the degree to 
which an idea resonates with a particular individual. Because resonance 
depends on individual experiences, as well as on available information, 
and not all individuals in a group share the same experiences, and 
(perceptions of) information, not all individuals will accept the frame to 
the same extent – rather, some may give preference to competing 
frame(s).  
      Those who were more embedded in socio-political milieus 
antagonistic to the state seemed to be in favour of direct action, mainly 
the student population and parts of the nationalist community. Where a 
moderate and reformist message might have neutralised and potentially 
even discredited the framing efforts of CRM’s adversaries and rivals, the 
radical one appealing directly to the traditional ethnonational divide 
(re)activated potential supporters of both communities along 
ethnonational lines, and ultimately convinced substantial sections of the 
Protestant population that the campaign was designed to serve an anti-
unionist purpose. Bernadette Devlin commented on how the lack of 
experience and effective coordination undermined the ability of PD to 
direct the situation and seriously inhibited any attempts of the remaining 
moderate groups to promote inter-communal interaction: ‘We started off 
without any political affiliations and with very little political awareness, 
they [PD] also started apparently with little knowledge of ordinary 
attitudes in the North. In fact, PD became the vanguard of Catholic 
bigotry’ (cited in Feeney, The Irish Times, 15.09. 1970). 
Eamonn McCann in an interview with PD leaders in April 1969 
remarked on the progressively exclusivist nature of the CRM collective 
identity and its sectarianism during some of its initiatives: 
  The cry ‘get the Protestants’ is still very much on the lips of the 
Catholic working class. Everyone applauds loudly when one says in a 
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speech that we are not sectarian, we are fighting for the rights of all Irish 
workers, but really that is because they see this as the new way of 
getting at the Protestants (The New Left Review, 1969: 7). 
 
        
                 
 
 
 
        Challenges to the (Northern Ireland) state 
 
      In late 1968 the Northern Ireland government (largely under pressure 
from the Labour government in London (Rose, 2001: 118)) embarked on 
a series of reforms to redress the grievances of the CRM.   The decision 
was taken with two audiences in mind. It is well-known that O’Neill was 
continuously worried about British opinion and pressure from the British 
government. As O’Donnell states: ‘maintaining a good image of 
Northern Ireland in Britain and abroad appeared more important to 
O’Neill at this stage than did domestic opinion (O’Donnell, 2007: 265). 
Policy changes would be necessary to restore order and to avoid direct 
intervention by the British government. The other intended audience was 
the CRM itself. The unionist government had its own political 
opportunity structure and therefore a complete fallout with the CRM was 
perceived as potentially dangerous (Rose, 2001: 120). 
      The strategy (or lack thereof) which emerged in response to the 
CRM was that of mixed messages. The government sought to 
simultaneously admit that reform was necessary and state that the civil 
rights agitation was merely a disguised republican plot. The Unionist 
Party’s manifesto clearly displayed this ambiguity resulting from the 
perception of an immediate threat: 
  The new attack on Ulster began therefore with a coat-trailing 
exercise described as a civil rights campaign…the name and claim of 
this movement carried untrue implications for everyone in Northern 
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Ireland has the same civil rights… The government quickly conceded 
several requested changes and procedural reforms. These changes will 
not alter anybody’s civil rights (Ulster Unionist Party, 1969: 3).  
  
      M. Milotte for example highlights two main reasons that contributed 
to the ultimate failure of Protestant working-class cooperation – the 
definitive influence of influence of Ian Paisley and a lack of any 
effective left-wing organization (Milotte, 1984: 262). Roy Johnston 
makes a similar point when he notes that the opportunity to create a 
potential common ground between the two communities in Northern 
Ireland, at least in terms of social development, was missed (Johnston, 
2006: 187). The CRM represented a potent challenge to the moral 
legitimacy and administrative capacity of the Stormont regime. In 
addition, the later embracement of street protests and demonstrations 
was to confront the state with unprecedented demands on both its 
logistical capacity and its moral and democratic authority. Highlighting 
both those points James Callghan, the then British Home Secretary, 
recalled the Unionist government’s unwillingness to fund an extended 
police force beyond an extra 500 police officers (Callaghan, 1973: 17). 
      The reform package, which was announced in November 1968 and 
was intended to be fully implemented by 1971 (O’Neill, 1969: 107) 
included: 
1. The reorganization of the gerrymandered and unionist dominated 
Londonderry Corporation as a Development Commission that would 
incorporate members of the nationalist community; 
2. a recommendation to local authorities to reconsider their housing 
allocation procedure to make it fairer; 
3. the appointment of an Ombudsman to investigate individual 
grievances; 
4. the abolition of the company vote in local elections; 
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5. the abolition of the Special Powers Act when the authorities 
considered the security situation sufficiently favourable. 
The reforms did not satisfy the original civil rights demand for ‘one 
man-one vote’ in local government elections (the property qualification 
remained so that one man could still have more than one vote), nor did 
they definitively eliminate the Special Powers Act or promise new 
housing. Universal franchise in local government elections was 
reluctantly conceded only in 1969.  
      The announcement of reforms received a mixed reaction from the 
activists, while many expressed disappointment that the ombudsman did 
not increase democratic representation, as his powers were not extended 
to the investigation of local government. The remote prospect of the 
abolition of the Special Powers Act was uniformly evaluated as a 
‘confidence trick to appease the British government’ (Belfast Telegraph, 
23. 11. 1968). No attempt was made to tackle job discrimination by 
strengthening legislation in this area, which provoked strong criticism, 
particularly from PD (Vincent McCormack, e-mail correspondence with 
author, 3 November 2009). The delay of solving fundamental problems 
of the divided community was also perceived as unacceptable: ‘The 
CRM was saying – we want something next week and not in the next 18 
months…The moderates (within the Unionist party) were prepared to 
concede a few things but on their terms and when they decide… The 
Protestant buzz phrase was law and order and the Catholic phrase was 
justice. There is a gigantic gap here’ (author interview with David 
McKittrick, 2 July 2009, Belfast). 
      Nevertheless the moderate components of the CRM (primarily 
NICRA and the DCAC) supported at the end of 1968 the cessation of 
protest activity, even for a short period of time, to allow O’Neill’s 
reforms a chance. At the same time many radicals advocated keeping up 
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pressure on Stormont to meet outstanding civil rights demands, such as 
universal franchise in local government elections. From this perspective, 
the reforms did not undermine the activists’ choice of the Northern 
Ireland government as a vital target of influence. They had a galvanizing 
effect on key segments of the CRM since the perception of the prospect 
of victory increased, encouraging further recruitment and narrowing the 
array of tactical choices. One of PD members Rory McShane recalls the 
decision to test the limits of the system and the (continuing) viability of 
radical strategies to carry out collective goals: 
  The fact that O’Neill’s reforms started was an encouragement rather 
than a disincentive… it was a positive influence on us to continue to 
mobilize and campaign. Because we felt there was evidence of getting 
somewhere, we thought we should pressurize…further. That was the 
beginning but it was not enough so we kept pushing because the door 
was open (cited in Bosi, 2011: 133-4). 
 
      The evidence in this case, thus, supports Rasler’s (1996) hypothesis 
that when concessions are only partial and/or procedural, group protest 
activity tends to increase in scope and intensity62. Following this logic 
witnessing the relative success of their opponent will also cause a surge 
in countermovement contention. With prominent moderates no longer 
participating in street politics, the protesters became more vulnerable to 
intensive repression, while the coersive propensity of the (Northern 
Ireland) state also increased. Some participants accept that the radicals, 
in fact, attempted to provoke the RUC into overreacting hoping that 
police repression now seen worldwide would have fundamentally 
undermined the establishment’s authority (McCann, 1993: 35). Where 
nationalist violence provokes repression it can be utilized to wrest 
legitimacy away from the state. State reprisals have the potential to 
                                                 
62 A different version of the argument about the relationship between concessions and protest (Meyer 
and Staggenborg, 1996) suggests that concessions granted to one side placate further dissident actions 
insofar as they respond to concrete and specific demands. 
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substantiate the idea that the nation is imperiled, as well as eliciting a 
belief in the justness of the (nationalist) cause and the righteousness of 
the struggle. The participants of the groups in favour of more disruptive 
and confrontational tactics did not necessarily fully absorb the collective 
identity of the CRM but shared a strong sense of antagonism towards 
Northern Ireland institutions. Reunification remained low on their scale 
of priorities but from their perspective, there was no time or space for 
any reform advocated by the moderates.  Michael Farrell’s conclusion 
captures the sense of urgency in boosting and achieving results in a 
struggle that had stagnated for some time:  ‘The border must go because 
it is a relic of imperialism… but it must go in the direction of a socialist 
republic and not just into a republic which might at some future date 
become socialist’ (New Left Review, 1969: 42, emphasis added). After 
the Belfast-(London)Derry march in early 1969 (organized by PD) when 
brutal incidents, which occurred throughout were again given media and 
international exposure producing moral shock the nationalist community 
was increasingly being characterised by an exclusivist nationalist stance 
echoing the traditionally dominant divisions in the Northern Ireland 
political and cultural system.  
      Throughout his period in office O’Neill’s twin priorities were the 
maintenance of Stormont power and London’s financial subsidy which 
funded social services and infrastructural development (Greer, 2009: 
233). The Northern Ireland government’s political space and room for 
maneuver was effectively constrained by three forces – the CRM, the 
British officials and intra-unionist dissent. A unionist newspaper’s 
editorial written after the peak of the events summarizes both O’Neill’s 
dilemma and the extent to which his agenda was contested throughout 
the unionist community, including the Unionist Party itself: ‘The crisis 
from 1968 …was mishandled with disastrous results by two Northern 
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Irish governments the leaders of which submitted to blackmail from the 
streets and blackmail from Westminster’ (Ulster Times, 1971: 1).  
O’Neill’s new economic and ideological strategy might have in practice 
achieved less than it was intending to but its potentially far-reaching 
implications had an impact on the perceptions and, consequently, actions 
of all those involved. 
 
      Unionist resistance to British government and Irish nationalist 
aspirations significantly modified the context within which political 
actors operated. Perceptions of powerlessness and alienation constrained 
both Irish nationalists and British government officials. Several 
commentators have stressed the asymmetrical nature of the relationship 
between Northern Irish nationalism supported by successive Irish 
governments and Ulster unionism hardly supported by Westminster and 
largely ignored by British public opinion (e. g. (Aughey, 2006; Southern, 
2007). According to this interpretative model, vulnerability inspires 
reactionary and volatile politics. Paul Dixon notes the fluidity of the 
unionist frame of mind in relation to their status: 
  During periods of high insecurity about their constitutional position, 
unionists have generally been readier to advocate more violent tactics, 
against both the state and republicans to achieve their strategic aim: 
defense of their position within the Union (Dixon, 2004: 139). 
      The all-encompassing process of political and economic 
transformation also aroused the fear of being downgraded in comparison 
to the nationalist community: 
…It did not take them (unionists) very long to work out that in a 
country where there was not a lot to go round if you divided everything 
equally, there would be a lot less for them… they were not just worried 
about the Republic or Catholicism, it was also, I think, about self-interest 
(author interview with Ann Hope, 12 January 2010, Belfast).  
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It is, thus, largely the instrumental value of power that drove much of the 
unionist determination to retain control over the political system of 
Northern Ireland. However defensive, there was a certain logic to this 
behaviour from the standpoint of entitlement and economic security: 
  …Northern Protestants were extremely afraid that the CRA would 
take what they had away from them and give it to the Catholics… they 
were afraid that most Catholics saw CRA demands on housing as an 
attempt to seize Protestant houses and feared that Catholic local councils 
would behave in just as discriminatory a manner as the worst unionist 
ones (Irish Times, 30. 09. 1970).  
 
      At the same time the fear of becoming an oppressed minority and the 
corresponding desire to avoid this outcome stemmed not only from 
considerations of economic well-being but also from the perceived threat 
to the collective identity of the community. Republican involvement in 
the CRM and the decision of the activists to take to the streets allowed a 
large section of the unionist establishment to reaffirm the belief in the 
disloyalty of nationalists who were interested in overthrowing the state: 
‘It has all been aimed at undermining and destroying the Constitution of 
this country’ (Harry West, Stormont debates, 30. 09. 1969, vol. 34, 
cc.75, cited in Farrington, 2008: 524). In addition, significant political 
and economic transformations in Britain led to the decline of the idea of 
a common ‘Protestant family’ whose interests and identity had to be 
protected (MacDonagh, 1983:139) contributing to unionists’ perception 
of having been abandoned by their traditional ‘patron’. As discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 5, insecurity, a sense of isolation from the 
British state and the imminence of an antipartitionist assault on the 
Northern Ireland state characterised the behaviour of the unionist 
grassroots. Such perceptions combined with resentment towards 
O’Neill’s agenda provided the impetus for emergent militant loyalism.  
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      Compared to O’Neillism which was distinguished by flexibility and 
ambiguity, Paysleyism as a radical protest movement offered clarity and 
certainty (Greer, 2009: 238). Through participation in Paisley’s agenda 
many unionists were given avenues into public life (as well as the 
expression of opinions and unspoken fears) that would not have been 
available to them through the ruling party. O’Neill’s mildly reformist 
approach to the traditional blocks in the unionist alliance alienated a 
substantial section of the grassroots unionist associations and party 
members who criticised measures that did not reflect the aspirations of 
their constituents. In addition, when eventually cornered into legislative 
reforms, O’Neill found a rather unsatisfied and unwelcome reaction 
from the CRM and was ‘buying reforms at last year’s prices’ 
(Bloomfield, 1994: 100).  The failure of O’Neill’s policies illustrates the 
subtle but fundamental differences between grassroots feelings and elite 
analysis, which was largely due to the mismatch in perceptions of the 
limits of the acceptable. It has been suggested that the particular 
attraction of Paisley’s style of leadership stemmed from his capacity to 
reassert old values staying faithful to the traditional unionist values and 
to represent himself as a powerful alternative to the ‘compromising’ 
establishment (Bevant, 2009: 325).  
      Although there is evidence to show grassroots unionist 
dissatisfaction with the general trend of policy and political events, this 
dissatisfaction was being mediated through the established institutions of 
the Unionist Party and the Orange Order. This meant that there appeared 
an obvious opening for someone like Paisley to mobilize people outside 
these institutions. Thus, it was formulated and articulated free of the 
traditional institutional restrictions (Greer, 2009a: 197; Farrington, 2008: 
529).  Importantly the agenda offered by Paisley did not lead to the 
formation or reinforcement of ‘brokerage institutions’ (Tilly, 2003: 35) – 
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organizations bringing about and forging linkages between elites and 
masses of different backgrounds and ideas. The appeal of Paisley’s 
message focusing on hardline constitutional issues, his ability to 
represent them in terms of an imminent and irresistible threat and the 
traditional conflict between Unionism and Nationalism revealed the 
broader fallacy of the cross-community aspirations held by the CRM63.  
      The unionist community, which as discussed in Chapter 5, identified 
and affiliated, both culturally and historically its political activism with 
loyalty towards the regional institutions and political order, while 
believing that both its interests and identity could only be protected by 
the continued union of Northern Ireland with the rest of the United 
Kingdom, did not take part in the movement after the march of 5th 
October.  It was evident that the CRM had not managed to recruit many 
supporters from the Protestant/unionist community. On the one hand, 
some Protestant/unionist groups displayed willingness and capacity to 
counter-mobilize fearing that a Catholic/nationalist gain would 
inevitably entail a Protestant/unionist loss.  On the other hand, as 
discussed above, friction developed within the ruling party, whereby a 
part of the party stood against government concessions, which were 
perceived to be jeopardizing the status-quo64. Tension was evident 
between those who perceived maintaining the integrity of the state and 
restoring public order as the supreme priority and those who saw the 
need to introduce political and economic concessions to placate or 
compromise with the nationalist minority.  Although the agenda shifted 
                                                 
63 The fragility and limited potential of the cross-community alliance is also captured by the evidence 
of the deep embeddedness of exclusive rather than hybrid ethnonational identities.   In an oft-cited 
loyalty survey conducted in 1968 Richard Rose found that the vast majority of Catholics (76%) 
regarded themselves as Irish, while the majority of Protestants identified with Britain (39%) or Ulster 
(32%) (Rose, 1971: 208). 
64 For an examination of the various groupings within the unionist elite see (Mulholland, 2000). 
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in response to events certain individuals remained persistently identified 
with these competing positions.  
      Thus, the unionist response to the development of civil rights 
agitation was not uniform. While some members of the unionist elite (e. 
g. Robin Bailie, Edmond Warnock) tended to be quite assimilationist in 
their aspiration to rapidly introduce substantial reforms to prevent the 
escalation of the campaign, for a much larger group (e. g. William Craig, 
Brian Faulkner, Harry West) reform was dangerous and destabilising 
because the underlying motive of the nationalist community remained 
the dismantling of the state. What was (re) emerging was a reciprocal 
development of nationalist ideology, as two competing identities fought 
for limited political and institutional space. Militant loyalists found it 
hard to disassociate Catholic protest from radical activism, as, from their 
perspective, this community now mobilising in the name of civil rights 
and justice only six years before had logistically supported the IRA 
border campaign (Taylor, 1984: 62). The suspicions were supported by 
the mixed messages emerging from O’Neill’s government.  
      As mentioned above, in a rather contradictory manner, the unionist 
government was granting limited reforms yet proclaiming their 
unnecessary nature and the bad will of those who were demanding 
change. The political climate, the tactics of the radical wing of the CRM, 
the weakness of O’Neill’s strategic approach and confusion among the 
anti-O’Neill wing of the Unionist Party combined to give Paisley the 
opportunity to become the focal point of the unionist backlash during the 
late 1960s. Yet paradoxically the loyalist misrepresentation of the CRM 
ultimately contributed to what they feared even more – a new military 
republican campaign and allowed the partition issue back on to the 
political agenda. When the civil rights campaign turned into a law and 
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order crisis, it enabled loyalists to interpret the campaign in terms of a 
fundamental challenge to the state. 
As one activist recently recalled: 
  The loyalist reaction was significant because of the leadership and 
the structure of the Protestant people politically and religiously. They 
were told and believed that they were under threat… I was lucky 
because I had friends and relations everywhere. But lots of people would 
see nationalists as the complete enemy, and lots of people within 
nationalism would see Protestants as the complete enemy (author 
interview with Patrick McClean, 4 January 2010, Beragh). 
 
In many ways interpretative shifts within loyalism mirrored increasing 
tensions in the CRM itself (Bosi, 2006: 85-7).  
              
        Internal dynamics within the CRM 
      The first wave of participants many of whom had been engaged in 
political activism prior to the 1960s retained a perception of hope that 
could have addressed their grievances. For the younger generation who 
got involved at a later stage and were generally socialised in a more 
hostile and perceived as oppressive environment in which it was harder 
to maintain the sense of optimism, disruptive forms of protest, including 
violence, was a natural way to resist outside attacks. The radicals who 
attempted to fight and overcome Northern Ireland sectarianism were 
among those who initiated confrontations and, to a certain extent, 
sectarian polarization. Whether or not conflictual and largely 
inexperienced leaders were authentic in their belief that marches could 
help combat sectarianism, they proved to be incapable of leading people 
in the streets, while the more moderate ideas were relegated to an 
inferior position in the ideological framework of the movement. The 
radicals, thus, believed change could be achieved through generating 
bottom-up pressure and lacked the experience of tactical sophistication 
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or strategic accommodation required of (effective) political leadership. 
The original leadership was constantly superseded by more radical 
groups who gave up moderation for active resistance.       
      As soon as they started to increasingly involve people in street 
politics, the CRM found itself unable to follow a single direction: 
‘Nothing ever became permanent policy… There was no way of 
developing a coherent set of ideas in that context. And that was very 
detrimental to political development’ (Eamonn McCann, cited in Baclus, 
2001: 12). At this stage CRM leaders were also less able to control the 
use of frames, which threatened the unionist identity and interests. The 
civil rights campaign was starting to be progressively redefined by new 
activists and opponents in terms of traditional nationalist aspirations and 
republican antagonism.    Many ‘traditional’ civil rights leaders claimed 
that the activities of extremist groups and, in particular, PD aimed to 
divide the CRM along political, ideological and class lines in order to 
reorganise it with a different strategy and leadership: 
  Revolutionary extremists are now in complete control of the Civil 
Rights Movement in Ulster… The last straw for many moderates came 
when Mr. Frank Gogarty…announced that autonomy and the right of 
independent action by NICRA has been surrendered in the interests of 
common coordinated policy. ‘In other words, surrendered to People’s 
Democracy’, says Mr. John McAnerney…who resigned as NICRA’s 
secretary (Daily Mail, 11.09.1969). 
 
In fact, moderates were increasingly frustrated by the negative image the 
movement assumed largely as a result of the lack of unity between its 
constituent groups: 
  We would never have gained in any circumstances, I think, mass 
Protestant support but we would have gained enough support amongst 
liberals and trade unionists… But unfortunately the whole thing came to 
be seen by many people in the North as a Catholic rights struggle (author 
interview with Ann Hope, 12 January 2010, Belfast). 
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…going more into the Protestant community… was very difficult 
with the way PD was pushing. (author interview with Edwina Stewart, 5 
January 2010, Belfast). 
 
      In addition, activists who had mobilized under a different context in 
the early 1960s increasingly felt that they could no longer identify with 
the movement leaving their leadership positions. The intensely 
cooperating web of protesters that had attempted to bridge the opposite 
poles of the ethnonational divide based on informal inter-organizational 
linkages and on the overlapping membership of its activists was 
gradually dissolving. In the process of social distancing and the 
deepening of categories (such as ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ within and 
between communities symbolic and figurative borders were (re)drawn 
clearly inside the nationalist community where political violence for 
defensive purposes was not excluded. A leaflet issued by the moderate 
sections stressed how the promotion of a particularly uncompromising 
type of nationalism progressively closed alternative cross-cutting ways 
of addressing existing concerns:  
  The civil rights movement…has become essentially a movement for 
Catholic self-defense…PD has now become a much more closely 
defined socialist political group, having increasing common ground with 
republicanism, thus cutting itself from liberal student support (PRONI, 
D 3297/4: 1). 
        
      Those who supported direct and confrontational forms of protest 
thought that their strategy would facilitate widespread acceptance of 
nationalist community grievances but the situation soon became unruly 
and slipped out of control: 
  The issues raised by the CRM generated a lot of tension in society, 
heightened agitation and made it easier to launch an armed campaign. 
We did not do anything to provoke that campaign…but there were many 
young guys out there, who could not and would not be talked to, they 
                                                                                         270
just would not listen (author interview with Denis Haughey, 7 January 
2010, Belfast).  
 
  There is a connection certainly between the CRM and the armed 
campaign. It was the frustration of a lot of young people, particularly 
young disadvantaged Catholic working class people, it was their 
frustration at the CRM not being able to make more rapid progress, a 
more dramatic progress, which drove them into the arms of an armed 
campaign. It was also a response of the police force and the Northern 
Ireland generally to the CRM that produced a great deal of anger, which 
was expressed again by people picking up a gun (author interview with 
Eamonn McCann, 8 January 2010, Londonderry). 
 
In March of 1969 four moderate members of NICRA Executive 
Committee resigned in protest against the growing influence of People’s 
Democracy. Even PD member Bernadette Devlin recognised that ‘the 
PD influx into the Civil Rights Association was seen by existing 
members as a sinister take-over plot’ (Devlin, 1969: 147). The 
leadership was never able to give a strong direction to the movement it 
helped to create. Indicative is what Dermie McClenaghan recalls: 
  …some of the other activists were happily attached to the activity 
alone and would not have been interested in a group held together by 
anything more than that… To these the reason for the activity seemed 
obvious because the conditions encountered dictated the reason for the 
action and the nature of it, because it was obvious that normal advocacy 
had only the slightest effect or no effect at all… if decisions leading to 
actions…had been subject to a tight organizational framework, they may 
never have been taken at all (McClenaghan, 2009: 37-8). 
 
      Thus, the ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973) of the CRM – 
communication channels and exchanges that facilitate intergroup and 
interorganizational cooperation began to break up as actors started to 
reinforce their different frames and identities. At the same time PD tried 
to face the process of demobilization through growing radicalization, 
while NICRA further moderated their objectives and strategies aiming at 
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the final institutionalisation of civil rights claims. This ideological 
divergence led to the ultimate disintegration of the movement. Higher 
rates of conflict (re)produced in the late 1960s not alternative cultural 
patterns but the radicalization of ideological positions already present – 
republicanism and loyalism. By the late 1960s the movement became 
highly factionalised and faced a number of challenges. The closing of 
political opportunities, the weakening of ties across organizations, 
resource competition, the lack of an effective leadership, contrasting 
collective identities and conflicting political beliefs served as sources of 
tension. It was at this stage that the main CRM organizations 
transformed into more formal and exclusive groups. They strengthened 
their internal structures, drew clear lines of division between each other 
and called members to concentrate on activities specific to their 
organizations while loosening old ties. On the one hand, NICRA and 
DCAC aspired to channel their claims inside the official institutions. On 
the other hand, PD distanced itself from NICRA trying to transform the 
movement into a vehicle for a socialist revolution and an All Ireland’s 
Workers Republic:  
‘People’s Democracy wanted to use confrontation politics to further the 
revolution’ (Edwina Stewart, in (Stewart, 1996: 69).  
      Many of PD’s statements, which laid out its key principles, 
recognized the ways in which it attempted to link revolutionary theory to 
practice and reasserted the belief that revolution was close: 
  The aim of the People’s Democracy is the establishment of a 
socialist system of society in Ireland and throughout the world… The 
Workers’ Republic… will work to create one unified community out of 
a synthesis of what is best in the different traditions in Ireland, rather 
than by the destruction of one tradition by another… The PD believes 
that the Workers Republic can only be achieved with the consent of the 
majority of the Irish people… and recognizes that a certain degree of 
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counter force may be necessary to carry out the wishes of the people (PD 
Political Programme, 29. 11. 1970: 1-2). 
 
At the same time Protestant/unionists definitively withdrew their (quite 
limited) support and some Catholic/nationalists discontinued their 
participation in street demonstrations. From this perspective, the CRM 
ultimately failed to fully develop into a ‘new social movement’ (e. g. 
(Mazzoleni, 2004: 115-48) by shaping new types of collective 
belonging, which would break traditional cleavages. While the various 
groups have deeply altered the agenda(s) of the actors in positions of 
power (the Northern Ireland state, as well as the British and Irish 
governments), they have not managed to transform the base of the 
political system and the underlying ethnonational dualism in the region. 
Rather the activism ended up being embedded in the dominant 
ethnonational cleavage strengthening conflictual tendencies in 
community interaction and opening up the way for radicals on both sides 
to come to the fore. 
        From mid 1969 defensive resistance became the major 
preoccupation for those involved not only to protect nationalist 
neighbourhoods from attacks but also to (re)create and reinforce more 
solid patterns of solidarity to continue to mobilise under unfavourable 
circumstances, in the face of growing disunity and potential 
disengagement. The moral outrage and desire for defense justified the 
use of violence as a legitimate means of struggle (English, 2009: 82) and 
the new younger generation grassroots leadership ‘was not averse to 
violence’ (O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 41).   Civil resistance replaced civil 
disobedience (Bosi, 2006: 94). Contacts across Northern Irish society 
were reduced destroying the ability of participants at the moderate end 
of the spectrum to foresee the consequences of actions.   
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      This transformation led each of the groups to emphasize its own 
ideas and strategies to such an extent that they produced the final 
breakup of the movement. While a segment of the republican leadership 
remained committed to promoting reunification through nonviolent 
tactics aimed at democratizing Stormont, many in the rank and file of the 
nationalist community started to listen to militant republicans who had 
mainly exited to the political shadows after the border campaign. As one 
observer notes, ‘the men who brought the guns and were able to use 
them would have the key to the situation in the Catholic ghettoes, and 
the initiative elsewhere’ (O’Brien, 1974: 177).  Defense committees 
were formed and barricades set up creating ‘no-go’ areas in nationalist 
neigbourhoods. It is widely recognized that one of the critical tipping 
points towards the reemergence of the IRA in its traditional mode were 
the events of August 1969 when Protestant mobs and the B-Specials 
carried out armed pogroms in nationalist areas of Belfast and 
(London)Derry.  Eamonn McCann captures how the aggressive public 
mood contributed to bringing about a clear shift to an anti-partitionist 
and anti-colonial frame with which the CRM was unable and unwilling 
to cope: 
  [From late 1969]… when people in the North were just raging mad 
at what was being done to the community the civil rights militants and 
left wingers generally had no prepared channels to try to direct that 
anger and no structure or organization to try to recruit people into, and 
no commonly accepted political ideas that we were trying to impose 
upon the situation. The one group that emerged, which had absolutely 
clear ideas, a clear explanation of what was happening – it was Britain 
oppressing Ireland and it was therefore necessary… to fight against 
Britain – the one group that came forward with that analysis and with an 
organization to give expression to that analysis was the IRA (Eamonn 
McCann, BBC Northern Ireland documentary ‘We shall overcome’,  5 
October 2008).  
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      Against this background armed struggle appeared to ‘bring results 
that were more tangible’ (Robson, 2009: 118-9). These quotes illustrate 
very well how radical leaders were able to, on the one hand, claim to 
successfully defend the vital interests of their constituencies.  On the 
other hand, from then on the innovative in the Northern Ireland context 
civil rights message was overtaken by a narrative that stressed historical 
continuity with traditional themes (partition, British domination, 
victimization) and managed to reassert symbolic dominance within the 
polity. 
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                             Chapter 7  
            NK and Northern Ireland: a comparative analysis    
       
         Setting the stage 
      Although each of the conflicts considered in this study is in many 
ways unique, even when compared to the wider regional (Soviet and 
Western European) experiences, they also exhibit some common traits 
and patterns. In this context some general relevant features are worth 
noting. First, in both conflicts the outcomes of the movements were not 
what the core of the first cohort of activists intended. In Northern Ireland 
those who successfully overcame the obstacles associated with 
organizing in a (repressive but liberalizing) setting failed to achieve the 
objective of democratization of the unionist dominated local state. 
Armenians did not succeed in fulfilling their goals of the reassessment of 
Soviet political cartography and internal reform. Instead new forces 
entered the political stage contributing to a result that had not been 
intended by the initiators of the movements.  Both patterns suggest that 
some factors which are significant for the emergence of ‘first actors’ 
(Petersen, 2001: 1, 33) may be less significant for the escalation of 
conflict.  
      Second, in both cases openings in the political environment led to an 
increase in protest activity due to a feeling of hope that exerting pressure 
in this way can bring about fundamental social transformation. While in 
Northern Ireland limited reforms were eventually implemented 
(reluctantly and largely under pressure from the British government), in 
Armenia and NK the openings proved to be ‘false’ in that they fell short 
of translating into substantive concessions or meaningful opportunities 
for fulfilling the movement’s goals. This chapter will attempt to compare 
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and contrast some aspects of violent escalation in the two cases with a 
focus on the dynamics of state-activist interactions, within-movement 
competition and the availability/ shifts in discursive, as well as 
substantive opportunities. Particular attention will be paid to the 
discursive dimension of the political context, as it is frequently 
underestimated in the literature. Comparative analysis is also important 
in revealing how activists’ perceptions and strategies changed over time, 
as they interpreted and reinterpreted state responses. Similarly, state 
officials also interpreted activist tactics in the context of each 
movement’s real and potential level of political disruption and threat to 
the integrity of the state. This type of dialogical analysis, which pays 
attention to the communication (or lack thereof) between political 
players as part of a feedback-driven process is consistent with the 
approach favoured by David S. Meyer (2004) and Vincent Boudreau 
(1996) in emphasizing the outcomes of shifting responses by both state 
officials and movement activists.  
      This chapter also makes some comparative observations on the role 
of state actors in the two cases.  In this connection I argue that the 
confrontational strategies chosen by the parties were effective in 
politicizing constituencies but polarizing processes beyond the control of 
political actors intensified polarization, made moderation and 
accommodation difficult and fostered deadlock. Previously complex and 
non-ethnically centered interactions between multiple actors break down 
or are relegated to the background to the extent that it becomes difficult 
for individuals or groups to credibly claim neutrality, and it is even more 
difficult for ‘external’ political elites to lessen the distance between 
groups or activate other cleavages.   
      Without subscribing to an overly deterministic line of analysis this 
chapter does attempt to suggest that in both cases political capacity of 
                                                                                         277
the state was highly constrained and the effect of its policies was often 
not fully intentional. Certain events and decisions seemed to have had a 
‘downstream’, as well as immediate, impact in the sense of constraining 
and influencing later options and developments, which ultimately led in 
the respective populations becoming estranged beyond a point of no 
return.  In addition, events on the ground and changes in the perceptions 
and thinking of local actors were occurring more rapidly than the 
authorities could have predicted and followed.  
      One of the key areas where substantial similarities can be found is 
the degree of involvement /passivity of external actors (states), which 
were nonetheless the key points of reference for the competing 
ethnonational groups. As one commentator on Northern Irish politics 
puts it, ‘…the limits of the northern state were always circumscribed by 
the interests and attitudes of political elites in Westminster’ (O’Broin, 
2009: 210). Despite their increased involvement in the conflict the 
British authorities had gradually evolved both a policy and an ideology 
of containment that was designed to suggest that the root of the Northern 
Ireland problem lies exclusively in the inherently divisive nature of the 
respective identities. This perspective allows the British state to 
represent itself as an ‘external broker’ working to help the two ‘internal’ 
communities within Northern Ireland overcome and resolve their long-
standing antagonisms. For the British the value of this policy, like the 
original partition settlement is that the insular nature of the conflict 
precludes any meaningful involvement of external actors. By separating 
Northern Ireland as a discrete unit of analysis this particular mode of 
dealing with and interpreting the Northern Ireland problem  
underestimates at least three salient points: first, the extent to which 
spatial and territorial issues are fundamental to the conflict, second, the 
ways in which its origins and dynamics can be traced to the level of the 
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two islands, and third, the ways in which such interpretations predispose 
towards an internally oriented analysis rather than one that would 
involve a more comprehensive and radical engagement of the British 
state.  
      While it can be argued that the Northern Ireland conflict is 
constituted by forces that extend beyond the boundaries of Northern 
Ireland and are inseparable from the wider structures of the British and 
Irish state system(s), the need to balance nationalist and unionist claims, 
to ‘appease two communities that have diametrically opposing 
aspirations’ (O’Malley, 1983: 205) has largely characterised British 
government attempts to deal with the Northern Ireland political situation.  
The response of the British government to the escalating situation in 
Northern Ireland was muted. The authorities seemed to hope that a 
system of devolved, albeit reformed government could continue. 
Ironically in contributing to forcing the CRM to take to the streets 
Westminster helped to destroy the non-interference convention.  
      Similarly considering the Soviet (mis)management of the NK issue 
and more specifically its overreliance on the social mechanism of 
brokerage is crucial to understanding the trajectory of the NK movement 
and the multifaceted environment that evolved parallel to and in 
interaction with the conflict. In both cases it would be more appropriate 
to view the behaviour of the competing ethnonational communities 
partly as a sign of their dissatisfaction with larger state polities (the 
British, Irish and Soviet states) which were (perceived to be) 
marginalizing them. The perception of prior injustices under Soviet rule 
has been a key factor in policies of ethnic redress in NK, policies 
seeking to ‘re-instate’ to what was perceived as the Armenian majority’s 
‘rightful’ place at the center of cultural and political life. As mentioned 
earlier (see chapter 2), the Soviet institutionalization of ethnicity within 
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the framework of federal republics and the engraving of the link between 
territory and ethnicity through its extensive policies of indigenization 
had a key impact on the struggle for the (desired) readjustment of 
borders in the late Soviet period. 
      It is worth restating briefly the key features of the political climate in 
order to bring out the main differences. The argument for structural 
opportunities for both NK and Northern Ireland follows the general 
theoretical explanations of the components of openings that are 
conducive to the emergence of organized collective action (e. g. Tarrow, 
1998; Oberschall, 1996). In relation to NK, Gorbachev’s policies led to 
more open participation in the political process by groups outside the 
communist party. The previously limiting factors shaped by policies 
dictated by Moscow and interpreted and applied by the Azeri 
nomenklatura were transforming towards a more open arena for all 
citizens. These changes also destabilized political alignments allowing 
pro-reform elites to take the dominant positions in the regime.  Those 
activists who once were beaten, jailed or silenced now found they could 
demonstrate more freely and could reach a wider public with ideas and 
demands, which formed the discursive core of the events of the late 
1980s.  
      While Northern Ireland nationalists remained largely unwilling to 
integrate themselves within the unionist state, O’Neill was the first 
unionist leader who was perceived to have liberal tendencies. The post 
Second World War introduction of the welfare state which stood directly 
in conflict with the particularism of unionism gave rise to a new 
generation of activists, who were able to benefit from novel social and, 
most importantly educational opportunities.  Having matured in that 
more universalistic socio-economic and cultural fabric some members of 
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the nationalist community were beginning to probe the foundations upon 
which unionist power was predicated in the 1960s.  
      The next section will consider how the initial agitations embraced 
what could be called a legalistic approach. Although the protesters in 
NK did not look specifically to courts, the initial phase of their struggle 
could be seen as legalistic in that they followed institutional and 
constitutional channels to advance their cause. They sought to expose 
injustice through a moderate repertoire of contention. This project, thus, 
defines a legalistic approach very broadly as one characterized by, but 
not limited to, institutional tactics, such as petitioning and lobbying state 
officials, bargaining over policy implementation and turning to courts 
for appeals.  I argue that on the one hand, a more open legal opportunity 
structure may facilitate the adoption of legalistic strategies but will not 
undermine the protest dimension, as nationalist movements pursue 
multiple courses of action. On the other hand, a closed legal opportunity 
structure (or perception thereof) narrows down the range of tactical 
options available to the incipient movement channeling its efforts 
towards a more confrontational approach. What matters in the 
formulation of contentious tactics is not so much legal opportunities per 
se but rather its contingent degree of openness/closure, its modification 
over time and the activists’ perceptions of those shifts (for an 
examination of the mismatch between objective and perceived shifts and 
threats see e. g. (Boudreau, 2005).  
                 
    Constitutional/legalistic strategies 
      As discussed in greater detail earlier65, in the mid 1980s Armenians 
understood their role to be limited to convincing Moscow about the 
justice of their cause.  Moscow was the traditional target of protest of the 
                                                 
65 See chapter 3.  
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aggrieved population in NK and Armenia in the non-violent forms of 
sending letters and petitions, the passing of quasi-legal acts and 
declarations within regional institutions of government, the publication 
of letters and articles in the regional press, meetings, demonstrations and 
strikes. Armenia’s long association and friendship with Russia 
reinforced the activists’ (initial) loyalty to the Soviet regime and the 
conviction that NK would remain a part of the Union. One of my 
interviewees recently recalled: 
  When in 1985 Gorbachev proclaimed glasnost and perestroika, 
Armenians began to write letters to the CC CPSU every day, there was 
an absolute trust in the CC CPSU. Letters were written by the sackful. 
Armenians believed that if they explained everything, those at the top 
where the wisest people were sitting, would surely resolve everything 
(author interview with Aram Sarkisyan, 14 July 2008, Yerevan).  
 
      In Northern Ireland the struggle for civil rights initially focused on 
the issue of discrimination in public housing and jobs. For example, the 
Campaign for Social Justice launched in 1964 sought to expose the 
unfair treatment of the minority under Unionist rule through the 
publication of well-researched and clearly argued pamphlets, geared to 
both Irish and British audiences, petitioning and writing letters of 
complaint to Stormont and Westminster.  In contrast to the independent 
legal recourse to federal courts in the US civil rights movement, the 
‘most obvious explanation for the failure of law and lawyers (to further 
civil rights in Northern Ireland) was the absence of any formal 
guarantees in the British and Northern Irish constitution of basic civil 
rights and the consequent lack of any tradition of civil rights litigation’ 
(Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard, 1975: 10).  In 1967 the Campaign for 
Social Justice brought a test case to challenge Stormont’s decision to 
declare Republican organizations illegal and took it to the House of 
Lords. The latter determined that ‘so broad a grant of discretion in 
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banning political organizations was lawful’ (Rose, 1976: 277). This 
failure represented the ‘final proof to the minority community that they 
could expect no aid from Britain in the struggle for what they regarded 
as their legitimate civil rights’ (Hadden and Hillyard, 1973: 13).  
      In comparison to Northern Ireland, the legal opportunity structure 
available to Armenians in the mid to late 1980s was arguably more open, 
even if only marginally. Here it is important to distinguish between 
symbolic and substantive openings within the legalistic/constitutional 
domain. While it would be erroneous to idealize symbolic rewards and 
gestures of nationalist movement recognition, they can influence activist 
strategies by widening the array of options available to pursue the 
desired goals.  In Northern Ireland a complete failure to find a way to 
redress some of the collective grievances through legalistic channels 
‘eliminated the last prospect of advance by constitutional means within 
Northern Ireland’ (Purdie, 1990: 102-3). This closure constituted a 
daunting structural constraint to achieving the changes advocated by 
CRM activists.  
       Somewhat differently, Armenians faced symbolic openings, which 
enhanced their perceptions of policy influence. For example they could 
debate and put forward their demands within the regional organs of 
power (the regional Soviet). Their request for reunification was 
approved by the regional Soviet in February and then again in June 
1988. Although this decision brought no substantive results, as it was 
later overruled by the central Soviet authorities, it was still important as 
a symbolic act of recognition of the justice of the Armenian cause. 
However, a certain degree of success in the institutional mobilization 
(even if within regional organs of power) only galvanized the activists 
and led them to pursue their demands and appeal repeatedly to higher 
levels of authority. Thus, the perception remained that channels of 
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appeal, which began as symbolic openings could develop real 
significance over time.     
      For this reason for a certain period (in early 1988) Armenians 
combined legalistic strategies (writing petitions, lobbying the 
authorities) with more direct forms of action (demonstrations). In 
Northern Ireland the switch to more direct forms of protest (marches, sit-
ins) meant a move away from purely legalistic avenues due to the 
collective perception of their futility. However, in both cases this shift 
did not entail a complete break with legalistic strategies, due to the fact 
that the actions, although innovative in those particular contexts, were 
not, strictly speaking, illegal and the continued perception of the moral 
righteousness of protest: ‘We have demanded the minimum of what we 
are rightly entitled to’ (Eddie McAteer, Nationalist MP, Belfast 
Telegraph, 18.11. 1968). 
 
      
 
State authorities, repression and discursive vs. structural 
opportunities 
      Before moving to consider in greater detail the role of state 
authorities in the two cases it is worth noting that analysis is complicated 
by the fact that the state was not a unitary actor and should be considered 
at several levels. As some recent studies have pointed out, the question 
of who represents the state in Northern Ireland is not straightforward, 
especially since sections of the nationalist community perceived the 
Northern Irish state to be an extension of the British state (Cunningham 
and Beaulieu, 2010: 186; English, 1999: 96-7). The bulk of decision-
making, as it affected the lives of ordinary citizens, was carried out at 
local level. The cohesion of the unionist alliance depended largely on the 
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semi-autonomous process of exclusion, and the localized nature of this 
process made the implementation of reforms demanded by the CRM 
difficult. The existence of two governments in London and Belfast and 
the unionist authorities’ relative autonomy creates problems over the 
scope and definition of the state itself, let alone what the interests of the 
British state might be in relation to the territory. For Northern Ireland 
when referring simply to ‘the state’ I mean both Northern Irish and 
British state and distinguish between them in specific contexts. In the 
NK case, by the term ‘state’ I mean primarily the Soviet state, since the 
republican Azeri authorities lacked the authority, as well as ideational 
and institutional capacity to act with a high degree of independence.  
.  
      As has been pointed out above, neither the CRM nor the NK activists 
faced a regime that was secure and stable in terms of support and 
legitimacy. The greater dependence of the Northern Ireland state on 
repression (even if it was applied inconsistently) was an indication of the 
precarious nature of its existence, though it was not immediately obvious 
to the minority, or indeed to the unionist establishment itself. While the 
Northern Ireland state did apply repression, albeit very inconsistently, 
one of the most striking features of the NK experience was the failure to 
employ the coercive forces available to the Soviet regime, especially 
given the fact that the resources of the movement were inferior to those 
of the government66. It is possible to argue that even with the 
liberalization of the Gorbachev era the unrest in Armenia and NK could 
have been quelled through the consistent and resolute use of force (see e. 
                                                 
66 The former President of Armenia (1998–2008), first President of the NK Republic (1994–1997) and 
one of the founder members of the NK movement for reunification Robert Kocharyan recognized the 
galvanizing impact of the absence of overt repression during the initial demonstrations. Kocharyan  
admitted that ‘if the first rally had been met with KGB repression, he would have run home, shut the 
doors and blinds, and hoped that they had not noticed him’ (cited in Derluguian, 2005: 192). 
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g. Kramer, 2003: 25; Medvedev and Chiesa, 1989: 247-8; Sakwa, 1990: 
244 for such interpretations).   
      This failure clearly contradicts the conventional wisdom of how 
political actors making decisions in a strategic manner are assumed to 
behave. One way of thinking about state reactions to social challenges is 
to argue that different types of regimes have varying repressive 
potentials (Tilly, 1978; Marks, 1989). Yet authorities within individual 
states also apply repression selectively, and this important nuance can 
hardly be measured by a regime’s general repressive propensity. I 
suggest that the ambivalent reaction of the Soviet authorities to the 
activism in NK and, to a lesser extent, the reaction of the Northern 
Ireland state to the CRM could be explained with reference to at least 
two interrelated factors. First, the authorities did not possess the 
experience of dealing with organized mass movements. Second, the 
discourse in NK and Northern Ireland focused on the priorities identified 
and/or accepted by policy-makers. 
      In relation to the first point, it could be suggested that the 
Northern Ireland state did not have a prevailing strategy for dealing with 
the type of claims originating from the CRM simply because they had 
not been made before, at least not in the same form as in the 1960s. 
When it had been confronted with labour claims, the Unionist 
government had tended to react by co-opting labour figures and agendas, 
via, for example, the Ulster Unionist Labour Association (UULA) and 
the appointment of John Andrews as Minister of Labour (Patterson and 
Kaufmann, 2007: 17-28). Both ideologically and strategically the 
Stormont regime was focused on the threat of irredentist nationalism and 
was unable to cope with demands for reform couched in the post-war 
language of social democracy.  
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      The perceived threat to the Northern Ireland state was not simply a 
product of the unionist imagination or a ‘siege mentality’: it was real. 
The nationalist community did not accept the settlement of 1921 as 
legitimate or permanent. It was reasonable for unionists to expect a 
renewed challenge in the future, and they wanted to be ready for it when 
it came. Like most regimes based on a system of hegemonic control, the 
regime in Northern Ireland was in a state of permanent latent crisis. The 
systematic exclusion of the minority and its refusal to grant legitimacy to 
the state was offset by an extraordinary level of compliance and consent 
on the part of the majority which had pragmatic economic and cultural 
reasons for supporting the unionist regime. There was a fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of society as the aims and aspirations of both 
groups appeared to be incompatible. Nevertheless it took the unique 
challenge of the CRM which exposed the internal divisions within 
unionism and the structural flaws within London-Belfast interaction. In 
this sense Stormont was not (fully) prepared for this type of challenge. 
      Very small political groups and individuals in Armenia and NK 
who had been pursuing nationalist goals during the Soviet period within 
underground structures were ordinarily persecuted and jailed.67 Given 
that independent activity outside state structures had not been feasible in 
Soviet society, the effect of such persecutions was to silence others. 
Thus, large gatherings of people discussing previously restricted issues 
represented a novel phenomenon. Such gatherings were also distinctive 
in the relationship they constructed (or perceived as possible) between 
the movement and authorities. The ‘spectacle’ aspect of initial 
demonstrations in the Armenian context, the intention of staging a 
performance has been noted (e. g. (Abrahamian, 1990; Dudwick, 1989).      
                                                 
67 See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this period. 
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      Although demonstrations themselves rarely attain the desired 
collective goal, they seek to accumulate influence, convey resolve and 
(where the polity is unresponsive) raise the costs of disregarding the 
movement (Boudreau, 1996: 181). In a similar vein, Mark Beissinger 
remarks how the growing political space that had been made available to 
contest the state also showed the regime’s vulnerability to the mass 
demonstration as a particular form of political action and contestation 
(Beissinger, 1996: 113). The following quote touches upon the unusual 
nature of this type of activism: ‘It was a unique situation and the 
authorities were at a loss how to react… The first slogans of the rally 
participants were ‘The Party, Lenin, Gorbachev.’ (author interview with 
Jasmin Gevondyan, 14 July 2008, Yerevan).  
      In relation to the second element mentioned above, the specific 
legitimating discourse of the NK movement focused on the themes of 
glasnost’ and perestroika, which was arguably one of the reasons for the 
center’s inability to show a consistent reaction and the absence of 
repression during demonstrations. In this sense the Soviet-initiated 
transformation was an important element of the discursive opportunity 
structure, similar to the ways in which the language of social democracy 
helped legitimize the demands of the Northern Ireland CRM. The 
structural aspect of opportunities in both regions has been amply 
described and frequently over-emphasized68 but the extent to which such 
opportunities were (re) created, perceived and used in discourse is 
somewhat neglected. My analysis suggests that these dimensions may be 
more central than is recognized in the empirical literature. In both cases 
the discursive opportunity structure allowed to gradually broaden and 
eventually breach previous parameters of acceptable discussion. 
Discursive opportunity structures provide sets of meanings that are 
                                                 
68 See chapters 3 and 5 for a more detailed discussion of this dimension. 
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challenged or accommodated by political actors. They inform the 
‘legitimate forms of political organization, but also the means by 
which…actors can pursue their goals’ (Jenne, 2007: 11; Adamson, 2005: 
554-5).  
       The argument is not meant to deny or undermine the fact that along 
with the perception and discursive use of new opportunities, there must 
be objective openings as well. In relation to the NK protests, Armenians 
– like the rest of the Soviet Union – believed and hoped that the time had 
come for fundamental changes. Their activism was closely related to the 
ills of authoritarianism being exposed: 
  …when the movement began we honestly felt that if we could just 
make the truth of our claims to NK known, those in power would react 
correctly… We knew everything was propaganda but we believed that 
Gorbachev would really change things (author interview with Sarasar 
Saryan, 23 July 2008, Stepanakert). 
 
At the same time political entrepreneurs draw on specific ideas and 
concepts to (re)frame and publicize particular issues to a domestic and 
international public linking localized events and concerns to broader 
frameworks of meaning. Non-state actors present their goals in terms of 
an accepted discourse to gain what Shain refers to as ‘archetypes of 
legitimacy’ (Shain, 1989: 127-8). On such occasions protests that are 
ethnonationally rooted operate partly within (yet in tension with) 
official, prescribed politics, while their success and resonance depends 
on an affirmation – sometimes sincere, sometimes strategic – of existing 
channels of inclusion. This ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien, 1996: 3) is 
difficult to dismiss or oppose, as it is based on claims legitimated by 
official ideologies and the regime’s own policies.  
      It is important to note that Armenian intellectuals presented their 
demands as the inevitable outcome of Armenian struggle against 
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oppression and aggression and simultaneously attempted to demonstrate 
the congruence between Armenia’s and Moscow’s aims – those of 
perestroika and reform – to elicit the center’s support. Drawing on the 
terminology and ideological precepts of Marxism-Leninism, as well as 
perestroika meant that the Soviet authorities felt unable to take any 
harsh, let alone repressive, measures because the issue was presented as 
a clear cut, ideal test case for system transformation. In this context 
outlawing the demonstrations, questioning their legality or the 
possibility of political accommodation in any decisive manner would 
have been widely perceived, by both domestic and international 
audiences, as undermining reforms. Not only were mass gatherings 
under the banner of perestroika one of the few structurally ‘permissible’ 
strategies, they were also chosen tactically through a contextually 
specific reading of how (symbolic) power against the regime could best 
be accumulated. As one of the participants has recently attested: 
  When police attempted to surround the demonstrators and was at 
the point of breaking them up, one of the demonstration participants put 
out a giant portrait of Gorbachev. We started to chant: “Gorbachev – 
perestroika – NK.” This brought the police to a stop as they did not 
know what to do… The ideological conception of the rally participants, 
the fact that they were for perestroika, immediately broke the 
authorities’ resolve. They did not know how to react and what to do 
(author interview with Manvel Sarkisyan, 31 July 2008, Yerevan). 
 
      As mentioned above, one of the options available to the Soviet 
authorities and persistently put forward by some Azeri activists later was 
the use of repression to avoid violent escalation. Until the end of 1988, 
perhaps, the central authorities would still have been able to resort to 
brute force on a large scale. However, on the one hand, the discourse of 
perestroika gave no ground to apply repression.   On the other hand, the 
failure to use force in a state which was still perceived to be highly 
centralized and authoritarian was taken by Azeris as a sign of 
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unconditional Soviet support of Armenian national goals, thus 
substantially contributing to the hesitant position of the Soviet regime. 
      In Northern Ireland the discourse of social democracy was arguably 
used in a much less calculated manner than in Armenia and NK. 
However, it is important to recognize that the structural changes 
occurring in Britain, to a certain extent in  Northern Ireland and other 
European societies in the post Second World War era were taking place 
against ideational and discursive shifts, as the universalistic principles of 
social democracy began to filter into public discourse. The reluctant 
acceptance of these principles under the Brooke government, at least in 
the economic and welfare spheres presented Stormont with serious 
challenges it could not meet. As the UK Representative in Northern 
Ireland (1969–70) notes, ‘It has been the existence of British-style 
democracy based on universal adult franchise which has guaranteed and 
perpetuated a most un-British style injustice towards the Catholic 
minority’ (Oliver Wright, PRO/DEFE/13/1397, 06.03.1970).  
      It was the establishment of the welfare state in post Second World 
War Britain that (re)created a socio-cultural framework through which 
traditional grievances could be mediated, as well as offering the 
possibility of articulating personal and collective perceptions of being 
treated as inferior citizens.   By accommodating, however reluctantly, 
state intervention and the tenets of welfare reform, together with the 
implementation of welfare legislation the Unionist government had 
given the minority a crucial political, ideological and discursive opening 
through exposing ideological contradictions between the practices of the 
local authorities and social-democratic ideals. Material and structural 
changes in education, healthcare and social security, which set the 
foundations for a modern post-war welfare state in Northern Ireland 
were matched by the gradual acceptance of the social-democratic 
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culture. A new political discourse of rights, equality, democracy and 
reform was coming to the surface alongside nationalism, which had been 
dominant in the Irish context. In the context of emerging global revolt, 
political class struggle and rights-based activism a new generation was 
beginning to rethink its status and role in society by applying the rhetoric 
of equality and social justice to its own circumstances. 
      Within 1960s Northern Ireland, most of the ambitious goals and 
projects of O’Neillism were never fully realized, although the rapid 
contestation of the proposed reforms and the conflictual exchanges 
between the government and the multiplicity of actors was central to the 
dynamics of this period. However, the public articulation of such plans 
and the attempt at the construction of policies and value systems had a 
profound effect (on this point see also Mitchell, 2010). Debates 
regarding issues of distribution between the nationalist and unionist 
communities which may have otherwise remained hidden in the daily 
functioning of internal administration were highlighted and brought onto 
the public arena.  It was the anticipation and heightened expectations 
associated with these changes even if they were not brought to fruition to 
which many participants – including civil rights activists and Paisleyites 
– reacted. The recognition and internalization of this new ideational 
environment by the challengers is partly evidenced by the fact that the 
protests were not intended to undercut the intended values and norms of 
O’Neill’s programme itself, but rather their mode of implementation and 
the inequalities that might be generated in the process. In appealing to 
the British authorities and claiming ‘British rights for British citizens’ 
CRM activists attempted to assert the importance of the international 
border around the United Kingdom: ‘The prime focus of the campaign 
was always Westminster’s responsibility for good government in 
Northern Ireland’ (Socialist Voice, 2008:1). Representing the UK as the 
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most appropriate framework for political contestation afforded them a 
measure of leverage on local developments and helped to emphasize a 
territorial and symbolic context within which unionist power was 
fundamentally diminished (O’Dochartaigh and Bosi, 2010: 418). 
 
                            
 
      British and Soviet ‘conflict management’ 
      In relation to the role of ‘external’ (British and Soviet actors), in both 
cases the practice of governing the territories appeared to be a recurrent 
source of problems for the respective ruling classes. Both the British and 
Soviet states have consistently sought to contain demands for Irish and 
Armenian self-determination respectively within terms acceptable to the 
constitutional status-quo. For the purposes of this discussion two points 
are worth noting. First, the ambiguity of both states’ positions 
significantly contributed to the radicalization and persistence of 
instability in NK and Northern Ireland, in effect belying genuine 
attempts to reach some form of political accommodation. It could be 
argued that the inconsistency was based on operating policies of 
distancing from the conflicts, as well as crisis management. The short-
term strategies attempted to discover ways to rapidly manage the crises 
and return to positions of distance.  Each measure was a reactive 
response to specific predicaments. The existing structures proved 
incapable of mediating and resolving conflicts due to the absence of 
adequate channels and the refusal of the respective (external) states to 
use their positions as the superior constitutional and political actors to 
intervene. Second, the states’ capacities to implement real 
transformation were constrained. They did not have a clear policy but at 
the same time, although a range of potential options existed, it was 
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extremely difficult to find one that could effectively improve the 
situation. 
      On the one hand, the agency of political leaders should be 
acknowledged and their failures and weaknesses given a substantial role. 
For example there is little doubt that Gorbachev’s personal weaknesses 
played a role in the ultimately unresolved state of the conflict: 
  Gorbachev…was a very weak leader. In Soviet times, the personnel 
management system was constructed in such a way that allowed for 
commonplace individuals, who were conformists, to climb the ladder to 
the very top. Gorbachev’s career is a vivid example of that. He tried to 
be pleasant to everyone …and he was always hesitant, constantly 
maneuvering, he lacked the inward fortitude… He had no independent 
vision of his own of what was really necessary to accomplish.   (author 
interview with Rasim Musabaev, 10 January 2009, Baku).   
 
A KGB member responsible for nationalist issues offers a similarly 
agency-centered explanation for the paucity of Soviet policy and the fact 
that the authorities had not anticipated nor prepared for the possibility 
that the situation in NK might implode. His recollection is illustrative of 
the authorities’ lack of experience of dealing with similar situations and 
lack of any deep understanding of local specificity: 
  I do not think any members of the ruling elite were seriously 
interested in the Caucasus…Both the Supreme Soviet and the Politburo 
knew that the conflict was smouldering… But no measures were taken 
until the first open demonstrations started…When people took to the 
streets of Stepanakert [capital of NK] with placards and red flags the 
Politburo decided to act as it knew best: if there is a problem, one should 
send people. It doesn’t matter who, the point is to send 
someone…Razumovsky [Secretary of the CCCP] and the culture 
minister Petr Demchev were sent to NK for some reason…They had no 
idea how to talk to the demonstrators…We saw that they were very 
afraid… Razumovsky attempted to persuade the demonstrators to stop 
but the crowd refused…He left very rapidly…A complete inability to 
communicate with the protesters showed how far Politburo members 
were from the problems that the country was facing’ (Lutsenko, in Trud, 
01. 02. 2001). 
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      It can be suggested that British policy-makers similarly failed to 
capitalize on the chances available to bring about changes in Britain’s 
Irish policies and that opportunities for transforming policies were 
ignored in favour of a reproduction of a more familiar trajectory. Despite 
the claims of many unionists that Northern Ireland was a natural part of 
the United Kingdom, British policy-makers formed and altered their 
own policies in an environment specific to Northern Ireland.  Different 
social, economic and political policies in areas such as defense, policing, 
security, education, welfare and justice were applied in Northern Ireland 
than in the rest of the United Kingdom. This distinctiveness contributed 
to a belief that Northern Ireland was a 'place apart' from the rest of 
Britain, while the British government continually attempted to 
(re)establish a mode of governance that left it in control with the least 
amount of direct involvement: ‘our policy is founded upon the belief that 
we shall get the best solution if Northern Ireland can handle its own 
problems’ (PRO, CAB/129/141 C (69) 45, 05.05. 1969). 
      Northern Ireland is often thought of as a ‘place apart’ from the 
mainstream framework of British governance, both psychologically and 
in political terms. 
Thus, it is arguable that before the late 1960s the authorities had 
deliberately insulated themselves from the province. At the same time 
once the process of distancing between the internal parties was set in 
motion, some signs of lock-in were brought to the surface69.  In that 
context, almost any move was perceived by the actors on the ground as a 
proof of marginalization, exclusion and/or domination, all of which 
produced further alienation and hostility. 
                                                 
69 See the introduction for an explanation of this concept. 
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      Political scientists have increasingly recognized how ‘what has 
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of 
a sequence of events at a later point in time’ (Sewell, 1996a: 262-3). To 
put it differently, decisions taken in the past may limit the range of 
available options at subsequent points and in this way encourage the 
retention of original choices. Persistent patterns in political and social 
life can be ‘…difficult to reverse’ (Pierson, 2004: 21).  For example in 
early 1989 (when the conflict became already relatively entrenched) 
direct rule was effectively introduced in NK for a short period (see 
Appendix 1).  During this time a neutral representative from Moscow 
was making genuine attempts to bring about some sort of peaceful 
compromise through gradual restructuring, predominantly in the 
economic, but also in the political sphere. However, he was perceived by 
each side as biased in favour of its opponent, which effectively deprived 
him of the power to substantially change developments on the ground70. 
A political activist and one of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet 
commented at the time on the tension between the weakness and 
incompetence of political elites and the downstream, snowballing effect 
of certain events and policies, which made the situation highly resistant 
to change:  
  It is difficult to explain the lack of action both locally and at the 
center… The expectation that the crisis will be settled automatically 
once the parties have grown wary of arguing led to the fact that 
momentum was lost… The situation in the Caucasus throughout the first 
half of 1988 was escalating very rapidly, and with every passing month 
it was becoming increasingly difficult to find and put into practice a just 
solution…The room for manoeuvre was limited (Sheynis, 1988, cited in 
Zolyan and Mirzoyan, 1991: 54, emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
70 See e.g. (Sarkysian, 2009: 19; Mirzoyan, 2006: 72-5; Aliev, 16.12.1999) for testimonies of how 
direct rule was seen by both Armenians and Azeris as solidifying and promoting the interests and 
‘hidden agendas’ of the other side. 
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      There is a substantial strand within the comparative conflict 
literature, which offers state centered accounts of (ethnonational and 
civil war) violence. For example D. Laitin argues: ‘Immunity from civil 
violence comes with building states with the power and incentive to 
enforce the rule of law. Weak, incompetent states… are dangerous’ 
(Laitin, 2007: 22). It is well established that the relationship between the 
likelihood of violence and regime type can be frequently described as an 
‘inverted U’: authoritarian and democratic regimes are unlikely to 
experience conflict, while semi-democratic regimes are much more 
conflict-prone, particularly, but not exclusively, if combined with regime 
change (e. g. Hegre et al., 2001). While weak states may be more 
susceptible to violent conflict than strong ones, Tarrow argues that ‘…if 
taken as a guide to action, the concept of state strength is somewhat 
wooden and lacks agency’ (Tarrow, 1998: 82). In addition, state 
strength/weakness is often a long-term, enduring condition, while 
violence typically erupts sporadically and at specific points in time 
(Lawrence and Chenoweth, 2010: 8). State strength, thus, intersects with 
the prevailing strategy of the state in dealing with contentious claims 
(see e. g. Kohli, 1997: 329-30).  
      Scholars have pointed out the significance of variation among states 
in terms of their ability to successfully penetrate and coordinate their 
domestic societies and the extent to which their policies embody 
consensus, legitimacy, effectiveness and stability (Huntington, 1968: 1; 
Mann, 1993; Ayubi, 1995). A state that exercises effective central power 
must create and maintain an internal consensus – within both the center 
and periphery – about the desirability of its role. Without such a 
consensus the center will be prevented from acting in a resolute manner 
when faced with peripheral actors’ attempts to change the status-quo. In 
a recent study of the radicalization of ethnic minorities’ behaviour in 
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Eastern Europe E. Jenne presents a rational choice centered model 
formalizing the interaction between minority representatives, their host 
government, central authority and an external lobby actor. She suggests 
that any decision on the part of the aggrieved group to mobilize against 
the state is driven by ‘perceptions of increased power vis-a vis the 
center’ (Jenne, 2007: 41). According to this perspective, the salience of 
ethnic issues in society and the perception of increased bargaining power 
is greatly enhanced by positive signals from the host and/or central 
governments71. 
      The sequences of contention encourage alterations between non-
violent forms of collective action in the pursuit of goals that are not 
exclusively nationalist and violent tactics in the pursuit of fundamental 
political and social transformation with strongly nationalist objectives. 
Such sequences are particularly likely in societies where states lack 
either the ability or the will (or both) to fully incorporate ethnonational 
groups into the polity. Thus, a state that rules a deeply divided society 
faces difficult strategic choices when confronted with a challenger 
movement’s demands for economic redistribution, cultural and political 
recognition. First, lacking an ideological base in society that would 
guarantee its legitimacy and the capacity to penetrate society effectively 
means that it frequently resorts to coercion, which limits room for 
maneuver (Ayubi, 1995: 3).    Second, receptivity to the challengers’ 
cause is widely perceived to be detrimental to the interests, prestige and 
sovereignty of the dominant ethnic group.  
      Those viewing reform-oriented protest movements and inclusive 
state responses to protests as having negative implications for their 
survival, authority and recognition are most likely to respond with 
                                                 
71 In addition to the absence of repression one of the positive signals for NK activists was the fact that 
the issue was being discussed in Moscow.  
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violent opposition (Beissinger, 1998; Tilly, 2002). Movement opponents 
attempt to pressurize states to shift their strategies away from inclusion 
towards reliance on exclusion. A state relying upon inclusion therefore 
runs the risk of losing its (frequently already weak) legitimacy in the 
eyes of the dominant ethnic group. State institutions seek to promote this 
hardening of boundaries among potential challengers by ‘turning 
boundaries into unquestioned features of…public life’ (Lustick, 1993: 
44). Shifts in authority within the state trigger changes in protest activity 
from demands within the framework of the system to those directly 
challenging the parameters of the official regime and ultimately the (re) 
emergence of discussions of boundary transformations in the public 
domain. 
      Scholars have argued that the actions of state elites can be bound by 
the need to preserve confidence and legitimacy with multiple audiences 
who have divergent interests, expectations and perceptions (Block, 1977; 
Skrenthy, 1996). Legitimacy processes are further complicated by the 
reality that the state itself operates at several levels. Thus, the 
complicated empirical reality of state response to challenge is one where 
multiple actors matter. In addition, as relationships are established, the 
control of protest is not necessarily launched in a swiftly coercive linear 
fashion.   
      In looking at state elites’ attitudes towards Northern Ireland and NK, 
as well as the (lack of) elite control it is important to remember that, 
despite the existence of particular patterns of behaviour structuring the 
decision-making processes, one single and universally accepted theme of 
policy development is difficult to specify. First, various levels and types 
of influence can be identified, including:  
1) Domestic opinion; 
2) The prevailing economic conditions; 
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3) The changing political environment; 
4) The character and private or public affiliations of 
individuals/agencies directly involved in the governance of the 
territories; 
5) The costs and potential benefits of involvement: ‘We have a 
severe economic burden in Northern Ireland, but any help that the 
Westminster Government has given to the region will not gain the 
British Labour Party a single vote, because the Unionist Party takes all 
the credit for anything the Government have done’ (HC Debates, vol. 
751, 25.10. 1967, cc1668). 
6) Perceptions of the consequences of certain courses of action. 
 
      Second, it could be argued that what mattered in relation to Northern 
Ireland was not just how British politicians and officials formulated and 
administered policies but also the extent to which the structure of British 
policy-making constrained (or facilitated) certain policies. The absence 
of a sustained general strategy could at least partly be attributed to the 
fact that responsibility for Northern Ireland ‘was divided between the 
Home Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Office and, 
sporadically, the Cabinet Office’ (Arthur, 2000: 26). The existence of 
these multiple centers does not allow for an analysis of a unified 
Westminster-based decision-making process. In fact it is frequently quite 
difficult to determine how relevant an actor is to a particular event, 
decision or process. In relation to NK the decision-making was arguably 
more centralized largely because of the more hierarchical structure of 
authority in the Soviet Union. But the influence of different categories of 
actors (including external audiences) is still relevant. 
      The belief in the possibility of the reform of Northern Ireland 
sustained the pressure placed upon Stormont by the British Labour 
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government headed by Wilson and other organizations, which 
emphasised their desire to apply ‘British’ standards to social and 
political issues in Northern Ireland: ‘We should press for an acceleration 
of local government…reforms to bring the system closer to that in Great 
Britain’ (PRO, CAB/129/139 C (68)119, 25.10. 1968). The political 
environment provided a new focus for opposition to British policy in 
Northern Ireland, one that focused on the importance of human rights. 
The Wilson government itself consistently faced criticism from 
backbench MPs on Northern Irish policies. Such arguments concluded 
that the actions of the Northern Ireland government were (albeit partly) 
the responsibility of the British electorate. Complete inaction threatened 
not only a possible revolt by Labour backbenchers at Westminster but 
also a potential backlash at the polls, as nationalist minority demands 
resonated widely with British public opinion: ‘Public opinion in Great 
Britain demands standards in Northern Ireland equal to those of the rest 
of the United Kingdom’ (PRO, CAB/129/141 C (69) 45, 05.05.1969). In 
this sense CRM activists had succeeded in using British government 
dependence on public opinion to exploit Stormont’s (primarily financial) 
reliance upon the British government. Labour’s links, however weak 
they might have been, with the Northern Ireland Labour Party meant that 
the fraternal connection British Labour had to Northern Ireland provided 
it with an extremely critical view of the unionist administration. Thus, an 
anti-unionist analysis of the Northern Ireland situation was quite 
influential on the Labour side. 
      At the same time the scope of potential intervention was restricted 
by the need not to undermine the confidence of unionists, for whom 
stability and security were the very product of ‘Britishness’. The British 
authorities showed a disposition to accepting the unionist veto on all 
policy changes that significantly threatened the status-quo in the 
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province. For example in 1968 Wilson argued against greater 
intervention by suggesting that MPs should not ‘underrate what has been 
done’ in Northern Ireland (HC Debates, vol. 765, 21.05.1968, cc.288). 
The aspirations of Irish nationalists have been consistently subordinated 
to the cooperation of Ulster unionists or the continuation of 
bipartisanship. Somewhat similarly, Moscow’s errors and 
inconsistencies could be partly explained by the willingness to maintain 
the perception of the desirability and appropriateness of its actions 
among several key audiences.  The need to minimize the risk of 
becoming alien and incomprehensible to the Armenian audience was 
largely driving limited Soviet attempts to address Armenian concerns. At 
the same time the fear that the loss of control over NK would make 
Azerbaijan more susceptible to pan-Turkic ideas and to Shi’ite 
fundamentalism emanating from Iran could be argued to have 
contributed to the refusal of the authorities to consider making a 
centralized decision to take the territory away from Azerbaijan 
(Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 350)72.  
      It could be suggested that actors persisted with policies adopted 
earlier to maintain credibility and present continuity of purpose. The 
cumulative effect of such choices was to influence the shape of later 
political developments by further politicizing identities and allowing the 
parties to pursue oppositional agendas dedicated to achieving maximal 
goals.  The emphasis on the need to maintain credibility with different 
actors is not meant to suggest that the British and Soviet states or at least 
sections within the establishment completely failed to appreciate the 
difficulty of the situation on the ground, even though participants 
                                                 
72 An analysis of official statements and memoirs of Gorbachev’s advisors reveals that the fear of a 
potential spillover effect of boundary alterations also had a strong impact on state behaviour. In a 
‘domino scenario’ other aggrieved groups could use such border changes to raise public awareness, 
further their agendas, exert pressure on the authorities and reorder national priorities to pursue similar 
results. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
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questioned why the state would ever diverge from alignment with them, 
when ideological goals were perceived to be shared. This divergence 
significantly contributed to the actors’ understandings of the tendency to 
ignore the underlying concerns of the population: 
  When in 1991 I met Primakov [a leading member of the Politburo] 
and had a 2.5-hour conversation with him, I asked him: ‘How did you 
allow the NK conflict to grow to such an extent that it effectively caused 
a chain reaction?’ Primakov told me: ‘There, at the heights of power, 
that NK seemed to us just a small dot, who paid any attention to it? 
(author interview with an official, 14 July 2008, Yerevan). 
 
The British government’s attitude and perception of the Northern Ireland 
situation appears to reveal a similar pattern:  
  The whole point of the partition of Ireland was to make the problem 
go away. There was one guy somewhere in the attic who kept a 
benevolent eye on Northern Ireland…They thought they had washed 
their hands of Northern Ireland and solved it (Oliver Wright, BBC 
Northern Ireland documentary ‘We shall overcome’, 5 October 2008).  
 
Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, a senior Stormont official in the 1960s 
emphasizes how ‘the Wilson Cabinet also demonstrated at that time the 
lack of real knowledge and ‘feel’ for Northern Ireland which arose from 
decades of detachment’ (Bloomfield, 2007: 20).  
      Until 1968 Northern Ireland remained low on the agenda of senior 
officials, the Home Office did not have any officials working 
exclusively on Northern Ireland or stationed there, and relied heavily on 
the Northern Ireland Civil Service and Labour MPs sympathetic to the 
CRM for information and advice. Defense Secretary Denis Healey spoke 
of ‘lamentably poor communications between Whitehall and 
Stormont…resulting from generations of inexcusable neglect’ (Healey, 
1989: 343). Only one member of Wilson’s Cabinet had visited Northern 
Ireland spending one afternoon there (Times Insight, 1972: 81). Most of 
the interaction between the officials of the two governments concerned 
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primarily the size of the national subsidy towards public spending in the 
province (Bew et. al., 2002: 152-4). This isolation from Northern Irish 
affairs was underpinned by a doctrine, which conceptualized the Home 
Office’s role as representing Stormont’s interests in Britain rather than 
monitoring its activities. A permanent Secretary of the Home Office had 
emphasized its functions ‘to act as the official channel of communication 
between the governments of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, 
to ensure that Northern Ireland’s constitutional rights are not infringed’ 
(Newsam, 1955: 168). 
      As mentioned above, the minimalist and largely inadequate 
responses of the authorities do not imply that they had no understanding 
at all of the nature of power, as well the problems and relations of 
domination/subordination in the respective communities. James 
Callaghan recognized the ‘illogical situation where…the Northern 
Ireland government was seeking to delay the introduction of reforms’ 
(PRO, CAB 164/ 1334/1, 06. 11. 1968).  Some of his statements at the 
time also touch upon how mutual fears rooted in specific local economic 
and historical circumstances contributed to the construction of conflict 
rather than cooperation as the pivotal axis for the (re) formation of 
collective identities:  
…the fears of Protestants are very real and genuine. They are as real 
and genuine as the fears of the Catholics… and their sense of injustice. 
These things must be understood and, I believe, are understood 
increasingly in this country (HC Debates, 13.10.1969, vol. 788, cc62).   
 
Gorbachev acknowledged that ‘the problem of NK exists… It has 
become more critical, since the former Azeri authorities had not always 
treated the population in the spirit of Leninist traditions’ (Pravda, 12. 12. 
1988). ‘…the time has now come to concentrate on solving concrete 
economic problems’ (Bakinskiy Rabochiy, 17. 02. 1988). 
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      On another level, opposition from within the regime also contributed 
to influencing the assumptions and options on which the political 
establishment was structured. To many unionists the Northern Irish 
authorities seemed unresponsive to the social and economic challenges 
they faced. The Party’s alliance with the Conservatives at Westminster 
combined with the domination of the higher ranks of the party by the 
landed and business classes, further strained intra-unionist relations. The 
competing demands of the CRM, the British government and the 
Unionist right wing (inside and out of the party) placed the Stormont 
regime in a restricted and unenviable position. The difficulty of selling a 
reform agenda to the grassroots of unionism highlighted just how far 
beyond the Paisleyite fringe the tentative liberalism of O’Neill was being 
rejected. Just as hard-line unionist ministers used the threat of loyalist 
countermobilization to press for repression of civil rights 
demonstrations, moderate ministers favouring reform used the threats of 
the imposition of financial sanctions by the British authorities and 
Westminster intervention to counteract the opposition. O’Neill and other 
ministers noted that Westminster could implement the changes 
unilaterally weakening the position of the devolved government 
(PRONI, CAB/ 4/ 1409, 23. 10. 1968).  During a meeting in late October 
1968 O’Neill told a unionist audience that ‘people in Northern Ireland 
did not realise how utterly dependant they are on the huge sums of 
money from the UK government in order to enable them to balance their 
budget’ (Derry Journal, 28. 10. 1968: 8).  
      In the NK case the resistance to reform from within the region was 
much less pronounced. Nevertheless it is possible to argue that the fact 
that old Armenian and Azeri communist elites felt threatened by 
Gorbachev’s liberalisation policies and saw in the nationalist movements 
an opportunity to regain political legitimacy may have further enhanced 
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the potential for conflict. One of the hard-liner Politburo members, Egor 
Ligachev, recognizes in his memoirs that by as early as 1988 some 
members of the Communist elite were already attempting to hold back 
the trends set in motion by Gorbachev (Ligachev, 1999: 111). Internally, 
the leadership (the central ruling authority) was divided over the scope, 
depth and pace of reforms. The divide was between the reform-minded 
and the conservatives within the Communist Party (Suny, 1998: 454, 
Gorbachev, 1996). What neither of the camps was able to grasp was the 
extent of the structural weakness of the USSR. Gorbachev and his 
supporters themselves appeared to lack confidence about where the new 
reforms were leading. 
      The ‘old’ Armenian and Azeri elites (nomenklatura) were still very 
slow to use the ‘nationalism tool’ to stay in power and oppose the 
reforms initiated from the top of the Soviet state. The challenge of 
solving the escalating crisis within the state, while simultaneously 
addressing the demands of the challenger movement was arguably 
greater for Stormont than for the Soviet regime. Nevertheless both cases 
demonstrate that the issue of what course of action state authorities take 
is relative, better defined by the relevance of different audiences to 
political elites more than by particular rational interests. The state-
challenger-countermovement relationship may therefore fluctuate 
according to a state structure where the actors seek to operate according 
to the varying rules of legitimacy.  
 
           Generational conflict and intra-movement dynamics 
      In the beginning of this chapter I suggested that one of the benefits 
of understanding ethnic conflict as a process is bringing in the time 
dimension, as well as helping to tackle two interrelated questions: 
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First, why is it that ordinary activists lend their support to specific modes 
of contestation at particular points in time? Second, what accounts for 
the shift from (relatively) sporadic short-term forms of contention to 
sustained, more wide-scope and long-term forms? 
If the ethnic group is not a unitary actor and if a range of (violent/non-
violent) strategies are potentially available, some factors that are 
significant for the escalation and expansion of rebellion may be less 
crucial for the decision to initiate ethnically centered collective action. 
      The collective identity of activists varies depending on the point at 
which they enter and their experience, ‘new actors joining an expanding 
movement bring with them particular sensibilities which become 
concrete in a specific set of objectives’ (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 
234). How does the political process become affected by the dynamics 
within a movement that is comprised of various actors with different, 
often conflicting ideologies, agendas and favoured modes of contention? 
It is possible to argue that the motivations and ultimate goals of those 
who joined later differed markedly from those of the ‘first actors’.  
      Many scholars have emphasized the wide diversity of elite interests 
within each ethnic bloc and the resulting intense intragroup competition 
as one of the key paths to ethnonational radicalization (Rabushka and 
Sheplse, 1972; Horowitz, 2000: 349-60). According to Donald 
Horowitz’s model of intraethnic party rivalry, ethnic ‘outbidding’ directs 
faction leaders away from moderation and political compromise. 
Outbidding prevails when elites have political and ideological space to 
shift within an ethnonational bloc (Horowitz, 2000: 359). I suggest that 
the situation in both NK and Northern Ireland does not correspond 
directly to the conventional model of ethnic outbidding but some useful 
insights can be gained from this literature about the process of factional 
competition that is evident here. The conventional ethnic ‘outbidding’ 
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model predicts that both of the (two or more) ethnic parties coexisting 
within the same political and ideological space will be pulled away from 
the center ground and compete to promote increasingly extreme 
nationalist positions to sustain their support within the constituency. The 
‘old’ elites in Northern Ireland and NK did not end up adopting a harder 
political line, they retreated after being presented as ‘out of touch’ with 
the changing reality and betraying their group’s cause. 
      Within a short period of time the NK protests, gaining overwhelming 
grassroots support expanded the goals of the movement to include 
liberalization in all areas of life, turning the resolution of the NK issue 
into a requirement of democratization at large.  Also evident at the later 
stages of the conflicts was an increasing alienation of the respective 
communities from a state perceived as undemocratic and hostile towards 
their national identity. In Northern Ireland gradually very little space 
was left for the emergence of a shared definition of reality on civil rights 
and social justice themes. In NK a rising political elite started to contest 
national narratives as written by Soviet ideology and exercised by the 
Communist Party. The direction of the debate around NK was redefined 
in predominantly political terms, as an aspiration to independence rather 
than purely a legacy of Soviet nationality policies. At that point the NK 
issue became only one aspect of a broader struggle between Moscow, 
NK, Armenia and Azerbaijan. First circumscribed to the redress of a 
historical injustice, the meaning of the claim widened to sovereignty and 
democratization channeled through the appropriation of the notion of 
self-determination. At the initial stage (1987- mid 1988) there were no 
Armenian demands for sovereignty. The emergence of a new leadership 
meant a transition and the creation of a new structure – the Armenian 
Pan-national Movement (ANM).  
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      The aspiration to achieve a wider set of political goals became 
dominant. Democratization and independence in Armenia itself were 
seen by that new cohort as necessary to produce positive results on the 
NK question. A new political elite born in contestation with the center 
built its legitimacy on a nationwide project of which NK was the key 
component. Shortly after March 1988 when the Soviet government made 
the decision to allocate funds to NK designed to facilitate socio-
economic development and some cultural links with Armenia, the public 
leaders of the movement started to change. The old intelligentsia 
(Kaputikian, Balaian) retreated. The younger cohort of intelligentsia 
appeared more daring, vocal towards the center and succeeded in raising 
the NK issue up to a political (rather than purely nationalist) level.  
      In nationalist movements different generations experience political 
openings in divergent ways (Johnston and Aarelaid-Tart, 2000; Pilcher, 
1994; Whittier, 1994). In both NK and Northern Ireland cases there are 
quite clear patterns of generational, as well as inter-elite participation 
and interaction. The bifurcation of the movements into (at least) two 
distinct groups can hardly be accounted for without reference to their 
generational divisions. As a key activist of the ‘old cohort’ recalls: 
  With the creation of the ANM, an absolute transformation of the 
NK movement took place. Among the tasks of the ANM adopted at the 
rally in August 1988, the reunification of NK and Armenia and the NK 
movement as such are absent. The focus was upon the liberalization of 
the economy, economic sovereignty and future independence. I believe 
that the ANM completely usurped the NK movement from August 1988, 
as it grew from a national-liberation movement into a liberal-democratic 
one (author interview with Larissa Alaverdyan, 18 July 2008, Yerevan). 
 
A key supporter of the ‘new line’ reflects on the internal contrasts 
and interactions influencing conflict behaviour: 
 
                                                                                         309
  In what did the position of Igor Muradyan differ from that of Levon 
Ter-Petrosyan? Both said that the NK people had the right to self-
determination. But Muradyan admitted self-determination in the 
framework of the Soviet Union. Ter-Petrosyan held that we had to self-
determine ourselves through democracy, that is to say, democratization 
in Armenia and NK had to go in parallel to the NK movement. The ideas 
of independence and democratization were already being put forward. 
We contended that self-determination was impossible in the framework 
of the authoritarian system, as it did not count with anyone’s opinion. 
How can we know what the authoritarian system will decide, to whom it 
will give the territories. Ter-Petrosyan says:  ‘It is Armenians that live in 
NK. They have self-determined themselves. They have the right to live 
as they want.’ There is much less focus on the idea that the land is ours 
(author interview with Stepan Grigoryan, 28 July 2008, Yerevan). 
 
      In line with the anti-Soviet stance, they argued that Armenia’s 
overreliance on dominant powers over the centuries resulted in a 
psychological barrier of the ‘dependence on a third force’. This hurdle 
makes the nation handicapped and hinders the achievement of 
Armenia’s independence. The younger leadership attacked members of 
the (old) intellegensia, who have continuously supported Armenia’s 
reliance on Russia as a buffer against the Pan-Turkic threat.   Silva 
Kaputikian expressed a view shared among the old elite when she wrote 
that ‘Russia remains our only salvation’ (Urmala, 29.06.1988). By 
contrast, the ideological construction of the ANM’s line centered around 
at least two consistent elements. First, Armenia needs to move away 
from reliance on external actors (Turks at the beginning of the 20th 
century, Russians at the end) and be self-reliant to enhance its security. 
Second, the expression of a community’s subjective collective 
motivations (rooted in history, beliefs, identification with particular 
ethno-territorial frameworks) should not be allowed to prevent the 
people from reaching pragmatic solutions on political issues.  
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      The arrival of Ter-Petrosyan to the NK committee in mid 1988 was 
instrumental in reviewing its strategy and expanding the movement’s 
ambitions. In the period from January-February 1988 when the main 
public figures are Kapoutikyan and Balayan to mid 1988 the vocabulary 
shifted from that of a purely nationalist cause based on historical 
grievances, vulnerability and an exclusive historical right to the land  to 
democratization and subsequently self-determination. The ANM made it 
clear that it would privilege democracy over nationalism, although these 
two concepts should be interrelated in practice, and that nationalism 
without democracy was perceived as dangerous and inefficient. In 
particular, it was argued that ethnonational ideology should be rejected 
as an obstacle to working towards the creation of a strong, secure and 
self-governing democratic state (Harutyunyan, 2006: 288).  The old elite 
was eventually sidelined for being too nationalist, for them reunification 
remained the only issue that mattered, and all means seemed appropriate 
to achieve the objective. The new generation considered the political to 
be the most valuable means of action for Armenians that should be 
turned into an objective, an end in itself rather than a tool to achieve 
nationalist goals. It could be argued that the new elite was more radical 
even though only ideologically, as the ideas espoused seemed very 
daring both in the context of Armenian history as a whole and for that 
specific period. The once overwhelming call for unity of the Armenian 
people ultimately deepened internal conflicts. For example, local 
residents – Karabakhis – were regarded by ‘true’ Armenians (from 
Armenia) as ‘not quite genuine’ or ‘inverted’ (shurtvatz hayer) 
(Shakhnazaryan, 2007: no pagination), partly because they were ‘too’ 
loyal to all things Russian and generally felt more at ease speaking 
Russian than Armenian. Importantly, the victorious ANM soon saw its 
rather pragmatic position clash with a more radicalized public opinion in 
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NK and local NK leaders, some of whom, as the first president of 
independent NK Robert Kocharyan admitted, were preparing for an all 
out war to come (cited in Derluguian, 2005: 192). Interestingly, while 
the NK issue remained the cornerstone of Armenian internal security, a 
team of actors predominantly from NK who rose to prominence during 
the active of the conflict, almost completely took charge of the 
independent Armenian state (post 1991). They constituted the 
overwhelming majority of the political elite in independent Armenia73. 
      In Northern Ireland a ‘new generation of political leaders was 
emerging’ (Ruane and Todd, 1996: 126). Generational factors were 
central to the emergence of a new anti-sectarian inclusive collective 
identity of the CRM: ‘We believed that our generation…could be the 
catalysts in setting off a social and political revolution’ (Farrell, 1988: 
13). In a recent contribution N. O’Dochartaigh argues that the ‘old’ 
cohort of militant nationalists faced great difficulty in asserting the 
primacy of the national over the local and regional scales of activity. The 
difficulty in maintaining a fit between the national and sub-national 
scales accounts for the relative weakness of the mobilization (2010: 
163). Both cases suggest that treating ethnic communities as unitary 
actors obscures the dynamics internal to movements, that ethnonational 
solidarity is not unchanging and does not always guarantee unity. 
 
                                               
 
                                   
 
                                       
 
 
                                                 
73 See also (Papazian, 2008). 
                                                                                         312
 
                                             Conclusion 
        
      The aim of the thesis is to analyze the unfolding dynamics of 
ethnonational contention and ethnic conflict escalation in both Nagorno-
Karabakh and Northern Ireland.  In this final section I summarize and 
draw together the arguments of this dissertation. I also revisit the main 
bodies of literature I have relied upon (on nationalism, ethnic conflict 
and contentious politics) to consider how a deeper appreciation of the 
empirical cases can contribute to theorizing in this field.         
      In this dissertation I argue that although each of the analytical 
perspectives considered here makes a significant contribution to the 
understanding of ethnic conflict processes, one should be aware of the 
limitations they entail, at least when taken in isolation. A considerable 
number of empirical studies concentrates predominantly upon a single 
dimension, or focus upon the interpretation of one of the sides to the 
conflict, frequently overlooking the overall dynamics.  When conducting 
a qualitative longitudinal and methodologically pluralist comparative 
analysis of nationalist movement development and radicalization in NK 
and Northern Ireland I have applied a theoretically mixed approach that 
pays attention to processes, expressions of relations and interactions and 
timing. In so doing, I have concentrated upon the periods when 
intersocietal communication was gradually being reinterpreted and 
reshaped on an ethnic basis, which also became increasingly crucial to 
public discourse. By conceptualizing conflict development as a process 
heavily influenced by interactions within and between multiple arenas 
and demonstrating the importance of the process of political contention 
to fluctuations between political mobilization, attempted reforms, 
resistance and violence I illustrate how concepts from this field can 
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benefit ethnic studies but have remained until recently largely 
underused.  
      In connection to the NK conflict, I have argued that without 
examining the differences in Armenian and Azeri perceptions of the 
ethnic and cultural identity of NK and its cultural and political 
significance, as well as the competing attempts by group leaders to 
authenticate the ethnogenesis of their respective national identities in 
connection to the homeland, it is extremely hard to fully understand the 
roots of the conflict. Such conflicting perceptions and narratives 
continue to influence the capacity and willingness to compromise on 
both sides. In my view, the ethnosymbolic approach is useful in 
explaining how competing historiographies were eventually integrated 
into collective memories and the reasons why nationalist appeals 
resonated so widely among the population.  
      In looking at Armenian and Azeri experiences and structural and 
ideational sources of conflict during Soviet rule I have focused mainly 
on the factors, forces and circumstances that contributed to shaping 
Soviet Armenian and Azeri identities, as well as real and perceived 
grievances against Azeri rule in NK (Chapter 2). Here I have argued that 
the evidence regarding policies of cultural and demographic oppression 
of the NK population is rather mixed. Partly because of their potential 
implications for status and prestige in the Soviet hierarchy most policies 
of the host republic were seen as unjustly forced upon the region and 
limiting its capacity to pursue its individual path. Economic shortages in 
the region and unmet demands fed into the growing frustration over a 
Baku centered bureaucracy in which the vast majority of Karabakhis had 
restricted control. I further highlighted the impact of social networks and 
mobilizing ideas and memories on the (divergent) processes of national 
activism in Armenia and Azerbaijan during the ‘constitutional’ phase of 
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the movement for NK.  At this stage the high level and intensity of such 
activism in Armenia and NK versus the relative passivity of the Azeri 
national movement should be seen largely as the result of the interplay 
between these three components.  
      A key argument of this dissertation (Chapter 3, Chapter 5) 
emphasizes that actors continually adjust their strategies in response to 
emerging opportunities and/or constraints presented by the specific 
situation(s) they face. The important task is to recognize the 
preeminence of strategic choices without neglecting the fact that elite 
flexibility in choosing courses of action and their capacity to maintain 
ethnic bloc cohesion, as well as continued widespread support for reform 
is significantly constrained by symbolic repertoires, self-perceptions, 
categorizations, facts and ideas that feed into the collective 
representation of the nation. This analysis, thus, modifies the 
predominantly rationalist and structuralist emphases found in those 
interpretations that center on the adaptability of (ethnic) elite interests 
(e.g. Snyder, 2000: 74-9). 
      NK generally features in the literature as a very clear case of an elite-
driven nationalist mobilization (e.g. Melander, 2001; Caspersen, 2008, 
2008a). On the whole, my investigation confirms that the emergence and 
subsequent ethnicization and radicalization of the movements in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK can be seen as the top-down product of 
particular strategies pursued by elites and intellectuals at decisive and 
critical moments.  I highlighted the ‘cultural construction of fear’, which 
intensified after catalystic events (e. g. Sumgait for Armenians, Khojaly 
for Azeris).       I argue that for elites engaged in struggles over national 
self-determination the earlier entrenchment of narratives of massacres 
and ethnic extinction which resonated with the earlier intellectual 
construction of (perceived) historical precedents and ethnic injustices 
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allowed to represent reality in terms of familiar preexisting models.   At 
the same time I suggest that the elite thesis is in some ways limited 
(Chapter 4). Even for those nationalist actors in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
who had tried to instrumentalize the conflict popular mobilization was 
shot through with unforeseen contingencies.  In my view, one of the 
most underresearched areas is the transformation of interethnic relations.  
      This dissertation brings into focus the importance of unverified 
orally transmitted information for individual and collective mobilization 
into specific violent episodes, as well as for changing patterns of 
everyday interaction at the micro level.   This perspective challenges the 
dominant interpretation of the entirely deliberate elite ‘marketing’ of 
ethnicity in the name of power and prestige (Snyder, 2000; Gagnon, 
2004). The snowballing impact of rumours and other oral narratives 
(through interaction with other members of the in-group) on engagement 
in violent activism highlights unintended consequences in the trajectory 
of conflict development. It was the redrawing of boundaries in the 
course of escalation that made the subsequent war seem inevitable.  
      I have examined the opportunity/constraint/ threat context and 
resistance strategies to key changes in the level of intensity of direct and 
relative threats, as well as to reform. Key themes of this dissertation also 
include state-activist relations and the dynamics of within movement 
competition. Central state policy (or, rather, lack thereof) resulted in a 
missed opportunity in terms of facilitating a less extreme and exclusive 
form of nationalism largely due to the inflexibility of the ruling elites 
and the self-reinforcing impact of the development of the situation on 
the ground, which was quite rapidly excluding alternative options. As 
the respective populations radicalized partly in response to the violence 
they experienced, the ruling elites found it increasingly difficult to 
prevent a further escalation. In this context even measures that, from an 
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outsider’s perspective, appear to have the intention to address the 
grievances and concerns of the competing constituencies (for example 
the socio-economic package allocated to NK by the Soviet authorities or 
the new planning initiatives proposed by O’Neill for Northern Ireland) 
are interpreted through the opposed historical narratives of the respective 
communities. 
      In the case of Northern Ireland case the dissertation has explored the 
process through which the initially reformist civil agitation was replaced 
by an ethnonationalist campaign, while its goals shifted from the reform 
of the Northern Ireland state to its abolition (Chapters 5 and 6).  I have 
argued that situating the CRM in a complex network of power relations 
over time instead of concentrating on the socio-economic environment 
or minority grievances can contribute to revealing the ways in which it 
gradually acquired an ethnonationalist character. Here I have discussed 
the various deliberate and, more importantly, unplanned changes that 
have dramatically raised the level of perceived threat among significant 
sections of the unionist community forcing them to adopt largely 
defensive tactics. 
      Thus, in the first few years of its existence the CRM appears to have 
managed to reduce the gulf between institutional politics and grassroots 
activism and, to a certain extent, the distance between nationalist and 
unionist communities, as members of the newly emerging middle class 
came together with representatives of grassroots groups. While the 
constituent groups have deeply altered the agenda(s) of the actors in 
positions of power (the Northern Ireland state, as well as the British and 
Irish governments), they have not managed to transform the base of the 
political system and the underlying ethnonational dualism in the region. 
Rather the activism ended up being embedded in the dominant 
ethnonational cleavage strengthening conflictual tendencies in 
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community interaction and opening up the way for radicals on both sides 
to come to the fore. 
      In chapter 7 I have demonstrated that despite significant differences 
between my two case studies in political and cultural settings, 
ideological background, demographic balance and other traits, 
similarities can be found in how the mutually reinforcing arenas 
considered above, namely, within movement competition, state-activist 
relations and structural and discursive dimensions of the 
opportunity/constraint/threat context operated, therefore facilitating case 
comparison. In my view, each of the arenas had a distinct influence on 
the overall process, although their concentration and saliency depended 
on the historical specificity of the cases.  In addition, I have stressed the 
temporal fluidity of ethnonational activism and the ways in which our 
understanding of ethnic contention would be deepened not only by a 
more rigorous examination of the actors involved but by the recognition 
of pluralism in even the most homogenous of conflict situations.  
      For both Northern Ireland and NK ideological and generational 
differences between various groups led to undercutting each other’s 
strategies. While a degree of competition and the existence of different 
voices within an ethnonationalist constituency has the potential to 
benefit a nationalist movement, excessive competition may lead to 
moderate actors struggling to remain relevant and to avoid being 
marginalized and ultimately silenced.  In this context violence can serve 
a double purpose – first, to weaken the ethnic opponent, especially in 
reaction to political decisions perceived as threatening and unacceptable 
concessions, and, second, to suppress critical political forces and voices 
within their own community. The group as a whole, which might have 
limited political leverage at the start of the conflict is, thus, projected 
into a more prominent role. For example, in NK former mid-level 
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bureaucrats and military leaders advanced to key posts in the NK 
Republic after independence (post 1994) and in this way could be seen 
to have ripped the benefits of the escalatory process. On the one hand, 
violent episodes and attacks can be one of the means to signal power and 
resolve in the hope to see the opponent back down and retreat from its 
claims to the disputed territory. On the other hand, they can be used to 
‘outbid’ intra-group rivals (e.g. Stedman, 1997:5; Gormley-Heeenan and 
MacGinty, 2008). Boundaries between formerly integrated groups are 
entrenched in the process; cooperation across boundaries becomes 
minimal, which has the effect of granting legitimacy to the radical 
nationalists’ cause.  
      Many scholars have linked agency driven intra-group friction to 
increased propensity for inter-group violence and a general ethnicization 
of politics (Rabuska and Sheplse, 1972; Horowitz, 2000 [1985]: part 3). 
The conventional ‘outbidding model’ predicts that ethnic parties will 
choose radical over moderate strategies in an effort to maximize support 
among voters belonging to a particular ethnic group (e.g. Rabuska and 
Sheplse, 1972: 83). Somewhat similarly, securing the success of a 
specific nationalist agenda requires operating in an interdependent field 
of rival strategies of legitimation. The elites’ desire for identification and 
recognition of their leadership position is closely related to legitimacy 
claims (Horowitz, 2002: 195). Whether or not a challenging faction is 
widely perceived to have a superior capacity to protect or defend the 
bloc it represents influences actors’ standing within a particular political 
and cultural setting. At the same time factions within each bloc attempt 
to strengthen the sense of exclusiveness by (re) activating symbolic 
references and selected ethnic ties. 
      In the two case studies considered in this dissertation more radical 
factions have ultimately managed to project themselves as the most 
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‘authentic’ representatives of their community, while casting other 
voices as ‘inauthentic’ or out of touch with grassroots reality and 
aspirations. In a context where the decisions and policies of state 
officials were progressively perceived as inefficient, as a failure and 
even as treacherous these leaders succeeded in  promoting an 
uncompromising form of nationalism and assuming positions of 
authority within the respective national communities. This process led to 
the sidelining of those group members who had tried to reach across to 
the opposing community and to maintain cross-community ties, however 
weak they might have been.  The struggles and disputes to become the 
legitimate representative of ‘the people’ and to establish the primacy of 
one out of an evolving array of competing narratives, as well as the 
impact of the political and ideological environment at a given point in 
time on the varying patterns of competitive interaction are often 
underestimated in the literature on ethnic conflict. The analysis of the 
political actors involved in such a competition and the deconstruction of 
their strategies highlights the various internal and external factors that 
lead to a certain narrative becoming dominant.  
      The theoretically mixed process oriented approach put forward in 
this thesis allows for a more comprehensive, nuanced and dynamic 
evaluation of ethnonationally centered collective action in Nagorno-
Karabakh and Northern Ireland and potentially other divided societies. 
When adopting this approach I have critiqued one-dimensional 
interpretations and models that tend to underestimate the multilayered 
nature of contentious social, cultural, political and territorial issues 
involved, as well as the way in which those problems are perceived and 
frequently misperceived by the main parties.  I have also challenged the 
undertheorized nature of the literatures on these conflicts by considering 
how these case studies confirm or moderate and refine the insights of the 
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wider comparative ethnic conflict conceptual field. I have examined, 
from an outsider’s perspective, the positions of both sides to the conflicts 
in question and the often contradictory public narratives each of the 
parties has produced. Particular attention has been paid to uncovering 
participants’ perceptions and their own perspectives on the choices and 
strategies pursued. 
      Drawing on a newspaper and archival investigation, as well as 
extensive semi-structured interviews this thesis has presented new 
empirical research on the mobilization, radicalization and ethnicization 
dynamics in the respective communities. The evidence casts doubt on 
strong versions of the ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ literature. I challenge 
straightforward instrumentalist perspectives by highlighting the fact that 
the connection between developments and politicization of ethnic 
constituencies on the ground and elite conduct ‘at the top’ was not 
automatic.  My argument suggests that the constraints facing elites 
within each ethnic bloc, as well as ‘external’ (state) leaders are built into 
the process of ethnic contestation. Overall, the thesis makes a strong 
case for greater attention to the limits of elite flexibility in eliciting 
uniform group preferences especially in terms of joining or supporting 
violent dissent. It challenges the idea that elites are entirely free to 
choose the path of radicalization, compromise or reform, and that ethnic 
bloc cohesion can be easily maintained simply out of common ethnic 
bonds. 
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                                           Appendix 1 
 
       Brief chronology of the main events of the NK conflict 
   
October 1813 – NK formally becomes part of the Russian Empire. 
April 1920 – Bolsheviks take over power in Armenia. 
November 1920 – Bolsheviks take over power in Azerbaijan. 
5 July 1921 – NK declared part of Soviet Azerbaijan with a broad 
regional autonomy. 
7 July 1923 – A decree establishing the NK Autonomous Oblast’ issued. 
October 1987 – demonstrations demanding the resolution of the ecology 
issue take place in Yerevan. Petitions on NK sent to Moscow. 
November 1987 – January 1988 – the first wave of Azeri refugees flee 
to Azerbaijan following interethnic clashes in the Kafan and Megri 
districts of Armenia. 
January 1988 – delegations from NK in Moscow meeting with Soviet 
officials. 
12–13 February 1988 – the first demonstrations demanding 
reunification take place in Stepanakert. 
20 February 1988 – the NK Soviet adopts a resolution demanding the 
transfer of the region to the Armenian SSR. A delegation from Yerevan 
comes to Moscow and demonstrations take place in Yerevan. 
26 February 1988 – key activists from Yerevan, Silva Kaputikyan and 
Zori Balayan, meet the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. 
27–29 February 1988 – pogroms in Sumgait take place. 
1 March 1988 – Krunk (Armenian for crane) Committee for 
reunification set up in Stepanakert. 
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May 1988 – the new eleven member Karabakh committee created in 
Yerevan. 
15 June 1988 – the Armenian Soviet supports the decision of the NK 
Soviet. 
18 July 1988 – Supreme Soviet of the USSR reaffirms that NK should 
and will remain part of Azerbaijan. 
August 1988 – Karabakh Committee transformed into the Armenian 
National Movement. 
September – December 1988 – waves of Armenian and Azeri refugees 
following intercommunal clashes in towns across Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and NK. 
17 November – 5 December 1988 – demonstrations take place in Baku. 
7 December 1988 – a devastating earthquake happens in the Armenian 
town of Spitak. 
12 January 1989 – Special Administration Committee headed by 
Arkady Volsky formed in NK effectively introducing direct rule from 
Moscow. 
May 1989 – Armenians start to form (voluntary) armed defense groups 
in NK. 
11 September 1989 – the Popular Front officially registered in Baku. 
28 November 1989 – Special Administration Committee dissolved. 
13 –20 January 1990 – mass anti-Armenian pogroms take place in 
Baku. 
May 1990 – Armenian National Movement becomes the ruling party in 
Armenia following parliamentary elections. 
1991 – end of the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan declare independence. 
2 September 1991 – NK announces its secession from Azerbaijan and 
the formation of the independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). 
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10 December 1991 – A referendum on independence takes place in the 
newly formed NKR. NK Armenians vote in favour of independence. 
25–26 February 1992 – Azeri casualties following Armenian attacks on 
the town of Khojaly near Stepanakert. 
1992 –1994 – full-scale war in NK and neighbouring territories. 
1994 – present – conflict regulation phase. 
 
Sources: De Waal, 2003: 287-97; Fond Geidara Alieva, 2006; 
Danil’yantz, 2011; Unusov, 2005: 68-76). 
 
    
 
 
Brief chronology of the main events of the Northern Ireland conflict   
                             (1963–1969) 
 December 1920 – A devolved parliament and government for Northern 
Ireland established by the Government of Ireland Act. 
 December 1956 – IRA begins ‘Operation Harvest’ (the ‘border 
campaign’). 
 25 March 1963 – Terrence O’Neill succeeds Lord Brookeborough as 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. 
1963 – Wolfe Tone societies formed. 
14 January 1965 – O’Neill meets Irish Taoiseach Sean Lemass in 
Belfast. 
 January 1967 – Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association formally set 
up. 
20 June 1968 – the Caledon protest takes place. 
24 August 1968 – the first civil rights march from Coalisland to 
Dungannon takes place. 
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5 October 1968 – civil rights march broken up by the RUC takes place 
in (London)Derry. 
 9 October 1968 – People’s Democracy formed. 
 22 November 1968 – O’Neill’s reform package announced. 
28 November 1968 – business vote in Stormont elections abolished. 
1–4 January 1969 – People’s Democracy march from Belfast to 
(London)Derry takes place. The march is attacked by loyalists at 
Burntollet Bridge. 
28 April 1969 – O’Neill resigns as Prime Minister and is replaced by 
James Chichester-Clark. 
August 1969 – loyalist pogroms take place in Belfast. 
December 1969 – IRA splits into Provisional and Official IRA. 
30 January 1972 – 13 civilians killed by British Army during a civil 
rights march in (London)Derry (‘Bloody Sunday’). 
24 March 1972 – proroguement of Stormont. 
          
  Sources: (Bew and Gillespie, 1993, McClean, n. d., Conflict Archive 
on the Internet). 
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                                        Appendix 2 
 
        Interviews (including position of interviewee and date of 
interview)  
                   Yerevan,  Armenia  ( a l l  responden ts  were  
invo lved  in  the  reun i f i ca t ion  movement )  
 
Alaverdyan, Larissa – state, public and political figure. Member of 
Parliament. Member, Heritage party. Member, Armenian Republican 
Council on Refugees. In 2004–2006 – Ombudsman in Armenia, 18 July 
2008. 
Arutunyan, Vagarshak – Lieutenant-General. 1991–1992 – deputy 
Chairman, Defense Committee of Armenia. 1999–2000 – Armenian 
Defense Minister, 31 July 2008. 
Asbekyan, Aida – deputy Chairman, Armenian branch, Tsitsernak   
International Rehabilitation Center, 15 July 2008. 
Balayan, Zori – political and public figure, writer. One of the leaders of 
the Karabakh Movement in Armenia. 1989 – member of the NKAO 
National Council, 29 July 2008. 
Gevondyan, Jasmin – Chairman, NGO “Nerush”, refugee from 
Kirovabad (Azerbaijan), 14 July 2008. 
Dr. Grigoryan, Stepan – Chairman, Analytical Center on Globalization 
and Regional Cooperation. Member of the ANM. 1995–1998 – 
Armenian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, 1998–2000 – advisor 
to the Armenian Home Office, 28 July 2008. 
Professor Manasyan, Alexander –  political scientist, Chairman, NGO 
“Academy of Political Studies”, 15 July 2008. 
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Melikyan, Arman –  Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 
coordinator of Civic Society Network “Refugees and International 
Law.” 2001–2004 – head of Permanent Representation of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic in Armenia. 2004 –  NKR Foreign Minister. 2004–
2008 – advisor to the NKR President on questions of foreign policy, 18 
July 2008. 
Petrosyan, David – political observer, Noyan Tapan News Agency, 28 
July 2008.     
Sarkisyan, Aram –  Vice-President, World Armenian Congress. Head 
of Organizing Committee “In Defense of Nagorno-Karabakh.” 
Chairman, Democratic Party of Armenia. 1990–1991 – First Secretary of 
the CCCP of Armenia, 14 July 2008. 
Sarkisyan, Manvel – independent expert, Caucasus Center. One of the 
leading activists of the Karabakh movement (in NK). Former advisor to 
the NKR President on political issues, 31 July 2008. 
Dr. Shakhnazaryan, David – founder and Chairman of the Center for 
Legal and Political Studies (Concord), Yerevan. 1988–1989 – member 
of the leadership of the Karabakh Movement and Founder-Member of 
the Board of the Armenian Pan national Movement (1989–1993). 1991–
1999 – Deputy of the Armenian Parliament, 1994–1995 – Head of the 
State Department for National Security in the Ministry of National 
Security.  Special Representative of the President of Armenia in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict negotiations, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary, 30 July 2008. 
Telyan, Jasmin – deputy Chairman, Democratic Party of Armenia. 
Member, Organizing Committee “In Defense of Nagorno-Karabakh.”, 
15 and 31 July 2008. 
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Verdyan, Julieta – executive Director, public and charitable 
organization Agazang Union of Armenian Refugees, refugee from 
Kirovabad (Azerbaijan), 17 July 2008. 
 
                           Stepanakert, NK 
 
 
Baghdasaryan, Gegham – editor-in-chief, Demo, the first public 
newspaper of Karabakh, Member, NKR National Council, 23 July 2008. 
Grigoryan, Vera – Chairman, Alliance of Missing Nagorno-Karabakh 
Warriors, 25 July 2008. 
Gulyan, Ashot – 1992–1993 – senior expert of the Commission for 
Foreign Relations, 1993–1995 – assistant to the Chairman of the 
Supreme Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 1995–1998 – 
Head of the Department of Diaspora and Bilateral Relations in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 1998 – 
Head of the Political Department of the Republic’s Foreign Ministry, 
1998–2001 –  Deputy Foreign Minister,  2002–2004 – Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 2004–2005 – Education Minister. Since 2005 
Chairman, NKR National Assembly, 22 July 2008. 
Karapetyan, Rita – senior official, Foreign Ministry of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic, in the late 1980s–early1990s worked as a journalist 
in the newspaper Sovetskii Karabakh (Soviet Karabakh), 25 July 2008. 
Mailyan, Masis – Karabakh political figure and diplomat. In 2001–2007 
– Deputy Foreign Minister of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. In 2007 
ran for president, 23 July 2008. 
Mirzoyan, Maxim – member, NKR National Assembly. 1988–1989 – 
Mayor of Stepanakert. Permanent Member, Special Management 
Committee under Arkadi Volsky, 18 and 22 July 2008. 
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Dr. Oganjanyan, Karen –  secretary, Krunk Committee. 1995–2000 – 
member, NKR National Assembly. In 2002, he was recognized as “a 
Man of the Year” by the Cambridge Biographical Center. Coordinator, 
NGO “Helsinki Initiative – 92”, 21 July 2008. 
Saryan, Sarasar – Chairman, NGO Organization for NKR Refugees, 
refugee from Baku, 23 July 2008. 
Somova, Galina – Chairman, NGO Russian Community of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Refugee from Sumgait, 21 July 2008. 
 
 
                                 Moscow, Russia 
 
Dashdamirov, Afrand – former member of the CCCP (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party) of the Azeri SSR, now academic 
and Deputy Head of the Pan-Azeri Congress, 4 March 2009. 
Dr. Krivopuskov, Victor –  1990–1991 –  Chief of Staff, Operational-
Investigations Group, USSR Ministry of the Interior in the NKAO. 
President, Russian Society for Friendship and Cooperation with 
Armenia, 11 August 2009. 
Dr. Perepelkin, Lev – ethnographer, associate member, RAS Oriental 
Studies Institute, 8 July 2008. 
Dr. Zargaryan, Ruben – advisor, Foreign Ministry of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic, 8 July 2008. 
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Professor Abasov, Ali – member of the Open Society Institute, 
Azerbaijan Soros Foundation Network, head of the South Caucasian 
Center for Culture, Peace and Dialogue of Civilizations, 7 January 2009. 
Abasov, Zakhid – former head of the department of Culture and 
Tourism of the Shushi in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of 
Azerbaijan, refugee from Shushi, 15 January 2009. 
Abdulaeva, Arzu – one of the founders of the first activist group 
forming the  National Front of Azerbaijan (1989), one of the founders of 
the Social-Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, winner of the prize of the EU 
‘For the promotion of democracy and civil society in Azerbaijan’ 
(1998), 7 January. 
Agaev, Zulfugar – student, journalist, refugee from Aghdam, 9 January 
2009. 
Alizadeh, Zardusht – Chairman of the Open Society Institute, 
Azerbaijan Soros Foundation Network, one of the founders and key 
members of the National Front of Azerbaijan, 5 January 2009. 
Akhundov, Jivanshir – Head of the Information Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, 7 January 2009. 
Dr. Bakhramov, Jabi – Deputy Head of the Institute of History, 
National Academy of Sciences, 6 January 2009. 
Bayramov, Akif – refugee from Shushi, head of NGO ‘Chernobyletz”, 
15 January 2009. 
Bayramov, Rizvan – Head of Department of Cultural Heritage, 
Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 13 January 2009. 
Guseinov, Vagif – refugee from Shushi (NK), former mayor of Shushi 
(1988–1992), 15 January 2009. 
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Hannum, Ofeliya – refugee from Khojaly, now living in Baku, 8 
January 2009. 
Isazade, Azad – military psychologist, former head of the Information 
Department of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan (1992–1994), 13 
January 2009. 
Kerimly, Kerim – President, NGO ‘Organization of Internally 
Displaced People’, refugee from Shushi, 6 January 2009. 
Dr. Kurbanov, Araz – Vice-president, of the Institute of Human Rights, 
National Academy of Sciences, 5 January 2009. 
Maharramov, Mahammad – Deputy head of the Department for 
Problems of Refugees, IDPs, migration and work with international 
organizations, 16 January 2009. 
Mamedov, Rashid – refugee from Aghdam, 9 January 2009. 
Dr. Musabaev, Rasim – Vice-president, Far Center of Economic and 
Political Research, former advisor to former President Ayaz Mutalibov 
on nationality policy (1991–1992), 10 January 2009. 
Dr. Namazov, Eldar – President, NGO Public Forum for Azerbaijan, 
former advisor to Heidar Aliev (1993–1999), 10 January 2009. 
Dr. Sevdimaliev, Ramiz – Head of Department of International 
Relations of the Institute of Human Rights, National Academy of 
Sciences, refugee from Armenia, 5 January 2009. 
Dr. Unusov, Arif – Head of Department of Conflict and Migration 
Studies, Institute of Peace and Democracy, Baku, one of the members of 
the National Front of Azerbaijan, 12 January 2009. 
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                       Belfast, Northern Ireland 
 
Professor Boyle, Kevin – lecturer at Queen's University, one of the key 
members of the People's Democracy and the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association, now deceased, e-mail correspondence, August 2009. 
Cooper, Ivan – involved in the Young Unionists in the early 1960s, 
later secretary of the (London)Derry branch of the NILP. Chair of the 
Derry Citizens Action Committee, from 1969 Stormont and Westminster 
MP for the SDLP. Founder member of the SDLP, now retired, 8 January 
2010, (London)Derry. 
Dr. Feeney, Brian – commentator on Northern Ireland history and 
politics, former SDLP councilor. 
Haughey, Denis – secondary school teacher in South Tyrone, member 
of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, Stormont MP for the 
Social Democratic Labour Party, now social and political activist, 7 
January 2010. 
Heatley, Fred – engineer, founder member of the Wolfe Tone Society, 
treasurer of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, now retired, 6 
January 2010. 
Hope, Ann – trade unionist, former secretary of the Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association, now human rights activist, 12 January 2010. 
McCann, Eamonn – journalist, one of the main activists of the 
(London)Derry branch of the NILP from the mid 1960s until the early 
1970s, member of the Derry Housing Action Committee and the Derry 
Unemployment Action Committee, now commentator and civil rights 
activist. Member of the Socialist Workers' Party, 8 January 2010, 
(London)Derry. 
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McClean, Paddy Joe – secondary school teacher, founder member and 
later Chaiman of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, 4 
January 2010, Beragh. 
McCormack, Vincent – member of the People’s Democracy, e-mail 
correspondence, November 2009. 
McKittrick, David – author and journalist, 2 July 2009. 
Stewart, Edwina – teacher, member of the Communist Party of 
Northern Ireland and of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, 
now retired, 5 January 2010. 
                           London, UK 
 
Toman, Eddie –  member of the People’s Democracy, 25 February 
2010. 
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